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Bookshelves, 1800-1970 
I Revolutions and Responses in England and France: 1800-1830 
703 WORDSWORTH, William, & Lyrical Ballads London (1798; enlgd, with 
COLERIDGE, Samuel TaylorPreface 
1800) ed Brett & Jones 1963 
704 WORDSWORTH, William The Prelude: or the Growth of a Poet's Mind 
(1798-1805, later rev) London 1850; ed De 
Selincourt Oxford (1926)1957 
705 COLERIDGE, Samuel Biographia Literaria: or Sketches of my 
Taylor 
Literary Life and Opinions (1814-1817) 
London (1817) ed Hartley & Sara Coleridge 
1847 
706 Aids to Reflection London (1825) rev 1830 
Wordsworth in France, 1790,1791-3,1802; Wordsworth and Coleridge 
together 1797-1803, in Germany together 1798-9: parallel shelves 
above and below mark parallel national or cultural space and times. 
707 BYRON, George Gordon Letters and Journals ed Moore London 
Noel, Baron 1830; ed Prothero 1898-1904 
708 SHELLEY, Percy Bysshe Essays, Letters from Abroad, Translations 
and Fragments ed Mary Shelley London 1840 
709 A Philosophical View of Reform (1819) 
ed & intr Rolleston London 1920 
710 BRAILSFORD, Henry Noel Shelley, Godwin, and their Circle 
London 1913 
711 HOUGHTON, Richard The Life, Letters, and Literary Remains of 
Monckton Milnes, Baron John Keats London (184$) ed. Lynd 1927 
Hmm... should I here romantically mix theory, letters, lives, 
poetry, and add the poems to the prose... along with Blake and 
Scott and a few others? Is the Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
or the Biographic of which it is in a sense the first draft, 
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ccccxlvi 
really prose poetry or theory... what would Harold Bloom do here, 
if poems are really the 'truest' response to or comprehension or 
apprehension or misapprehension of poetry - always attempting to 
repeat an earlier poem in a new context (like Schleiermacher's 
historical reformulations of 'religion', religious feeling), and 
so always failing, but not, at least, like theoretical prose cri- 
ticism, mistaking the very genre of the attempt... 
... But I didn't list the Night Thoughts or Fingal or 
The Castle of Otranto among my eighteenth-century pre-romantic 
'texts', assigning them rather to the textual context, the 'liter- 
ary context' of the eighteenth-century theory which I marked out 
in the textual, bibliographical, coordinates of my reading 'in' 
that century... true, I listed Candide and Werther and Meister 
and Hölderlin's poems, and found Romantic theory elaborated in 
the Romantic symmetry, the theoretical symmetry, indeed, of 
theory and poetry... and various other coordinates or dimensions 
as well: 
712 STA. L, Anne-Louise De la Littdfrature consider4e dans sea 
Germaine de Rapports avec les Institutions Sociales 
Paris 1800; rev with new Preface & ann 
1800; ed van Tieghem Geneva 1959 
713 De l'Allemagne (Paris 1810) London 1813 
714 Reflexions sur le Suicide London 1813 
715 Considdrations sur les Principaux Evenemens 
de la R4volution Francaise London 1818 
716 HEROLD, JC Mistress to an Age: A Life of Madame de 
Stael London 1958 
717 CHATEAUBRIAND, Francois De Bonaparte, des Bourbons Paris 1814 
Rene de 
I will, I think, pass over a shelf or so of relatively 'minor' 
books... 
ccccxlvii 
II Responses to the first responses, in England, France and Germany, 
from around 1830 to around the end of the century 
In Part III I traced parallels in England and France to the german 
theoretical scene dominated by Hegel and Berlin, then suggested that 
a new phase from around 1830 (say, beginning 1827-33) might be con- 
sidered as reactions in those three countries to the intellectual, 
political and material revolutions of the previous half-century or 
so, taken now in their european unity. Thus Madame de StaVl, during 
her association with the elder Schlegel had introduced. german Romance 
into France - or rather had attempted this in 1810: Napoleon ordered 
the destruction of the whole french edition of 1810 before publication, 
and it was first published, along with her other writings after that 
date, in England, where it was read by the young Carlyle in 1817. 
He then moved toward his own importation of Germany into England - 
his Scottish version of Madame de Sta4l's french project, so to speak. 
I have noticed his Life of Schiller and transaltion of Meister in 
1823-4; the Wanderjahre actually appeared in 1827 as two of the four 
volumes of: 
718 German Romance ... with biographical and critical notices (trs of 
Jean-Paul, Tieck, Hoffmann, Fouque, Musgus, 
Goethe, with intrs) London (1827) 
Perhaps these translations and appreciations should be shelved with 
the Athenaeum; but in the essays, many on german Romanticism, begin- 
ning in the same year, it is the dominant 'man of letters' of the 
mid-century who starts to take his own british shape.. 
719 CARLYLE, Thomas Critical and Miscellaneous Essays (1627-38) 
(Boston 1838) London 1869 (in Works) 
720 Sartor Resartus -London (1833-4; ed with pref 
Emerson Boston 1836)-ed Wood 1902 
721 The French Revolution. A History 
London 1837 
722 On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in 
(lects 1840) London (1841) ed Parr 1910 
ccccxlviii 
Man of letters... is Carlyle's French Revolution theory.. or 
history (if it were, why the need to underline the fact in the 
title? )... or fiction, a novel, 'romance', Leavis' ! dramatic poem 
in prose'? Hmm, genre again. Hayden White thinks all nineteenth- 
century 'history' is properly a sub-genre within narrative fiction. 
I suggested in Part III that the predominantly occasional frame 
of Carlyle's writing reflected its fundamental dramatic axis. 
Into this drama, then, enters his younger friend Mill, somehow 
losing the manuscript of the first version of The French Revolution 
in 1835. 
723 MILL, John Stuart Autobiography' London 1873 
I traced in that book Mill's dramatisation or narration of, and 
reflections on, the 'nervous breakdown' of 1827 which marked the 
passage from the one-sided 'analysis' for which his father had 
educated him, to its coupling with the Romantic 'feeling' of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge... 
724 MILL, James An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
Mind London (1829) ed, intr, ann John 
Stuart Mill 1869 
725 MILL, John Stuart A System of Logic London (1843) many revs 
to 1872 
Mill, theoretically defining the relations of theory and feeling, 
keeping autobiography and theory at a greater distance than Carlyle, 
and dominating theory outside the University over the mid-century 
as Carlyle's fellow scot dominated within.. 
726 HAMILTON, Sir William Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic ed Man- 
sell & Veitch Edinburgh 1859-60 
... rather as Mill's friend Comte dominated theory outside the 
University in France (or rather, Paris), and Cousin within - 
Cousin providing the educational model for Europe and for Arnold 
who with Ruskin so to speak takes over as critic of literature 
and Society (and with Ruskin, Society and Art generally), while 
Spencer takes over from Comte and Mill, and the 'hegelians' from 
all these, in the University... 
ccccxlix 
727 ARNOLD, ývlatthew Culture and Anarchy (London 1869) ed 
with seins from: 
Schools and Universities on the Continent(1868) 
Essays in Criticism (1865; 1889) ed Keating 
Harmondsworth 1970, 
728 RUSKIN, John Frondes Agrestes (from Modern Painters, 1843-60) 
(Orpington 1875) London 1900 
729 Sesame and Lilies (lects 1864) London (1865) 
1900 (fr tr by Proust in 1906... ) 
730 SPENCER, Herbert A System of Synthetic Philosophy London 1860- 
731 BRADLEY, Francis Appearance and Reality Jondon 1893) 
Herbert Oxford 1959 
732 WOLLHEIM, Richard F. H. Bradley Harmondsworth 1959 
.. and to close the century, as it were coming full-circle... 
733 HOPKINS, Gerard Manley Poems and Prose sel & ed Gardner from 
(d 1889) 
Poems ed Bridges 1918; Letters ed Bridges 
1935; Notebooks & Papers ed Bridges 1937 
Harmondsworth (1953) 1963 (78-9) 
... then passing on to Germany... 
734 WALLACE, William Lectures and Essays ed with Life Caird 
Oxford 1898 
735 ELLIS, Havelock Affirmations London*1898 
(containing two. of the earliest british responses-to Nietzsche, 
written 1895-6; the translator and propounder of Hegel was at work 
on a book on Nietzsche when he lost control of his bicycle and died; 
Caird gives the opening section) 
736 WALLACE, William The Life of Arthur Schopenhauer London 1890 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer.. Will as alternative to Reason, and 
Schopenhauer eclipsed in his period by setting himself up quite 
literally as the 'alternative' to Hegel (like Deleuze holding his 
seminar at exactly the same time and day as Lacan), whose volumes 
ccccl 
have so to speak pushed his onto these shelves with Wallace, natur- 
ally finding in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche resonances of the primary 
ethical, 'practical' axis of british reflection confronting Hegel, 
and echoing even in the detail of a biographical framing of Schopen- 
hauers reasoning on the wills, that questioning of the abstract 'in- 
ternal' image of the practical implications of the System in the 
outward context of the History it framed, already noticed in Haym, 
in the generation after 1848, and taken up by the young Nietzsche 
around 1870... that questioning of the rational projections of the 
politicised hegelianism, whether of left, right or centre, which in- 
duced the posthumous response to Schopenhauer after mid-century, that 
he had so desperately sought in his lifetime... 
737 SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (Leipzig 
1818) tr Haldane & Kemp (London 1883-6)NY 19 
738 Parerga und Paralipomena Berlin 1851) tr(part) 
Saunders London 1889; tr 
... And since we have come to biography and alternatives, and altern- 
atives to Hegel at Berlin in particular, I will somewhat illicitly 
borrow a bit of shelving for Denmark, beginning with Kierkegaard's 
half-fictional attempt to repeat the visit to Berlin to hear the old 
Schelling who had etentually revenged himself on his former fellow 
student, where Schopenhauer had failed, after cholera had disposed of 
Hegel, and Friedrich Wilhelm IV had called in the replacement... 
739 KIERKEGAARD, Seren (Repetition) (Copenhagen 1843) tr Lowrie 
Princeton 1942 
740 (Philosophical Fragments), (Copenhagen 1844) 
tr Swenson Princeton (1936) 1962 
741 (Stages on Life's Way) Copenhagen 1845 
tr Lowrie Princeton 1940 
742 . (Concluding Unscientific Postscript) (Copen- 
hagen 1846) tr Swenson & Lowrie Princeton 
(1941) 1968 
743 (Purity of Heart: Is to Will one Thing) (Copen- 
hagen 1847) tr 
744 (Journals 1835-55) ed & tr Dru Oxford 1938 
. ccccli 
Perhaps this is the right place for Hilarius Bookbinder and 
Johannes Climacus, anyway... and I can't help feeling that there's 
a bit of a... gap... at the beginning... and rather a brusque transit- 
ion to Ldwith's other, alternative, alternative, next.. 
? 45 MARX, Karl, & Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*(Moscow/Frankfurt 
ENGELS, Friedrich 1927-33) rev Berlin 1975- 
The very singular divided individual Kierkegaard, and then MEGA, 
become the canonical text for the culture of millions for which it 
is the theoretical authority (in various senses), the theoretical, 
and textual, embedding of half of the World, in post-hegelian Nature, 
which by a sort of reflex supports in that half of the World a great 
philological industry of commentators, editors, state publishing 
houses and printers... which one feels quite physically engaged in, 
as one takes one of these volumes from the shelf. Books that say: 
this is about what's going on all around you, inside, but especially 
outside, this library. And I glance uneasily towards the books b^ck 
on the left, there through the solitary devotion of David Swenson, 
and I feel... Is this me seeing my social being in the material dia- 
lectic of Nature reflected in the regular volumes of the Marx-Engels 
Gesamtausgabe? And I wonder who I am, caught between the alternative 
alternatives of these two sets of scripts for my physical confront- 
ation with them there on the shelf. And I suddenly begin to feel... 
What am I doing here... 
MARX, Karl Differenz der Demokratischen und Epikurischen 
Naturphilosophie (1840-1): (95)above, (745)I. 1 
746 ökonomische-philosophische Manuskripte (1843-4) 
(745: pt I vol 2 first ptd 1927-32) 
tr Bottomore . 
Moscow/L 1959 
747 MARX, Karl, & Die Heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen 
ENGELS, iriedrich Kritik (Frankfurt 1845) tr Dixon Moscow/L 1956 
748 Die Deutsche Ideologie (1845-6, ptd 1932) tr 
pte 1,11 abgd)with(751) Arthur i"oscow/L 
1970 
749 Manifäst der Kommunistischen Partei London 
(1848) tr Moore (1886)intr Taylor Hswth 1967 
ccccli. 
750 MARX, Karl Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen 0eko- 
nomie (1857-83Moscow 1939)tr McLellan L 1971 
751 Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Heft I 
(Berlin 1859) tr Ryazanskaya Moscow/L 1970 
752 Das Kapital. Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie 
(Hamburg 1867-94) vol I ed Engels, tr Moore 
& Aveling London (1886)1889,1954; vols II, III 
ed Engels, tr Untermann (1907,9)1956-9 
753 ENGELS, Friedrich Dialektik der Natur (1873-8, ptd Moscow 
1927) fr tr 
Dialectics of Nature: I remember Pierre Macherey, 
early one Saturday morning (I felt that he held his seminar at 
9 am on Saturdays to as it were confront the jeunesse doree of 
the Sorbonne with an image of the fundamental fact of life that 
most people are alienated by having to turn up at another sort 
of institution at 9am every other morning of the working week) 
remonstrating with one of the students at his seminar on Hegel's 
Philosophy of Nature, who had referred to 'La-Philosophie de la 
Nature'd'Engels'. To confuse Hegel's and Engels' titles was to 
miss at the outset the very axis of Engels' critique of the ab- 
straction common to both idealist logic, and the non-dialectical 
academic 'materialism' which carried over into the 'external' 
Nature in which it embedded its scientific logic of experience 
just that unitary internal determination of 'external' Nature 
which reflected the abstraction of Hegel's logic from the real 
conflict or contradiction of forces in the real Nature from which 
the logical determination of the relations of logic and Nature 
abstracted, in abstracting from the ideological, political and 
economic embedding of academic logic - whether idealist or mater- 
ialist - in their material context. Logic is the Money of the 
Mind, its operation regulating academic debate is set as an image, 
a reflection, in the wider material economy regulated by Capital, 
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in which the professors, idealist or materialist, play their 
parts by transposing real, practical contradictions and questions 
into an abstract image in the economy of logical Theory, in which 
a solution or resolution can then be deduced - relative to an 
initial presupposition of the maintenance, precisely, of that 
transposition into a theory, which both supports and is supported 
by the abstract, alienated--'logic' or dynamic of Capital, apparently 
presenting the optimal material inscription of human Culture in 
" the unitary mechanical Nature whose teleology of progress it re- 
flects. Philosophers have only interpreted the World: the point 
is, to change it. So suddenly the books on the shelf mark the 
place of the shelves, and the library, in an interplay of inside 
and outside the building, and the institution of clam reading, 
dispassionate critical reflection and debate, in a dramatic or 
practical order in which the ideological economy of language is 
coupled with the material economy of production of books and other 
commodities, globally, 'in the last instance', inscribed in the 
latter. Kojeve in the thirties had dramatically focussed parisian 
intellectual life, setting the Phenomenology in a drama of material 
confrontation with, reading of, the text, on the podium of his 
lecture-hall, 'amphitheatre', which reflected the embedding of that 
text at once in the Romantic drama from which the young Hegel wasl 
in its composition, dramatically abstracting himself toward his 
hermetic Science of Logic, and also in the wider 'marxist' coupling 
of hegelian Logic and the practical order of Society from which 
it abstracted to give a logical image in a nominally 'external' 
Nature. Reading Marx in the 1960s, then, at the other side of 
the mid-twentieth century, one could trace a converse process to 
that read in the Phenomenology, as Marx over the mid-nineteenth 
century passed back, through the practical question of the abstract- 
ion of hegelian Logic and Nature from the practical order of real 
social questions, and an 'epistemologicpl break' a la 3: ichsl'rd 
or Kuhn from the logic of embedding of the logical in the practical 
order, to the practice of theory, toward a materialist dialectic 
in which 'theoretical practice' would articulate in language the 
material economy as frame of social interaction in Nature, framing 
ccccliv 
in thecapitalist mode of production the question posed by 
theoretical inscription of capitalist economy in the true 
socialist frame of optimal production, as abstract alienated 
logic could be in the language it thought to frame as a sort 
of historic short-circuit, whose other side in language was the 
figural dynamic of interaction elaborated by Lacan. Thus in 
the practical political order of transformation of french society, 
through organising the transformation of the mode of production 
in a 'revolutionary break' that is prefigured by Marx' 'epistemo- 
logical break', Althussser's general framing of what is open, and 
theoretical analysis of the optimal course towards social trans- 
formation, is coordinated with other components of that practical 
business within the bureau politique of the french Communist Party. 
754 Lire le Capital - essays by Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, Ranciere 
Establet Paris 1965 
755 ALTHUSSER, Louis Pour Marx Paris 1966 
... But where in all this is me, reading Marx or Aithusser in the 
library? The symmetric system of embecding theory in language 
in human interaction in the material economy of the capitalist 
mode of production in that piece of Nature we call north-western 
Europe, with its unitary Language, its instituted Direction, by 
the Party, itself remains a system of abstractions, brought into 
question as the students of 1968 play out their personal dramas 
of 'Revolution', Althusser suddenly absents himself from the scene 
(to reappear in comic parody in Godard's Vent d'Est, charting the 
Revolution in perceptions)... reappearing when the students, by 
now 'alienated' from the Party, discover that their own Revolut- 
ion has itself only been a dream, a parisian spectacle. Back 
with his students a few years later, Althusser struck me forcibly 
by the exaggerated irony in which he played out his role of 
'reading' the political philosophy texts on the Agregation syl- 
labus; a few years later still, as I sat in Jacques-Alain Miller's 
seminar-room at the Hopital Sainte-Anne, Louis Althusser was 
incarcerated somewhere else in the complex, the domestic drama 
having quite overtaken the wider social drama in which it had 
cccaly 
been nominally embedded or inscribed. 
If we're going to stand where we are, 'outside' old 
Hegel's logic, we can't simply start at some point marked 'outside' 
in his logic, and make our 'epistemological break' out to there, 
once we've set up a new axis of coupling of logic and World through 
that new point - whether it be Kierkegaard's subjectivity or Marx's 
material economy of Culture in Nature... or Helmholz' Science.. 
756 HELMHOLZ, Hermann von Vorträge und Reden* Berlin 1865 
.. or some generalisation from-it.. 
757 BüCHNER, Ludwig Kraft und Stoff erUbingen 1855) tr Colling- 
wood London 1864 
758 LOTZE, Hermann Mikrokosmos (Leipzig 1856-64) tr Hamilton 
& Jones Edinburgh 1885-6 
... or some abstract coordination of Kant's 'scientific' frame of 
individual experience in universal Nature, with that spatiotemporal 
interface of these two poles of human Culture and History from which 
Kant abstracted... 
759 LANGE, Albert 
? 60 DUSSORT, Henri 
Geschichte. der Materialismus*tpzg 1866) Berlin 
1873 
L'Ecole de Marbourg Paris 1963 (76) 
.. we can't just try logically inscribing our logic in its material 
economy, and end up blocked with Althusser in a tragic emotional 
impasse; if we're going to come to terms with the questions posed 
by Hegel's abstraction, and by the residual abstraction of all these 
nominal positions 'outside' its logic, we have to work from the 
question of what we're doing in the library with these books, not 
from travelling in imagination, as we read through the 'internal' 
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space of their arguments, through some sort of frame external 
to the words, in which they themselves must, implicitly, be sup- 
posed to be found - but rather from the confrontation with their 
questioning and assertion as we find ourselves standing or sitting 
'outside' the authorial instance of assertion in the words, as 
that worked and still works through them as the writer's response 
to what he or she found open, confronting a mass of earlier books, 
and with an adequate supply of blank paper, time, and so on, at 
his or her disposal. 
Each of these books is in a sense a 'script' for our 
confrontation with them in the library or elsewhere, which presents 
us in response to our opening of them, with a certain 'part' in 
the context they frame as a World - of atoms, planets, societies, 
people, books, libraries, and so on. Thus Marx and Kierkegaard, 
in bringing the logical axis of questions evolved from an initial 
abstract positing of Being (as nominal correlate of the mere empty 
form of position itself) in hegelian logic into a more 'radical' 
questioning framed in the logical symmetry of logical and 'external' 
coordinates of hegelian System, each open up a moral or practical 
matrix pr"axis of assertion in which the textual order of its mark- 
ing is only one dimension or coordinate. The texts invite us into 
a figure of assertion in the practical matrix or space coordinate 
with the marking of this possibility in the textual order as the 
questioning of an earlier abstract line of questioning in which 
we were invited to mimic the part of the abstract instance of 
rational assertion, Reason, itself - and the several texts of 
Marx and Kierkegaard in the early 1840s present, in Kierkega"°rd's 
figure, so many 'stages' of their writers' passages into the 'part' 
which eventually becomes more or less fixed after mid-century, in 
a sort of inversion of the earlier hegelian abstraction from a 
particular biographical drama to the abstract part of 'I' in the 
universal frame of cosmic History. Thus the articulation of the 
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circuit or circulation of Capital in a practical space of human 
activity opened up initially by a 'logical' passage out of the 
coordinate logical short-circuit of hegelian abstraction ( and the 
'holy family's' abstract versions of such emancipation), eventually 
frames the writer's and his readers' parts in the egalitarian sym- 
metry of a social interaction and activity emancipated from the 
'alienated' parts played out by the various coordinate players in 
Capitalism's abstraction from the radical order of what is open to 
men together producing their livelihood in material Nature - this 
rather as the marking in the Ancien Regime of a 'system of Nature' 
in which it was in principle inscribed was coordinate with a question- 
ing of the old abstract theology of different roles in the divine 
plan, identified by the philosophes with its particular political 
function in restricting certain lines of questioning, and certain 
associated lines of otherwise possible social development. Kierke- 
gaard's part, on the other hand, becomes after mid-century fixed 
in a questioning of the institutional church as 'hypocritically' 
identifying the radical subjectivity whose axis is just the part of 
questioning identification with any part, with a part in some fixed, 
closed hierarchy mediating the interplay of this radical question 
or part of subjectivity, and infinite divine response to the dramatic 
configuration of this question or part in its social context. 
In each case, a series of texts in the 1840s effect a 
transposition of the hegelian axis of questions coordinate in the 
mature System with the formal instance of Reason as response to the 
formal matrix of questions in language, into a practical axis which, 
in the 'mature' Kierkegaard and Marx, is consolidated around the 
extra-linguistic matrix of questions and assertions around the figure 
of a new *partt, valid in a way for the writer and any emancipated 
reader, even if, with Kierkegaard this is the part, precisely, of 
questioning any identification with a particular part or role in 
the narrow theatre framed in the limit by the institutional Church's 
short-circuiting of what is open to God and men (and women) in the 
radical part of always choosing one's part, and its consequences, 
while never simply assenting to, say, the role of Regine's husband, 
or danish minister of religion, or whatever. 
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In principle, then, any individual reader can accede 
to the parts worked out in practice by Marx or Kierkegaard over 
the mid-nineteenth century - can become either 'obejectivel about 
their class role in the capitalist mode of production, or 'sub- 
jectively' experience their true self as, precisely, a subjectivity 
that, in a sort of finitary analogy with hegelian Reason, dist- 
inguishes itself from any role that has not been positively chosen, 
chooses choice rather than what Christ calls 'acting', hypocrisy, 
and Sartre mauvaise foi, the part of pretending that one is not 
free to choose, because one is stuck in a part one has not chosen, 
which precludes certain - or uncertain - lines of action. 
Books, then, 'for everyone and for no-one', since the 
readers to whom they are addressed are the actors, indeed the 
actor, behind the interchangeable masks or roles of class or some 
other unquestioned part in the human drama. But what if, simply 
by finding oneself in the part of reader of Marx or Kierkegaard, 
or the part, indeed of Marx, or of Kierkegaard, himself, one is 
thereby radically marked off by one's biography, or destiny, or 
whatever, from the otherwise uniform part of subjectivity or ob- 
jectivity to which one accedes through the part of writer or'his 
reader? And what if, as reader of both, one finds oneself thrown 
back into, say, the biographical dynamic which results in two such 
different readings of Hegel, as Marx and Kierkegaard slowly 'find 
themselves' or-'become whom they are' in the passage out of identi- 
fication with unitary Reason and its world-historic drama, into 
parts in the practical order which initially beckons in the logical 
question attaching to the symmetry of logical and other dimensions 
of their biography or situation? The socialist 'herd' are through 
their very biographical rooting in the evolution of human types, 
bound to react as they do to Zarathustra's part of singular self- 
distinction from the symmetric parts of that uniform passive mass 
of humanity, and Zarathustra is constitutionally opposed to the 
dyspeptic pessimism of Schopenhauer and angst of Kierkegaard. He 
doesn't address the crowd, except, indirectly, to speak to a 
select few-who respond by themselves distancing themselves, with 
Zarathustra, from the crowd: the uniform crowd cannot, in principle, 
cccc1. x 
in that part of uniformity, join the singular Zarathustra. 
Indeed nobody can join completely with Zarathustra except Zara- 
thustra himself in lonely retreat, for otherwise they would 
simply have to be Zarathustra. And this radical selectivity 
of address itself confirms the contents of the various addresses: 
the crowd must continue to assert their parts of uniform indif- 
ference, of crowd, or the singular parts of the noble actors 
who stand apart from the crowd would themselves dissolve into 
insipid indifference, having nothing to differ from, and no 
dramatic frame for their singular self-assertion as, precisely, 
'who they are', as the part they choose, the noble part of choosing 
and asserting what one has been chosen by one's destiny to be. 
Thus the addressees of the 'mature' Nietzsche's writing, down 
to the final crowned heads of Europe, and Ariadne/Cosima herself, 
are more and more marked out in his texts as Nietzsche himself 
approaches that axis of his 'destiny' in which his self-assertion 
will eventually be quite lost in the self-assertion of cosmic 
Will, Assertion, itself. And here I am, gazing in imagination 
upon a row of books on my imaginary bookshelves, remembering how 
this madman supplied the scripts for my adolescent self-assertion 
as I discovered just how much one, It could question, delighting 
in a perverse irony whereby I would arbitrarily change or dis- 
tance myself from some part which I felt was normal, expected, 
in some situation, thereby to assert my young nietzschean self 
in the more open play of parts I hoped to precipitate. Of course 
this generally appeared as mere perversity, and rather closed down 
the possibilities of interaction, than opened up new ones. I 
tended to mistake my audience, or sometimes simply to feel that 
this habitual irony was a usefully direct way to single out from 
the timid crowd those few who would play my nietzschean game. 
I had seen, at fifteen, a television adaptation of 
Alasdair Gray's Fall of Kelvin Walker (London 196 )- or was it 
rather a television drama from which the book was evolved? - in 
which the young protagonist discovers Nietzsche in the library 
of his obscure scottish home town, and finds a new world of 
possibilities opened up in the self-assertion he finds in himself 
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responding to the radical questioning that Nietzsche organises 
in the questioning of all previous values - answers, ideals - to 
which the will to Will, assertion of Assertion, is the response 
of those who have the strength to respond, rather than fall into 
passive nihilism. My response was to borrow from the local library, 
and then acquire for myself, a translation of... 
761 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich Also Sprach Zarathustra. Ein buch für 
Jeder und Keiner (Chemnitz 1883-4 (I-III), 
1885, Leipzig 1891 (IV), - in Werke below) 
tr Common London 1; tr Hollingdale 
Harmondsworth 1961 
... followed by.. 
762 Gdtzendtmmerung (Leipzig 1889) 
tr Hollingdale, with (763) Harmondsworth 1968 
763 Der Antichrist (1888; ptd Weimar 1895) 
and later, when I had learnt some Berman, 
764 
765 WURZBACH, Friedrich 
(ed, ann & intr) 
then at Oxford, 
766 
767 
S 
and at Paris, 
768 
769 
Morgenrathe (Chemnitz 1881) Munich 19 
Nietzsche: Sein Leben in Selbstzeugnissen, 
Briefen und Berichten Munich 1968 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Leipzig 1886) 
tr Hollingdale Harmondsworth 1973 
Die Wille zur Macht (188 -) ed Förster- 
Nietzsche & Gast Leipzig rev 19 &c 
tr Kaufmann & Hollingdale NY 1968 
Die Geburt der Tragödie (Leipzig 1872) 
tr Kaufmann NY(1967) with (769) 19 
Zur Genealogie der Moral (Leipzig 1887) 
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770 Über Wahrheit und LUge im aussermoralischen 
Sinne, with other early writings (187 -) 
ed, with fr trs, 
.. then in Yorkshire, in the Autumn of 1979, I borrowed most of 
the initial english translations from the local library (preferring 
them to Hollingdale's and Kaufmann's).. 
771 The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche gen ed 
Levy Edinburgh & London 1909-13 
I already had Schlecta's three-volume compendium: 
772 Werke in drei Bände ed Schlecta Munich 19 
and subsequently acquired the Taschenausgabe, 
773 Werke intr FUrster-Nietzsche Leipzig 1906-7 
along with a set of the french translations 
774 Oeuvres Completes, various trs Paris 1898-1903 
and a range of contemporary reactions that I won't list individually, 
all from the dispersal of the bequest of an early english 'nietzschean', 
Arthur Hughes, to (oddly enough) the Beccles Working-Mens Cooperative 
Association. I also used the 'ßrossoktavi and Kroner editions... 
775 Werke ed Förster-Nietzsche & Gast 
Leipzig 1905-13 
776 Werke ed Bäumler Berlin 1930-2 
... So I will have all these on the imaginary bookshelf we are 
currently considering, along with Andler's book, already noted 
(and the Basel pamphlet De Fontibus L. D. ) and: 
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777 PODACH, Erich Nietzsches Zusammenbruch: Beiträge zu 
einer Biographie auf Grund unveröffent- 
licher Dokumente' Heidelberg 1930 
fr tr 
778 HEIDEGGER, Martin Nietzsche (lects 19 - ptd Pfullingen 
1961) fr tr Klossowski Paris 19 
779 Nietzsche (proceedings of Cerisy colloque, 
1972) ed 
Heidegger's book, and various early writings of Nietzsche s, 
dominated Derrida's agregation seminar of 1975-6 (I will shelve 
his contemporaneous rewriting of his Cerisy paper, E ep rons, with 
'Derrida') 'La Vie - La Mort' (the subject, as always, being de- 
termined by the agregation programme, which figure was itself them- 
atised over the course of the seminar). Derrida's reading of Heid- 
egger's book on Nietzsche opened with the reflection that it was 
in the first place very singular for a major philosopher to write 
a very long book about one of his historical peers (although a lot 
of exceptions come to mind), and proceeded to question the opening 
of Heidegger's reading with the latter's brushing aside of his 
subject's own life in a few words, as irrelevant to the elucidat- 
ion of the single thought whose unity, abstracted from any contin- 
gencies attaching to its textual presentation, was what in Nietz- 
sche's, as in all other cases, made him, precisely, a singularly 
great figure. Nietzsche, closing the history of ontotheology, in 
his limiting identification of Being with a being: Will, Life - 
the 'biologism' of Nietzsche's assertion of Assertion, in response 
to the perennial Question of Being. Nietzsche and Heidegger, then, 
and a nietzschean criticism of Heidegger's abstraction of 'the' 
nietzschean text and its single thought, from the biographical 
coupling of abstract thought (even if articulated in the axis 
of the question of the question to which Being responds, the 
question as the radically reflexive movement of Thinking in 
Being) and the dramatic axis of that particular part (of Nietzsche, 
not Da-Sein interchangeably non-interchangeable between particu- 
lar individuals) which is a movement from relatively autonomous 
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logic or philology into that self-assertion of Life, Will, in 
which Nietzsche's logic logically asserts its inscription, finally 
quite losing, like Hölderlin, any autonomous separate assertion, 
in the circuit of inscription of its script in the drama. 
In Yorkshire, in the autumn of 1979, I spent a great 
part of my time reading Ecce Homo, and the earliest texts of 
1870-2 from which, in his 'autobiography' Nietzsche traced his 
philosophical 'destiny', together with the fragments of Heraclitus 
and Parmenides whose reading marks Nietzsche a passage from Diogenes 
Laertius to the birth of tragedy contemporaneous with the 'origin 
of philosophy'. - This in an attempt to focus in these various 
circuits of opening and closing, the question to which I might 
begin to (re)write my response. When I 'went mad' in Devon in 
November, writing my writing within the drama it framed, taken 
over by the coupling of text and action in the affective axis of 
my relations with Julia, of which I was only the scribe, I knew 
I was entering the play of forces from which Nietzsche never returned 
to the world in which he had lived, however singularly, until 1889, 
and which had been my only home, too, for as long as I could re- 
member before 1979. In Paris in early January 1980, I found a 
french translation of Podach's book, and naturally enough brought 
a copy back to Hereford on my return. 
Nietzsche, I discovered, or felt, had strayed through the 
same invisible passage leading into the coupling of script and 
drama, by which I had unwittingly passed or been drawn, but had 
done so, as he himself had earlier prophesied, a century too soon, 
and could not, stuck in the 1890s, find the way back. I could 
identify with all the apparently bizarre logic of his part, charted 
by his family, friends, and first psychiatrists, in the passage 
from 1888 to 1889, but he was stuck in the progressive integration 
of that logic in a dramatic axis, between which and the exoteric 
logic of the 1070s and 1880s through which he had come there was 
no possible communication, since the question of the order of 
script through which he had passed, simply could not be logically 
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posed, marked, in the thought - or language - of his time. 
Taking on, in his last telegrams, the part of 'The Crucified', 
he had thought his destiny had finally focussed in him the 
Second Coming, the millenial transformation in which all through 
him would discover their parts of Actor behind the masks each 
took for himself or herself. But like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquis- 
itor they locked him up in their reason,. crucified him again. 
Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Mill, Comte... 
780 COMTE, Auguste Cours de Philosophie Positive Paris 1830-42; 
ed Littr6 18 
781 LEWES, George Henry Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences 
London 1853 
.. I have just been reading Martineau's account of that 
'nervous 
breakdown' which, in conjunction with his brief year with Clotilde 
de Vaux before her death in 1846, prepares Comte's transition from 
the logic of the Cours, to the reorganisation of the whole system 
and Universe around the practical axis of a positivist 'Religion 
de 1'Humaniti' around 1850 (in Types of Ethical Theory) - an 
epistemological and revolutionary 'break' from the earlier abstract 
critique of abstract theory, to the inscription of the logic of 
the critique in a primary frame of Action, which parallels, as 
I noted in Part III, the 'breaks' of Marx and Kierkegaard around 
the same time, and both parallels a similar transition from logical 
to social theory in his friend Mill, while echoing the 'nervous 
breakdown' towards 1830 through which Mill himself broke out of 
the logical straightjacket of his father's 'analysis', into the 
emotional axis of Romantic 'feeling', -in association with 
Harriet 
Taylor. Nietzsche's radical questioning of questioning itself 
left him, like Holderlin, with no residue of separate logical 
identity after the 'breakdown', or break-out from logic to the 
universal poetic in which abstraction from the play of figures 
and forces had become just one figure lost among the others in 
their disordered play. Comte's breakdown led through his self- 
discovery in the new part of Apostle of Humanity (or pope of 
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Positivism) to a kind of instituted 'madness' in which he and 
those of his earlier adherents who were not alienated by the new 
turn from Science back to Myth, together with various new adherents 
who had not been engaged by the Science, but who found a part in 
the Myth, organised the dogmas, rituals and roles of the new 
Religion along the practical 'axis' whose 'logic' was defined 
by the questioning of the logic of 1830, in the sociological 
frame of 1842. If the Year of Revolutions constituted as it were 
the Second Coming, the Societe Positiviste by the time of the 
Commune were posting broadsheet proclamations of the new Kingdom 
in the streets. I found one of these tucked into a translation of a 
positivist account of the transformation into Positivist Society 
taking place in Paris... 
782 (anonymous) Political Notes on the Present Situation of 
France and Paris tr Beasley London 1871 
... In the 'abstract' Comte's theology of practical Positivism may 
seem - and did to many - quite laughable; yet in its direct analogy 
with and mimicry of Roman Catholic theology as inscribed in the 
universal Drama or Comedie Divine whose Script(ure) was to be found 
in the books of Moses and their sequels, rather than the Cours and 
theirs, the transposition of the initial logic into a system of 
'parts' in the transformation of Society or Humanity, organised 
around the part of Comte himself (and Clotilde, now dead, as pre- 
siding Spirit, with a ceremony at her grave each Wednesday), might 
easily be adapted not only to a millenial familiarity of the under- 
lying dynamic of the new sect, but also to a more or less working 
interplay with all the other 'parts' in a society that had itself 
grown up such a dynamic, and incorporated it throughout its per- 
ceptions and institutions. Thus Comte, like the literary dictator 
of France over the mid-century, Victor Hugo... 
783 HUGO, Victor Cromwell Paris (1827) 
... presents us with what is on the one hand patently a 'mad' de- 
lusion, but a delusion or illusory 'part' or identity, defined 
in relation to his 'scripts', which, through its commanding role 
in that interplay of roles which is its social context, works as 
well towards its ends, if not better, than the 'sane' practical 
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roles from which it stands out: 'Victor Hugo etait un fou qui 
se prenait pour Victor Hugo' - Victor Hugo presenting in the 
preface to Cromwell his revolutionary polemic against the abstract 
artificiality of the french 'classical' poetic, and becoming by 
the time of the franco-prussian war and the deposition of his 
great rival Napoleon III (or not so great, indeed: 'Napoleon le 
Petit' according to his great rival Hugo), the focus of a Romantic 
formalism as rigid and abstract as the classicism it had displaced. 
Cousin, even, as dictator of french 'academic' philosorhy and the 
whole educational system of which it was the nominal focus over 
the same period characterised in other spheres by Comte and Hugo 
(I have more than onee drawn the analogy between these three and 
counterparts in England, and suggested the associated dynamic of 
interaction seen in the close rel'tions of Comte and Mill, Hugo 
and England, Arnold and Cousin's institution, and so on), might 
be taken as the very epitome of that french institution of a 
french 'subject' or instance of 'I', who organises around him 
the reformulation, for each new period, -ýf the cartesian focus 
of french Theory, in terms of some new version of that 'I', which 
he embeds in the contemporary culture of France and Europe through 
practically focussing the intellectual life, the salons, seminars 
or whatever, of Paris - and in this we might even find Cousin to 
be the maddest of all three: at least Comte and Hugo were conscious 
that they were engaged in the setting-up of a new Religion. 
784 CUUSIN, Victor Cours d'Introduction ä 1'Histoire de la 
Philosophie (lects 1830-1; Paris 1831) 
Brussels 1834 
785 Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien Paris(185 )18 
And then there's Renan, nominally reformulating the 
old one... 
786 RENAN, Ernest Vie de Jdsus (Paris 1863) tr 
London 1864 
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And then... Science... all the 'scientists' as Whewell 
first called his colleagues at a meeting of the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science in 183 , apparently making any 
Religion obsolete, as they follow the young Comte of 1830 in em- 
bedding all questions 'in principle' within the limiting mathe- 
matical frame of laplacean determinism: 'Je n'ai pas besoin de 
cette hypothese' said Laplace in reply to Napoleon's question as 
to the place of the Creator in his Systeme du Monde, as the author 
presented the new ruler of France with the first two volumes of the 
full system in 1800... 
787 LAPLACE, Pierre Simon de Traite. de MgcauiguerCeleste Paris 1799-1825 
f «'ý 
I 
All 'questions': for such is the character of every detail 
to be in principle determined within the mathematical embedding of 
its logic in the physical Universe... logically defined by the em- 
bedding of 'the physical' in its logical determination in language, 
as universal external frame, universal mathematically ordered Con- 
text of the mathematical texts of laplacean and hamiltonian and 
heimholzian Mechanics. The mathematicians. astronomers, geophysicists, 
,. biologists, 'scientific' sociologists, political theorists, linguists, 
/logicians, working back from universal Context to the texts of its 
exposition, treating various components of the scheme from the 
various aspects and in the various styles of the developing language 
of their various national schools, all abstracting from the converse 
movement out from the Text taken over by Dilthey from the hermeneutics 
of the Book, the Script - and from the supposedly 'doctrinaire' 
social analysis of such as Marx, who would make the question of 
the 'scientists' engagement as producers of 'Science' in the social 
interface of Text and universal Context, primary - and subordinating 
local perspective to the international elaboration of the great 
collective enterprise... leaving the 'philosophers' with whom they 
once belonged back in the previous century... 
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Thus the 'mechanics' of the british engineers is brought 
back into the european context of the theoretical mathematical mech- 
anics with which it had parted company a century earlier, after the 
great row between newtonians and leibnizians - this through the 
translation (in which the young Carlyle helped) of Legendre's text- 
book, and its eventual introduction as text at Cambridge through 
the efforts of the Analytical Society.. 
788 PEACOCK, DMA Comparative View of the Principles of the 
Fluxional and Differential Calculus. Addres- 
sed to the University of Cambridge. 
Cambridge 1819 
(this is in fact a reactionary sounding of the alarm) 
Contributions came, indeed, even from central Asia (Lobat- 
chewski in Kasan - 1829) and obscure towns in Hungary.. 
789 BOLYAI, Janos Tentamen Juventutem Studiosam in Elementa 
Matheseos Purae, Scientism Spatii Absolute 
Veram exhibens (Maros Vasarhelyini 1833) 
Vienna 1900 
.. so I will mix all the Science together on a new imaginary shelf, 
irrespective of country and school, rather as I earlier found his- 
tories of 'Science' on separate shelves from 'Philosophy', before 
moving between the two sections of the imaginary library via their 
common references to the philology of Diels, the 'presocratic' 
fragments dedicated at the opening of the twentieth century to 
Dilthey. 
790 HAMILTON, William Rowan The Theory of Conjugate Functions.. with a 
Preliminary.. Essay on Algebra as the Science 
ol Pure Time (papers 1833-5) (79) 
791 Lectures on Queternions Dublin 1853 
791A Elements of Qnaternions London 1866 
? 92 TAIT, Peter Guthrie An Elementary Treatise on Quaternions London 
1867)rev1873 
793 Scientific Papers ed with memoir Cambridge 
(79) 1898-1900 
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794 MAXWELL, James Clerk A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism 
Oxford 1873 
795 DANIELL, John Frederic An Introduction to the Study of Chemical 
Philosophy London 1839 
796 LIEBIG, Justus Chemistry in its Applicati-. ns to Agriculture 
and Physiology ed Playfair London (1840) 
rev & enlgd 1843 
797 GALL, Analyse d'un Cours du Docteur Gall (notes of 
Paris lects 1807-8, reported Adelon) Paris 1808 
798 HELMHOLTZ, Hermann von Die Lehre von den Tonempfindun'en 
Berlin 1862 tr Ellis London 1875 
799 DARWIN, Charles Robert On the Origin of Species by Means of Natur^1 
Selection London (1859) 1902 
800 The Descent of Man London (1871) 1882 
801 BETTANY, GT Life of Darwin London 1887 
... And here we are at the half-way stage from the mathemat- 
ical physics of its universal external context, back to the embeading 
of that physics in the formal and informal language of its mrithemrt- 
ical texts. Halfway, where we meet Man and Culture, not to say 
Darwin and his disciples.. 
802 HUXLEY, Thomas Henry Science and Culture and Other Essays 
London 1881 
803 BAGEHOT, Walter Physics and Politics London 1872 
... and one might set this embedding of: Geisteswis:; enschaften in 
Naturwissenschaften, final in efficient causality ('means' of nat- 
ural selection remaining strangely equivocal), Culture in Science, 
History in Nature (Natural History), in the 'history of science', 
by marking the points where, first, it is put into mathematical 
form, in a retrospective survey of Natural Selection a la Mach: 
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804 HALDANE, John Burden 
Sanderson 
The Causes of Evolution. A Re-examination 
of Darwinism (incl papers on Mathematical 
Theory of Natural Selection as apex) 
London 1932 
.. and then, second, where it becomes, itself, a model for the 
'universal' frame of mrthematical physics in which it has been 
biochemically inscribed over the mid-century: 
805 MONOD, Jacques Le Hasard et la Necessite Paris 1969 
Back, now, to nineteenth-century Culture: 
806 LYELL, Charles The Antiquity of Man London 1863 
... well, there's the natural history of Tylor's 'primitive culture' 
from the outside.. and we can become 'scientific' again is we follow 
the path set out by Sir William Jones at the close of the eighteenth 
century, and by Friedrich Schlegel after him, through the struct- 
ural analysis of mythical and grammatical dimensions of different 
languages 'inward' to the logical frame of any grammar, and its 
emerging mathematical formulation over the course of the century... 
807 FRAZER, James George The Golden Bough London 1890-1915 
abgd by Frazer 1922 (79) 
808 BRUGMANN, Grundriss.. der vergleichenden Grammatik der 
DELBRÜCK, 
indogermanischen Sprachen Berlin 1886-1916 
809 SKEAT, Walter W An Etymological Dictionary of the English 
Language Oxford (1879-82)rev 1909 (77-8) 
810 LOCKWOOD, WB Indo-European Philology, Historical and 
Comparative 'London 1969 (? 7-8) 
811 WHATELY, Richard Elements of Logic London (1826)1848 
812 DE MORGAN, Augustus Formal Logic London 1847 
ý- 813 BOLZANO, Bernard Paradoxien des Unendlichen Berlin 1851 
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814 BRENTANO, Franz Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte 
1874) tr 
815 BOOLE, George The Laws of Thought (London 1854; ed Jourdain 
1916) NY 1961 
816 DEDEKIND, Richard Stetigkeit und Irrationale Zahlen 
Braunschweig 1872 
817 Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? 
Braunschweig 1887 
818 Essays on the Theory of Numbers ' (187 
(London 1901)NY 1963 
819 CANTOR, Georg Beiträge zur Begründung der Transfiniten Meng- 
enlehre Braunschweig 1895-7 tr 
820 FREGE, Gottlob Begriffschrift -Halle 1879; tr in () 
821 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau 1884) 
ed with tr Austin Oxford/NY (1950)rev 1953 
822 
822A Philosophical Writings (1891-1919) ed & tr 
Beach & Black Oxford (1952)1960 
822B Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Jena 1893-1903 
partial tr Furth Berkeley 1964 
(responses to Frege by Russell, Quine, Dummett and others may be 
classed with other writing by their various authors, since their 
'argument' tends rather to define their authors' positions in relation 
to Frege's nodal position towards the turn of the century, than to 
than to directly define or elucidate the latter) 
We become more and more 'scientific' as we work in either 
direction 'in' or 'out' from the social interface of mathematical 
logic and the physical world in a human Culture of which the production 
of mathematical analysis of logic or physics is a component -the more we 
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rather, these writers) 'abstract' from the order of human activity 
and interaction, of which the writing of its theory, its 'science', 
is itself a component. It was the eighteenth-century poet of 
Reason who claimed 'the proper study of Mankind is Man', and it 
was the political 'radical', the revolutionary, who claimed(1) 
Radikal sein ist die Sache an der Wurzel fassen. Die Wurzel 
für den Menschen ist aber der Mensch selbst. 
.. And Comte, in his mid-century 'epistemological break' from 
abstract unitary Science into the dramatic axis of his new Religion 
of Humanity, breaks the formal circuit from the mathematics of the 
limiting external frame of physical Space and Time, back through 
Heaven, Earth, its geology, chemistry, life, culture, institutions, 
theory, to the cartesian mathematical frame of that theory, precisely 
where he thought initially to close it, in the social order of human 
interaction - rather as Helmholz inscribed the interface of mathe- 
matically articulated external Nature, and the logical processes of 
the Mind that so framed its external context, in his mathematical 
analysis of those tonal or harmonic structures which frame our 
auditory sense, the aural dimension of the sensory interface of 
Mind and Nature. 
Circle of Science, of the sciences: les extremes se 
touchent, as over the century the symmetric hamiltonian frame of 
external Space and Time reappears in Frege's analysis as simply the 
formal structure of substitution in, the bare matrix of, language 
itself - coordinate, through Bolzano's system of analogies of re- 
flexive structures of Thought on the one hand (which Gedankenwelt 
includes itself as one element in it) and the physical continuum 
analysed later by Dedekind and Cantor on the other. In its limiting 
form the reflexive structure of Bolzanö's paradox reappears fifty 
years later simply in terms of those 'sets' he bequeathed to 
Dedekind, Cantor and Frege which were to organise 'logical space' 
(and its time of deduction) as a direct mirror of physical space 
with its familiar 'inclusion' and 'exclusion'; but the vicious 
circle to which this elementary mathematical circuit coordinating 
logical and physical space gives rise at the end of the century 
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is only a sort of epitome of a more general breakdown of the 
whole wide circuit leading from the mathematical physics of 
physical Space and Time as universal external frame of activity 
on the one hand, through a whole series of nested sciences a la 
(jeune) Comte to the complementary extreme of the internal space 
of the individual scientist's thought of that external frame on 
the other. Thus Haeckel, as I noted, was able to extend his in- 
itial darwinist coordination of efficient physical causality and 
logical finality from the natural history of Man, by 1899, to 
not so much a positivist system of Science articulated within an 
initial mathematical correlation of logical and physical sides of 
a unitary Universe in the bare form of 'thesis', position, positing, 
the 'mark', point, but rather a converse system of questions, 
paradoxes, 'riddles', together constituting the whole Universe as 
precisely the universal riddle, Weltrfftsel: 
823 HAECKEL, Ernst Die Weltrfftsel (Bonn 1899) tr McCabe 
London 1900 
The whole world of Science has become, at the end of the 
century, a system of questions, a scientific Universe structured 
by the logical embedding of the logical order of theory as one 
side of experiment, experience, and activity as answer to the 
questions posed in experience, whose other side is the limiting 
physical context of all experience. A new unitary logic of Science 
has finally quite emancipated itself from abstract metaphysical 
theories, through restructuring the axis of elaboration of theory 
in a logical embeading of logic in the World of which it produces 
the theory. The 'practical' frame of this new world of Science, 
scientifically organising activity as the rational resolution of 
'questions' had already been set out in 1851: 
824 Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations. Catalogue 
(Special Issue of Journal of Design and Manufactures London 1851)facs 
NY 19 
... And yet while the nineteenth-century 'scientist' might embed 
human activity in his mechanical Universe through a logical framing 
of the 'experimental' axis of activity as resolution of questions 
or problems, in which his logic itself was to be organised as one 
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component dimension, in empirical interplay with a complementary 
'external' physical order of the experimenter's situation, nineteenth- 
century literature was enmeshed in a converse movement, in the Roman- 
tic legacy of dramatic - indeed melodramatic - engagement in 'irrat- 
ional' fictional identification with a part in the closed circuit of 
a fiction, a fictional action. Science and literature present two 
contrary sides of a nineteenth-century persona evolved through two 
converse movements of questioning previous 'abstract' Reason: the 
'scientist' articulates a new axis of questions within the symmetry 
of an older abstract logic and the 'real', external, physical context 
from which that old logic abstracted to give an 'internal' metaphysical 
representation or picture of the World in which the picture was set; 
the writer or artist finds the tragic optimism of the rationality, the 
axial questioning of both old and new logic, compromised by the darker 
side of our persona or identity, which cannot be presented simply as 
the rational transposition of questioning from the old abstract axis, 
to the new practical axis, as the old axis as a whole falls prey to 
its own inquiry. We cannot simply move from old metaphysical Reason 
to new empirical rationality, by rationally transposing the axis of 
our questions from the internal symmetry of an abstract picture of 
the World in which that picture is one component, to the 'external' 
symmetry of that picturing and other dimensions of its World. Old 
optimistic Reason is not the point from which to frame the transition 
to the new primacy of action: rather does the impasse of abstract 
progressive rationality throw us back into a dark prior engagement 
in a physical bodily identity earlier than Reason, from which super- 
ficial Enlightenment thought to abstract, and which holds us in its 
play of parts and feelings - epitomised by the irrational emotional 
dynamic of Art - in which the part of rational distinction of a sci- 
entifically detached 'I' from its engagement in World and Flesh, 
corruption and decadence, decay, is the superficial reactive illusion 
of an imagination too weak to confront the truths of Art, a bland 
optimism good through lack of imagination... 
825 PRAZ, Mario La Came, la Morte e il Diavolo nella Letter- 
atura Romnntica (Milan 1930) tr 
The Romantic Agony Oxford (1933) 
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826 MERZ, John TA History of European Thought in the Nine- 
teenth Century (I, II Science; III, IV Philo- 
sophy) London 1896- 1914 
Literature, Science, Philosophy. Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche philosophers caught, at either end of their century, 
between Science and Art; criticising an abstract embedding of 
the old logic and reason in the context from which it abstracted 
to give the abstract picture of a World in which it is now, in 
turn,, to be inscribed as in its 'real' external frame. Yet the 
very grammar of such 'real externality' has been elaborated 'in' 
abstraction from real externality. And, indeed, the schopenhauer- 
ian deposition of Reason, and transposition of cosmic axis from 
Reason to Will, and of the instance or locus of question and quest 
from abstract universal ': I' to tragically incarnate individurl, 
itself maintains the rational abstraction of a universal axis, 
even as this is transposed from the abstract Reason which frames 
the fiction of its abstract universal Context, to the specific, 
localised, temporary individual, through which absolute cosmic 
Will is nominally determined to pass. 
Other transpositions, emancipations, in their turn retain 
residues of the Reason which they frame in a new practical ther. tre 
of reflection, precisely through their framing of the new loci and 
terms, variables, of question and action, through an initiril form-11 
inscription of earlier abstraction in the abstract picture of 
World which it hnd framed. Jules de Gaultier, a french nietzscheen 
at the turn of the century, presents a limiting figure of such a 
logic of inscription of logic in World. -. 
827 GAULTIEk, Jules de La Fiction Universelle. Deuxihe Essai sur 
le Pouvoir d'Imaginer Paris 1903 
.. in which Science, Philosophy and Art coincide... in theory. The 
individual becomes, precisely, the locus of an identification 
chosen freely in the radical symmetry of logic and World as pure 
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self-assertion in what, until it is practically assumed and 
acted out, is logically speaking 'imaginary'. Corresponding 
to Haeckel's universal system of questions to which unitary 
actuality - the very existence of the Universe - is the single 
trans-logical response, the frenchman asserts the primacy of 
free subjective self-assertion in a universal system of 'iddes- 
forces' framed by the logical inscription of their logical system 
in the symmetry of logic and the various dimensions of its actual 
practical context which frames Haeckel's 'scientific' play of 
questions. 
... But. just as Haeckel and Gaultier are framing a logical 
transposition from the abstract internal logic of substitutions in 
language, to the substitution for that abstract axis of questions 
and assertion, of the practical, empirical, mathematical, dramatic 
(and so on) axis of symmetry of internal logic and external physics 
in experience and experiment, Russell is finding in Frege's abstract 
frame of such inscription of logic in mathematics - the mathematics 
itself framed logically this transposition -a radical 'paradox' 
attaching to the very starting-point of such a 'universal' trans- 
position: a paradox rooted in the abstract definition of the starting- 
point in a logic that is then supposed to frame its transposition 
into a supposedly primary interface of internal logic and external 
world, through an initial supposition of a universal abstract 
distinction of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion', coordinate 
with the abstraction of the 'logic' of the whole programme as an 
'internal' order of distinctions to which the 'extrinsic' contingen- 
cies of externally marking, say, the logical distinction of logical 
from physical distinction or difference, is quite 'external', and 
may be so to speak bracketed at the outset. That is: over the 
turn of the century all sorts of books in all sorts of different 
'fields' of theory mark the recognition that one cannot assume a 
'logical' starting-point in the old order of 'metaphysical' abstract- 
ion from embedding of logic in context, in order to mark the 'real' 
starting-point - logically - in the interface of old 'internal' 
logical order, and what it had until then determined 'internally' 
through the logical opposition of internal logic and 'external' 
order in which such opposition must actually be marked. 
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We might here close the shelving for 'Nineteenth-Century 
Europe' with another coincidence of Science, Literature and Philo- 
sophy... 
828 DODGSON, Charles Lut- Alice's Adventures in Wonderland London (1865) 
widge ('Lewis Carroll') 
Through the Looking-Glass London (1871) 
both, ann Gardner 
1 9'x° 
... where another english mathematician explores a transposition of 
the abstract 'logical' order of substitution in language, into a 
complementary fictional order of substitutions, which is as it were 
mathematically or formally equivalent as system of substitutions, 
and in this mediates between the bachelor mathematician's fantasy 
in which Alice Liddell becomes Alice-in-Wonderland, and the logical 
or rational distancing from such an emotional engagement through 
comic detachment from the evidently unreal inversion or conversion 
of extra-fictional sobriety in the looking-glass of methodical 
madness - this rational distancing from engagement in fantasy, in its 
turn, being itself constantly drawn into the teasing play of the 
author's seductive fiction.... 
... And finally mark the embedding of one-dimensional 
verbal strings of marks, and library shelves, and abstract linear 
logic, in a configuration of coordinate dimensions of the drama 
in which logic plays its part, but which its unilinear deduction 
cannot contain... 
829 ABBOTT, Edwin Flatland. A Romance of Many Dimensions. 
By a Square LLondon 1884) facs oxford 197 
De to fabula narratur 
Nous savons aussi, par Menjot, que 'feu M. 
Pascal appelait la philosophie cartesienne le 
roman de la nature semblable a peu pres a 
l'Histoire de Don Quichot': ce qui, au surplus, 
n'etait pas trahir le vrai visage de celui dont 
la devise etait: 'Mundus est fabuls'. (1) 
Shelves of nineteenth-century books, then, marking various 'parts' 
of theory in the external context of the questioning and assertion 
pursued by their writers through the inner logic of their printed 
words.. and a couple of odd volumes almost falling off the end of 
the last shelf, marking comic detachment from all those competing 
logical identifications of the part of theorist, inquirer, revolut- 
ionary, positivist, superman, as still caught in theological trans- 
position from the abstract instance of cartesian rationality in 
the internal symmetries of substitution in a text, to a new part 
whose initial marking and grar-mar 'outsiae' the old abstraction 
from radical symmetry of text and context, has itself been deduced 
from an 'internal' iteration of the old line of inquiry, as the 
latter confronts, textually, the question posed by the actual in- 
scription of its logic 'in' the contextual symmetry or correlation 
of logic and other dimensions of the 'World' which that logic had 
framed. 
1: Chevalier, Preface to (445), p xii. The quotation from Menjot 
(Opuscules Posthumes, 1697, I. 115) is borrowed from Lafuma; Descartes' 
motto is attested by 'le portrait de Descartes par Weenix ou l'on 
voit Descartes tenant un livre ouvert avec cette devise - cf notre 
Descartes (rev Paris 1942) P 355'(notes to passage cited, p 1362) 
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Nineteenth-century writers, then, marking their distance 
from various versions of the 'part' of Philosophy or Science in 
the World in which they find themselves, as, standing 'outside' 
both the axis of question and assertion in a text of which they 
are critical readers rather than writer, and, in the 'real' outside 
of that residually abstract 'internal' textual order of the writer's 
inquiry and argument, asserting themselves in the difference they 
experience between themselves and the part in which the writer would 
have them find themselves ('in' the outside of the old order that 
he frames - as he stands outside its old abstract logic - in his 
text)... 
In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of product- 
ion, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding 
to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is 
England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief 
illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If, 
however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders... I must tlainly 
tell him, 'De to fabula narraturl'.:.:. Karl Marx. London, July 25,1867 
(1) 
The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society 
impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly 
in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern in- 
dustry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. 
That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in 
its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre 
and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even 
into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso- 
German empire. Karl Marx. London, January 24,1873. (2) 
The working of the inaustrial system of this country. -is coming 
to a dead stop. Free trade has exhausted its resources; even 
Manchester doubts this its quondam economic gospel... The decen- 
nial cycle of stagnation, prosrerity, over-production and crisis, 
ever recurrent from 1825 to 1867, seems indeed to have run its 
1: Capital (London 1886) Preface of 1867 (p xvii) 2: Pre°ace of 
1873 ad fin. 
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course; but only to land us in the slough of despond of 
a permanent and chronic depression. The sighed-for period 
of prosperity will not come ... England is the only country 
where the inevitable social revolution might be effected 
entirely by peaceful and legal means. (Marx) certainly 
never forgot to add that he hardly expected the Enf-lish 
ruling classes to submit, without a 'pro-slevery rebellion' 
to this peaceful and legal revolution. Frederick Engels. 
November 5,1886. (1) 
... But how, then, is one to act when the cycle from the hegeliAn 
dialectic of the 1820s, to the recognition over the mid-century's 
successive phases of material and theoretical development of 
the material dialectic operative where the 'ideal' aspirations 
of 1848 have broken down, does not, in fact, meekly submit to 
Marx' and Engels' scenario, but returns through renewed tr'de 
(Juglar) cycles after the Crash of the early 1870s, to climb b^ck 
from the turn of the new century in a new broad cycle of exprnsion 
led by Germany and America, a Second Industrial Revolution? 
830 TOLSTOY, Lyov N (Life 
tr Hapgood London 1889 
a1-äZ 
(My Confession & The Spirit of Christ's 
Teaching,, eil 
832 ULYANOV, Vladimir (What. is to be.. Doue Stuttgart 1902) 
Ilyich ('Lenin') 
tr 
833 (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism 
Moscow 1909) tr 
'These slave are the great radical livers-out of their theories' 
wrote William to Henry James. I tried to draw a parallel between 
the theatre of leninist 'activism' to the East of Europe at the 
turn of the century, and the play of american 'pragmatism' to 
the West. Marx took over the abstract 'internal' or iderlist 
1: Engels' Preface to the english translation of Capital, ad fin 
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dialectic of Hegel's System, and transposed its axis from the 
internal logic of that abstraction to the complementary material 
axis - logically symmetric with the logical axis in Hegel's log- 
ical articulation of the Universe in his texts - of social life 
in Nature, in which the production of theory finally appears in 
mere footnote and parenthesis, in the mature theory of the system 
of material production set out in Kapital. Lenin in his turn takes 
over Marx's coordinates of the 'universal theatre' of capitalist 
crisis, emancipating them from the rigid systematic axis of euro- 
pean capitalism as framed by Marx, as he discovers his own part 
of framing political options as itself a political act which enters 
as one component into what is practically open in the interplay of 
social coordinates first discovered theoretically by Marx in the 
social configuration of mature european capitalism: a political 
activism, of which Marx's own global framing of the material dia- 
lectic of human society within a social order abstracted by a system 
of expropriation and alienation from what he discovered to be mater- 
ially open to the individuals he found suffering under that con- 
stricting order, provides so to speak the limit case, hardly recog- 
nised by Marx himself in its primary character of political inter- 
vention in the interplay of the various components of his situation 
(material, theoretical, political, ideological, and so on). Against 
the passive deterministic evolutionism of his political riv4ls on 
the left, Lenin, borrowing a title ('What is to be Done? 1) and a 
dramatic figure of the posing of this question, not as some theor- 
etical quandary, but as an 'existential' confrontation with the 
question of one's part in the russian theatre both behind, and yet 
potentially ahead of western Europe, from another 'great liver-out 
of his theory', Tolstoy, questions the part of abstraction to a 
'theoretical' line of questioning and framing what is open, which 
sets the social dynamic in a correspondingly abstract 'natural' 
development, in terms of its essentially reactionary character as 
political response to the actual situation in Russia. The axis 
of questions, as framing of what is open, is set squarely as merely 
one dimension in the radical political order of what is open to 
each player within the russian theatre. Any theory of russian 
society and its dynamic is to be judged according to the part it 
plays, regressive or progressive, in the revolutionary transform- 
ation of the frame of russian activity of which it is a theory. 
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'Prise de parti en philosophie': 
834 ALTHUSSEH, Louis Ldnine et la Philosophie Paris 1969 
... echoed by the soviet hagiographies and western demonologies 
that jostle on western library-shelves next to books written by 
Lenin himself, as by the new autocracy and its new theology in- 
stituted by Stalin around 1930, which still organises editing, 
commentary and publication and export of the texts of the marxist- 
leninist canon, and the part of writers in soviet society, and 
the official vetting of all scripts, and proscription of any writer 
who dissents from participation in the russian theatre as directed 
by Politburo and Party. 
Turn of the century russian 'marxism', then, may be seen 
as a theoretical marking of the transition from one closed russian 
theatre of activity whose theology and politics and economy were 
breaking down as effective social system in the wider global theatre 
recovering from the Crash of the early 1870s, towards a mid-twentieth 
century reintegration of the russian theatre's various dimensions 
within the new play of forces opened up by the complete breakdown 
of the old order over the period of the Great War - an integration 
which I marked by Stalin's 'definitive' response to the mid-century 
question of the part of its very language in the theatre of soviet 
activity which it was the new czar's or autocrator's own part to 
frame as unitary action, to direct: 
835 STALIN, Joseph Marxism and Problems of Linguistics (Pravda - 
'Truth' - articles, 1950) tr Moscow 1954 
On the other side of Europe I marked a theoretical 
transition from around 1870 to around 1930 in terms of the *parts' 
of James and Dewey in the international theatre - the part, together, 
of framing over the turn of the century an avowedly 'american' 
perspective on theoretical debate, bringing as it were to explicit 
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self-consciousness a tradition growing out of the transplantation 
of european intellectual culture, along with other coordinate ele- 
ments of european society, into the New England frame of recon- 
struction or reorganisation of those elements, themselves evolved 
from classical Antiquity through Middle Ages and Renaissance and 
Reform in continuous and materially embodied institutions of a 
vastly different scale, within the radically new (and yet radically 
old) order of an agricultural pale set in virgin Nature - this trans- 
plantation formally instituted at 'Cambridge' Massachusetts in 1636: 
at precisely the period, then, then I take to mark'the turning-point 
in the overall theoretical transition from thirteenth-century Schol- 
asticism to the Romanticism of around 1800. If one takes Berkeley's 
ultimately unsuccessful project of establishing an ideal educational 
institution in the Bahamas, and his two-year stay (1729-31) in Rhode 
Island, writing Alciphron, as marking a subordinate turning-point 
across the Atlantic from Europe in an american parallel to the 
european transition from around 1650, 'Scientific Revolution', to 
around 1800, then here is a sequence in my reading leading down from 
that point to the Pragmatism of 1870-1930, which latter might itself 
be taken to, turn about William James' epochal lecture, at the close 
of the century, at the flew university whose very name proclaims 
the model of transposition from East to West to be the eighteenth- 
century project of the man who wrote 'Westward the course of Empire 
takes its way': Berkeley. 
836 EDWARDS, Jonathan The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the 
Spirit of God (Boston 1741) ed & intr ! Zesley 
London 1742 
837 A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the 
Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom 
of the Will.. Boston 1754 
838 FRANKLIN, Benjamin Works (incl Autobiography) London 1793 
839 JEFFERSON, Thomas & The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen 
others 
united States of America (Philadelphia: In 
Congress, July 4,1776) face 
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840 BUCHANAN, Joseph The Philosophy of Human Nature Richmond, 
Kentucky 1812 
841 POE, Edgar Allan Works (1827-48) ed Quinn & O'Neill 
1946 
842 EMERSON, Ralph Waldo 
843 Essays (from The Dial Boston 184o-4) 
Boston (1841-4) 
844 Representative Men (lects in London 1847) 
London 1850 
845 THOREAU, Henry David On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (Boston 1849) 
846 Walden, or Life in the Woods (Boston 1854) 
London 18 ; with (845) ed 
847 WHITMAN, Walt Leaves of Grass (Brooklyn 1855) 
848 Specimen Days in America 
849 JAMES, Henry Snr Lectures and Miscellanies IiY 1852 
850 The Nature of Evil NY 1855 
851 Literary Remains ed with Life, William James 
Boston 1884 
852 SARGENT, Mary Elizabeth Sketches and Reminiscences of the Radical 
& others Club of Chestnut Street, Boston 
Boston 1880 
853 JAMES, William Principles of Psychology NV 1890 
854 The Will to Believe and other Essays 
(18 -) 
855 The Varieties of Religious Experience' 
(lects 1901-2) London 1903 
cccclxxxv 
856 Pragmatism (lects 1907) 
857 Letters* ed Henry James London 1920 
858 JAMES, Henry Notes of a Son and Brother* London 1914 
859 PEIRCE, Charles Sanders Collected Papers ed Hartshorne, Weiss R" Burks 
Cambridge Mass 1931-58 
860 GALLIE, V'J B Peirce and Pragmatism iiirmondsworth 1952 
861 ROYCE, Josiah The World and the Individual(Gif=ord lccts 
1899-1900) NY 1900 
862 SANTAYANA, George Egotism in German Philosophy" NY/London 
1919; rev 1939 
863 WHITEHEAD, Alfred North The Concept. of Nature Cambridge 1920 
864 Symbolism- Its. Meaning and Effect NY 1927 
865 Process and Reality Cambridge 1929 
866 Adventures of Ideas Cambridge 1933 
867 LEWIS, Clarence Irving A_Survey of Symbolic Logic (ýeticeley 1918)NY 
868 Mind and the World Order NY(1929)19 
869 MEAD, George Herbert Mind, Self and Society (lects)ed Morris 
d 1931 Chicago 1934 
870 DEWEY, John How we Think NY 1910 
871 Reconstruction in Philosophy NY 1920 
872 SCHNEIDER, Herbert A History of American Philosophy 
NY/London (1946) 1963 
As for context, a few more texts: 
873 H0: 'STADTER, Richard 
874 CARROLL, Peter & 
NOBLE, David 
875 WRIGHT, Esmond 
The American Political Tradition NY (1948) 
The Free and the Unfree* NY 1977' 
Washington and the American Revolution 
London 1957 
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'Pragmatism$: a new name for some... very... old ways of thinking; 
a thinking about 'how we think'... which recognises itself in 
standing-back from, questioning, the part of actor and thinker 
abstractly projected in all the old european books of 'theory' 
from a logic which works through the 'internal' space of the 
words and books of exposition, theory, 'thinking', purporting in 
this progress, to be working through the question posed by the 
symmetry of that verbal space of framing The World, and The World, 
there framed, in which this exposition takes place. In fact, of 
course, this presents us in each case with a logical identification 
of the locus of the inquiry pursued through the words, in their 
supposedly unitary external 'context, 'the World'. Yet the unitary 
structure of this 'World' is itself a mere correlate of our starting 
from an abstract logic, in order to transpose its axis of question 
and assertion into what is in that abstraction framed as 'outside' 
it. The fact that each thinker takes a fair time to reorganise 
his new axis of questions and answers - his 'new theory' - around 
the new starting-point initially marked in relation to the old 
theory - marked indeed in the frame of the old theory as the new 
axis about which theory is to be reorganised - reflects the circum- 
stance that the practical dynamic from which the old theory had 
abstracted to an 'internal' abstract image within its formal 
structure of substitutions in language pur7orting to be a perfect 
substitute for the wider order of substitutions of which the substi- 
tution of sign for thing is only one dimension or variety, actually 
'works' differently from its image in the old space and time of 
abstraction. 
The 'pragmatist', now, finds himself not in some 'part' 
which has been projected from some previous 'internal' logic of 
theory out into 'the World' as theatre. of substitutions for that 
basic part (subjectivity, producer or whatever), through the initial 
identification of the new locus of question, assertion, acti-gin and 
so on as the focus of symmetry of old theory and old World which 
the old 'abstract' theory framed 'in theory' as its context, whose 
new 'grammar' will be emancipated from the embedding of the new 
focus in the matrix of the old theory in a sort of practical 'break' 
out from abstraction which cannot be understood merely in theory': 
he finds himself, rather, precisely 'at work' in the practical 
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business of differentiating himself, others, and the objects and 
institutions of the 'real World' outside theory and its abstract 
'fictional' logic of substitutions of its terms and their 'theoretic- 
al' grammar in the theory, from the theoretical pictures of all these 
things which are so to speak coordinate with each logic of embedding 
of logic in some new theatre with some new practical dynamic, each 
theory of transposition of theory into 'context'. And this new 
'part' of the theorist, the systematic thinker, evolves towards 
the turn of the century, in America, in or on the scene of 'psycho- 
logical laboratory' and 'laboratory school': in a very theatre of 
playing with various formulations of the radically 'practical' 
dynamic of our actual thinking as we 'internally' frame situations 
in which we are involved 'in our head', in thought, in response to 
new developments which go beyond our earlier picture or model or 
identifications of the various parts and things and workings in which 
we are involved, and the 'grammar' so to speak, or empirical syntax, 
of all the various elements in our situation. In the 'laboratory' 
we can actually control the number of such elements or varir, bles, 
and work through particular configurations, 'theatres' indeed, 'plays' 
perhaps, actions and interactions, rather as the writer of theory 
had earlier worked through the interplay of various elements and 
their abstract logical syntax or grammar, in the internal space of 
his theoretical text, working at the same time, perhaps, through the 
imaginary theatre constituted by the imagined interplay of the variots 
elements of the 'external world' identified with the various theor- 
etical terms, as the writing charts a passage in imagination through 
that 'real' theatre in which the various terms are asserted to truly 
belong, framed by the initial configuration of embedding of logic 
in World arrived at through bringing the abstraction of an earlier 
starting-point and image of 'the World', 'into question': into a 
question which is at once an iteration of the movement of questioning 
which had articulated earlier theory, and at the same time the opening 
of a new frame and axis of questioning, with a new identification of 
the theorist's part in his new World as locus of the new questioning. 
The 'part' of thinking, then, whether framing 'artificial' 
experiments in thinking, or in that 'educational' prodess which is 
the 'artificial' theatre of eduction of a working social identity 
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or part, through systematic differentiation of self and things 
from partial, confused, unworkable, un-worked-out images, in that 
theatre of imaginary constructions and their bringing-into-question 
in relation to real or imagined experience and its working (which 
so often refutes and confounds the im9ginary working which we 
project in trought) - the classroom of discussion and experiment- 
ation - or the part of thinking, indeed, as it frames this con- 
figuration of psychology and education in a provisional formulation 
in the 'pragmatist's' reflections, papers, lecture-series, books, 
seminars, reading and so on - all this last being just his or her 
part which one may call that of 'theorist' by a limited analogy 
with earlier systematic reflection carried out in abstraction 
from its cultural context - this part, these parts, of thinking, 
may all be considered, provisionally, as so many 'workings' of 
what we mark by the term 'thought', in so many different but inter- 
acting situations: the common figure, in Peirce's formulation, of 
the activity one is thrown into, or finds oneself engaged in, 
when an unquestioned habit or expectation suddenly encounters 
something counter to expectation - when the scenario we had been 
as it were unconsciously"engaged"in suddenly gives way to the 
scenario of something differentiating itself from its part (perhaps 
absence) in the initial scenario. 
Now in relation to earlier theory, this assertion of 
theory, science, as simply systematic thinking, which comes to 
self-consciousness, theory of theory, 'philosophy' and logic, 
when it eventually begins just to question 'thinking' as one 
component of the world or situation it is systematically investi- 
gating -a component in which, like World, Life and so on, it 
has of course been unconsciously engaged all along - this mpkes 
all earlier 'philosophy', or system of 'everything' formally 
organised as system of answers by an initial fiction of the 
locus of theory itself as being in some identification with a 
term that properly only marks an ongoing function of different- 
iation from some identification with some 'part' - this makes 
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all those almost countless books of theory so much fiction, so 
many stories spun out within a millenial dynamic of a verbal 
logic that works through its texts, as it works in imagination 
through an imaginary theatre substituted for its actual context, 
whose elements are identified by the various abstract terms of 
the theory or story, their relations determined by the abstract 
grammar of fregean substitutions at various points in the verbal 
chains of sentence, paragraph, chapter, book, with the whole de- 
termined by the abstract substitution of book for World, and locus 
of question and answer in that verbal matrix substituted for the 
actual locus of action - including the writing of theory - in the 
real context which, through the millenial tradition, constantly 
distinguishes itself from 'theories', while no theory takes any 
practical notice of this one constant factor, this one constant 
character of its nominal 'object', to differ from its framing in 
a book. 
In particular, the very image of a unitary 'World' which 
could in principle be framed 'in' a theory, is - following ironically 
the etymological equivalence of 'fiction' and 'creation's itself 
pure fiction, coordinate with the circular path from a particul^r 
situ.. tion to a theory and logic which abstracts from its embedding 
in its time and place and circumstances, only then to theoretically 
set its abstracted line of pure theoretical questioning and its 
formal matrix of purely logical substitution as universal armature 
of 'any language', through the question posed by the symmetry of 
that logical dimension and its formally coordinate dimensions of 
'context', 'back' in the sum of this related abstrnct dimensions 
as its 'World', in which the situation of theoretical deuction of 
such an abstract universal frame is then itself to be supposed 
embedded and understood. Mundum est fabula. 
De to fabula narratur: and a 'religious' story or uni- 
versal scenario rooted in the part of finding one's part in the 
story or cosmic drama, may work just as well, in principle, as, 
say, the converse undramatic 'scientific' picture articulated 
about the part of distinction from any such identification, the 
part of unlimited questioning and its finality of imaginary Truth 
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abstracted from the question of the consequences of such a part 
in the specific situations in which it is adopted. In many nodal 
cases, nineteenth-century 'theory' passed through the sort of 
crisis, breakdown, conversion scenerio that James discusses in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience: in pirticulnr, his own 
'part' of turn-of-th-century 'pragmatist' emerged, as he narrates 
there in a fictional displacement to his 'french correspondent', 
through just such a transition from abstract questioning to a paart 
opened up as this questioning, and the previous identity of the 
theorist's 'I' implicated in, organised by, and organising it, comes 
in nietzschean manner to confront itself, and call itself into 
question and both theoretical and personsl, dramatic, impasse. 
I suggested a complementarity between turn-of-the-cen- 
tury russian 'activism' to the East of the millenial theatre of 
european theory, and american 'pragmatism' to the West: to the 
East a passage from the old 'closed' culture of tzarist autocracy, 
through political revolution, to a new 'theoretical' autocracy 
framed by the emergence of a superior or more successful scenario 
of unitary national or post-imperial soviet culture organised in 
terms of the part of defining or assuming one's part in the tran- 
sition from old byzantine Russia and its pre-capitalist system of 
feudal circuits of power, ideology, identity, part, through the 
focussing of the machinery of transition in emergent industrialisat- 
ion and its relatively more open circuits of 'alienation', to one's 
natural, 'scientific' part in the circuit of rationally organised 
culture as collective provision of life in material Nature. The 
'part' of each in this new religion of rationally plAnned culture 
was simply to find his or her part as this was progressively defined 
in the various scenes and levels of interaction with others engaged 
in the same self-discovery or self-definition in the evolution or 
revolution of the global, or at least soviet russian, organic sum 
of parts. 
What William James' b: other surveyed as 'The American 
Scene' at the turn of the century, on the other hand, might be 
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characterised by a converse figure of practical restructuring 
of various strands of european theory and its institutional 
contexts, within the tradition which leads down from the seven- 
teenth century village community transplanted from Europe to 
an isolated forest clearing on the north-american coast, rather 
than down from seventeenth-century importation of european cul- 
ture into the tradition of a single slavonic Rus or 'space' of 
action converging towards the european tradition through medieval 
absorption of the closed byzantine model of culture which remained 
throughout those 'middle ages' as a sort of static mirror of the 
point of emergence of distinctly western, latin, Europe, with the 
close of classical Antiquity. The american part taken on by 
William James and then John Dewey, lies in an 'open' dynamic of 
progressively re-framing scenario and part in it, up to the point 
at the close of the nineteenth century when Turner could define 
american history in terms of the dynamic axis of such constant 
reframing of the scene as village pales coalesced into broader 
communities, towns and trade emerged, states with indeterminate 
western boundaries, new states to the west within a broader con- 
federation, then a western seabord and a conflict of North and 
South, and finally reconstruction and integration as the whole 
finally took on the character of a_unitary organism growing with 
the strength of this dynamic tradition, moving onto the global 
stage, having fulfilled the condition set out by Hegel at the 
beginning of the century: the 'Land of the Future' could only 
enter into World History once it became a unity of activity 
'within a fixed frontier'. - Up to the point where american 
'pragmatism' could find the part of America in theory, and theory 
in America, precisely in the part of questioning formulptions 
of things, parts, processes, institutions and all the rest, by 
testing such formulation within the radical scenario of an 
'experience' in which things differentiated themselves from 
our characterisations and expectations of them, and we distingu- 
ished ourselves from various images of ourselles - and in part- 
icular from images of what our theory and thinking might me - 
and discovered the 'working' of theory and thinking, and the 
radical locus at last of our self-assertion as judging inquirer, 
in our differing from abstract theories of this part of theory 
whose working we found in this differentiation within our own 
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experience of ourselves. 
This figure of the theorist, and this scenario of theory 
around the turn of the century, focussed in the part of William 
James' self-discovery in such a part, evolving 'Lrom the crisis in 
the years around 1870, to the assumption of Peirce's l bel of 
'pragmatism' around the turn of the century, may be taken as a 
sort of transitional focus or node of the various lines of develop- 
ment of 'p-3rtial' questionings of hegelian abstraction, developed 
in various european schools of 'philosophy' and 'science' over the 
course of the century. The recognition of the locus of theory in 
the part of distinguishing oneself from some part or image of this 
locus in an abstract scenario which is so to speak a 'fictional' 
projection 'back' into 'the World' from an abstract image of the 
locus of questioning and theory typified by Hegel's Reason progressively 
distinguishing itself from any particul'r part in the universal con- 
text of the Logic it organises around this abstraction - this may 
itself be taken as a radical conversion of the hegelian movement 
from Romantic confusi©n of 1800 to the mature system of the 1820s 
organised by the abstraction of Reason and the Idea from the young 
Hegel himself, against the background of the 'hegelian' dominance 
in American 'philosophy over the last decades of the century. I 
tried to coordinate this part of William James, itself elaborated 
over the first three decades of the twentieth century into Dewey's 
systematic pragmatism of the 1920s, with various analogues or cor- 
relates within what emerge. over the turn of the century as so many 
dimensions of a Modernity no longer confined to the old european 
theatre: in 'theory' I identified 'modern' logic, physics, psychology, 
aesthetics, theology and ontology in terms of the final programmatic 
rel3quishing of the attempt to define the transposition from the 
old 'abstract' axes of deduction in these theories to a new order of 
questions 'in terms of' the old abstract starting-point. The situat- 
ion is epitomised by the various 'crises of foundations' typified by 
paradoxes in the new 'set theory' developed by Dedekind, Frege, 
Cantor and others: by the loss of the old 'fictions' of those primary 
abstractions - immediate self-consciousness; self-identical and auto- 
nomous 'object' behind its empirical 'phenomenology'; unitary 'per- 
spective' in painting, literature, theatre, music (rather than a 
dynamic of assertion and differentiation in a play of perspectives); 
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universal 'absolute' Spice and Time independent of our being in 
it, and definite physical quantities and properties independent of 
their measurement, observation.. determination; abstract logic of 
inscription of Book in determinate universal cosmic History or 
Drama coordinate with that universal Script. 
James' , Dewey's, Peirce's, Mead's 'pragmatism' - or 
rather, making a pluralistic virtue out of the vice attributed 
by Lovejoy to the label: 'pragmatisms' - present(s) both a common 
model for each of these more specific analogues in particular 
'dimensions' of turn-of-the-century 'theory' finding its previous 
logic an abstraction from a dynamic of questions rooted in acticn 
and interaction (particular 'modern' phases of the various theories 
or sciences or whatever one now calls them); and at the same time 
confronts each of these more specific domains or dimensions of 
explicitly 'modern' or 'modernist' inquiry with the question posed 
now by the very abstraction of each as nominally separate theory 
of one particular component of what each implicitly determines as 
a radically primary coordination of the various dimensions of the 
common 'modern' World of which they are the respective 'theories'. 
For once we relinquish in each 'domain' the analogue of a 'pure' 
logical space of logical inclusion and exclusion, which logically 
'excludes' from its dynamic of deduction the 'external' configurat- 
ion of its actual marking or framing, and with this 'space' relin- 
quish also the elementary 'points' or indivisible terms of that 
particular domain, we are in this so to speak already halfway back 
to the everyday confusion and interplay of various dimensions and 
terms, elements, of our non'-theoretical or pre-theoretical exper- 
ience in which the new 'logic' of pragmatism finds the primary 
dynamic of questions of which any theory must be seen as simply 
a more or less systematic elaboration or architecture developed 
(for reasons relating to the institutional context of the theory) 
in some particular direction: a primary an ineluctable embedding 
in everyday activity and everyday questions from which the old 
logics and theories were - as it now turns out illicitly or illog- 
ically - abstracted. Abstracted from the 'pragmatic' question of 
their embedding as system of questions and answers in the practical 
business of life, of human interaction in Nature, as all, together, 
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belonging to merely one dimension of that drama, which they had 
been thought to set as a whole within some wider, more regular, 
abstract 'universal', unitary, theoretical space and time. 
I have already alluded (in discussing Becker's lectures 
on the Enlightenment as proposing just such a 'utopia' of theory, 
and thereby engendering a revolutionary breakdown of practical 
everyday life) to the 'New History' associated in America with 
Robinson and Beard from around the turn of the century, and directly 
parallelling the 'Pragmatism' of James and Dewey. One may set the 
'new' history in the wider context leading in Europe, then America, 
from French Revolution, Romanticism, and Industrial Revolution 
through the dominance of the german school of Niebuhr and Ranke 
in the nineteenth century, to various turn-of-the century quest- 
ionings. of Rankes 'noble dream' (to cite Beard's characterisation 
of that 'Universalgeschichte'): 
876 STERN, Fritz The Varieties of History NY (1956) enlgd 
London/NY 1970 
... and such a history of historiography, modelled on the narrower 
framing by Geyl of french 'histories' of the napoleonic transition 
into the historical frame of that writing (already noticed) itself 
reflects the turn-of-the century recognition that the historian is 
himself always in the widest frame in which he organises his mater- 
ial - that Ranke's project or projection of a universal objective 
'scientific' dynamic of questions, coordinated in the diplomatic 
interface of texts and the actions to which they relate, through 
the gradual association of each primary source with a definite 
position in the action on which it is a perspective, is, historically 
speaking, a dream, a 'fable', that may itself be associated with 
Ranke's own position in mid-nineteenth-century Prussia. 
Dilthey over the turn of the century, as I have noticed, 
went so far as to, so to speak, $stand Ranke on his heads: to-in- 
vert the 'scientific historian's' project of inscription of Geist 
in Natur, moral in natural sciences: one was to write history, 
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that primary frame of the Geisteswissenschaften - and so also 
of the historically evolving human theories of Nature, of that 
cultural activity we call Naturwissenschaften - not by system- 
atically distancing or detaching oneself from the 'parts' in the 
action one was reconstructing of its principal actors, but rather 
through the converse process of identification with them: not set- 
ting human interaction, through the inscription, ultimately, of 
Culture in Nature, in that universal mathematical frame of exper- 
ience and inquiry corresponding to the (fictional) part of the 
'scientist' (though we may even understand this activity of science 
and 'scientific history' by identifying with that fictional identi- 
fication) - but seeking in history rather, so to speak, the greater 
aristotelian truth of Poetry; understanding the working of a spe- 
cific textual configuration through its progressive inscription 
in its extra-textual context - as this is itself unfolded in the 
historian's text - by working out from our primary experience of 
the dramatic embedding of our thought and its texts in the dynamic 
of interpersonal interaction, in the progressive nesting of fig- 
ures of such embedding in which we know ourselves, but re3tructured, 
as it were, to end up back with, say, the young Hegel, rather than 
with us, where it begins. Or rather - working back and forth be- 
tween the 'I' of the young Hegel, and of me - or Dilthey rather - 
within the overall symmetry of these two 'I's in their common 
figure of embedding as actors in a common dynamic of inscription 
of thought in script in action - History being a sort of notional 
limit of this process which would involve my identification with 
and understanding of all the actors past and present, and all the 
working of their collective interaction - which would effectively 
be my complete dissolution in History, as me. 
Thus here, at the turn of the century, historiography 
becomes as it were a special case of the novel: of that textual 
embedding of the script of an action in a verbal nprration of 
the extra-textual components of the action. Writing history - 
always a history, a narration of an action abstracted like a 
drama or novel from the notional 'wider' context (traced by 
Ranke through the major component strands of his projected 
'universal' history) - is a sort of 'scientific' literature, 
in that - in Dilthey's case at any rate - the 'narrative' frame 
of the drama related is elaborated in the interplay, tyr, icnlly, 
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of two historically separated processes of thinking: in partic- 
ular, two historically separated versions, 'theories' in some 
sense, of this process of understanding oneself and one's part 
in the World or context of the earlier texts, and one's own - 
two versions, then, of this 'communication' of History as radical 
frame of one's part in a world of texts and contexts, actions and 
interactions. 'History', then, becomes a universal drama, writing 
'history' the most direct line of inquiry into one's part in the 
drama, through communication and interchange of thought about the 
various components of this History 'across' spatial and temporal 
separation, through written texts. Thinking tries to-comprehend 
the Action in which this thinking is one component; and it does 
not begin in some nominal abstraction from its own position in 
the action, but rather begins precisely in the experience of 
radical engagement, inscription, embedding, incarnation, in the 
Action, along with others whose 'positions' or perspectives one 
can frame from one's own position, then by 'communication' through 
the common figure of framing the Action from a point in it, one 
may slowly begin to articulate, like different people seeing each 
other from different places in a common space of that seeing and 
its communication, a working understanding, and formulation, of 
such space and position. This rather as Einstein was reformulating 
a 'relativistic' physical Space and Time, in terms of two observer's 
framings of each other's framings of a common Spatiotemporal separ- 
ation, as each corresponding to different points in the common 
'space-time'. The 'objective' or physical distance or separation, 
is, by definition so to speak, just what is symmetric or common 
in the two formulations of difference of place and time from the 
two different places and times. It was Berkeley's recognition of 
visual space as precisely a practical construct, rather than an 
'immediate' perception of some frame in which we were ourselves 
seen to be at one particular point rather than another, which 
led Peirce to enrol him as the first of that american school of 
'pragmatists'. 
Ranke's nineteenth-century 'classic' ideal of scientific 
History as universal frame of resolution of all questions relating 
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to a 'Universal History' ending, conveniently, around 1800, 
from 'outside' - or at least from a neutral, objective, 'scient- 
ific' position in the universal Space and Time of historical 
action that had been discovered at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century - his picture of embedding the interaction of the various 
parts attested by the primary sources or script of the Action, 
through progressive abstraction from all those parts, as each 
is inscribed as one particular perspective on the Action which 
eventually one comes to see altogether from 'outside', from the 
unitary focus of a fully abstracted scientific position in the 
Space 'outside' the action, a position equally and symmetrically 
abstracted from each of the participants' parts, through a complex 
system of coordinate steps of abstraction from all these different 
views of all these di'ferent views or ierspectives - this formal 
inscription of historiography in the nineteenth-century frame of 
unitary Science, is a direct complement of a 'hermeneutic' approach 
which frames a particular historical drama - typically the biography 
of a thinker or a group of thinkers - the 'Romantic' transition of 
around 1800 forming the ideal element of one's inquiry - in the 
form of a literary dynamic of identifications unfolding from the 
primary figure of identification itself, the elementary categorial 
frame, so to speak, of participation through communication in a 
common Action or actuality, of which questioning thought, inquiry, 
'history' as we call it after Herodotus, is one radical dimension, 
organising the dynamic of inquiry in the question of textual em- 
bedding of that question in its context - in the 'transcendental' 
frame of the coordinate dimensions of question that may be asked 
of a questioning, an inquiry, corresponding to the various dimensions 
of its inscription or embedding in 'context'. A book of history, 
then, will be articulated as the narration of a drama - say that 
of the unfolding of Hegel's or Novalis! or Schleiermacher's thought 
or questioning - as this questioning unfolds through the historian's 
own text in the symmetry of earlier text or script of inquiry with 
the primary coordinate dimensions of its (now textually related) 
context. The Romantics of 1800 present the ideal subject for such 
historiography, precisely because their own inquiry mirrors the 
structure of its hermeneutic embedding in 'context', as it proceeds 
ccccxcviii 
through the textual exploration of the symmetry and associated 
interplay of 'scientific', narrative or 'historical', and dramatic, 
poetic, 'literary' dimensions of text - or rather of the books, 
scripts, in which this textual dynamic is coupled with the embedding 
of their books or scripts in their lives, and the confusion of Art 
and Life, so characteristic - in principle at least, and to a great 
extent in practice, this typified by Novalis who thus becomes the 
very type of 'Romantic' - of the more 'poetic' of the Rom? ntic writers 
of around 1800. 
Now the complementarity of these two 'external' and 'in- 
ternal' frames of historiography - history as Ranke's scientific 
articulation of the global political frame of organisation of human 
activity in space and time, and history as literary dramatisation 
of he dynamic evolution of the thought of an individual or a small 
group within wider rankean society as a whole - itself presents a 
radical question for historiography at the beginning of the twentieth 
century: a question, indeed, which one might take as marking the 
very axis of development of Weber's 'scientific' sociology, caught 
in the tension between hermeneutic identification with the individ- 
ual's experience of his part, and 'scientific' coordination of a 
mass of individual parts in their collective interaction with the 
general 'economy' of material life on Earth, as individual rart and 
society as a whole come into relation through an intermediary dynamic 
of types representative of social groups or global differentiations 
(class, religion, sex, age;.. ) within the organism as a whole. At 
the same time that they pose this 'internal' theoretical question 
for historiography, they necessarily pose also the practical quest- 
ion, for each historian, of his writing as itself his part (or an 
element of it, corresponding to the part of 'historian' or group 
of historians) in the wiaer History which includes both his subject 
and himself or herself. Thus Beard, for example, proclaims that 
a historiography organised by just this question can be, and indeed 
should be, a primary progressive and emancipatory force in History, 
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opening up, like a parallel 'pragmatist' philosophy which in- 
quires into the general frame of the particular actions which 
are the subject-matter of the historian, a freer play of parts 
in society, and a greater and more productive freedom of each 
individual to determine his part, to choose, from the various 
frames open in his particular situation. Each individual thus 
ideally tends towards complete democratic freedom and equality 
under the Constitution, there being no more social short-circuits 
so to speak, which confine him in principle to some particular 
part or range of parts, no matter what he may do. Lenin's alto- 
gether 'contemporary' history, conversely, presents the ideal of 
an undifferentiated mass of parts which must be coordinated so 
that each is assigned to a particular function so as to optimise 
the whole and thereby optimise the lot of each of the participants 
in the whole, between whom the fruits of their collective product- 
ion will be equally distributed: the individual's part is precise- 
ly to fix as exactly as possible his or her part, rather than, on 
the american model, to become as free and socially mobile as pos- 
sible. 
Contemporary' history: where traditional historians 
enter into the discussion of the recent past avowing great reluct- 
ance, since their account must necessarily as it approaches their 
own part in the Action become tinged with subjectivity and a parti.. l 
perspective, Lenin writes the history of his own time avowedly in 
order to make history: the participation of the historian in the 
events he narrates is not to be reduced to an academically accept- 
able minimum, but its 'partiality', its rooting in a particular 
perspective on what it narrates, constitutes for the Irevolution^ry$ 
historian the sole value of his narration. 
Barraclough considers.; or at least considered... 
877 BARrACLOUGH, Geoffrey An Introduction to Contemporary History 
Harmondsworth 1964 
.. that the passage from nineteenth to twentieth century marks 
the beginning of a transition, not so much from one structure 
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of inquiry to another approach to the same 'object' as defined 
by, say, Niebuhr's latin documents, Ranke's documentation of 
the opening of 'Modern History' in the interplay of latin and 
germanic culture from around 1500, or the systemic transition 
from that old order to a new coupling of various dimensions of 
human activity around 1800, from which the nineteenth-century 
historiographical tradition of analysis of the broader 'western' 
tradition stretching from classical Antiquity down to nineteenth 
century itself derives - but a transition, rather to a new object, 
defined by a global coupling of the various dimensions of europ- 
ean activity to the various coordinate dimensions of their extra- 
european context, as the european dominance of this interplay 
begins to break down or 'come into question' over the turn of 
the century. The historiography of twentieth-century 'european', 
and indeed 'World' history, has structured the history of break- 
down of 'internal' european dominance of the relations of Europe 
and World, and of the disintegration of the nineteenth-century 
internal coherence of Europe associated with this wider transit- 
ion, in the old frame of the 'european' dynamic bequeathed by 
Ranke and his heirs. Rather should european history, and the 
history of european internal disintegration over the period of 
what Europe sees as 'the two World Wars', be itself inscribed in, 
and its dynamic reconstructed in, the wider global frame: and 
this, then, in large measure as the history of european failure 
to frame its activity in such a changing context. Twentieth- 
century european politicians have in large measure precipitated 
internal breakdown precisely by framing their self-image and 
political aims within an obsolete model of an autonomous european 
order of questions abstracted from the wider context it tradit- 
ionally controls, and thus in the application of the old model 
to relations it no longer represents, generated a still wider 
divergence of traditional picture from the tragic reality which 
can alone explain this vicious circle of failure - as it might 
also explain an earlier circuit of apparent european dominance 
of the relations of Europe and World as rather the temporary 
self-confirmation of an abstract representation of the World 
through the success of that representation of History in the 
abstract picture or History it framed. The eurocentric vision 
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presents within the wider frame of World History the cyclical 
dynamic of a myth which over the transition from nineteenth to 
twentieth century passes from the rising phase of self-confirmation 
to the declining phase of self-destruction, as it systematically 
misinterprets, like Oedipus, the practical consequences of its 
misrepresentation or misinterpretation of 'the World' and its part 
in 'the World'. 
Barraclough, writing in 1963, just before Kennedy's 
assassination, took the latter's election in 1961 as marking the 
passage into a new structure of 'contemporary history',, in the 
aftermath of the first true 'World War' (the 'Great War' was es- 
sentially a european conflict, the breakdown, precisely, of that 
closed 'World'; and on a global scale the World War was a diffuse 
transition into a new post-colonial world order, not defined by 
the beginning and end of formal hostilities in Europe). Kennedy 
had fought in the Pacific theatre, and his perception of the new 
East-West and North-South axes of world economy and geopolitics, 
and of the ideological axes associated with these - Dewey and 
Beard's democracy against Lenin and Stalin's world plan; decolon- 
isation - presented for the first time a (north-western) focus of 
framing activity in the global theatre, now first perceived as 
such, emancipated from the abstract analyses, pictures, institu- 
tions that, even before the great european war of 1914-18, had 
ceased to 'work'. 
Barraclough's sketch of 1963 is of course in many ways 
premature. Kennedy was, after all, born in the most european of 
all american cities, before the 'Second World War', and, insofar 
as he did free himself from a european'perception of 'the World', 
only exchanged it for that 'northwestern' or american myth which 
may itself be taken as only one axis of transition from the millen- 
ial abstraction of the european 'theatre' of History into a sym- 
metric global dynamics of Culture or cultures articulated as so 
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many less or more autonomous systems of economic, political, lin- 
guistic, ideological, theoretical abstraction of the activity of 
groups of rational animals, featherless bipeds, from a common ter- 
restrial Nature, its geophysical frame set in astrophysical 'solar 
system', in physical 'spacetimet. 
Zeitgeschichte: Barraclough borrows his characterisation 
of 'contemporary history' opening up in the transition from nine- 
teenth to twentieth century, from the Institut für Zeitgeschichte 
established at Munich at mid-century, after the second european 
catastrophe of the twentieth century: as archive of primary material 
for analysis of, and through this collective national distancing 
from, the tragic cultural frame of the first half of the century, 
dominated by an ideology of collective identification with a certrin 
part in History: 
878 CHAMBERLAIN, Houston Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts 
Stewart 
879 ROSENBERG, Alfred Der Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts 
Munich 1930 
The history of Europe, and thus indeed of the World 
whose dynamic axis is just this emergent dominance of its external 
context by Europe, as driven by the tension of an organic inte- 
grative frame of graeco-germanic, aryan, activity, with as one-of 
its primary components the tradition of framing the integrative 
drama as itself one integral part of what it frames, _set against 
a converse parasitic force of disintegration, the semitic germs, 
sown in Antiquity, which organises a european Jewish tradition df 
abstraction from integration, framed by the coordination of scat- 
tered Jewish 'parts' in the fiction of a wider other-worldly 
drama. Chamberlain traced the dynamic through the breakdown of 
the initial greek impulse of Antiquity in the disintegration of 
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roman unitary Empire as its practical direction was systematically 
sapuied by parasitic semitic mythology and its conversion of pract- 
ical institutions into the machinery of their own destruction, 
then through germanic reassertion of order in the reintegration of 
the ruined structures of Antiquity in gothic revival, renaissance 
of Antiquity, and reform, disintegrative forces then growing again 
upon this healthy structure down to the period of the French Revo- 
lution. This dynamic then framed the transition into the twentieth 
century as marking the critical point where germanic order must 
recognise the tension at work and reassert itself once more, or 
perish in the gathering twilight. The critical part of the british 
wagnerian Chamberlain in the great drama was to pose this question 
of their part to each of the players, and thus induce the critical 
reassertion of the aryan frame in which its framing played throughout 
the maintenance of the tradition a crucial practical part: no detached 
abstract history this. By 1930 Rosenberg would have organised the 
analysis of the complementary nineteenthrcentury germs of Jewish 
capitalism and communism, extending Chamberlain's history both into 
the wider frame of its embedding in a universal 'biology' of the 
two traditions, aryan organic culture and semitic germ of disinte- 
gration, in a natural history of fight to the death of Culture it- 
self - and into the radically 'contemporary history' of the veriod 
since 1800, down to the focus of the struggle in Germany in 1930, 
where his history was explicitly and avowedly organised as 'myth' 
both practically integrated within the activity of the rising National 
Socialist Movement, and at the same time framing the dynamic and 
practical tactics of that Movement. 
One may compare-, as indeed I did compare in Part III9 the 
transition from Chamberlain's turn of the century dynamics into 
which his framing of the dynamic itself entered as one 'critical' 
or revolutionary component, opening up a new order of ideological 
questions, to Rosenberg's systematisation of its 'Myth' as one 
dimension of the Nazi Movement it framed in a global narrative, 
with Stalin's systematisation of Lenin's Revolution, Dewey's sys- 
tematisation of James' Pragmatism or Mussolini's ideology of his 
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'fascist' movement: 
880 MUSSOLINI, Benito 'Fascismo'* in Enciclopedia Italiana (vol 
XIV) Florence 1932 
... and one may compare Rosenberg's avowal of all theory and history 
as fundamentally story, 'myth', whose truth lies in its practical 
consequences in the order of activity it serves to frame and in- 
form, with Spengler's nominally detached biology or 'morphology' 
of History: 
881 SPENGLER, Albert Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse 
einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte 
Munich(1918-22)1923 tr Atkinson NY 1926-8 
.. and Benda's practical attempt to raise the alarm against the im- 
pending disastrous practical consequences of european theory's 
rising contagion of disavowal of its traditional detachment, its 
abstraction from practical, and more particular political, consid- 
erations in its questioning and response: 
882 BENDA, Julien La Trahison des Cleres" Paris 1927 
... and, finally, one may confront the question posed by Rosenberg's 
attempt at unitary 'ideological' articulation of National Socialism, 
in the elaboration of its global frame, inscribed as one practical 
component or dimension of the Movement thus framed, in its interplay 
with that actual political part of the actor in whom the Movement 
was practically focussed, which we may guage by that component of his 
activity which was his histrionic dictation of his part up to the 
Munich Putsch, while consequently imprisoned: 
883 HITLER, Adolf Mein Kampf' Munich (1925-6) 1930 
together with a couple of perspectives on the part of that writing 
in the architect manque's biography, and the part of that biography 
in the Movement and its european and global context: 
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884 MASER, Werner Hitlers Mein Kampf* Munich 1966 
885 Adolf Hitler: Legende Mythos Wirklichkeit* 
Munich 1971 
886 RICH, Norman Hitler's War Aims London 1974 
887 BULLOCK, Alan Hitler: A Study in Tyranny 
.. and a play of different perspectives on the interplay of ideo- 
logical and political dimensions of various parallel cultural 
dynamics or 'movements' in vari us different countries that are 
all (... ideologically... ) grouped together under the single word, 
'fascism': 
888 LAQUEUR, Walter (ed) Fascism. A Reader's Guide London/NY 1976 
.. which is framed as a coordination of questions organising the 
vast mass of primary and secondary literature around the fundamental 
question marked by this word. 
Fascism: Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Laval - and ranged 
against them in the european theatre Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, 
De Gaulle: so many 'national' frames of activity focussed in one 
leading part or role; so many political structures organised as 
theatrical spectacles in which all parts are coordinated in these 
central parts of national self-assertion. Hitler, for example, 
directing the various dimensions of the Movement and New Order, 
as arbiter between contending ministries and deputies, could co- 
ordinate Rosenbergs ideology and Goebbels propaganda, as ideolo- 
gically the nominal instance of determination of the part of its 
ideological representation in the Movement or Order which it framed 
in more or less unitary global terms, this as part of the general 
role of coordinating the various ends of other ministries, which 
Goebbels could support or facilitate through suitable reuresent- 
ations. 
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Hitler, then, impersonating simply the part of aryan 
assertion, at the focus of Rosenberg's mythical global m? trix of 
the great struggle for Order: Hitler taking on more and more com- 
pletely the direction of the struggle as framed by his 'ideologist', 
becoming so to speak the dramatic analogue of the instance of ger- 
manic assertion which structures Rosenberg's text of 1930, and 
Hitler himself acting thenceforth as the actual persona, the very 
embodiment of 'wirklichkeit' by which the truth of the representat- 
ion of his assertion in the ideologist's text may itself be judged: 
this attesting precisely the 'pragmatic' definition of truth there 
proposed - the truth about the FHhrer as embodiment of germanic 
Will, is by definition, apodictically, what the FHhrer himself 
assents to in the representation presented to him by Rosenberg. 
In the more 'theoretical' terms of BHumler as minister of Pedagogy, 
Hitler is the 'living reality' from which the formal place of assert- 
ion as 'Dasein' is but a 'cold abstraction'. Hitler becomes towards 
1940 the model for all parts in his New Order, its representative 
persona or personification; his book becomes a ritual script, printed 
now like a bible, and given to all couples on the occasion of civil 
matrimony. Like the european version or representation of european 
relations with the external world, before they began to break down 
over the turn of the century, the 'myth' and associated order is, 
until it comes into direct conflict with other versions and 'parts' 
which do not accept that 'De to fabula narratur', self-confirming, 
actually organising what it presents as the World more and more in 
accordance with that presentation: it 'works', and is therefore, 
ipso facto 'true', a theatrical spectacle whose mythic truth reveals 
the abstract Truth of all the Jewish intellectuals of the new dias- 
pora of 1933 as merely the most cunning part of that great semitic 
Lie. 
The fable seems to confirm its own truth and its own 
version of 'truth' over the thirties, as these who frame the dyn- 
amic of their reflection in Dewey's educative self-differentiation 
from any fixed identification or part, physically abstract themselves 
from the physical scene of the hitlerian spectacle, the german Boden. 
A majority, including Laqueur, find themselves sooner or later, 
after 1933, in the America of Dewey and Roosevelt; and the experience 
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'from outside', from a complementary position - in Rosenberg's 
own terms - of 'semitic abstraction' from an unwelcome part 
(eventually of simple elimination) in the Nazi fable organising 
the 'truth' of the History it frames by, as it might first have 
appeared to Rosenberg and Hitler, working to organise that History 
in its own image, leads Laqueur, in the aftermath of the cata- 
clysmic spectacle of Gbtzenddmmerung, to embed the failure of 
the Nazi myth of racial identification and Order in a wider his- 
torical order, evincing in the lesson of National Socialism, of 
the part of Hitler, a Practical Reason, a moral truth, behind 
the european tragedy... 
889 LAQUEUR, Walter Europe since Hitler: the Rebirth of Europe 
NY/Harmondsworth 1982 (rev ed of The Re- 
birth of Europe, 1970, with 'Afterword': 
'Europe in the 'Seventies') 
.. the pragmatic lesson which is just the transposition to the 
complementarity of the american part of 'freedom' in which he 
now finds himself, and the russian part of integration of in- 
dividual roles in unitary soviet activity, of the thirties' op- 
position of Nazi assertion in the germanic frame of the Movement, 
and what Rosenberg identified as complementary Jewish abstrr: ction 
from any such part, from his vital, mythical, tendency toward 
integration in collective self-assertion. Laqueur argues that 
the transition from 'thirties to 'sixties and 'seventies threatens 
a reiteration on the wider global scale of the historical dynamic 
of european Fascism in the interwar period: Europe frames its 
position as so to speak ion the fence' between East and West, as 
if the polarity were essentially stable - but the lesson of Ap- 
peasement is that the underlying dynamic, in which the rise of 
Fascism simply prefigures the rise of soviet communist imperialism 
in its aftermath, from its ruins, naturally tends to make the 
fence more and more subject to soviet control, shifting the 
balance between East on one side and West on the other (or rather 
Russia and America), threatening through such destabilisation to 
precipitate a final conflict which would make the earlier Arma- 
geddon a mere theatrical prelude. 
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From the fence, the perspective is rather different: 
890 STEELE, Jonathan The Limits of Soviet Power NY 1984 (rev 
ed of Soviet Power, 1983) 
1981's 'International Reporter of the Year', standing back from 
his day-to-day ('journalistic') perspective on the details of 
international 'questions', to set in a unitary survey the inter- 
related workings of the various components, finds that, far from 
programmed to grow in the complementarity of a fundamental East- 
West opposition of the two prime players on the global stage (which 
is supposed to dominate the subordinate tension between North and 
South), the soviet 'machine' is in fact constantly struggling 
merely to maintain stability within secure borders, in a global 
dynamic where the dominance of East-West polarity in the immediate 
aftermath of the World War is itself is being progressively reduced. 
Laqueur, on such an analysis, is seeing in his version of soviet 
identity as essentially rooted in a dynamic of creeping expansion 
as it (like fire or aristotelian life) integrates the interface of 
System and World in the configuration of its System, both a false 
analogy with the Movement from which he fled in the nineteen-thirties, 
and at the same time a reflection of his own adopted american creed, 
which has itself maintained its 'progressive' identity in precisely 
such a System of subordination of interface with Context to System. 
One might say that his frustration with european refusal to align 
with traditional postwar american geopolitics is itself a reflection 
of the failure of the United States to maintain its postwar hegemomy, 
to sustain 'fifties ideology as over the 'sixties and 'seventies it 
proves to be less and less workable. 
Eighties' journalism - or rather a journalist in the 
nineteen-eighties attempting to cast his daily perspective on 
details of a notional story or history, in which he is always, 
in principle 'in the middle' (a newspaper is not a book, with 
beginning, middle and end: it begins in the middle of the story, 
selling a new perspective, and ends still in the middle, when 
the perspective, however modified, no longer sells), into a 
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unitary view in a wider historical context than could be repeated 
as prelude, every day, to the new details which emerge day by day. 
The 'news' has to be precisely what is different from yesterday, 
so that the historical context, which remains the same, is simply 
elided from the 'news' - as it were deferred to the end of the 
story (which will never appear in a newspaper) or carried over 
from the previous day (when it was carried over from the days and 
years before, having been initially taken over from the general 
presuppositions of the other newspapers the day it entered the 
market). 
In Part III I took the perspective on its global situat- 
ion in a newspaper, which is itself directly embedded in the scene 
and dynamics on which it is a daily view (in some sense exactly the 
same every day, maintaining so to speak the same 'position' in rel- 
ation to the various components of its context, as these develop 
from day to day - and, as Shaw remarked, exactly the same length 
every day, no matter how much or little 'happens') as characteristic 
of an 'ideological' dimension and associated dynamic, as interface 
between the 'abstract' questions of Theory, and the cultural poetics 
of action (the latter articulated between the 'global' scale of 
internal and external 'policies' of groups directing national acti- 
vities insofar as they are amenable to unitary direction, 'politic- 
ians'). I suggested for example the character of 'Structuralism' 
as a journalist's name for something - some structure, indeed - 
which rendered various parisian 'theories' of the 'sixties more or 
less equivalent in the journalistic or ideological dynamic of lan- 
guage in which the journalist had to embed or present them, and their 
interplay with one another, and with the everyday drama of the 
wider culture or activity in which they were 'theoretical' com- 
ponents. I noted the criticism of the-'sixties old guard in their 
instituted academic abstraction from the embedding of their formal 
questioning in everyday language and culture, in response to the 
success 'in the media' of the so-called 'nouveaux uhilosophes'. 
And I noted a certain irony in the criticism of the embedding of 
'ideas' in the native ideological dynamic of Language and discours, 
mediating the interplay of 'theoretical' and 'practical' questions, 
coming as it did precisely from the 'structuralists' who had pro- 
jected just such a reversal of the parts of Theory and discours. 
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Characteristically, the academic group's repudiation of their 
'image' in 'the media', repudiation of a theoretically question- 
able embedding of ideas in discours and discours in the cultural 
and political dynamic, itself belongs to the part of, and is de- 
fended in terms of, the old abstract 'theory' that they had thought 
to (theoretically) render obsolete. And I suggested that this 
confrontation of what the journalists saw as Old versus New Phi- 
losophy, old against new intellectual fashions, might itself be 
seen as one component in the iteration of the 'sixties step from 
Theory into Language (Language first 'theoretically' regarded as 
unitary matrix on the model of the transcendental space and time 
of subjectivity it was displacing) and the move around 1970 from 
unitary Language to pluralist discours. Since I began writing 
this long book this 'iteration' has progressed (? ) to its 'eighties 
focus in the question or questions of 'Postmodernism', with as 
chief french representative Lyotard's New Myth: 'the truth of a 
story lies in the pragmatics of its social transmission'. Echoes 
of Rosenberg, of Nazi 'ethical decisionism', oddly underlined by 
Lyotard's constant iteration of a rhetorical coupling of "ibstr!, ct 
Enlightenment progress and Universal History with what he supposes 
to be its practical impasse in the death camps of Hitler and Stalin. 
Lyotard's only proof that Rosenberg's avowed 'myth', framing its 
own truth in a version of truth curiously analogous to Lyotard's 
(if only less 'theoretically' inconsistent), lies in the reflection 
(and why even-should we believe'this: there are still those who 
argue that the death-camps were a zionist fiction) that its main 
retailers were physically stopped in their 'transmission' of their 
story by hanging at Nuremberg, suicide at Berlin, or imprisonment. 
That Lyotard's rhetoric is itself only a transitional iteration of 
a slow shifting of the axis of 'theory' from Sartre's mid-century 
drama of subjectivity (in its interplay of theory, journAlism, and 
theatre) through a textual dynamic of inscription in theoretical 
text of a context (with 'subjectivity' as one coordinate) this in- 
scription articulates (around 1970) towards a questioning articu- 
lated in a script in which the textual marking of what is oben in 
the situation of marking itself comes into question as only one 
thing open at each point of its marking, is reflected in the 
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residual abstraction of his assertion from the question of its 
own transmission, and correlative explicit coupling to the relatively 
independent dynamics of non-discursive dimensions of his situation 
as parisian academic. 'On paper' his exposition of his 'ideas'. his 
'position(s)', on the theatrical coupling of ideas and image, space, 
object, dynamics of their coupling abstracted from traditional psy- 
chological subject and physical object, an one floor of that building 
(Beaubourg) where the primary visual axes of twentieth-century explor- 
ation into the coupling of 'subjective' and 'objective' as painting 
and sculpture are coordinated on two further floors, and books ranged 
as a library on two more... the ideas, the story, is engaging. But 
as theatre it was incoherent, far less engaging than, say, Sartre's 
wordy theatre of ideas... even though one was supposedly playing a 
part in the production oneself, rather than 'merely' identifying with 
actors on a closed separate stage. For Sartre's drama was at least 
written as the writer worked through both the internal linguistic 
space of his argument, and in imagination through the physical space 
and time in which it was imagined, and would in fact eventually be, 
spoken, enacted - and one could enter into this coupling of subject- 
ivity and action through the action presented before one on a stage. 
But Lyotard's 'theatre' was still articulated in a textual or indeed 
theoretical dynamic, of his textual embedding of relations of text and 
context in a 'text', where 'action' and 'interaction' are dominated 
by their place in an abstract argument, rather than by the place of 
that argument in partly extra-textual interactions between people and 
things in an Art Gallery. To appreciate the 'exposition' one hid to 
so to speak translate back from the situation in which one found one- 
self, to the textual or discursive position which it 'illustrated'. 
Once again I was different from the notional participant in the 
drama Lyotard had planned on paper. Another fable which didn't al- 
together work. 
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It didn't work. I was different from the notional 
participant in the drama Lyotard had planned on paper. Six months 
before I hRd wandered into the empty apartment in the old Ecole 
Polytechnique at 1, rue Descartes, seeking out the near-invisible 
College set up by Derrida and others under the auspices of the 
first socialist 'government of intellectuals' since the 'thirties, 
as institute for the the investigation of the social institution 
of Theory. Exploring the new 'space' of reflection as one might 
leaf through a new book - for I considered that such an institution 
should be the transposition from book to some new theatre, of the 
old axis of inquiry -I layed aside the proprieties appropriate 
to visiting a stranger's apartment, and having taken a solitary 
black lace brassiere hanging from a peg in the bathroom as confirm- 
ation of my sense of theatricality, I began to look through papers 
on desks and in drawers in the various empty rooms, eventually find- 
ing a couple of large cardboard boxes of photocopied volumes of the 
initial dossier presented by Derrida and others to the minister re- 
sponsible for examining the proposal for a new institute (Chevene- 
ment) in one of the wardrobes in the hallway. I took away a couple 
of copies, together with various other material assembled in my 
'reading' of the new space of inquiry - my new form of research, 
already well known to policemen the world over in their examination 
of new theories bearing on the part of inquiry in the cultural 
order of embodied everyday life. As my search hod proceeded I had 
become more and more self-confident in my impropriety and my ap- 
propriation of College property. Derrida had, after all, spent 
considerable time bringing into question the propriety of propriete 
in its various textual and contextual dimensions, in seminars I had 
attended years before, and I felt that should I be disturbed by 
one of the newly instituted inquirers, I could easily defend my 
activity as precisely the sort of 'interventicn' appropriate to 
the new frame of debate. 
I went away undetected, and having perused the results 
of my new form of research, was somewhat disappointed to trace the 
breakdown of the initial idea of setting ideas in a new dynamic 
of questioning, as this fed through to a merely formal division 
of the new space into 80 many 'sections' of the programme which 
would be covered by academic seminars dotted around the refurbished 
CCCCCXiii 
Polytechnique, and other perfectly traditional institutions of 
theory, nearly all in Paris. When I actually went along to some 
of these seminars, I found that they were indistinguishable in 
form and content from the seminars of the 'old' institution of 
Theory they were explicitly proposed to complement, rather than 
merely augment. And when in one of the seminars I proposed the 
theme of the theatralite of reflection as focus for a traditionally 
abstract discussion, from the podium, of the relation of verbal 
and visual, and suggested that the abstraction from this question 
seemed to me to reflect the continuing abstraction of discussion 
in the new institute from any organisation deriving from its pro- 
posed embedding in a new coupling of ideas and cultural context, 
I was greeted with familiar blank incomprehension: Where did my 
question fit into the line of the seminar director's inquiry? My 
thesis, being precisely my position in the plushly redecorated 
little amphitbeätre at It rue Descartes, did not, of course, fit 
into the textual matrix of the script whose reading from the podium 
was organising the little drama. And since the various parts of 
reader at his table on the podium and assistants, auditeurs until 
the director designated the textual space for their 'intervention' 
in the textual order of the debate he directed, were controlled 
by the old dynamic of those parts carried over from the t-aditional 
'expository' frame of parisian 'seminar' or cours magistrale, my 
question was simply elided as a new question was invited from the 
audience, and we all returned, after my brief caesura, to the orig- 
inal discussion and its dynamic of abstraction from context to 
textual reflections on the relation from text and what it designated 
from within the verbal matrix as the imaginary visual domain it 
sought to coordinate with equally imaginary verbal domain - in some 
other time, place and drama from that in which such relptions were 
actually being dissected and, unwittingly, exemplified. As for 
the new institution being philosophically proposed as a new space 
in which the traditional boundaries and subordinations between 
'Philosophy', 'Sciences' and 'Arts' would no longer persist, the 
extent to which this was just an idea about the embedding or in- 
scription of ideas in Culture, was well reflected in the near-ex- 
clusive predominance in the new seminars of philosophical discussion 
directed by profe"., sional academics and aspiring academics who could 
not have 'their own seminar' elsewhere, which was constructed and 
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organised in the old elision of precisely the question that nom- 
inally informed the dynamic of the 'new' institution. I thought 
of film I had seen of the heady days of May 1968, when the Student 
Revolution became focussed in the spectacle at the Odeon, whose 
diilogue turned irresolubly in discussions about how the discussion 
should be structured, with chronic disruptions of direction from 
the leaders on the stage of the old theatre across from the Sorbonne, 
by interventions from the floor attempting to question the power 
relations implicit in direction of discussion from the Stage. 
It didn't work. My part as passive auditeur at 1, rue 
Descartes, which was in fact just my part of passive auditeur at 
countless parisian seminars varying across the spectrum from the 
formal taking-down by the majority of the (mainly upper-middle-class 
female)-students at Paris IV (Sorbonne) of what the professeur read 
and commented upon from his raised table at the front of the amnhi- 
thdatre, to Deleuze' circus at Vincennes (Paris VIII) dominrted by 
the interplay of interruptions from (often literally) the floor, 
new arrivals climbing in from the first floor window of the room 
next door, dogs barking in frustration of their owners' overlong 
stay in the crowded room, lights going on and off as the crush by 
the door pushed against the switches, people leaving to return with 
north-african spiced sausages from the bazaar which had taken over 
the ground floor of the building... 
There I was, then, in these various theatres of parisian 
theory, differing, feeling different, distinct, from the various 
parts assigned by the various directors' scripts of the relations 
in which their assertion of such relations were implicitly set. 
Who then is this 'I', marked here in this script as differing from 
its part as recognised in those parisian scripts of seventies and 
eighties? 
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Well, I suppose its me, writing; writing this, about to 
write this, h'ving written this, and having at the outset of this 
long script marked in the script a difference between me, Martin 
Joughin, writing, you, whoever you are, reading, and the 'I' which 
I tried to share at the outset, as it stood, more or less indirferently 
at the 'opening' of this book, at the entrance into the unfolding of 
this attempted embedding of the textual matrix of embedding of this 
text in a context - in which I am writing, and wrote, it, and you 
will and have read it, and are reading it. 
I suppose it's me here relating my difference from a 
part coordinate with the authorial instance of 'I' in various 
parisian texts whose titles are inscribed here, as this book through 
its various titles is inscribed with them in the common context of 
my life, me writing or reading them. Me marking or describing or 
asserting myself here as an embodied instance of 'I' that recog- 
nises myself, in part, in differing from various parts mirked in 
other writers' books (and parisian monologues) in which I do not 
altogether recognise myself - but which I recognise as all 'books' 
in relation to which as a set of (about a thousand) books, I may 
mark myself in this book ('my' book) as whatever differs in the way 
here marked from the parts as here marked that it finds in those 
books, as they are set in the common context of my reading then Ind 
writing that reading. That's me; and I communicate with you, here, 
through common elements of our two parts of 'I' differing from one 
another in the different'writers from whom we differ, as in differ- 
ent differings from, and partial identifications with, the various 
parts of 'I' in the books that we have both perused, and in the 
contexts in which each of those textual instances of question and 
assertion are correlative with some more or less imaginary part. 
The part of 'reader' and critic is, I suppose, to frame 
the questions to which the writer responds in articulnting his or 
her 'theoretical' text as argument: the instance of an 'I' that 
differs systematically, in the verbal matrix of the writer's as- 
sertion, from each instance of that progressive assertion. To the 
extent that a real reader, formally marked in the verbal matrix as 
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actually and unpredictably differing from the formal or imaginary 
instance of critical questioning 'in' the text, 'agrees' with the 
instance of critical questioning articulated in the book he or she 
is reading, they may agree also with the writer's self-assertion 
in a common 'I' as it responds identically to such an implicit 
questioning. At some point, though, between the two poles of 
each being in some sense 'I', sharing that common instance of 
question and assertion in (I suppose, if there actually is reading 
rather than mere scanning of foreign marks) a more or less common 
language, and each being either the physical author of the marks, 
the instance of 'I' that chose them, or not, they must differ, 
although a great deal of theoretical writing assumes that such a 
difference is essentially extrinsic to the abstract dynamic of 
theoretical argument, as it articulates various components or 
component configurations of a common language in the formal 'log- 
ical' and psychological axis of cartesian formal assertion in 
a fregean and saussurian matrix of verbal substitutions. 
But.... theory is not as yet marked by any such ideal 
universal agreement... and I suggested that one may still, towards 
the close of the twentieth century, articulate a dynamic of inter- 
play of different 'theories', in terms of different writers' 
extra-textual or extra-logical, 'contextual', embodiment in, 
above all, different times and places, where their configurations 
of theoretical assertion or theory - their playing the part of 
abstract 'I1, so to speak - have evolved from birth in different 
languages and different couplings of language, culture and mater- 
ial economy of life in those cultures, as attested by different 
groups of books through whose reading and criticism the. education 
or eduction or induction of this their theoretical persona has 
unfolded. 
Thus a 'pragmatist, framing of the logic of that framing 
in a cultural order it articulates, in terms of Dewey's educa- 
tional dynamic of abstraction from parts in which one finds 
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oneself more or less unworkably engaged as one develops in 
youth (then, through university, in some cases, to the abstracted 
part of framing this whole process as teacher), towards a sort 
of ideal free democracy in which each mature educated citizen 
symmetrically shares the common integrated personality äs locus 
of an 'I' that can freely, impartially, choose between the various 
parts open to it in any particular situation - this, I suggested, 
could itself be coordinated with Dewey's part of 'nntional phil- 
osopher' of the United States (Morris Cohen's characterisation) 
as it evolved from his own postgraduate work at Chicago around 
the beginning of the century, toward the unitary ideal frame even- 
tually coordinated around that part in the twenties. Rorty's 
part in the nineteen-eighties as international ambassador, or 
representative in various different european traditions, of Dewey's 
frame, reasserted now after the mid-century dominance of scien- 
tific 'naturalism' (another strong american tradition) following 
naturally enough upon Dewey's systematisation of 'Experience and 
Nature' (this, most particularly with the 'thirties influx from 
Germany and Eastern Europe) - this in its time or its turn reiter- 
ates the instance of theoretical assertion that has itself, in 
its coupling with extra-theoretical dimensions of the american 
democratic tradition, shaped the educational dynamic in which 
Rorty elaborated his own 'position' from his schooldays in the 
nineteen-thirties onward. Similar considerations apply to Haber- 
mae' evolution in a Germany reconstructing its cultural tradition 
in the aftermath of the impasse of a New Order of parts in the 
national whole represented by Hitler. I attempted to articul-te 
the context of theory in postwar France in rather more detail 
in the latter part of Part III, since my own part as writer here 
evolved from the mid-seventies onward primarily as the definition 
of a critical position in relation to the various parisian 'theor- 
etical positions' I encountered in seminars, periodicals, books, 
in the context of my life as a postgraduate student in Paris in 
1974-6"- a position I retired to define after 1976 in three years 
of 'abstraction' from most british, french or other culture in 
the english countryside, occasionally revisiting Paris to attend 
further seminars, acquire further books and periodicals, examine 
the shelves in FNAC, PUF9 La Hune and a few other bookshops, eat 
well, see films, exhibitions, speak french, and so on. 
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Seminars, books ... and finally, at last, my own bookshelves, 
rather than an imaginary library: 
College de France 
Let me list the seminars I attended and books written by their 
'professors' in the order of the dates of formal canonisation, so 
to speak, of the various positions, by the granting of a chair: 
First, Merleau-Ponty's successor: 
VUILLEMIN, Jacques: I came to feel that Derrida should really have 
succeeded to this chair, but Merleau-Ponty died prematurely; I never 
read anything by Vuillemin, and never worked out just who the couple 
of dozen old people at his seminar were. Perhaps he was too far 
ahead of his time, lecturing on the american philosophy of lPngu^ge 
and of science of the fifties. Canonical isolation, anyway; I don't 
remember any reference to him in other seminr: rs or reading. 
Then, to begin again, opening the 'structuralist' canon with its 
first 'official' representative: 
LEVI»STRAUSS, Claude 
891 Les Structures E1dmentaires de la Parentd 1949 
892 La Pensde Sauvage 1962 
893 Mythologiquee 1964(1)-71(IV) 
894 LEACH, Edmund Ldvi-Strauss London 1970 
Since nearly all french books are published at Paris, I will only 
note places of publication different from the metropolitan centre. 
By the time I arrived to study in Paris Ldvi-Strauss had been des- 
erted by the french young and (or) fashionable, and had already 
achieved the symbolic or historic status conferred by a predominance 
of americans in his audience that I would see overtake Derrida in 
the late 'seventies. Not many japanese, smartly dressed with busi- 
nesslike attache-cases, listening to the mythical ancestor of sixties 
structuralism though. I saw their numers slowly growing elsewhere 
from a couple in the front row at Kristeva's seminar in 1974, to 
a whole tribe taking over the front rows at Derrida's seminar, after 
he had moved, nominally, to the Ecole Pratique (still holding his 
seminar at the Rue d'Ulm, but now in the theatre rather than the 
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smaller, traditional, Salle Cavailles upstairs, next to his old 
office. 
FOUCAULT, Michel: Histoire des Systemes de Pensee (1970) 
895 Histoire de la Folie a 1'Age Classique 1961 
896 Les Mots et les Choses: une Archdologie des Sciences Humaines 1966 
897 L'Archeologie du Savoir 1969 
898 L'Ordre du Discours (Lecon Inaugurale, 1970) 1971 
899 Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la Prison 1975 
900 Histoire de la Sexualite: 1 La Volonte de Savoir 1976 
II 
Three hundred people, a hundred on the floor around the long podium 
at the front of the hall and down the aisles or standing in a crush 
at the four entrances to the room; the large table on the podium 
covered with tape-recorders and microphones, microphones hanging 
from various protuberances on walls and windows around the room. 
Only fifty or a hundred people in the second room across the rear 
courtyard of the College, linked by speakers. Foucault arrives at 
5pm, an hour after the first people had claimed their seats, slowly 
picks his way through the bodies around the podium, then through 
those along behind his table, to his chair; others pick their way 
forward to switch on their tape-recorders. Foucault sits down, 
arranges his papers, adjusts the microphone, and begins. January 
1975; my first experience of this sort of parisian theatre; and 
down to the right of the podium, sitting in a space provided by a 
window-sill, is a girl who looks just like the french girl I met do 
the lake behind the Aswan dam the previous summer, and who seems to 
occasionally glimpse over to the window-sill in which I'm crouched 
halfway up the other side of the sloping room. 
BARTHES, Roland: Semiotique Litteraire (1977) 
901 Le Degre Zdro de 1'Ecriture 1953 
902 Mythologies 1957 
903 Sur Racine 1963 
904 Elements de Sdmiologie (196 ) 1965 
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905 Critique et Verite 1966 - reply to: 
906 PICARD, Raymond Nouvelle Critique ou Nouvelle Imposture 1966 
907 S /Z 1970 
908 Le Plaisir du Texte 1973 
910 Roland Barthes par lui-meme 1975 
911 Leqon Inaugurale (College de France) 1977 
912 Le Chambre Clair: Note sur la Photographie 1980 
Same two rooms, same number of people, of tape-'recorders. And something 
almost gastronomic (I've just remembered his introduction to Brillat- 
Savarin's Physiologie du Gout) in his sympathetic delectation over and 
digestion of his texts. I would notice the grain in the wooden seats, 
the texture of women's' clothes, the play of glances in the audience, 
echoing as it were the sensual tone of Barthes' discours.... and as I 
try to echo those echoes in these words, they become almost an imitat- 
ion: I see that 'the sensual tone of his discours' has a dual sense... 
the tonus as he would have said, playing on the ambivalence between 
french and latin in the word, as both defining a sort of thematic key 
of the text, and as resonant with the'very timbre of the voice that 
breathes the words. And this convolution seems indeed to echo the 
very play of figuration, the music, fugue even, which renders the 
very personal tone of a sense, sensuality, sensibility, that was con- 
stantly poised between the formal matrix of a text and the bodily re- 
lation of Roland Barthes to the members of his audience, for which 
any text might provide the script, the pretext. And I begin to sense 
in this play of words and memories the figuration of Eros which for 
some reason I associate most particularly with the books I never opened, 
Systeme de la Mode, Fragments d1un Discours Amoureux - even though 
the detail from Botticelli's Primavera that clothes the latter book 
seems to have become for me a kind of image of Barthes' vision after 
1977. Is this Roland Barthel writing, or'me? Or Echo? 
BOULEZ, Pierre: 
913 Penser la Musique Aujourd'hui Mayence 1963 
Harm. This seems to be the other side of Barthes' play in the verbal 
fabric of his script: a theoretical discourse on the abstract 'musical' 
space and time of embedding of ambiguous voice and tone in the harmonic 
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interface of psychological and physical, inner and outer, space 
and time: a 'harmonics' of musical space and time that echoes 
Helmholz'construction of classical diatonic music in his epochal 
treatise of the Sensations of Tone, in a reconstruction from first 
principles, so to speak, of a universal musical dynamic that un- 
folds its language and notation from the elementary geometry of 
physical 'space' itself. I felt that Boulez' seminar at the 
College de France was essentially a sort of secondary reflection 
of the practical work going on down at IRCAM in the second floor 
underground at Beaubourg, where the complementary, but closed, 
technical seminar was held. Indeed the room at the College de 
France where he gave his seminar was on the other side of the 
main courtyard from the rooms where Foucault and Barthes used to 
give their seminars, in the section given over to the 'exact' 
sciences.. 
'Music': down to the time of Mersenne a branch of mathe- 
matics, along with arithmetic, geometry and astronomy; I have already 
reflected on the subordination of the Renaissance harmonics which 
culminate in Kepler's Harmonice Mundi and Fludd's rival Monochordion, 
and in Mersenne±: s mathematics of diatonic 'space' and the projective 
geometry of Desargues and Pascal, to the 'analytic' approach of 
Descartes and his successors from the mid-seventeenth century, and 
upon the gradual re-emergence of 'harmonic' structures from around 
1800 - culminating in the first three decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury in the reconstruction of mathematical physics in a 'harmonics' 
of action from which the 'classical' poles of unitary cartesian 
Space and its infinitesimal arithmetical division are seen to be un- 
workable abstractions, coordinate with the complementary abstraction 
from the physicist (observer, measurer) in the Nature he investigates, 
to the formal pole of cartesian Subject. And I suggested an analogy 
between this harmonics of physical interaction, systematised from 
the turn-of-the-century questioning of the abstract classical poles 
of absolute Space and infinitesimally divisible Action (associated 
with. Einstein and Planck), and the systematic reconstruction by the 
'Second Viennese School' (Schoenberg, Berg, Webern) of musical 
'space' and its dynamics between about 1900 and 1930, to which 
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Boulez explicitly frames his systematic analysis of musical 
synchrony and diachrony - 'syntax' - from around 1950 as a direct 
response. 
'Philosophy in a new key': the analogy between the 
space-time of 'modern' music and of 'modern' physics after 1900 
itself belongs, as I tried to show in Part III, to a far wider 
'synchrony' of various different dimensions of 'modern' theory, 
and to a synchrony of such 'modern' theory with various dimensions 
of its ideological, cultural, material, and indeed physical, con- 
texts. And one might regard this 'musical' harmony and dynamics 
of twentieth-century 'theory' and context as a sort of closing 
recapitulation of the initial pythagorean figure of a 'musical' 
embedding of 'theory' or cosmic vision in the universal 'hPrmony' 
of which it is the vision - or silent 'hearing' - within the wider 
harmonics and dynamic of the whole intervening western tradition 
of 'theory'. In fact I sketched 'musical' theory down from the 
pythagoreans only as far as Euclid's contemporary Aristoxenus, whose 
musical system is a direct parallel to Euclid's systemrtic abstract- 
ion of geometry and arithmetic from their initial fifth-century 
subordination to pythagorean harmonics. I had in fact attempted to 
pursue the unfolding of harmonic musical 'space' and rhythmic mus- 
ical 'time', as complementary dimensions of melodic 'line', down 
from Aristoxenus and through the seventeenth-century systematisat- 
ion of diatonic 'space' and its associated dynamics to the breakdown 
of diatonic space around 1900 that parallels the contemporary break- 
down of central perspective (analogous to 'central' tonality) in 
'modern' painting: 
914 BOYDEN, David An Introduction to Music (NY 1956) 
London (1959)1971 (78-9) 
915 BLOM, Eric Mozart London 
916 SCOTT, Marion Beethoven London 
.. but as the mass of other material swelled to unmanageable pro- 
portions, I found myself treating the various 'dimensions' of 
poetic space and time (pictorial, sculptural and architectural 
space, narrative line, theatrical and cinematic space-time) as 
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so many questions of detail within the correlation of poetic 
and other dimensions of theory and context as a whole - so that 
the 'musical' or melodic treatment of line, for example, in Bot- 
ticelli's composition, did not explictly figure as a component in 
the wider transition from albertine perspectival space to Leonardo's 
'dramatic' coupling of pictorial space and narrative line, over the 
second half of the fifteenth century. Botticelli drops out again. 
Meanwhile, before leaving the College de Frsnce, I should 
note a short-lived interdisciplinary seminar in the summer of 1976, 
which must I think have begun as a collaboration between the College 
and the Ecole Pratique. Barthel' presentation at the opening s_ 
of what he called a 'dossier' on a certain theme (I forget what) 
was a sort of rehearsal for the Legon Inaugural six months later; 
and this and the following seance, when Charles Moraz6, one of the 
two founders of the sixieme section of the Ecole Pratique, and the 
Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme on the Boulevard Raspail, was the 
only occasion on which I saw the writer who had become a sort of 
constant background reference ever since I set out from Engirnd to 
work with him in 1974: 
917 SERRES, Michel Hermes I La Communication 1969 
II L'Interference 1972 
III La Traduction 1974 
IV La Distribution 1977 
... In fact this interdisciplinary seminar (as I felt), just as 
I was about to leave Paris after two years, was where I should 
have come in. But that merely meant it was time to leave. I 
have since discovered that one knows when some writing or a painting 
is finished, by the recognition, at last, of how one should have 
begun. That is always the time to begin something else. Time I 
finished this writing. 
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Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes 
Moraz4 and Dum4zil: the sixieme section, that odd 'floating' 
institution based at the Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme, whose 
several hundred 'semin^rs' scattered all over Paris have been 
the invisible centre of 'structuralism', that floating signifier 
covering indiscriminately so many analogous fields of floating 
signifiers, focussed since he transferred to the Ecole Pratique, 
and transferred his seminar under its auspices to the rue d'Ulm, 
and a new audience, in the man who stood in, over the years 
around 1970, for that focal 'shifter' or indexical sign, 'I': 
LACAN, Jacques 
91$ De la Psychose Paranolgue dans ses Rapports avec la Personnalitd 
9.19 Ecrits*(1936-66) 1966 
(1932)1975 
920 Le Seminaire: Livre XI. Les Quatre Concepts Fondamentaux de la 
Psychanalyse (1964: opening seminar at rue d'Ulm)1973 
92.1 Livre XX. Encore (1972) 1975 
922 (Livre XXI. L'Amour 1973) pircy nd (1976? ) 
923 T416vision (TV interviews 1973) 1974 
924 WILDEN, Anthony The Language of the Self (tr of 'Discours 
de Rome', 1953, with intr essay & notes) 
Baltimore 1968 
925 'French Freud': Yale French Studies no 48 New Haven 1976 
f 926 TÜRKLE, Sherry 
I will not list here uncollected pieces in anthologies listed 
elsewhere, and periodicals (Scilicet, Ornicar, L'Ane in particular) 
By the time I arrived in Paris the seminar had been 
transferred to the largest amphitheatre in Paris, at the Faculte 
de Droit, between the Sorbonne and the Pantheon. At 12 noon, 
every second and third Wednesday of every month between December 
and May each year, Lacan would arrive at the front entrance to 
the building: the Fiat 500 pulled up, his secretary would get 
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out of the back seat beside him, and hold oven the door. Lacan, 
in his grey fur overcoat, smoking a bent cigar (I found a shop 
where one could buy these: two freshly rolled cigars were twisted 
together by their roller, and when dry were separated to give the 
symbolically appropriate shape), would walk through the entrance 
hall, and up the left aisle of the vast auditorium, making his 
way through the bodies on the floor to the long table on the 
podium in front of over a thousand acolytes. To the left of the 
table, was always the same long-haired male, with female make-up 
and effeminate clothing, sitting on a chair on the podium. The 
secretary cleaned the blackboard, and attached to one section of 
it some diagram of a complex multicoloured 'knot', which people 
all around me at once began to copy down into their notebooks, 
having been waiting with the page open and the date marked for 
the best part of an hour already. Eventually the Master would 
begin to speak - in slow motion, as it were, at half the norm'l 
speed, distinguishing the mallarmean matrix of lalangue into which 
he was entering, from communicative prose. Taperecorders along the 
walls of the huge hangar, along the rows of desks, along the table 
on the podium would begintto register the days text, as the greater 
part of the audience took it down verbatim. In the foyer here, and 
on notice-boards in other facultds, in bookshops, anc4 elsewhere in 
Paris, one read advertisements for tapes of the S4minaire for such 
and such years, or of photocopied typescripts, going back to the 
'fifties sometimes. Lacan would refer in passing to some rather 
obscure theorem in algebraic topology, that I happened to have 
come across in the distant past, and I would notice an opulent and 
very soignde bourgeoise beside me,. perhaps in her forties, duti- 
fully attempting to note down exactly. what he said, but evidently 
in her mis-spelling and misconstrual of the reference, being as 
far from making anything literally comprehensible of it, as her 
predecessor of three hundred years before of some arcane latin 
theological allusion in one of Bourdaloue's sermons (which were 
equally well attended in his day by ddvotes d'un certain age). 
Lacan would move to the blackboard and begin to make rather gest- 
ural connections between the topological figures or 'bits of string' 
that he copied from a piece of paper in his hand. And the 1^dy 
beside me would begin valiant efforts to transfer some sembl^nce 
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of what was happening on the blackboard to her notebook, before 
it was erased or transformed into something else. Perhaps, like 
a few hundred of the people there, including most of Lacan's school 
of analysts, she was in lacanian analysis, and this was all a nec- 
essary part of the ritual. Perhaps, like the not dissimilar landlady 
of one of my friends, she just went along because it was the current 
fashion, and she would return with a few new terms to mingle in her 
half-digested analyses of the sexual problems of her friends' hus- 
bands... 
Down the road at Notre Dame every Sunday there was the 
Archbishop of Paris; but here every second and third Wednesday at 
lunchtime, was the Pope himself - 'standing-in' as it were for, 'in 
(the) place of' l'Autre himself (or itself, or herself): standing 
at the place in the matrix of lalangue, where one asserted oneself 
in response to the radical open-ness organised around this pl'ce or 
function 'I', rather as, Descartes had earlier identified himself 
with the same function and, at Paris, the femmes savantes parodied 
by Moliere, had heard Clerselier 'stand in' at Paris for the seven- 
teenth-century maitre-penseur, focus of french thought and intellect- 
ual fashion for a while. Midday Wednesday: french seminars are 
every year at the same time as the year before. As there are so 
many different institutions and seminars, the only way to assure 
that times do not clash, is to maintain the times already set by 
perennial tradition, and tailor the time of any new seminar in relat- 
ion to those already established, thenceforth to keep precisely to 
that time until one retires. The place, even the institution may 
change, but the time is fixed. It's rather like parisian driving 
in a way: none of the british interplay of parts or rights and duties 
according to unwritten rules; each driver sees what those who have 
already decided what to do are doing, and asserts himself in what 
remains open to him, with no regard for anyone else involved in the 
same system who has not yet had a chance to assert themselves. The 
similarity goes further: non of the intellectual leaders (except 
Kristeva, but she is a lady driver) make direct references to each 
other in their seminars, and hardly at all in their publications. 
Each simply asserts himself in the space of terms and themes left 
open by the others, trying to define his position, and the nearest 
one comes to the british symmetry or interplay of debate is the 
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indirect interplay of different configurations of more or less 
common or analogous themes and terms, as each of the analogous 
positions are constantly redefined or reasserted in the shifting 
interplay mediated by journalists or Julia Kristeva (the latterday 
mistress of the salon whose organ is Tel Quel) or Catherine Clement 
(but she's essentially a journalist posing as a philosophy teacher). 
Thus I suggested that one could map a primary 'space' and associated 
dynamic of parisian theory around 1970, in terms of a system of sub- 
stitutions, in a common synchronic space of questions attaching to 
the textual inscription of text in context, for the 'focal' lscan- 
ian marking of 'the place of the Other' as the place in language, 
and in the theatrical dynamic of the wider 'space' (with its time 
of desire) in which language situates itself as 'language' (as system, 
precisely, of substitutions), at which or in which I assert myself 
by responding to what is open to me in this configuration (the funda- 
mental thing which is open being just 'me'). One can fix, for example, 
the contrary pole of this parisian space of around 1970, by noting 
that Deleuze at Vincennes sets the time of his seminar at... midday 
every Wednesday, playing Schopenhauer to Lacan's Hegel, Rousseau in 
his parisian version of being (just) 'outside' the parisinn theatre 
and its false play of parts, to Lacan's Voltaire. There hnd been 
a tradition at Vincennes that various joke candidates would be en- 
rolled for Deleuze's seminar and duly, after two terms, receive their 
course credit (valueless, because there was no monitoring of attendance, 
or examinations, both being as ideologically unsound as an entrance 
requirement for the department as a whole - of which, of course, there 
were none either). Deleuze was eventually drawn to refer to some of 
the imaginary people who were getting credits on his course: 'I don't 
mind Arkle (the racehorse), but I really must draw the line at this 
Jacques Lacans. 
Descartes, Bourdaloue, Voltaire ... Cousin, Bergson, Breton, 
Sartre... so many incarnations of the parisinn Subject (and so french 
subjectivity) par excellence. I had read Boris Vian's satire on the 
cult of Sartre (below) at school, and was astonished by the similarity 
between that role around 1950, and Lacan's around 1970. At the rite 
every second and third Wednesday at the Faculti de Droit, Jacques 
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Lacan spoke 'in place of' 1'Autre, the axis of his slow monologue 
articulated as response to that question posed by the place of 'I' 
in the linguistic matrix which named its own place in the theatrical 
matrix of the Seminaire, as 'lalangue'. He just happened to be at 
the right place (in french, in Paris) at the right time (after 
Freud and Saussure... and Sartre) to play the part of what he him- 
self determined as the phallic function of paternal assertion or 
authority, the Father, the father-figure of parisian intellectual 
life around 1970. On my birthday, 5 January 1980 he arrived as 
usual at the Seminaire, and in front of a stunned audience at last 
carried out the threat that he had presented at the close of each 
seminar for many years before: he was closing the Seminaire and 
dissolving the Ecole Freudienne de Paris which he had instituted 
in the move to the rue d'Ulm in 1964, and in which he had, in 
terms of his own theory, absolute unquestionable control, its in- 
fallible Pope, speaking ex cathedra: for if anyone questioned this 
function of authority, they would ipso facto be at variance with the 
fundamental articles of faith which defined their membership of 
the Ecole. This assertion of authority came in response to the 
crisis that was developing in the Ecole over the question of the 
'succesion': Lacan was nearly 80, and the epigonoi had for a few 
years been dividing into pro- and anti-Miller factions, contesting 
the imminent succession to focal authority of the designated heir, 
Lacan's son-in-law Jacques-Alain Miller, who had, as I noted in 
Part III, been developing the lacanian 'mathJm-atique' into a 
unitary symmetrical system of inscription of his fregean analysis 
of Language in the theoretical and institutional context which it 
framed. Lacan played his trump card: he was now going to play the 
absolute Analyst, becoming silent in the face of all those who had 
come to confuse him for l'Autre, breaking the transference which 
had kept the S4minaire going since 1964 in this form, and requiring 
the contending parties in the generalised oedipal frame of con- 
test for the succession to 'the place of the Other', to define 
their positions - in writing to him - as direct response to the 
Other, whose place he left open by his own silence, prefiguring 
the manner in which it would be definitively opened up by his 
approaching physical disappearance: 
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L'Autre manque. ca me fait dr31e ä moi aussi. Je tiens 
le coup pourtant, ce qui vows 4pate, mais je ne le fail 
pas pour cela... S'il arrive que je m'en aille, dites-vous 
que c'est afin d'etre Autre enfin 
Lacan finally asserts himself to be other than the identifi- 
cation with the Other for which he has for so long, as 'father- 
figure' been taken, 'understood': 'Jacques Lacan est entre au 
Pantheon de son vivant' wrote the journalist in the article in 
Le Monde the next day in which I first read of the 'affaire Lacan' 
that was to dominate the journalistic representation of the Paris- 
ian intellectual theatre for several months. Apotheosis in life, 
like Nero, or Caligula's horse. 
I, meanwhile, was at Vincennes, meeting Julia, and was 
the next day both shocked to have missed this formal theatrical 
end of an intellectual era, at which I would have been present 
were it not for the appointment at Vincennes, and at the same time 
reassured in my own paranoid scenario, in which the epochal break 
with the sixties and seventies at the 'pantheon' (for so was the 
Law Faculty named, after its entrance on the Place du Panthdon) 
was a sort of direct symmetrical correlate of my own 'crisis in 
my mental life' (to borrow John Stuart Mill's characterisation of 
the 'breakdown' I took, with all the other intellectual and spirit- 
ual crises already noticed - Descartes, Pascal, Carlyle, Comte, 
Nietzsche... Augustine, Rousseau and so on), through which I had 
broken or was breaking out from the representation in language 
of the theatrical embedding of language in context, into the 
working reality of a 'theatre' or divine comedy in which the 
Hamlet-like impotence of a melancholy imprisonment in represent- 
ations of the passage from representation into action, now appeared 
precisely in its real theatrical dynamic, rather than caught in the 
circle of its own abstrrct representation of that dynamic of 
passage from script into action. 
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For, if since about 1975 I had begun to see Lacan's 
linguistic embedding of its 'script' in the abstract dynamic 
of an oedipal scenario which it presented - presenting itself, 
then as 'Ecrits', scripts, scripture, but always transcripts of 
Lacan's part in some specific situation - he published no 'books' 
after his thesis in 1932 - as simply the most direct of a group 
of complementary parisian abstractions from the question of their 
theoretical analogy or symmetry ('structuralism'), the dramatic 
context of my reading had been, although I had hardly understood 
the relation until the winter of 1979-80, articulated in the 
extra-textual sexual axis of my emotional and practical relations 
with Julia in France and Debbie in England - the relations with 
Julia being, especially after I left Paris in 1976, almost entirely 
'textual'. It was only as I began in November 1979 to attempt to 
write down the framing of the 'symmetry' of the various 'struct- 
uralist' positions - and their symmetry as a whole with contemp- 
orary theory in England and America, and such 'philosophy' as a 
whole with a more international 'physics', 'mathematics' and so 
on - that I suddenly found the question posed by the frnmin of 
this abstract symmetry of various dimensions of 'theoretical' 
questions, as the radical question and response in terms of which, 
alone, the symmetry could be brought 'into question' and expressed. 
And, as I have already related in the opening section of this 
Close, this radical figure of writing as 'script' for the situ- 
ation and theatrical dynamics-of writing, was revealed, not through 
some abstract theoretical question of the locus of questioning 
the symmetry of various analogous orders of questioning (for I 
had not, before starting to write, confronted the question nosed 
by the symmetries of an abstract mathematical 'sp! -ce' of quest- 
ions, and other extra-textual dimensions of questioning-as-an- 
activity), but rather through the writing of a letter to Julia, 
which opened with the question of why I was once more writing to 
her. 
I have already sketched the first phase of the madness 
which overwhelmed me as I found myself to be merely the actor 
writing the script of my discovery as engaged in and through 
the writing in the 'theatrical' dynamic of a real sexual symmetry 
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which seemed to be now organising its own description in a letter, 
rather than being, as I had always somehow imagined before, simply 
one of the dimensions of the familiar world which I had since 
childhood learnt to frame in language. Of course the various 
figures or scenarios of my part, and Julia's, and those of others 
to whom I wrote in the same inspiration or trance, were constantly 
being revealed as only partial identifications, masks, personae, 
which as it were 'half' worked, but which were constantly being 
changed as the closed frame of one inscription of its script in 
one particular situation of writing was again and again broken open 
as time, place, and characters moved on to a new scene or act. 
In particular, having spent four years attempting to write the 
theoretical Script of what I came to call this 'Globe Theatre' in 
which this script, this book, would identify itself simply as 
the writing of its writing through the questioning of its quest- 
ioning, opening up, I hoped, a new scenario for human interaction 
on this Globe - after four' years in rural abstraction, I wrote 
once more to Julia who, of course, was at the same time writing to 
ask me if she could come and visit me in England, having reached 
an impasse in her relations with the man who had been the primary 
male (apart perhaps from her father) in her world since her return 
from Africa where we had first met in 1974, ten years before. 
The first year she spent (May 1984-5) in the triangle of myself, 
herself and Christian (or quadrilateral: the impasse in Paris had 
corresponded to a liaison between Christian and one of her old 
friends who had engaged Christian in her catholic mysticism) seemed 
to involve, among other things, a transformation from my earlier 
very abstract framing of my supposed part of global scriptwriter 
(the abstraction dominated by the fact that I was still writing 
about the inscription of writing in action, rather than playing 
a more active part on the global stage), towards a more practical 
coupling of this part with the World, through the practical inter- 
actions of life with Julia in rural England and in Paris. Then in 
the second week of May 1985 I suddenly had to leave the old water- 
mill where I had lived, written, and sold books for five years, and 
in the space of a few days my parents decided to get divorced, 
Julia became pregnant by Christian, and I was arrested in London. 
From then onward (which is to say from page clxxiii above) the 
scenario of the past five years slowly seemed to fall apart. A 
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year later, in mid-1986, Julia eventually gave up trying to 
make it work (the pregnancy had not gone very far, but together 
with the various other breakdowns in my social identity it marked 
a turning-point between the workable and the unworkable), and with 
the beginning of 1987 I began to write again - from page clxxiii - 
after a break of a year and a half, echoing various breaks for simi- 
lar periods in earlier years when I could not write. 
Back to Lacan: I had been astonished in the second half 
of the seventies that the theory I was working on in Paris and then 
on my return to England, was actually working on me - or rather, 
seemed actually to work in my relations with Debbie, which I had 
earlier acted out according to what, as any young man, I learnt or 
failed to learn altogether untheoretically as days, weeks, nights, 
years followed one upon another. De nobis fabula narrabatur; some- 
times, and up to a point, anyway. It certainly didn't work past 
the point where a theoretical approach, simply as such, was emotion- 
ally unacceptable or irappropriate. And it didn't seem, on the 
whole, to be doing much good to a couple of women friends in Paris 
who were 'in' lacanian analysis. And it didn't do much good to 
poor old Louis Althusser, whose murder of his wife followed upon 
his response to his old analyst's dissolution of the School in 1980 - 
his public denunciation of this stalinist revisionism. Nor, more 
generally did it 'work' for the long succession of analysts who 
had first of all expelled Lacan from their various professional 
organisations, and then those who were in turn expelled from Lacan's 
successive versions of the extended analytic family or fraternity, 
or who voluntarily left that their earlier home. Of course it did 
'work' for all these people, as their behaviour was 'analysed' by 
Lacan himself, and those who remained faithful, those who still 
believed in or identified with their part in the lacanian scenario. 
Freud as prophet of the Unconscious, Lacan as gallican antipope, 
'leader of the faithful' - Ecole Freudienne de Paris or Eglise 
Freudienne de Paris? - as the brother of one of my friends in 
analysis said to her, after she had sold her car to pay for the 
extension from two to three sdances each week, 'Wouldn't it be 
cheaper to see a-priest? '. 
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Sherry Turkle frames her critique of lacanian theory 
by embedding it in the narrative frame of its institutional dyn- 
amic, its abstraction from which to the formal stage of abstract 
triangular Family, primal scene, oedipal contest and so on, may it- 
self be seen to organise - symptomatically - its own institutionrl 
pathology: and this, even, in various figures theoretically defined 
in that pathological abstraction itself. Derrida had alreedy, by 
1975, made the unusual step of reading Lacan's reading of Poe, so 
as to bring 'into question' the closed circuit of a lacanian posit- 
ion that so to speak 'forecloses' radical criticism by inscribing 
itself as one term in the frame it poses or asserts: I attempted 
in Part III to suggest a transposition of the relations of Sartre's 
extramural coupling of theatre, journalism, and theory as so many 
dimensions of 'engaged writing' and Merleau Ponty's increasingly 
distanced 'academic' questioning over the years around 1950, into 
the relations of Lacan and Derrida twenty years later. These 
ähnliche Zeitpunkten, in Novalis' expression, I take to mark a 
certain figure of 'continuity' in french theory, which I traced 
further back from midcentury to Breton as 'Pope of Surrealism' in 
the context of the Ecole de Paris around 1930, when the young Lacan 
entered surrealist circles. I suggested a 'synchrony' in the metrix 
of institutional embedding of french theory in parisian intellectual 
life and intellectuals' lives, which remains constant in the din= 
chrony or dynamic which leads from Sartre 'in place of' french 'I' 
around 1950 to Lacan defining his place in lalangue and in the 
theatrical context focussed in the Seminaire where lalangue frames 
its own place as one term in the configuration of terms which con- 
stitutes its dramatic context (Lacan's transcripts being the verbal 
record of the dramatic working-through in words of this embedding 
of the terms 'standing for' the various elements of their context, 
in that context). Derrida's complementary articulation of questions, 
the abstraction from any fixed identification to the textual con- 
figuration of textual embedding of terms in a contextual configurat- 
ion they textually mark, on the face of it abstracts also from any 
place 'in' the specifically parisian theatre of reflection where 
Lacan like Sartre or Cousin or Voltaire or Descartes (even if phys-. 
ically 'outside' the theatre) before him actually, personally, dra- 
matically, works through the focal coupling of french theory and 
its cultural context. Thus Derrida 'travels' (as one says of a 
cccccxxxiv 
french wine) better than Lacan. But the transcription of 
derridean text into, say, an american or british context, may 
itself be analysed in relation to the parallel elision of com- 
plementary lncanian textuality, in terms of the 'theatrical' 
coupling of french text and french and international 'context'. 
Thus a text by Derrida which in Paris works to present philoso- 
phical questions arising from the embedaing of a 'philosophical' 
text in a more radical 'literary' interface of abstr-ct theor- 
etical space and empirical context (this move opening up natur- 
ally enough from Merleau-Ponty's confrontation in language with 
the question of the complementarity of theoretical embedding of 
empirical intersubjectivity in transcendental subjectivity, and 
empirical embedding of what language marks as 'transcendental 
subjectivity' in the practical dynamic in which this question 
actually arises or can only arise), works in New Haven to open 
up 
.a 
theoretical space for the critical analyäis or 'deconstruct- 
ion' of literary texts, as one method among others seeking favour 
among the students and faculty of the Yale School of Modern Lan- 
guages - this rather as the 'transcendental' axis of Wittgensteinis 
later 'investigations' becomesin postwar England the missing point 
of a new game used to sharpen the wits of prospective civil ser- 
vants. 
When Alan Montefiore and Jonathon Culler organised an 
introductory 'structuralist' seminar at Oxford in 1977, Lacan 
did not rear his muddled gallic head; nor did he appear in the 
book commissioned from Vincent Descombes (below) to present to 
an anglophone audience 'forty-five years of french philosophy'; 
nor indeed did he enter the debnte in the earlier Wolfson College 
lectures on Structuralism (transcripts below), until some french 
members of the audience in the last event of the series, 'Discus- 
sion', asked rather bemusedly why the'most prominent 'structur- 
alist' of Paris was not included in the british representation 
or presentation of this new account of representation. Was it... 
symptomatic? A lacanien, of course, could explain such forclusion 
or elision only too well. And I have already noticed Lacan's 
relief to be back from kmerica among those who misunderstood him 
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comprehensibly, constructively. When at the close of that 
1976 seminar the unheard(of) occurred, and someone had the 
temerit; to : c:. dress Lacan prom the audience, the Master's derisory 
analysis of the interruption (rather than the point of the quest- 
ion) was but an echo for his audience of the american accent and 
loud checked shirt of the barbarian intruder. Imagine someone 
asking the Archbishop a question from the congregation, at the 
close of his sermon down at Notre Dame. 
Master and slaves - or slavish listeners, collectively 
the Other to which Lacan's monologue was each week the canonical 
response, in response to which, in their turn, the members of 
the audience could reassert or redefine their theoretical rind 
emotional personae. Only when the Pope dissolved his church on 
5 January 1980 did the anti-Miller faction of the priesthood vocally 
revolt, eventually bringing a legal case against Lacan on the grounds 
that under french law, he did not have the authority to dissolve 
a professional organisation without a majority vote From its mem- 
bers. But then anyone who would imagine that the Ltiw of the 
Father could be made subject to the formal french law which was 
merely its echo or image in the french language, had already thereby 
excluded themselves from Lacan's 'school', by then already renamed 
La Cause Freudienne. 
Crise: the very word had permeated from an initißl 
crise du p6trole in the wake of the Yom Kippur Wnr of 1973, into 
every stratum of language and activity by the time of the affaire 
Lacan of 1980, and the contemporary rapid accelerrition of inflnt- 
ion heralding the bank crashes and Debt Crisis of 1982, and the 
global Depression coming in its aftermath. A group of ex-normal- 
iens who had attended Lacan's and Althusser's seminars at the 
rue d'Ulm, and had seen at first in the Events of May 1968 a 
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revolutionary crisis or break out of the twin circuits of capit- 
alism and ideological repression of personality, out of their 
historical complicity, would by the second half of the 'seventies 
have come to regard the Imarcusian' space of the Possible, of 
social Imagination, into which they thought they were breaking, 
as, precisely, imaginary - an abstract theoretical fiction, which 
must be judged not on or in its own circular terms, but rather 
practically or pragmatically, by the same 'experience', in its col- 
lective coherence, in which their individual moral responses, rec- 
ognised as what informs individual judgement, had slowly and separ- 
ately led each to see their personal seduction in May 1968 as opening 
a long passage through a failed theoretical dream or fable. 
Slowly through their individual writing, discussions, 
experiences - so the story goes - these old maoist normaliens of 
1968 had shifted from the academy into journalism (none were pro- 
fessional academics) and from the abstract political theatre of 
1968 (whose two complementary sides had been presented in terms 
of lacanian psychoanalysis and its outward reflection in althusser- 
ian marxism) into a narrative order which coupled abstract theory 
and the autobiographical drama of disillusion in a sort of gestural 
pathology of abstract theoretical framing of Universal History and 
the individual's part in it. Gestural: narratives of situations 
whose constant moral was always simply the moral order of individual 
freedom and choice informed by the empirical operation of personal 
'conscience' in its radically dual french sense, coupling thought 
and action, theoretical and practical. 
In this coupling, then, the pathology of the theoretical 
determinations of the moral or practical order from 'outside', 'in 
theory', could itself be narrated in the journalistic axis of point- 
ing the practical moral of a representative situation - whether 
the personal experience of disillusion over the years around 1970, 
or mgrxist theoretical justification of soviet repression of 'dis- 
sident' questioning of the ; r"ictical consequences of a 'theoretic- 
ally' framed social order of activity. The wide stage of this new 
parisian theatre of reflection, well adapted to displace in 'the 
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media' the old structuralist theatre framed in difficult theo- 
retical texts, was set in 1976 by Guy Lardreau and Christian 
Jambet's best-selling reglement de compte with 'the only ones 
who count: Ziegel, Marx, Lacan'. For in the journalistic frame 
of pointing morals of representative situations, Lacan's might 
be taken as the 'representative' presentation of various analogous 
theories of a dynamic of substitution (rath: -r than representation) 
articulated by setting Language as system of substitutions in a 
wider system of those elements of context for which terms in lang- 
uage may be substituted. In the argument against Lacan all the 
others were covered in principle simply by a system of substitu- 
tions which carried one theory over into another of the same 
abstract 'structuralist' form. In the ideological order in which 
Foucault implicitly set 'structuralism' as corresponding to a 
'lacune de vocabulaire', the various different theoretical dim- 
ensions of articulating its cultural context through the textual 
working-through of the symmetries of text and context were all 
'practically' equivalent, but Lacan's position was 'representative' 
since it was simply the assertion of theoretical assertion itself 
in the general 'structuralist' frame of linguistic framing of 
the theoretical configuration of abstract discours and the abstract 
theatre of social interaction it framed, and in which it framed 
itself and, in circular manner, justified its own abstraction... 
and justified the practical subordination of individual parts in 
the social dynamic to some theoretical image. Lacan, like Hegel 
and Marx before him, presented the figure of the maitre renseur 
who cast his theoretical analysis of the dialectic of Master and 
Slave in a form which implicitly carried over into the relation 
of theorist of human interaction and individual 'objects' of his 
study, just the asymmetric relations, the circular authority of 
the Master - the 'Dictator' even - that they thought to be bring- 
ing into question. Hegel, the young Marx, Kojeve, Sartre, Lacan, 
had all presented textual analyses of the abstract dialectic of 
power working through that initial disruption of the radical 
symmetry of two 'I's, in which Rousseau had found the origin of 
human society: hegelian subjectivity, first discovering itself 
as what, in 'external' Izature can yet as Dasein frame its difference 
from that externality in the 'internal' differentiation of inside 
and outside of some body which is elementary self-consciousness, 
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in one fell swoop in a free space of Imagination in which one 
would find oneself, once the twin circuits of economic and ideo- 
logical repression and alienation were seen for what they were 
(or indeed just seen, for they operated by excluding or eliding 
the perception of their own operation) and in this revolutionary 
vision immediately, automRtically, dissolved, along with all their 
illusory (but while the illusion prevailed, utterly concrete) force. 
By 1985 Derrida had been succeeded by Lyotard in the 
part of 'Director' of CIPH: his insistence upon always articulat- 
ing the ideological interface of theoretical questioning and the 
practical assertion of such theory as a question, as constantly 
questionable (where a majority of his colleagues in GREPH saw this 
interface rather as the locus of assertion of their conception of 
the part of the theorist in society - notably the part of a certain 
academic tenure, salary and so on), replaced by the more assertive 
narration of theory as one genre of narration within the 'rhetorical' 
dynamic of coupling of narration with other dimensions of social 
activity -a dynamic of competing assertions or narrations of the 
competition of narratives, of which dynamic the nouveaux philosophes' 
unitary 'moral' assertion of moral consensus in a social harmony 
of parts might be seen as a transitional prefiguration. Political 
manoeuvres by Ricoeur and others had failed to realise the promise 
of a chair for Derrida at Nanterre, and so France's leading philo- 
sopher finally exchanged the humble part in which for twenty years 
his reflection had been organised as commentary upon the texts set 
for the agregation each year for a newly instituted post at the 
Ecole Pratique where at last he could select texts in relation to 
which to define the axis of his reflection, rather than adapting 
the axis of questioning to each year's syllabus, while on the other 
hand questioning in GREPH or CIPH such an 'institution' of phi- 
losophy. 
Like Comte preparing students for Polytechnique exam- 
inations in the 1830s and 1840s, Derrida had glossed the agre- 
aa tion syllabus in weekly lectiones before normaliens in a Salle- 
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Cavaill4s at the rue d'Ulm, filling up over the years wish 
germane, americans and then Japanese. After 1984, in his new 
part as instituted theorist of the 'Institution of Philoso;; hy' 
he could choose his own texts and define his own axis of inquiry 
in relation to them - even if this outwardly perpetuated the same 
old form of careful reading of a few texts before an international 
audience at the rue d'Ulm. 
Foucault had gone through a crisis associated with his 
journey to Iran to cover the iranian revolution of 1979-80 as a 
journalist, and become something of a recluse until his death in 
1984; Barthes had died in 1980 three years after leaving the Ecole 
Pratique for the College de France; Lacan had died in 1981, not 
long after dissolving the Ecole Freudienne de Paris; Derrida's old 
superior at the rue d'Ulm, Althusser, had been in a psychi. rtric 
hospital since 1981. Derrida himself was seriously ill over the 
winter of 1984-5, and had to interrupt his seminar on 'Philo$orhy 
and Nationality' after a few weeks reading of the section on Philoso- 
phy in America in De Tocqueville's De la Ddmocratie en Amdriquc. 
Braudel, the director of the Ecole Pratique, died at the close of 
1985... so many crises closing the great 'structuralist' period of 
the sixties and seventies, whose main home had been the Ecole Pra tiaue 
which Derrida was at last joining. 
... And yet as the foreigners began to outnumber the french 
in his audience, and his questioning of the institution of rhilo- 
sophy itself became instituted in the question of the rrim? ry insti- 
tution of Philosophy in a national tradition or school, an!. as the 
number of places open in the agrdgation concours in Philosophy fell 
towards only one percent of the number of candidates each year, the 
post of humble rdpetiteur, 'rehearsing''(literally) normaliens for 
the examination which was the hub of that circular 'reproduction' 
of theory that Bourdieu had analysed in the dynamic of french edu- 
cation, no longer corresponded to Derrida's axis of questioning. 
One percent: yet still determining in classes surerieures 
of the lycee, preparing students for the entrance concours to EINS, 
as in the University where normaliens would join students who had 
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come up through the University premier cycle and licence, in 
the deuxiame cycle preparing a maitrise which was a necessary 
qualification for competing in the agrdgation, then in EINS and 
University classes 'rehearsing' the examination that would recruit 
teachers to prepare the next generation of students in these var- 
ious institutions for the same examination - still determining, 
then, in ly e, University and grange dcole, through a central 
choice (at the Ministry of Education) of each year's set texts 
and central coordination by the Jury of the standards of critical 
exposition which would justify appointment to a pst teaching such 
exposition to further candidates - still determining the central 
axis of 'Philosophy' as instituted in France. 
The Ecole Pratique, on the other hand, trained not the 
superintendants of this national tradition of critical reading and 
exposition of texts, but 'practical' researchers - And its diplomas 
were of no use in obtaining access to the main circuit of educat- 
ional 'reproduction'. On the other hand, foreign nationals could 
not compete in the agregation, so the (structuralist' seminars of 
the Ecole Pratique could proceed unencumbered by the constraints 
of agregation syllabus and Jury, while giving foreign research 
students qualifications that might serve them in more open systems 
of social reproduction of theory at home. At the same time there 
was a sort of lesser circulation at the Ecole Pratique and also in 
the Universities, where certain posts were open to 'internal' can- 
didates who continued from maitrise through a 'troisieme cycle' 
of DEA and Doctorat de Troisibme Cycle - candidates who might 
then compete with a rd es for higher posts by preparing a Doctorat 
d'Etat. Last of all there was the CAPES whose preparation was 
modelled on that for the agrdgation, generally being taken by 
those who either had failed sifter sevQral attempts at the arr4- 
gation, or who felt there was no hope of passing the more diffi- 
cult concours in the Birst place, and which recruited teachers 
to assist the arg eges in the lower classes of lycees. 
Derrida's move, then, mey be taken as an index both 
of a temporal transition from the 'structuralism' of 1970 through 
the various 'crises' of late seventies and early eighties to a 
new configuration of parisian theory represented, say, by Lyotard 
cccccxliii 
at CIPH in 1985, and of the more or leas constant synchronic 
'space' of the various parisian institutions of theory - the space 
of 'institution of Philosophy' in Paris in the second half of the 
twentieth century, through which the various strands of transition 
from around 1970 to around 1985 might be traced. Within such a 
'spmce' and time of late-twentieth-century parisian theory, for 
example, Todorov, arriving like Kristeva as a research student in 
the sixties to study parisian developments of the 'formalist' ana- 
lysis of literary texts as linguistic systems, whose prewar roots 
were in eastern Europe, himself exemplifies the relatively autonomous 
and relatively international circulation and 'reproduction' of 
'structuralist' theory at the Ecole Pratique, more or less inde- 
pendent of the primary axis of reproduction of french writing-of- 
reading which is the agr4gation. 
TODOROV, Tzvetan 
927 Introduction ä la Littdrature Fantastique 1970 
928 Th4ories du Symbole 1977 
Todorov is noticed below as editor of Poetique, presenter of 'struct- 
uralism in poetics' in the collective Quest-ce que le Structuralisme, 
and of russian formalism in french translation. This 'straightfor- 
ward' relation of 'presenter' to text always struck me as rather 
odd among all the complex french texts dealing with the working-through 
in texts of their embedding in a textually framed context. The en- 
gagingly 'simple' Todorov would follow in the steps of earlier east- 
ern european formalists, extending Saussure's 'differential' analysis 
of linguistic synchrony and diachrony from the elementary level of 
phoneme in langue to the various levels - word, phrase, sentence, 
section - of a complete text; and in the seminar of 1975-6 (resulting 
in (928)) would apply the same 'differential' or structural approach 
to theoretical texts about 'the literary texts', organising a range 
of german Romantic theories of symbolism as so many 'positions' in 
a synchronic con. -textual or meta-textual space defined by a range of 
parameters analogous to the 'distinctive features' of Jakobson and 
Halle's phonetics: this synchronic space of embedding of text in 
language could then be set in a wider historical dynamic or diachrony 
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of literary theory, articulated in Todorov's own textual account 
(928), so that the classic 'structuralist' poles of differential 
analysis - global langue and elementary 'distinctive feature' - 
would appear as two extreme limits of a central axis of linguistic 
synchrony and diachrony traceable through the interface of 'inter- 
nal' and 'external' differential systems in the primary order of 
text. It was at this seminar that I first met with the poetics of 
Novalis, about which so much of my reflection would turn, back in 
England the next year. And the apparent 'untheoretical' simplicity 
of Todorov's expository style, his 'failure' to approach his texts 
in terms of some textual 'system' of his own, or to refer to the 
'systems' or theories of his parisian contemporaries - to explicitly 
engage 'theoretical' questions, 'philosophy' - to organise'the 
frame of his exposition, for example, in terms of its implications 
for the traditional abstract space and time of 'subjectivity', in 
relation to which Lacan, Derrida, Foucault and the others took their 
various positions; and his failure to define his position in relat- 
ion to those various versions of the 'death of the Subject' - this 
belied the implicit definition of his position in relation to all 
those subtle french theories, as organising the symmetries or syn- 
chronic 'space' of differentiation 'inside' and 'outside' the text, 
in which space the various french theorists abstracted to their 
various 'critical' positions in their theoretical texts. His 
'formal' coordination of 'internal' and 'critical' space and time 
in relation to texts as the primary unit of analysis, doubled by 
his female compatriot's explicit coordination of the various paris- 
ian theories of 'the text', of 'semiotics' - their critical inter- 
textuality informing her analysis of the intratextual revolution 
accomplished by Maliarme towards the beginning of the century - 
provided two complementary models - male and female, so to speak - 
of a space of analogy, of homology, of different theories of homo- 
logy or 'structure'. And it was at Todorov's seminar that I first 
heard of a complementary approach to the interface of text and 
context, as a german student from the University of Konstanz 'ex- 
posed' various german versions of a RezeptionsKsthetik which set 
the differential system of 'the text' not as a more radical inter- 
face of traditional 'subject' and the 'other' side-of the text 
coordinating desire, intersubjective group, linguistic sign and 
cccccxly 
so on; but rather in the Berman 'hermeneutic' frame of coordinat- 
ing different readings of a text through the interactions of dif- 
ferent groups within the wider natural economy of social relations 
in Nature, and the 'diachrony' of this social space of 'intersubject- 
ivity'. But it was only after leaving Paris that I began to explore 
the general 'synchrony' of british, french, german and american 
traditions or schools of theoretical embedding of theoretical text 
in theoretical context, as so many symmetric abstractions from the 
question of 'theory' as systematic questioning, and came to recognize 
in the collaboration of Jean Bollack and Heinz Wismann on the text 
of Heraclitus and its tradition (77) an interplay of french and 
german traditions that echoed my own british attempt to articulate 
the pythagorean tradition of 'theory' in a general synchrony and 
associated diachrony or dynamic of theoretical text and 'symmetric' 
coordinates of she 'context' of which the text in question was 'the 
theory': the tradition, then, of a 'philosophy' which was just the 
most general theory of coordination of theory with the widest, 'uni- 
versal' context or Universe, of which the theory was the theory, 
the 'vision'. 
WISMANN, Heinz: Philologie et Histoire 
Over my first year in Paris Heinz Wismann was embroiled in a contro- 
versy over the non-renewal of his research post at the CNRS. I 
remember Jacques Bouveresse deploring this 'scandalous' patent dis- 
crimination against a german on the part of the french 'theoretical' 
establishment which he (3ouveresse) had apparently (so I heard in- 
directly from a student of Jacques-Alain Miller's) been deploring 
ever since his days at the rue d'Ulm in the early sixties (the 
canadian girl had been working on Wittgenstein with both Bouveresse 
and Miller, and reported the latter saying of his old classmate 'Oh, 
he's always complaining). By 1975-6 Wismann was, like Todorov, 
holding an Ecole Pratique seminar at the rue d'Ulm. A few years 
later, in the early 1980s, I was rather surprised to find, collab- 
orating on Wismann's seminar on Heraclitus at ENS another colleague 
from the Ecole Pratique who was already teaching lacanian psycho- 
analysis at Paris VIII9 doubling his EHESS seminar with Julia Kris- 
teva's department's troisieme cycle course structure, and playing 
an active part in Rene Thom's development of 'catastrophe theory' 
down at IHES twenty miles south of Paris: 
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PETITOT, Jean: Modbles dynamiques en Sciences Humaines 
'What are you doing here? ' I asked; and he seemed rather a'fronted 
that I should imagine his polymathy stopped short of philological 
investigations into the heraclitean tradition. Down at the Maison 
des Sciences de 1'Homme he was also collaborating with Greimas and 
in two other seminars, apart from continuing the Wednesday seminar 
on 'Applications de la Theorie des Catastrophes en Semiolinguistir, ue' 
which I had attended in 1975-6. I had already been rather astonished 
then that this former polytechnicien should have combined the 'two 
cultures' of advanced mathematical physics and the whole spectrum 
of parisian semiotics in such a very unfrench manner, and I would 
often stay and chat after the seminar, as he was the only person in 
Paris who spoke both the languages in which I was working. Thom's 
'Catastrophe Theory' amounted effectively to a programme to recast 
the whole of mathematical physics, and various other structures such 
as molecular biology, linguistics, and so on, in terms of homolog Y9 
or a mathematical theory of 'structure', that Petitot was e°fectively 
taking as the abstract formel framework of which the various 'struct- 
uralisms' were so many analogous or homologous exemplifications de- 
fined in relation to informal language - so many different 'dimens- 
ions , then, of embedding of actual places of theoretical assertion 
(in informal language, french) in the general formal frame of a 
mathematical inscription of a system of formal substitution and (or) 
symmetry in the general physical context of substitution of a mathe- 
matical symbol for a 'term' or item of its context. Or rather, so 
many correlative dimensions of embedding of their common abstract 
form (as structures of substitution) in the 'ordinary' informal 
language that was the primary context of the mathematical symbolism. 
The mathematics of substitution -a sort of idealised model of 
saussurian 'language' as matrix of possible substitutions at dif- 
ferent points in chains of signifiers -*gave the abstract 'meaning- 
less' structure common to the 'logic' of each 'structuralist' theory 
or inquiry, and to the complementary matrix of analogy which the 
various theories in their various ways identified as the linguistic 
frame of embedding of narrative or discours (as interface of locical 
and analogical or figural) in context. In a sort of cartesian limit 
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where muddled informal language had been completely unfolded, 
unpacked, analysed, into a pure formal space of clear and distinct 
ideas articulated about the abstract figure of cartesian assertion 
itself - in the goal of the cartesian project of rational recon- 
struction of the World, where language would become simply the 
mathematically precise system of signs that could exactly model 
the inscription of that system in the physical space of substitu- 
tion of one body for another (which it would also perfectly model) - 
one might hope to do a sort of lacanian revision of Comte's uni- 
versal theory, by taking a universal Culture organised in a complete 
analysis of human relations into the elementary symmetries of all 
the different 'parts', interacting in a mathematically precise 
metaphoric space and metonymic time of desire or will, as the 
universal interface of the completed cartesian logic, and a com- 
plementary completed mathematical physics of 'external' physical 
space and time. Yet such an ideal global mathematical 'structur- 
alism', in which various Istructuralisms' might be seen as so many 
correlative dimensions of embedding of unitary absolute lam as 
'complete' system of differences, in the different 'absolute' dim- 
ensions (physical, sociological, rsychoanalytic and so on) of uni- 
tary absolute context (unitary Universe), is from the first (al- 
though it took the best part of a decade, the sixties, to see this) 
radically compromised precisely by the (deconstruction' of unitary 
cartesian 'internal' space of theory - and its analogues in unitary 
langue, culture, physical Universe and so on - as itself the pro- 
jection in a particular order of finitary 'informal' discourse, 
specific to a particular time, place and culture, of a figure of 
inscription of that discourse in an abstraction from the imperfect 
play of substitutions among its words, whose historical dynamic or 
'mechanism' within informal language and specific discursive form- 
ations can be convincingly demonstrated in just such 'ordinary' 
language. Indeed it was just the breakdown of the millenial 
project of framing in hegelian manner a unitary Kosmos coordinate 
with the abstract theoretical space in which it was supposed 
framed (as system of symmetric coordinates of the context of that 
unitary logic), which expressed itself at the beginning of the 
twentieth century in 'modern' or Imodernistl models of the various 
dimensions of theory and context. After around 1900 one could no 
longer naively begin from a logic that was itself abstracted from 
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the ; prz, ctic... l ccntext of the process of abstraction - from an 
'internal' order of substitutions in language and a3sociated 
dynamic of questions - in order to frame the process of abstract- 
ion; indeed one could no longer even begin, after about 1900, 
from a merely 'logical' determination of the axis of inquiry, 
of one's starting-point, defined as 'external' to the earlier 
logical space and time in terms of, terms 'borrowed' from, that 
earlier space of inquiry, theory. One had to begin from where 
one actually was, even if the determination of that starting-point 
was always radically questionable: one had to begin by questioning 
the starting-point, and organise one's inquiry in the axis or 
dynamic associated with that incompletely determined question. 
So Jean Petitot was not engaged in framing the formal 
unitary mathematical space of 'structuralism' in which the various 
structuralisms might be embedded through the formal inscription of 
the 'short-circuit' of informal language in some complete analysis 
of elementary differences and their unitary global syntax. Dif- 
ferent theories of the complementarity in actual informal lenguage 
of the theoretical dynamic of substitutions in and symmetries of 
the linguistic chain of signifiers, and the 'analogic' space of 
metaphor and metonymy identified by Jakobson, were associated 
with different axes of inquiry corresponding to the different 
'positions' of the various theorists 'in' a more or less common 
french language, and in the french cultural context of that shared 
language. There was no comprehensive total theory, because that 
would imply that the theorist was not some real parisian theorist 
in some particular institution, working with a finitary and still 
largely informal discursive 'apparatus', but the old cartesian 'I', 
organising a logically reconstructed unitary language around his 
nominal place in its totla matrix. The primary axis was Lacan's 
converse trajectory of unfolding in french his, and indirectly 
our, difference from that classical Subject, and the dynamics of 
this difference as expressed in 'working throi'gh' it in the 
coupling of textual expression of this 'working-through', and 
components of the context of that discourse marked in the discourse, 
through what was marked in the discourse as the 'analogical' 
space and time of desire. 
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Jean Petitot himself, in an extraordinarily wide range 
of coupled institutional 'positions' or personae, was working through 
the mathematical coordination of various components of the various 
'structuralist' discourses - in his 'own' seminar in 1975-6 slowly 
'working through' a Mallarm6 poem. A poem that was Mallarmd's 
'script' of the writing of the poem itself: the closed hermetic 
matrix of words which dramatically framed itself as one component 
in the situation or scene of composition and its dynamic of evocat- 
ion or invocation. The articulation of this poem in the abstrrct 
mathematical space of substitutions that expressed the analogy or 
'ana-logic' of the various 'structuralist' versions of inscription 
of the various elements named in the 'informal' language of the poem 
in various complementary dynamics of metaphor or figure, in which 
we - or parts of us - and the poet, and the theorists were actually 
implicated (as we are implicated in various structures of informal 
language concretely, rather than 'abstractly' in formal systems of 
substitution indifferent between the various concrete dynamics that 
may be modelled, substituted, by them), opened up a sort of analogical 
space and time of 'interaction' or coupling of the various structur- 
alist discourses brought into play in reading the poem. The drama 
of Mallarmd's poem, mapped by a formal system of substitutions and 
an associated formal dynamic, served to coordinate various different 
structuralist positions in the Paris all around us in a sort of 
dramatic logic that Petitot regarded as a 'mathematical poetics'. 
This is not the version he gave of his 'mathematical poetics'; none 
of us really knew what was going on in the seminar, except that we 
were reading Mallarmd's poem, each (it was the most 'interactive' of 
al the seminars I attended) applying different ', structuralist' fig- 
ures to the relations of these various figures, and somehow organ- 
ising an interplay of different theories of analogy and language 
in the metaphorical space and time of the poem - with an abstruse 
mathematical structure that had itself only been rather metaphorically 
sketched (Petitot was the only one present who actually understood 
the details of differential topology involved) as a sort of currency 
in which all this circulation of figures and themes was carried on. 
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Petitot used to drive me and a german student from 
his seminar (who had also studied mathematics) down to Thom's 
Saturday seminar at IHES in the picturesque setting of the 
village of Bures-sur-Yvette south of Paris -a sort of french 
version of the mathematical section of the Princeton Institute 
for Advanced Study, where mathematicians are left to get on with 
collaboration on advanced research, with no distractions in the 
way of students or teaching: 
Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques 
THOM, Rend 
929 Stabilitd Structurelle et Morphogenese: Essai dune Theorie G(n- 
4rale des Modbles Reading, Mass 1972 
930 Modelee Mathdmatiques de la Morphogenese (papers 19 -) 197 
Now Thom's programme of a 'general morphology' had as its axis 
a complex mathematical framing of the elementary dynamics of 
separation of 'name' and 'thing' -a correlative unfolding of 
Language and World from an 'originary' kernel of that mrthematical 
poetics on which Petitot was working - so that the theory would 
come full-circle, be 'bootstrapped' as one says of physical theories 
that frame the part of 'observer' in the Kosmos of which he is 
providing the physical theory, when one could eventually model 
the mathematical language in which the theory was framed, in the 
theory it framed. I felt that this was another example of the 
'horseless carriage' on the way to becoming a car: the complex 
mathematical theory supposed at the outset would actually have 
to look rather different in the eventually reconstructed poetics 
of correlative unfolding of Language and World, from the way it 
appeared in a mathematics based on an essentially cartesinn 
unitary external 'space' and time of abstract indivisible point- 
instants. I felt that the extreme mathematical complexity of 
Thom's theory, brought in to model or describe the elementary 
relations and dynamics of 'marking', 'pointing', was a reflection 
of the complex circuit from initial configuration of term and 
thing, through the limiting abstract frame of point-instant in 
unitary mathematical Space and Time, back to the implicit start- 
ing point which was in fact much simpler in its principles than 
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the formal theory being used to reconstruct it. I felt that 
what one should be trying to reconstruct was not the limiting 
circuit from word through abstract elementary mark, geometrical 
'point', back to the framing of that 'point' as extreme abstract- 
ion from the cartesian coupling of language as mntrix of substi- 
tutions and 'external World' as space and time of substitution of 
one physical 'thing' for another - with language itself determining 
its own character as system of substitution of words (or rather 
'ideas') for the wider universal System in which language (or thourht) 
was only one among several dimensions; in which words were themselves 
only one kind of thing (the kind of thing we call 'word').... I felt 
that one should be trying to construct a narrower, but more radical 
circuit, of marking in pythagorean manner the 'syntax' or general 
poetic 'space' and time of marking, of which the abstr'xct mathematical 
circuit through 'pure' Space and Time with its infinitesimal point- 
instants was a sort of imaginary limit correlative with the abstract 
starting-point of cartesian 'point', rather than the language whose 
matrix of substitutions, substituted as a whole for the general 
'space' of which language was but one dimension, itself determined 
this imaginary 'point'. 
Now Thom's colleague at IHES, Alexandre Grothendieck, had 
elaborated in his IHES seminar on Algebraic Geometry over the sixties 
(which I never attended in the seventies), a coordination of the 
(algebraic' syntax of marking or naming 'points', and 'geometric' 
structures 'in' various 'spaces', but 'relativistically' invarirnt 
between different systems of framing or corking them, which may be 
taken as the mathematical analogue of Derrida's 'structurali-3t' pre- 
sentation of a pure unitary 'inner' space of transcendenýal subject- 
ivity as itself an abstraction from the linguistic 'space' and time 
in which it was nominally defined, and in which the dynamics of this 
'positing' could be analysed 'deconstructed' in terms of a more 
radical space and time of 'grammatology'. Grothendieck's theory 
of 'topoi' deconstructed, so to speak, classical cartesian space - 
a global unitary space of indivisible point(-instant )s - and pre- 
sented it in terms of a more radical dynamic of coordinating di'ferent 
mappings or frames within a new mapping, where the different initial 
partial mappings or frames could each be associated with a particul^r 
point or perspective in the new frame. The 'theory of topoi' had 
itself been initially developed in a cartesian system of classical 
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geometric 'analysis', but by around 1970, as I noted in Part III, 
Lawvere had shifted the axis of the theory, so to speak, by 
framing the cartesian space in which topöi were first of all 
investigated as itself one particular case of a more general 
'topos'. This marks an eventual 'structuralist' deconstruction 
of the abstr: 9ct cartesiin coupling of 'pure' algebraic mark, co- 
ordinate with a purified and symmetric linguistic matrix articu- 
lated around the logic of abstract cartesian 'If asserting its 
instance of assertion in response to the place of the question in 
the linguistic matrix of substitutions, and elementary cartesian 
'point' represented by such a pure mark, through the cartesian 
symmetry of pure 'internal' space of unitary logical analysis, and 
equally unitary and 'analytic' external space, pure 'extension'. 
Thom's dynamics of coupling of mark and thing was, I felt, in need 
of mathematical Ideconstructicnt, parallelling in the formal language 
of mathematical substitution (and the physical order of substitution 
of one thing for another which it traditionally modelled) what 
Derrida had undertaken in informal 'ordinary) language for the 
correlative cartesian 'subject' and its associated space and time 
of theory - the unitary cartesian space of framing the embedding 
of that pure internality in a coordinate Universe, whioh had been 
reasserted, for example, by Husserl in his Paris lectures of 1930. 
In my lectures on Wittgenstein - my 'exposition' of the 
transition from Tractatus to the posthumously published reflections 
On Certainty -I had attempted a preliminary sketch of a possible 
reconstruction of the global mirroring of logical and physical 
space of the first work in terms of a correlation of 'internal' 
topology of the subject (borrowed largely from Lacan) and 'external' 
topography of the World (which I took to be questions addressed by 
Wittgenstein in On Certainty and the Investigations respectively). 
This I planned to develop from considerations of 'internal' and 
'external', logical and physical, spaces correlatively unfolding 
in a common time, out of a radical figure of 'internal' and 'exter- 
nal' sides of the distinction or difference of 'internal' and 
'external'. I suggested that 'logic' and 'physics' were correlat- 
ive framings, from the two sides of their difference, of their 
difference or distinction. One could not begin 'in' either side, 
with he supposition of resolution of the radical duality or two- 
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sidedness of this complementarity of 'internal' and 'externFl' 
sides of two-sidedness: one must rather attempt to map this 
radical duality and its dynamics in an intermediate 'poetic' 
order of symmetry of the two sides, logic and physics, deduction 
and causation, which articulated the mutual embedding of each 
dynamic of inscription of the rel-ltion of the two sides in one 
side, one in the other, in the primary temporal symmetry of two 
directions in time (final and efficient causality, logical and 
physical time) - rather as a book or story might be considered 
to be articulated in this symmetry of opening and closing, of 
interplay of intentions or intentionality of its various charact- 
ers, with the 'outward' physical dynamic of the situation in which 
the action or interaction 'took place'. 
Physical and logical, 'inside' and 'outside', as two 
sides of their two-sidedness; and their two dynamics then just 
the dynamics on each side of embedding the relations of the two 
sides in one side or the other respectively - with the 'poetic' 
order of human interaction in Nature or rather Culture as the 
primiry model or matrix of coupling of the two dynamics - or 
rather of the two dimensions of a deeper fundamental dynamic. 
I renamed the book I was preparing to write 'Time and Durlity', 
changing from 'Le Signe et le Temps' with which I hnd arrived 
in Paris. 
At this point the book or thesis was to be constructed 
simply as the symmetric logical dynamic of unfolding within the 
mathematical frame of their analogy, of theories of the 'internal' 
and 'external' dynamics of Psyche and Physis, down from the 
initial pythagorean marking of these coordinate sides of the 'mark' 
or boundary, Qo S, and a coordinate heraclitean dynamic of 'sep- 
aration' (in Wismann and Bollack's expression) of 'internal' 
Acs("S and 'external' , to the point at which I felt theory 
had arrived around 1970, when each of the separate dimensions 
of 'logical' theory, theories of the various primary dimensions 
of embedding of Theory in Context or Kosmos, must at last confront 
the question posed for each of them by their 'm^thematical' sym- 
metry. Each separate 'domain' or theory, I felt, logic, physics, 
psychology, poetics and so on, had reached an impasse where the 
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abstraction of each dimension from the symmetry of the various 
coordinite dimensions of embedc; ing of logical theory in physical 
World and cosmic Context (of which logical and physical were but 
two dimensions) was reflected in analogous 'symptomatic' piradoxes 
in each domain of 'theory'. I would bring the theoretical story 
opening with the pythagoreans and Heraclitus full-circle, and close 
it, by finding in the theory of topoi a mathematical model of 
marking the relations of the various dimensions of the mark, from 
which each of the various theories of around 1970 would appear as 
an abstraction or concretion instituted in their coordinate or cor- 
relative 'breakings' of the radical mathem? tical symmetry of dif- 
ferent 'sides' or 'dimensions' of the mark or sign. I would thus 
present a sort of circular interplay of questions, which could not 
itself be questioned, since it would already hPve 'relntivised' any 
thematic in terms of which it might be brought 'into question' to 
some particular axis or dynamic within the whole it coordinated. 
By the summer of 1979, on a lonely welsh hilltop overlooking the 
coast where I had picked it up, the image or model of the book I 
was trying to write lay on the windowsill in front of my typewriter: 
a small smooth stone. 
As for my radical 'topos', I was by then working on 
the elementary algebraic geometry of the 'trinity knot' which 
appears as a model of the symmetry of physical and logical space 
halfway through the Introduction above. This had evolved fairly 
naturally from Lacan's various 'mathemes' with which I hAd been 
playing since 1975, trying to find a much simpler figure of the 
poetic or analogical coupling of logical and physical 'spaces' 
than Petitot's Catastrophe Theory. It was a matter of finding 
a spatial structure that was a spatial model of the way that the 
three-by-two dimensions of space-time were themselves only one 
coordinate dimension or side of the coordination they modelled - 
for which they might be 'substituted', just as the simple algebra 
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of elementary symbols (a, b, c, ab, a-1 , abc-1 and so on) which 
modelled the topological structure of the space 'divided' in 
various coordinate ways by the knot presented an elementary matrix 
of substitutions which was itself a substitute for or model of 
the relations of itself and other correlative 'dimensions' - the 
'spatial' or external dimensionality of the knot in particular. 
This then was the 'problematic' or axis of my questioning 
in mid-seventies Paris until the winter of 1979-80. I was trying 
to focus the symmetries of various 'structuralist' theories of 
ana-logical embedding of language (and with it the psychological 
'subject') in linguistically articulated context (contextual or 
coordinate dimensions) in a sort of elementary and 'categorial' 
marking of the symmetry -and (symmetrical) asyýnmetry - of various 
primary 'sides' or dimensions of the 'mark' as such, as 'mark', 
öeog. 
- This through a 'mathematics' for which Lacan (with Petitot 
and Miller) provided an initial model, and which would link the 
parisian Geisteswissenschaften of structuralist sixties and seven- 
ties wich a more international Naturwissenschaft, and at the same 
time with an anglo-american philosophical tradition then turning 
about, precisely, the relations of formal and informal lnngunge 
as complementary frames of modelling a World of which each was it- 
self a component or dimension. 
IHES, like EHESS (as the VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique 
was redefined in 1975) had a decidedly internationnl character: 
the central figure in the sixties, Grothendieck was born in Berlin 
of a russian father, in 1928, escaping to France in 1941 when his 
father was killed by the Nazis) Thom is a protestant from the Juri 
near Basel; his chief collaborator, Christopher Zeeman, was so to 
speak the only link between Warwick and Paris during my sty there 
in the mid-seventies. And Thom also collaborated with Maurice Loi 
and Jean Dieudonnd in a decidedly international seminar devoted to 
Philosophy and Mathematics' held once or twice a week at the rue 
d'Ulm, where the papers were generally given by eminent visiting 
mathematicians, logicians, physicists or historians of science, and 
usually generated a long debate among the eminent french and foreign 
scholars in the audience: 
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Ecole Normale Supgrieure (Rue d' Ulm) 
S4minaire de Philosophie et Math4matique (Loi, Thom, Dieudonne) 
Here I would try and pick up, in the dynamics, so to speak, of the 
discussion, the analogies or (informally speaking) homologies that 
directed the patterns of exchange between speaker and vprious members 
of the audience. For if 'modern' mathematics is defina'ale as the 
attempt to formulate structures that appear in different guises 
within different theories within mathematics as a whole, in terms 
independent of the different instances or representations of those 
'structures' - as tending, then, towards Whitehead's 'Universal Al- 
gebra' of around 1900, or Eilenberg and Maclane's Category Theory 
of mid-century (proposed as 'foundational' or primitive mathematical 
structure and language by Lawvere around 1970) - then the prefigurat- 
ion of new theorems and theories in 'modern mathematics' may generally 
be found in the analogies of different theories with which m^themat- 
icians play in their 'informal' discussion, or in the silent ^ersonal 
reflections or jottings which belong to the same order of interplay 
of unformalised suggestion and conjecture. 
I wanted a formulation of just this radically analogical 
dynamic of mathematical theory itself -a more or less formal miitrix 
of terms which would present a"tsort of kernel from which mathem! tics 
as formal theory of analogy or homology might be unfolded: this Pro- 
jection itself in direct line from the turn-of-the-century attempts 
to find mathematical and logical formulations of the a"nalory between 
logical and mathematical 'syntax' - between say, subject-and-predic- 
ate and variable-and-function, or between the mathematics of loric. al 
'inclusion' and 'exclusion' and of physical, geometrical, spice - 
in a direct line from the logic of Frege and Russell : end Hilbert 
and Poincare, as from their mathematics; a direct line from the first 
International Congress of Mathematicians in the Paris of 1900, to 
the more informal seminar at the rue d'Ulm in the seventies. 
What in fact I got, was the dynamic in my own inquiries, 
that I have already typified in describing the dynamic of Petitot's 
seminar: a finality of reflection apparently tending towards the 
articulation of the informal thematica of various *-nalo. ous 'theories' 
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within a formal matrix of substitutions within which their 
informal language might be supposed formally organised in 
local configurations of abstraction of matrices of words - like 
mallarmean poems - from the wider formal space... while the terms 
of that formal m"itrix were themselves still partly embedded in 
just such 'poetic' configurations from which they were supposedly 
in process of being abstracted. And it was not until late in 
1979, when I sat down to eventually frame the millenial circuit 
of such a dynamic of theoretical finality, that I discovered that 
the 'poetic' configuration of a Mallarmi poem or its various his- 
torical analogues, was not something that could 'in general' or 
in principle be formally embedded as simply the circuit of ab- 
str; Action or concretion of 'informal' language and its unmathe- 
mutical words, within the formal matrix of some abstract system 
of substitutions which defined itself as a substitution for the 
wider 'cosmic' system of which it was but one side or dimension: 
rather now did I see, or practically discover, that the theory or 
thought dramatised in a Mallarmd poem as one component in the situ- 
ation of conception or composition of the poem - the drama or 
dramatic situation of which the written or printed poem was 
script ('Prose') or transcript - must itself be inscribed as 
it is written in a dramatic order of substitutions or variable 
components in an action, in which any writing of theory, as one 
action among others possible, must, like the words of a Mallarme 
poem, inscribe itself as script. 
This, then, was the starting-point, defining the 
axis of a questioning, and of its transcription into this long 
record of inquiry, not in the closed hermetic symmetry of a 
narration of the 'internal' dynamic of theory down from the 
pythagoreans, disappearing in its close into the symmetry of 
Symmetry and Asymmetry, like the identity of Identity and Difzý'erence, 
or the heavenly Sphere of parmenidean Being; but rather in the 
progressive marking or transcription at (indeed, as) each stage 
of the written questioning, of the question posed or opened up 
by the symmetry of the previous question and its marking, with 
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various extra-textual configurations, dimensions, of that 
marking. 
I finally came at the close of 1979 to attempt to 
systematically frame the symmetry over time, in 'theoretical' 
space, of the unfolding of its logical and other dimensions 
towards a structure or pure matrix of substitution, and with it 
of all questions and theories, which recapitulated the opening 
pythagorean framing of theory in the marking (as Tetractys) of 
the symmetry of the various dimensions or aspects of 'the mark'. 
The symmetry of opening and closing markings of the symmetry of 
various dimensions of 'the mark' simply as such (aimark, then, 
substituted for, indifferently representing, any particular 
mark or sign that might be substituted for, or represent, some- 
thing more specific) would itself articulate the elementary 
differences of which historical theories were seen to be the 
theories, in the radical difference between opening and closing 
of the whole otherwise perfectly symmetrical structure, in time. 
But how, then, open the presentation or representation of this 
radical symmetry of theory over 2,500 years, which latter was 
itself a sort of frame, in its turn, of the wider cosmic dynamic 
in which it as historical theory was embedded, and of which it 
was the unfolding theory? For the terms in which the opening 
pythagorean 'theory' was framed, as framed in the marking of the 
symmetry of the various dimensions of their marking, must themselves 
be supposed organised and articulated within the limiting matrix 
finally defined simply as the marking of its marking which organ- 
ises a general space and time of questions, in which the whole 
account of unfolding of theory from pythagoreans to 1970 is nom- 
inally to be supposed inscribed. But this would in principle 
require a working back from the end of the presentation to the 
beginning, unfolding from the absolute symmetry of the conclusion 
or close a converse embedding of the informal language of the 
text in a formal coupling with symmetric dimensions of context, 
governing the working forward from the informality of the opening 
of or movement into the presentation, towards its final embedding 
in the cosmic symmetry at which it eventually arrived. 
ccccclix 
Now it was just 'at this point' in my inquiry - but not 'in' the 
inquiry as I then conceived it - that I found myself writing to 
Julia, asking why I was still writing, writing that questioning 
of its very writing. And as I wrote I began to recognise in the 
dramatic coupling of the writing and the other symmetric components 
of the action of which it was the writing, the action of writing 
the questioning of this writing, as it set itself in a configuration 
of terms in which it identified itself as one among othersf.. I began 
to recognise the true space and time of questioning and theory, in 
which I must open up the question of the coupling of different di- 
mensions of theory over time. Not some limit of absolute symmetry 
from which the space and time in which this symmetry was marked 
would mysteriously unfold in parmenidean manner from the mere fact 
of there being a mark, and a question posed by the difference of 
this principle of differentiation, from absolute symmetry which ab- 
stracted itself from even this difference: rather a space of quest- 
ioning embedded in the coupling of theory and its logic with the 
'external' physical order, the questioning of which itself unfolded 
into a theory of that space and time in which its theory was embed- 
ded; a 'space' of questioning opening up from the marking of the 
various dimensions of questioning of that their marking as the inquiry 
opened in language, and in physical space, in a certain culture - in 
the book into which the inquiry which made up the book would be the 
inquiry. 
For how else could one frame in a book a 'space' and 
time of questioning, and of questioning of earlier spaces of quest- 
ioning in particular, as they were embedded in the space of the 
inquiry, the book: to frame a matrix of substitutions of marks one 
for another, and all for the focal mark 'mark' or Isign', 'positively', 
in the opening of a 'traditional' book of theory, would be to ab- 
stract the matrix of terms in which this their central term was to 
be considered posed, from the radical question posed for each by 
that central term, itself marking the question posed by the sub- 
stitution of linguistic for non-linguistic components of the inquiry. 
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Indeed traditional books of theory, and the theory of which 
they were the writing, might all be coordinated in a common 
'tradition' of theory precisely through the inaugural abstract- 
ion in each case of their discursive 'space' and time from the 
question posed in their very opening by the passage 'through' 
that opening from context into text, as itself considered as 
one variable in the action of writing theory. Even in the rare 
case where this transition, and the character of 'theory' as 
'practice' is not elided, it traditionally appears articulated 
theoretically in a textual matrix of terms 'substituted' in the 
book of theory for the practical matrix of writing a particular 
book, while the wider matrix of the questio4s in whose theoretical 
dynamic this question of relations of text and context is in- 
scribed does not itself appear articulated in the radical symmetry 
of the linguistic matrix of its questioning, and the practical 
or poetic matrix in which that order of transcription of symmetry 
into textual 'question' is itself one subordinate term. My 
directing question would be, then, the question posed by the 
very marking of the symmetry of inquiry and action as a question, 
this presentation of the symmetry of the various orders or di- 
mensions of my questioning in my questioning, as so many orders of 
symmetric questions, as itself posing the next question, whose 
marking would pose the following question, and so on. 
Thus Derrida's inscription of the dynamic of theoretical 
questioning in earlier books, in the linguistic order of substi- 
tution of the theoretical matrix of questions for the linguistic 
matrix of substitution that was traditionally considered to be 
theoretically inscribed in the 'pure' internal space of the theor- 
etical questions - this image of theory itself, then, subject to 
a converse ana-logic of figuration, a poetics of abstraction - 
this symmetry of theoretical and figural in which his own discourse 
on the poetics of theory was articulated as both theory and lit- 
erature at once, might itself be in its turn inscribed in a more 
radical 'poetics' of substitution of its textual or linguistic 
presentation, for the 'practical' matrix of this substitution 
itself: 
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Me and Jacques Derrida 
DERRIDA, Jacques 
931 L'Ecriture et La Difference'(1959-67) 1967 (74-5) 
932 L'Origine de la Geometrie (tr of Husserl's 1936 study, with very long 
introductory essay) 1962 (74) 
933 La Voix et le Ph4nom4ne 1967 (74) 
934 De la Grammatologie 1967 (74-5) 
935 Positions (interviews 1967-71) 1972 
936 La Dissemination (196'-72) 1972 
937 Marges - De la Philosophie 1972 
938 Eperons, Les Styles de Nietzsche (Cerisy 1972: in (779); rev, with 
intr Agosti, ill Loubrieu Venice 1976)1978 
939 Glas 1974 
940 La Carte Postale de Socrate ä Freud et au-delä (1975-9) 
Me and. Jacques Derrida - or rather Jacques Derrida and I. I first 
encountered him ten chair et en os' (a phrase which recurred rather 
often in his seminar) rather than in his books, a couple of weeks 
after my arrival to study in Paris in late 1974. A syrian student 
I had met had introduced me to Ricoeur's seminar (he was prep ring 
a thesis on 'Le Transcendental' at CNRS with Ricoeur), and in return 
I was standing outside a door on the first floor of ENS with him, 
about to introduce him to Derrida's seminar, by taking him along 
with my verbal letter of introduction (: so to speak - in effect just 
the name Alan Montefiore and my relation to it). On the beige door 
was a little tin holder for a card and the occupant's name. It was 
empty, but someone had written a just legible 'Jackie' in pencil in 
place of the card and name. Derrida was also teaching at Yale, in 
the long french academic vacation between the agrdgation in May and 
the rentrie in mid-November. 1-knocked, and we entered. Jacques 
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Derrida was speaking on the phone, and signalled us to sit down. 
I tapped the ash from my cigarette into the ashtray on his table 
and found a chair. 
'Mais... C'est mon texte' were the first words I remember, 
the voice rising to a characteristic high pitch of exclamation which 
I later came to know as a specifically derridean modulation, marking 
phonetically something like a verbal 'pointing' (in various senses) 
with no direct correlate in his writing. 'Ma ch4re... comment peux-tu 
me demander si_je suis sGr qu'il n'y ait as une erreur: c'est mon 
textet' 
The telephone conversation concluded, we briefly explained 
our research to Derrida, and were invited to a short series of 'inter- 
nal' ENS classes on the relation between psychology and phenomenology 
in Husserl, before the opening of the seminar proper, devoted to the 
reading, lectio, of a group of texts around the thematic 'La Vie-La 
Mort', Derrida's transposition of the year's agrdgation theme, 'La Vie 
et La Mort'. The seminar opened, and its axis was set, in that margin- 
al suppression of copulation: '-' for 'et'; and the reading turned 
about Freud's Jenseits des Lustprinzips, as Derrida notes at the open- 
ing of the revision of that section of his script for the seminar, 
which appears as 'Spdculer. - sur 'Freud' ', in La Carte Postale. Not 
so much S/Z as -/et ... so to speak (though how would one speak that: 
-/et 
/ S/Z ? ). 
I only discovered La Carte Postale during my last stay with 
Julia in Paris. She was living in a flat just off the Jardin de Lux- 
embourg. I was spending most of my time wandering around Julia, the 
flat, and Paris with a borrowed camera, taking a hundred and fifty 
photographs in an attempt to organise what I thought of as a sort of 
visual 'syntax' or grammar of the city, with a mechanical eye substi- 
tuted for 'I'. I could photograph Julia Kristeva'a bathroom, its 
open windows giving onto the inner cour two floors below: there was 
one flat on each floor, hers on the third, Julia's (? ) on the fifth. 
I would meet her son fairly often on the stairs, remembering how he 
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had made his silent 
seminars when I was 
... profile... of bot] 
then as an explicit 
ing of the neonatal 
'intervention' over the course of Kristeva's 
first in Paris - first as a slowly changing 
z Julia Kristeva and her seminaire de 30 cycle, 
reference, contrasted with Winnicott's read- 
state. 
I had heard vaguely that there was a reference to an 
exchange I had with Derrida in 1977 in the book - an exchange on 
the lawn at Balliol that I have already referred to (before en- 
countering La Carte Postale) towards the close of Part III above. 
Derrida was in Oxford, giving a paper that would become Limited 
Inc., a, b, c, (Baltimore 1977), and I was visiting Oxford from my 
Cotswold hilltop thirty miles away to witness his performance in 
this new, but old, scene. But I was no more prepared for the sym- 
metry of the trajectory opening from that encounter, and passing 
through Derrida's encounter with 'la carte postale' and the two- 
year 'correspondence' with an unnamed woman, of which it became 
the visual or visible medium... and my own trajectory from that 
meeting to another encounter at the beginning of December 1979, 
than was Derrida for the encounter with the Carte Postale..... 
... For his encounter with an image in which the 'parts' 
of Socrates and Plato are reversed, inverted as in a strange mirror: 
an image of the converse dynamics of the Image, from which the 
'socratic' scripts are the dramatic inaugural abstraction to a 
millenial image of reflection and its transmission, communication, 
its destiny - beginning with Plato's fiction of being Socrates' 
scribe, and reaching its destination (a message 'geschichte' over 
2,500 years or so) as Jacques Derrida suddenly finds his own 're- 
flection' or speculation reflected in this image, and concluded so 
to speak in the final inversion or conversion which transforms 
that residual platonic reflection on the reflection of Derrida's 
reflection in an image, into the mere reception of the message 
transmitted by Socrates through this thirteenth-century postcard. 
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This image, this postcard, then - the following day - becomes 
the medium of a writing of an inquiry into the 'correspondence' 
through that medium of Derrida, its scribe, and 'sa' femme: a 
transposition into a more symmetric exchange, correspondence, in- 
tercourse, of, say, the earlier more formal inscription of his 
writing (and reading at Cdrisy) of a reflection on the writing of 
reflection in 'la question du style' focussed in what the pen, 
the stylus, tries to pin down as femme. The earlier metaphoric 
space of verbal imagery becomes articulated in an image - liter- 
ally, rather than as mere verbal metaphor for metaphor - and in 
a transference for whose verbal content the image supplies the 
material support, between Derrida writing and a woman en chair et 
en os, a ! literal' transfer of a sequence of transports of reflect- 
ion, a ctöc. 4c. ecty which provides. another image of-verbal imagery, 
'metaphor'. 
I had begun my 'correspondence' with Julia - or Brigitte 
as she then was -a few weeks before on the reverse of a photograph 
by Ralph Gibson: a profile of a woman's head and shoulders against 
a landscape, taken from her left side, her right hand over her right 
eye as her left eye gazed beyond the left-hand margin of the image; 
and Derrida closed his sequence on the 17th November 1979, just as 
my 'correspondence' with Julia was dramatically transforming my 
reflection. Furthermore, the first postcard of the derridean 
sequence was a photograph of the large quadrangle in Balliol, set- 
ting the scene, so to speak (3 June 1977): 
Apres la sdance, les dchanges se sont poursuivis sur la 
pelouse de Balliol. Tu devines en haut, au fond et ä gauche, 
le petit apartement du college dans lequel j'ai dormi.. 
On 4 June Derrida, now writing on the reverse of the reversed 
image of the inauguration of a millenial reflection on the image, 
rest6 comme le n4gatif dune photographie ä developper depuis 
vingt-cinq siecles - en moi biers aur..., 
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describes his encounter with the postcard (in the entrance-hall of 
the Old Bodleian) sometime before the seminar the previous day. On 
the 6 June he returns to the dchanges sur la pelouse, where I find 
myself transcribed into the logic of exchange, the economy, of the 
whole sequence - my questions, as I remember them, transposed into 
a new pattern or sequence of themes - or rather, Derrida's replies to 
two different questions within the sequence recombined in his tran- 
scription ('Si je me souviens bien') of a reply to one of them: why 
he didn't kill himself. I had suggested that this would be sun tree 
beau texte', acting, as I put it, the advocatus diaboli, trying to 
question what I took to be, in my british manner, a practical instance 
of its assertion in Derrida's purportedly open play of questions, 
which could not simply be identified with some term 'in' the play, 
if there were to be, as there was, any finite, 'closed' text, rather 
than chaos or absolute textual relativity. I had begun by simply inter- 
jecting into the conversation in which I had until then remained silent 
the question 'Qui fites vous? ', and Derrida had replied 'Je ne sais pas'. 
'What do you say if you were stopped by the police, then? '... 'Ah, but 
that's different'.... 
That was a practical question ... one didn't pose theoretical 
questions to policemen in response to such a question; one knew the 
role of 'policeman' and the different consequences of different 
responses to the assertion of a uniformed man in that role... 
Yet Derrida had just been questioning, in the seminar be- 
forehand, Searle's attempt to frame linguistic exchanges - and so 
questions and, implicitly, theories - in the practical matrix of 
just such action or interaction in various roles, as inscribed in 
its turn 'in' theory, in a theory of 'speech acts'... just as he had 
earlier questioned Lacan's inscription of'the 'practical' dynamic 
of our assertion of will or desire 'in theory' by his psychoanalytic 
theory which embedded the complementary 'analogical' matrix of 
metaphor and metonymy, the 'play' of analogical substitution, in 
the 'theoretical' matrix of questions. And in formulating in 1972 
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'the question of style', Derrida had inscribed his inscription 
of Nietzsche's writing in the metaphorical play of 'style', in 
the same radically open play of language in the metaphorical 
space which is, so to speak, the converse side in language to 
the theoretical space and time which traditionally has thought 
to metaphorically abstract from that open play - to, say, a theory 
of the embedding of theory in the play of metaphor. That is: the 
apparently resoluble question posed by different possible con- 
structions of 'J'ai oublie mon parapluie', depending on different 
restitutions of a 'missing' context, serves to close Derrida's 
own quest by providing an analogy for the radical absence or un- 
availability - ever - of any 'total' definitive context for any 
text, including that his own text 'on' this absence. 
And yet Jacques Derrida does 'close' his text in the 
carefully structured circuit of just this question of its open- 
ness, the open-ness of that particular sequence of words and 
other typographical marks - and he, Jacques Derrida, does rý nct- 
ically decide 'definitively' the inscription of his theoretical 
text in a wider context: 
Ma ch6re... comment peux-tu me demander si je suis sur qu'il 
nly"ait pas une erreur: c'est mon textet 
... For what he determines theoretically, 'in' the order of 
theoretical questions articulated by the logic of substitutions 
in language, as the theoretical contradiction of supposing any 
adequate theoretical inscription of the converse analogical or 
'figural' order of substitution in 'its logic', corresprnds in 
the practical order of constructing a. finite text to express this 
aporia, to the practical indifference'for this purpose of the 
whole open matrix of further theoretical questions that might 
in principal have been, or which might in fact subsequently be, 
elaborated 'from' or indeed 'in' the finite text as we have it 
from Derrida. What appears 'in theory' as an irreducible matrix 
of metaphorical substitution, complementary, even, to its own 
theoretical investigation, and 'directing' even that theoretical 
ccccclxvii 
questioning of the 'direction' which cannot be properly determined 
'in' theory - this infinite irreducible matrix or play of analogy 
is 'practically' just the theoretical reflection of the way that, 
in practice, some term may mark one variable of an action, and its 
relation or interaction with various other 'terms' or components 
of the action whose 'logic' or analogic is 'indifferent' to various 
inapplicable aspects or connotations of the term which might prove 
no longer 'indifferent', and indeed inappropriate to the same com- 
ponent considered in the context of another, different, activity or 
interaction - or 'theoretically' considered as 'defined' by that 
only partly appropriate term, as if its use to mark some component 
of some particular activity were taken to also imply the theoretical 
inscription of that activity - and in those terms - in the wider 
matrix of all possible activities into which it might enter, in many 
of which the wider working of that term appropriate in the first 
case, might be quite inappropriate. 
'Qui fites vows? '... 'Je ne sais pas': Je ne sail pas. - 
and yet this 'je' asserts itself in response to my question, albeit 
by questioning 'in theory' the instance of response which responds 
to a question by marking itself as questioning that its mark. Back 
to Descartes: how can the instance of questioning question, at least, 
that it is questioning? Yet Derrida's maximal supposition was, 
rather that he was, at least 'un corps materiel', the conversion 
into mere physical self-assertion, of the locus of the logical order 
of questioning. I later wrote a very short letter to Derrida, begin- 
ning 'Chair anonyme' (which I never got round to posting). 
And yet the question attaching to the instance of assert- 
ion as 'It cannot be constantly Ideferredt, disseminated through the 
matrices of texts; 'It am not 'indifferent' to the question, any more 
than ton the various possible instances of assertion in the con- 
struction of a text from what is open to 'me' in the practical con- 
frontation with language and writing materials (or speech). 'Why 
do you write such good books? ' I asked, turning into a personal 
question the heading of the chapter in Ecce Homo often cited by 
ccccclxviii 
Derrida; 'Why are you good rather than evil? '... 'How do you know 
I am, in private? ' he replied. 'Well, why don't you kill yourself, 
for example? ' The separation of public and private would break down 
there. 'Anyway, that would be a remarkable text, perfectly expressing 
your position, closing your overall 'text' perfectly'... 
Au lieu d'argumenter, de le renvoyer ä ceci ou a cela, j'ai 
r4pondu par une pirouette, je to raconterai, en lui renvoyant 
sa question, en lui signifiant qu'il devrait savourer, avec 
moi, 11intertt qu'il prenait visiblement, en ce moment mime, 
h cette question dont je m'occupais par ailleurs avec d'autres, 
dont moi. En privd. Et quest-ce"qui vous prouve, lui ai-je 
dit si je me souviens bien, que je ne le fail pas, et plus dune 
fois? Je to pose la meme question, par le meme courrier... 
In place of arguing, of a renvoi to another text, Derrida 
replies in a 'pirouette', a renvoi of the question as the question 
of a shared plaisir in the question itself... which must endlessly 
defer suicide to prolong the pleasure of its contemplation. In 
Derrida's account, the privacy of his private wickedness becomes 
the privacy of an ultimately imaginary (since it does not become 
public in an inaminate corps matdriel); and I only eventually find 
myself reading this account of our dialogue because, two years later, 
the tradition of keeping one's private life out of one's theory has 
itself become a theoretical question - or a question at least - for 
Derrida, who publishes a text not (one supposes) directly written 
for 'publication' or public delivery before a correspondingly partly 
anonymous audience, in conjunction with other texts in which he has 
publicly questioned the inscription of theory in the sexual axis 
of an intercourse part of which must (one imagines) remain as private 
as. the parts involved in it... and the failure of any attempt (such 
as Lacan's) to reinscribe this relation and its dynamic of corps 
mat4riels and laisir 'in theory'. 
Corps matdriel, plaisir, amour; lettres d'amour taking 
their place in the derridean... corpus; derridean theory inscribed 
in the dramatic order of a sexual relation, while sexual relations 
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are theoretically considered as the primary axis of the metaphorical 
matrix (in every sense.. ) which doubles theory and its dynamic of 
logical substitutions, in the 'other side' (the other's side) of 
language, of every text, theoretical or other-wise. 
I had been questioning the closure of any text as a theor- 
etical question, considering Derrida's questioning to inhabit an 
unquestioned practical or ethical dimension with its own finality 
of judgement, which I then still thought of as providing a sort of 
transcendental categorial scheme 'in' theory, without which any 
theoretical text would itself be unthinkable. I felt that Derrida's 
questioning of any theoretical embedding of theory in the metaphorical 
doublure of the text, through, say, a lacanian capitonnage (a quilt, 
so to speak, rather than an umbrella), was simply symmetric as a text- 
ual order of questions articulated in the text itself as primary 
question (always, though, 'the' text rather than this text in any of 
its singular thisness), to Lacan's circular assertion of the locus 
of its framing in his (by comparison) 'positive' theory. I felt that 
GREPH's radically unquestioning assertion of the absolute value of 
questioning was questionable precisely as a non-theoretical assertion 
of theory in its practical context -a coupling of supposedly free 
disinterested questioning and the 'positive' activity such questioning 
actually 'constituted9. When Derrida came back to Oxford just after 
concluding (in an envoi of the whole that doubles,. on its back the 
image of Socrates and plato on the front of the book) his Carte Postale, 
and presented to a bemused audience of literary theorists the practical 
parameters of the battle to save philosophy teaching posts in the 
face of Giscard's pragmatic reforms, I asked from the audience 'Why 
shouldn't Philosophy die? ' Derrida stared'at me for a while, and 
then replied 'Didn't you ask me to kill myself two years ago? '. The 
audience was moved by laughter. 'C'elt la m8me question' I replied. 
By then I had just come to inscribe my own questioning in 
a cosmic dynamic whose axis ran through the radical sexual symmetry 
of my relations with Julia, transcribing all the terms I had earlier 
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organised symmetrically 'in' the theoretical space and time of 
questions, into an embedding of this theoretical space and time 
in the symmetry of the various dimensions (including itself) of 
which it attempted to frame 'abstract' theories, through the con- 
figuration of writing to Julia that my writing to Julia. 
Transcription: writing in a trance, as if I were merely a 
spectator in that strange theatre where Martin was writing to Julia, 
just playing a 'part' before me, who was passively watching the 
drama unfold. Transcription: writing then to Alan Montefiore and 
David Wood in the same configuration of Script which framed itself 
dramatically as the writing of its writing, but now writing the 
transcript of my response to the 'philosophical' possibility of 
reorganising all my earlier theoretical questions and their theor- 
etical symmetries, within the 'dramatic' question posed by the sym- 
metry of that theoretical space and time with the various dimensions 
of its context of which it provided 'abstract' theories -a symmetry 
organised now in or around the actual situation of its writing, 
through the questioning of that the questioning, through the question 
posed by the symmetry of the various dimensions of that very 'question'. 
Derrida, I felt, encountering his book in 1985, as I was 
organising around a borrowed camera a visual syntax of Paris, artic- 
ulated like my writing in the relation of Martin and Julia, had 
travelled over those two years, 1977-9, on a parallel path to my 
own - but he had chosen Living on, - Survivre - Sopravivere in response 
to my questioning of questioning, rather than the death and transfig- 
uration of theory into a pythagorean vision that was the discovery 
of both hp ilia and sophia, philosophy as a drama, a mystery: He who 
would save his life must first lose it. 
But what was this symmetry, then, of Me and Jacques Derrida 
in two sets of lettres d'amour - two writings of the inscription of 
that writing in its sexual mirror - leading from my inscription in 
his side (so to speak) in the opening of his sequence of letters, to 
his closing envoi of the whole sequence, while I in Devon closed a 
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whole sequence of my writing, then back in Oxford a few days later 
repeated my question which figures in the opening of La Carte Postale, 
but now in terms, not of his tend', but that of Philosophy in France? 
I have often suggested that the matrix of possible sub- 
stitutions of one word or phrase (or paragraph or chapter or book.. ) 
for another which is syntactic 'language' might be considered to 
have two complementary 'sides' -a 'theoretical' side in which 
a 'classical' programme of Philosophy as total unitary theory (at 
least since Descartes) had projected to systematically articulate 
around the pure space of substitution as complete system of questions 
and answers (the dynamic of questioning organised by Descartes around 
the self-assertion of the instance of assertion, 'I', as radically 
primary response to the place of substitution, questioning, doubt, 
'itself') - and this 'theoretical' side doubled by a 'figural' side 
whose axis is organised in the 'metaphorical' dynamic of desire of 
which Lacan and Derrida give their (so to speak) complementary 
'positive' and 'negative' versions or pictures, in terms of an 
'ana-logical' substitution which is, in fact, present throughout 
the very institution or constitution of the 'classical' project of 
a 'pure' logic, directing all the while a certain vouloir of its 
dire. 
I have suggested that the latter 'metaphorical', analogical, 
figural side of words articulates the embedding of language in the 
'dramatic' or poetic dynamics of human interaction, where words, 
phrases, and so on, themselves appear as variables of an action, 
suýtitutable by or for various other non-verbal components. In this 
light the derridean insistence that, say, there can be no 'theory' 
of metaphor or sexuality, no definitive: inscription in the cartesian 
space and time of unitary questioning and answer of the 'other side' 
of language (whose metaphorical dynamic can be shown to organise 
even such a classical attempt at 'theoretical abstraction' from 
the figural 'colour' of everyday language), is so to speak the con- 
verse of (and convertible with) the insistence upon an irreducibly 
practical or pragmatic embedding of the elaboration of any 'theory' 
in that implication of its terms in actions (variously construed as 
'speech-acts', 'language-games' and so on in the anglophone tradition) 
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which is reflected in the 'metaphorical' or 'analogical' substi- 
tutability of different words in the same linguistic component of 
some action, where the relations of the limited range of variables 
of that action is 'indifferent' to the difference between the struct- 
ures of substitution, the syntax, of the different terms, when em- 
bedded in some other action whose working is not indifferent to 
the substitution. In a restricted picture, for example, a theory 
of 'currents', pressure, volume of flow, and so on, may be indiffer- 
ently applied to water in pipes or electricity in wires - and yet 
at some point water and electricity are different, and this difference 
is reflected in a sort of divergence within the thus far common 
syntax governing the analogous theories of water and what was at 
first called 'the electrical fluid'. 
A 'theory' of the embedding of theory in action, then, 
can in principle be no more articulated within a primary 'abstract- 
ion' to some global and unitary pure logical syntax of language, than 
can a theory of metaphor be a 'pure' theory, or a husserlian theory 
of language constructed in a 'reduced' space of pure subjectivity 
itself practically constituted 'in' the language it would theoret- 
ically reconstitute. For just as Derrida had articulated the organ- 
isation of such projects by the analogical dynamic of substitution 
from which they'would 'abstract' to a *purel space untrammelled by 
the obscurities of, say, spatial metaphors, so conversely can one 
argue - theoretically even - for the contradiction of supposing the 
substitutability of various variables of an action (and a fortiori 
of 'action' in general) definitively modelled 'in' some purified 
space of unitary cartesian question and answer, yin' language ab- 
stracted from its own pragmatics, or 'in' thought' abstracted from 
both language and its 'pragmatics'. 
In this light the unlimited domain of metaphorical dis- 
semination and play which sometimes seems to be merely formally 
posited by Derrida as a sort of 'alternative' to the 'reduction' 
of metaphorical substitutions to some 'theory', may be seen, rather, 
to be an unacknowledged index of the practical or 'dramatic' char- 
acter of Derrida's questioning of theory, of a traditional unitary 
'abstract' space and time of inquiry, as itself embedded in the 
activity, the human interactions, in which Derrida, in his literary 
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production, plays his part. 'Sometimes when I'm very tired' he 
replied to another of my questions 'I don't try and think of an 
answer to a question, but just imagine what 'Jacques Derrida' 
would say'. 
That is: the unlimited free play of relativistic meta- 
phoricity may itself be considered as an abstraction from the 
limited and relatively definite range of substitutions for the 
various components of-the action (say, a philosophy seminar) in 
which the irreducibility of the figural to the logical is marked. 
It may be seen as an abstraction to a linguistic 'space' and time 
of substitution from the practical indifference in the 'syntax' of 
some action, to the exchange of one term for another, in a dramatic 
configuration of which language is only one dimension; and the 
verbal complexity of embedding its 'theoretical' or discursive 
characterisation in a web of metaphor abstracted from the limited 
configurations of practical context (a metaphoric matrix which is 
remarkably like, in effect, a unitary frame of all action, substi- 
tuted for the old unitary frame of 'pure' theory which has been 
rejected) may be taken as a sort of subtle transposition or tran- 
scription of the earlier complexities of abstracting 'theory' and 
the logical matrix of questions, from that metaphorical doublure 
in language. A subtle complexity for which one can find fairly 
simple images, in the abstraction from the literal 'image', of 
common sensation, to verbal imagery of which that literal order 
provides, in practice, a primary 'image'. 
Image, 'appearance$: a limited version of one's situation 
that might be further embedded in a wider action, if one could get 
'behind' the limitations of what is actually present - the various 
terms or components more or less working according to one's fram- 
ing of them, including oneself - and trace back beyond the limited 
metaphorical working of one's terms for the elements of one's 
situation to a complete, definitive, identification of its compon- 
ents, a complete understanding of their 'working', their dramatic 
syntax, so to say, in all possible extensions of present experience. 
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But, of course, as Husserl, Peirce and others in their 
various ways presented our canonical situation' or experience at 
the turn of the century, we have only a partial 'image' of the 
'objects' we encounter (including ourselves and our fellows), and 
the very constitutive 'essence' of these 'objects' is to differ, 
sooner or later, from our image of them - to differ, indeed, all 
the time, insofar as this difference constitutes the 'intentional' 
directedness of our experience, predicating any appearance to some 
object 'behind' it as its appearance. And that the various orders 
or dimensions of such being and appearance cannot be definitively 
inscribed simply in one --say the logical or psychological - dim- 
ension of the actual space and time and dynamic of experience, but 
must themselves be set in the working of a radical Analogy of 
Being - into which one enters not simply 'logically' but Practically, 
in the passage from logical analysis into Oo? t- - this logical 
recognition of the final limit of a 'theory' that in the end, and 
as its end, must be inscribed or discovered as one dimension among 
others in the symmetry of actual Kosmos (rather than the whole 
working of itself and its contextual dimensions being definitively 
articulated 'in' theory) is of course as old as Aquinas and Arist- 
otle in its explicit discursive formulation. 
Given, then, a working of various terms in our situation 
and in the substitution of term for thing that is one dimension 
of our situation, we may consider a 'question', for example, as 
the activity of marking the inscription of a present configuration 
of elements and terms in a wider frame, which demands a response 
in the reassertion of our common activity in the new frame, which 
goes beyond the limited working of the previous configuration 
before it was opened up by, say, one of its components different- 
iating itself from some limited aspect. Given some configuration 
of action (so that 'appearance' now has more the character of 
a theatrical configuration on a stage - 'an action standing for 
another action' - than some nominal elementary 'sensum' or whatever) 
we might express this dynamic of orientation of the participants 
in the unfolding of their activity in terms of 'all possible em- 
beddings' of the present configuration in a wider one - like 'all 
possible actions' in which one might embody the momentary image 
of photograph or painting, all possible narrations of the action 
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a moment of which is depicted in abstraction from its temporal 
dynamic. Emotional or dispositional orientation in a situation 
of which we have a limited perception might then be seen to belong 
to the 'analogical' order of coordination or syntax of a variety 
of elements which we are only able to characterise 'up to a point'. 
The web of metaphor then appears as a linguistic model of the dyn- 
amic - the 'poetic' dynamic - of orientation in a configuration 
that might turn out, develop, in all sorts of different ways. Our 
orientation or disposition to action in such a situation must be 
'indifferent' to the various different unfoldings between which the 
situation does not allow us to decide - except insofar as these 
various unfoldings are all subject to the 'ontological' constraints 
of 'the form of 'object' in. general' (as what differentiates itself 
from any image or framing of it, and various other 'transcendental' 
figures of actuality (our character as actors who can formulate a 
choice among developments otherwise undetermined being included). 
Motive, emotive, dynamics of 'analogy': and in the limit 
" we discover, then, in the emotional or dispositional dynamics of 
our situation, a poetic axis of which a derridean 'logique du sup- 
pldment' or complementary lacanian metonymy of desire and 'logique 
du fantasme' presents an 'abstract' linguistic version -a dynamic 
of a two-sided matrix of words, figurally embedded in the activity 
directed by desire, but abstracted from the doubling in the practical 
or poetic order of activity, of this linguistic 'side' of activity 
as a whole, from the complementary material economy in which it is 
ineluctably 'embodied', set. A material economy which itself, in 
its two 'sides' of abstract unitary physical space and time, and 
the same 'figural' order of the 'image', 'appearance', already en- 
countered as the other side of physical and other theories 'in' 
language, itself reflects the two-sided linguistic economy of 
logical and figural - in the 'mirror' so to speak of the Image 
which is their interface, the surface of things. 
... For in the minimal formal limit of the 'poetic' 
order of actions (rather than the linguistic order of texts or 
the material order of economy or process) different actors are 
'emotively' or emotionally or dispositionally embedded in that 
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limiting metonymy-which coordinates the 'universal' term which 
marks the place in language of any of its instances indifferently, 
and its particular instances, and that 'sympathy' which directs 
our interaction in a collective assertion or activity 'indifferent' 
to the differences between the different instances of 'I' emotionally 
coordinated in this radical 'identification'. In lncanian terms 
this metonymic identification with the place of question and assert- 
ion - of 'I' - in language, is understood as the original indifference 
of affective orientation of infant and mother; and correlative oed- 
ipal Strife appears in the competition of two symmetric instances 
of assertion to assert themselves 'in' this place, this place of the 
Other. In sartrian terms we are back in the dialectic of first, 
second, and third person; for Kojeve this is the dialectic of Master 
and Slave. More generally, in terms simply of experience and act- 
ivity as matrix of substitutions of terms, of which words are only 
one variety or dimension, we may recognise a simple 'poetic' symmetry 
and associated dynamic, for which all these are, along with many 
other pictures back down to Empedocles' Love and Strife, so m.. ny 
'metaphors' or images in language. 
Lettre d'amour, then: a writing which organises the text- 
ual and contextual variables in which the writer finds (in the cases 
now in question) himself around an axis of questions and responses 
symmetric between the 'I's of, or in the 'I' of, writer and (imagined) 
reader. Writing entered into in the empathy or sympathy of a dis- 
position or emotion in which the two instances of 'I' are identified 
in this most radical 'analogy': 'love' as the emotion or disposition 
organised in this analogy and symmetry of persons. An 'intersubject- 
ivity' or community of emotion, empathy, sympathy, Pround which as 
primary axis the complex dialectic of Love and Strife unfolds in the 
play of sympathies and antipathies, identifications and assertions 
of difference. For self asserts its. '-selfishness' in a consti- 
tutive self-distinction from some analogous self, from some common 
image of various selves analogously situated in the matrix of their 
common activity, just as the very 'essence' of an 'object' as well 
as such 'subjects' is to differentiate themselves from some partial 
inscription in and reduction to the 'poetic' order of image, sense, 
emotion and so on. 
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'In the limit' (once more) two 'I's differ in their 
physical embodiment as things in external space; and yet simply 
as bodies 'I' and 'you' are utterly symmetrical: there is no 'ob- 
jective' ground for 'my' consciousness and body being my mine rather 
than your mine. Similarly, in the other extreme, we share symmetric- 
ally a nominal locus of questioning and assertion in the impossible 
limit of 'pure' thinking or theory, cartesian self-consciousness, 
pure transcendental subjectivity or whatever other version one 
chooses. If in collective activity I cannot 'see' my next move, 
and mark this impasse with a question, you may be able to decide 
between various lines of action open in my situation by responding 
to the analogy of our positions, helping me direct my as-ertion or 
action to the common good. Habermas' ideal dialogue tends towards 
the realisation of an ideal community whose activity is perfectly 
coordinated towards a recasting of Kant's transcendental Good, it- 
self earlier framed precisely in terms of the symmetry of all actors 
or agents, 'I's. Rorty simply argues for the resolution of conflict- 
ing orientations through the discursive resolution of their trans- 
scriptions into the discursive space and time of debate, as being 
pragmatically the optimal orientation. Lyotard enters the three- 
cornered debate with his polemic in favour of irresoluble polemic. 
... And yet this debate about the coupling of discourse, and theory 
as one variety of discourse, with other dimensions of the activity 
it constitutes is itself conducted 'in' theory, in a purely textual 
dynamic of 'argument' over the 'correct' discourse on the radical 
embedding of discourse in action, in human interaction: in the 
internal textual drama whose dynamic is as a whole organised in 
the shared abstraction of each of the three participants in the 
'debate' from its extratextual components, a common substitution 
of the linguistic space and time of question and answer, of that 
order of substitution, for a wider 'space, of activity in which 
that shared substitution itself comes 'into question'. The question, 
for example, of differing institutions or constitutions of the 
supposedly shared discursive 'space' of the argument in France, 
Germany and the United States -. in french, german and... english 
(or is it american english, or simply american...? ). -. 
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Now Derrida's departure from ENS in 1985, and his 
institution of a new axis of his questioning in EHESS, the old 
VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique, as 'Les Institutions Philo- 
sophiques', itself marks a break with his previous part of in- 
duction of agrdgation students into that mastery of the textual 
space of 'philosophy', which, under examination, will in some 
cases guarantee their own transposition into the place of formal 
authority in that 'space' as instituted in France. Philosophy 
as questioning taken to its limit: but if one questions the ab- 
straction of a textual 'space' of argument and philosophy from 
its coupling in the french institution of 'Philosophy' with 
various contextual dimensions as part of french activity as a 
whole, then one may find that the sort of 'philosophical' text 
one produces in response to this more 'radical' questioning proves 
so to speak 'politically' unacceptable to the agr4gation Jury 
appointed by the Minister of Education to recruit new philosophy 
teachers for the various institutions of secondary and tertiary 
education. - for whose contribution to national activity as a 
whole he is responsible to an elected government and so, ulti- 
mately to the possibly unphilosophical mass of electors within 
the widest institution of France itself. 
Derrida's agrdgation seminar, until his move to EHESS, 
might be seen as a limiting version of that model of 'philosophy' 
reproduced since the foundation of the ENS in the 17908 in the 
circuit from lyceen learning to paraphrase IclassiCI texts accord- 
ing to the models presented in his (or her) textbooks and by the 
teacher in front of the class, through licence or classes supdr- 
ie Ures, mattrise, and agregation or CAPES prepared in University 
or Grande Ecole, back to the lycde - but now as teacher able to 
'expose' or present any text or catena of texts in the western 
philosophical tradition within a unitary space of reading, of 
questions and answers and questioning of earlier questions, of 
which he has at last mastered, as it were, the philosophical 
grammar, rather than as the pupil which he once was, beginning 
to learn this special language, like those now before him. 
A textual space of question and answer in which, or into which, 
any previous questioning or theory can in principle be mapped 
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simply by that bringing-into-question of its questioning which 
is critical reading, finally brought by each teacher into a 
unitary articulation through that authority which is his or 
her discovery, consolidation, and assertion of their own critical 
instance of questioning and theorising - that instance of 'It as 
locus of question and response equally 'outside' all the texts 
of the tradition or syllabus, and so uniformly coordinating their 
inscription and correlation within the new (spaces of questions 
it organises around itself, in a constant recasting of the Cartes- 
ian tradition. Derrida takes this tradition to a historical 
limit by embedding the whole tradition and its dynamic simply in 
its language or textuality 'as such', rather than in some more 
abstract traditional 'space' of philosophical reading - whose 
own textual dynamic of its abstraction from 'mere' textuality or 
language he has critically $read' to define - or pose the question 
of - his own 'position'. 
One might compare this french tradition or 'school' of 
instituted Philosophy - the primary axis of 'philosophical' quest- 
ioning and theory in France since the Revolution - with the ana- 
logous american institution as represented - indeed as largely 
instituted - by Dewey. In the former case the operation is 
directed by the identification with an instance of 'I' in the 
textual 'space' of the western philosophical tradition, which 
allows one to 'expose' or transcibe or represent any given philo- 
sophical text, and the textual dynamics of its various relations 
to earlier and later texts, into the textual space systematically 
articulated 'around' that identification with an instance of 
critical questioning and assertion. The philosophy 'teacher' 
serves both as model with which pupils ; may identify and so imitate, 
and as sympathetic critic who opens up questions in the nascent 
teachers' expositions, helping them to-organise their response to 
the texts of the syllabus in the direction of systematic self- 
assertion and the adoption of a systematic critical position of 
their own. Dewey's ideal of the School, on the other hand, is 
to generate critical mastery of the social, rather than the textual 
matrix - the pupil's identification, so to speak, in the grammar 
of action rather than in the abstract, textual space of reflection. 
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When french students from lycdes, University, and 
grandee dcoles read Marcuse in 1968 and for a few short months 
lived out the fantasme of self-assertion in a sort of wider 
social text in which the old politics of educational induction 
into alienated parts in the various coupled components of the 
'spectacle' of french society were thought to have been finally 
themselves 'brought into question' and relegated to History, 
this precipitated an eventual reorganisation of the University 
of Paris into a range of various 'spaces' of exposition into 
which teaching staff in Philosophy and other disciplines grouped 
themselves, those of similar positions or dispositions consti- 
tuting so many separate 'universities' within the old buildings 
(and some rapidly constructed new ones, such as the isolated 
site in the Bois de Vincennes outside the periph4rique to which 
the most radical teachers migrated) among which prospective stu- 
dents could now freely choose as frame of their studies. 
Progressive philosophy teachers congregated in Paris I: 
DESANTI, Jean-Toussaint 
941 Les Id4alitds Math4matiques 1968 
942 La Philosophie Silencieuse 1975 
BOUVERESSE, Jacques 
91i3 IIne Parole Malheureuse 1971 
BACHELARD, Suzanne 
JANKELEVITCH, Vladimir 
BELAVAL, Yvon 
KOFFMANN, Sarah 
MACHEREY, Pierre.... 
... while traditionalists grouped themselves in Paris IV, which 
alone maintained the title 'Sorbonne', and where alone the more 
conservative offspring of the parisian bourgeoisie would venture: 
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ALQUIE, Ferdinand 
LEVINAS, Emmanuel 
944 Totalite et Infini. Essai sur 1'Ext4rioritd The Hague 1969 
945 Autrement qu'etre, ou au-delh de 1'Essence The Hague 1974 
BIRAULT, Henri..... 
... and while the opening towards the mathematical logic represented 
by Desanti, Bachelard and Bouveresse at Paris-I could only find an 
isolated institutional base in Roger MARTIN's seminar at Paris V 
('University' of Mathematics and Information Sciences) - which he 
effectively shared with Bouveresse. 
Meanwhile Kristeva's embedding of texts in the $scientific' matrix 
of structural linguistics, and an equally 'scientific' psychoanalytic 
dynamics theoretically posited by Lacan as (so to speak) the 'other 
side' of that linguistic matrix from the pure cartesien consciousness 
of traditional theory or 'science', found its place amongst the 
more traditional 'scientific' laboratories, lecture halls, computing 
installations and so on in the huge new Jussieu complex of the 
! Science' University, Paris VI; -VII, rather like a little image in 
the University as a whole of the Ecole Pratique, with which many 
of its seminars shared dual status: 
Paris VII - Departement des Sciences des Textes et des Documents (STD) 
KRISTEVA, Julia 
946 tKr` ý: Recherches pour une Semanalyse (papers 196 -) 1969 
947 La R4volution du Langage Poetique 1974 
948 
If la. femme does not exist $in theory' - whether in the theoretical 
dynamic of Eperons or in lacanian theory of the 1970s (rather than 
that of 1955 criticised by Derrida in 1975) where 'lafemme n'ex-siste 
pas' - then, one is tempted to add, Julia Kristeva is that wommn, 
organising the various theoretical axes of the various 'structural- 
isms$ in the analogical or poetic space articulated around her 
place of femme. A space instituted at Paris VII in seminars domin- 
ated by french women and immaculate Japanese men with attache cases. 
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A space of japanese men and french women focussed in la chinoise 
(in the jargon of 1968) with whom, at the centre of the editorial 
space and assuring the practical or political direction of that 
primary textual axis of 'structuralism', Tel Quell Derrida broke 
after 1968 - publishing his critique of Lacan in 1975 in the more 
neutral space of Todorov's Podtique. And just as la femme, formally 
marked in his text of 1972 as 'outside' any theoretical determinat- 
ion in the textual matrix of 'inside' and 'outside', concretises 
over the late seventies as a particular woman who in the comr. on 
context of Derrida's texts coordinates their 'direction' in the 
figural dynamic of desire and love, so does Kristeva'a coordination 
of parisian and other theory around the primary lacanian figure 
of (m)other and nascent identity of the child become practically 
embedded in her assumption of the position of mother and analyst. 
The central 'woman' of parisian theory, organising 
around her the poetic space, the intertextuality, of 'structural- 
ism', as so many analogous 'positions' coordinated with that of 
the 'father-figure' Lacan - organising in relation to some poem, 
say, the theoretical dynamic of interpretation in the symmetry 
of all those male responses to the fundamental question posed by 
the poem (this then analogous to Petitot's mathematical frame, 
itself doubling as STD and EHESS seminar) - may serve as a sort 
of middle term between the various more or less 'orthodox' posit- 
ions and teaching spaces in Paris proper (within the periph4rique 
or the old line of fortifications it follows) and that rousseauiste 
opposition which is a parisian version of being 'outside' paris- 
ian theoretical space in the woods of Vincennes over the 1970s: 
Paris VIII 
Ddpartßment de Philosophie 
DELEUZE, Gilles 
949 Empirisme et Subjectiyitd 1953 
950 Diff4rence et Repetition 1968 
951 Logique du Sens 1969 
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952 Cin4ma I: L'Image-Temps 19 
II: L'Image-Mouvement 198 
with GUATTARI, Felix: 
953 Capitalisme et Schizophrdnie I: L'Anti-Oedipe 1972 
954 Rhizome: Introduction 1976 
Rhizome echoes the wandering or rambling of the seminar of 
1974-5; Cindma the seminar from 1975 until the early eighties: 
an 'empirical' wandering around in the analogical space of the 
various 'orthodox' theories - latterly the space of the moving 
image - moved only by what may in passing be marked by various 
terms practically adapted to the 'agencement' of such 'ddlire' 
in the particular 'territoire' in which it happens to find it- 
self. I remember a student suggesting that the seminar should 
transfer itself to the, woods outside: the participants would 
carry on their reflections from exchange to exchange as the various 
separate paths crossed and recrossed, in a sort of mobile capit- 
onnage. This suggestion was ruled out by Deleuze on practical 
grounds: there had to be a certain degree of spatial liaison if 
the enterprise was to retain any character of inquiry, any co- 
herent space; the delire could not be completely delig. And yet 
the space in which the participants were being trained to find 
themselves and orient themselves within by the 'nouveau carto- 
rg aphe' (in the phrase of what the cartographe called 'un nouvel 
archiviste') was still not acceptable to the french government 
as a new version of the classical textual space still elaborated 
at the 'Sorbonne', into which a philosophy teacher might be paid 
to induct the nation's young. Course credits, whether for Arkle, 
Lacan, or real students, were of no value in that dominant anti- 
nomadic agencement of centralised government of hospitals for 
schizophrenics, stock-exchanges, and state schools, which yet 
nominally recognized the bouc dmissaire or pharmacy sent out 
to Vincennes after 1968 as part of the reconstituted University. 
... And, indeed, on a deep level of analogy the process agence 
rather chaotically around, the crumpled figure of Deleuze at his 
desk in the crowded room among the trees, was the same process 
of induction into a french textual space as that practised through- 
out the University 'proper! in Paris itself... an analogy under- 
lined in thoroughly derridean manner by the formal status of 
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Deleuze' and Lyotard's Philosophy Department as only one half 
of the D4partement de Philosophie et Psychanalyse, the chair al- 
ternating between Chätelet and Miller, whose colleagues presided 
over the strict exposition of the lacanian canon in the (usually 
locked) rooms diametrically across from the Philosophy Department 
on the same floor of the same building: Another department 'outside' 
orthodox academic space, and diametrically opposed both physically 
and metaphorically to deleuzian delirium, in its closed circuit of 
inscription of textual space within the analogical matrix of 'the 
Unconscious' organised around 'the place of the Other' in language, 
as this 'other' side of language was theoretically framed in the 
canonical lacanian texts whose authority was assured by their 
normative self-inscription in the analytic dynamic of fantasme 
and transfert they prescribed - an authority maintained by the 
strict discipline of 'the School', determining the place of the 
nominally academic department in the formation of its hierophants, 
much to the outrage of the early students who thought that mere 
passage through the formal business of credits and degrees out in 
the woods would allow them to set themselves up as lacanian ana- 
lysts in town... 
LYOTARD, Jean-Franjois 
955 Economie Libidinale 1974 
956 Instructions Pa! ennes 1977 
957 La Condition Postmoderne 1979 
958 Le Diffdrend 1984 
(I remember the mot d'ordre thrown out with a definitive flourish 
in a seminar of 1977: 'Le probleme pour noun autres postmodernes, 
ce n'est plus de capter le flux du capital, mais do maximiser la 
performance) ) 
Departement de Psychanalyse 
MILLER, Jacques-Alain 
With Lacan's death and the move of Paris VIII from Vincennes to 
'Vincennes ä St Denis' (interesting for the cartographer, whose 
seminar was transferred from a room overlooked by trees in a wood 
to a Nissen hut beside a busy dual carriageway in the industrial 
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suburb) the heir moved his own seminar into town, to the Ecole 
des Arts et Metiers. 
Finally, further out still, to Paris XII at Nanterre, 
where the radicals who ended up at Vincennes heralded the Evenements 
of 1968 towards the close of 1967... and back to Ricoeur's seminar, 
which I mentiohed in opening the reflectionO on Derrida's. Nanterre: 
so far out that Ricoeur actually held his seminar at one of the 
research centres of the CNRS in Paris; and so far out that it did'nt 
seem to be part of parisian intellectual space at all, caught rather 
somewhere between Eastern Europe and North America, with a wide 
variety of students still continuing the international Phenomenolog- 
ical Movement in the various countries from which they came to study, 
and a steady procession of visiting colleagues from Louvain, Warsaw, 
Prague, Canada, the United States and so on... 
Paris XII 
RICOEUR, Paul 
959 De 1'Interpretation: Essai Bur Freud 1965 
960 La Metaphore Vive 1975 
... In the midst of a deconstruction of subjectivity and conscious- 
ness in a linguistic space whose theory theoretically embedded it- 
self in the primacy of the 'other' side of the verbal matrix, the 
dynamic of 'the Uneonscious' is 'reduced' AL la Merleau-Ponty to a 
conscience ambigue - and in the seminar over the mid-seventies this 
was coupled with the study of the complementary anglo-american 
version of that 'other' side of the verbal matrix, as the practical 
embedding of language in action. Photocopies of papers from anglo- 
phone philosophical journals would arrive efficiently a few days 
before the seminar, through the post, and $exposition' would follow 
a few days later at CNRS. I never quite understood the point of 
this attempt to transpose the anglo-american debate into a parisian 
textual space; it seemed like the worst of both worlds, though in 
retrospect the questions implicit in this collation of french 
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'space' of 'reading philosophy', and anglophone pragmatics of 
language seem to suggest some radical pregnancy (to borrow an old 
term from Phenomenology), echoed in my reflection on the 'prag- 
matics' of Derrida's theory, or rather of its theoretical and 
practical embedding or inscription in the 'analogical' dynamics 
of human interaction. At the time I was most struck by the arrival 
at the seminar one week of Anna-Maria Tymeniec. ka (once a student 
of Roman Ingarden) whose book Why is there Something rather than 
Nothing? (the dedication is 'To my mother, Countess..., of whom 
my earliest memory is of her reading Bergs)n to me on her kneel or 
something like that) I had bought and treasured at oxford as 
a sort of largely incomprehensible symbol of an almost comic echo 
from the 'other side'. of Philosophy from that taught there. I was 
deputed to take her back to her hotel on the Metro - she was famous 
for losing her way, apparently - and had, in the context, a tran- 
scendentally comic discussion about the Phenomenological Movement 
on the way. 
So much for the physical and institutional space, scene, 
in which I found myself critically reading the various 'structuralist' 
and 'post-structuralist' texts upon the embedding of the theoretical 
axis of their questioning in the in some sense extra-theoretical 
dynamics of context. Context - but never precisely that actual dra- 
matic context: always a textual framing of some abstract configurat- 
ion of 'context' in general, in the substitution of the space of 
the text for the space and time in which that text practically came 
'into question' as one variable coordinating intra-textual and extra- 
textual variables in the scene or drama of its very production. 
Derrida had indeed, as I realised in 1985, organised his questioning 
of writing between 1977 and 1979 in the literary dynamic of a one- 
sided roman dpistolaire philosophique, in the symmetry of the theor- 
etical axis of reflection or speculation and the figural order of 
an image which was both the mirror of that reflection, and the 
medium in the spatiotemporal matrix of human interaction of a certain 
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'correspondence' ä travers le miroir, organising the 'direction' 
of the writing and reflection in the sexual axis of that amour 
in which 'I' responds to the identification, the analogical identity 
of my 'I' and yours... 
Qui dcrit? A qui? Et pour envoyer, destiner, expedier 
quoi? A quelle adresse? Sans aucun ddsir de surprendre, 
et par lä de capter l'attention ä force d'obscurite, je dois 
a ce qui me reste d'honnetete de dire que finalement je ne le 
sais pas. Surtout je n'aurais pas accord6 le moindre interet 
ä cette correspondance et ce decoupage, je veux dire a leur 
publication, si quelque certitude m'avait a ce suet satisfait. 
This contextual frame of his 'theoretical' writing in the rest 
of the volume remains essentially a question for Derrida, coordinate 
with the questions organised in the institutional space of ENS 
seminar and elsewhere 'in public', but the publicly instituted 
reflection on writing and reading, and the private axis, here pub- 
lished (with the privacy, and la femme remaining here in the internal 
gaps excised in the letters, rather than in the so to speak 'external' 
gap around 'Jai oubli4 mon parapluie' or Eperons as a whole) con- 
stituting so to speak the 'other side' of the public persona and 
its theoretical direction, are not coordinated in some more radical 
question of philo-sophia, the drama of inquiry into inquiry, any 
more than they are directly coordinated with Derrida's political 
response to the french institution of Philosophy as 'practically' 
brought into question by Giscard's 'pragmatic' proposals for educ- 
ational reform: 
961 GREPH Qui a Peur de la Philosophie? Paris 1977 
962 Les Etats Gendraux de la Philosophie Paris 1979 
The institution itself, perhaps, militates against the coordination 
in a single axis of questioning, a single 'spaces and time of an 
inquiry framed in the symmetry of internal and external dimensions 
or coordinates of the inquiry itself (its 'matrix', then), of the 
'internal' space of an agrdgation seminar, the sexual axis of its 
embedding in the wider context of human interaction in France (and 
abroad), and the political axis of that complementary 'public' 
space of human interaction articulated in the generic symmetries 
of one's various 'parts, (class, race, gender and so on) one plays 
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in 'institutionalised' social interaction, abstracted from the 
private singularity which is one self. With Giscard replaced 
by Mitterand and Haby by Chevbnement, the two 'public' components, 
'internal' and 'external', of the classic space of academic french 
Philosophy, may be coupled in the question or possibility of a 
new institution of Philosophy whose axis would be precisely that 
coupling... 
963 College International de Philosophie: Sciences, Intersciences, Arts 
Rapport presente ä M. Jean-Pierre Chevenement 
.. par Fran9ois Chätelet, Jacques Derrida, 
Jean-Pierre Faye, Dominique Lecourt 
(Paris 30 September 1982) 
... but I have already described the manner in which the old 'space' 
of exposition and reading 'philosophy' texts has been simply carried 
over into the new institution - as into Derrida's EHESS seminars 
back at the rue d'Ulin: Derrida may well inquire into the primary 
institutional frame of the national School of inquiry, within the 
overall axis of inquiry at EHESS defined by the question of 'Les 
Institutions Philosophiques'`, but the personal trajectory which led 
from his questioning of his part inducting ENS students into the 
mastery of the textual space of the western philosophical tradition, 
as in GREPH, -Etats'Generaux, and CIPH that part and space began to 
come into question in a sort of reiteration of the 1960s move from 
abstract theory into its textual dynamic (a move from text, now, 
towards the wider or more radical space in which it appears as one 
variable in the private and public dynamics of context) is still 
not directly coupled to the academic exposition of say, Tocqueville's 
exposition of 'Philosophy in America' in the essentially verbal space 
of his seminar, with its traditional scenario of monological re- 
flection on a text before a passive audience, for whom the very 
institution of that space of the seminar is not, 'in' the seminar, 
'in question'. The only way the institution of Derrida's question- 
ing of the institution of systematic questioning is in question for 
these students, is in the silent personal alternative of, say, at- 
tending the seminar this week or not, continuing to seek a EHESS 
diploma or not. The private life of student and teacher is insti- 
tutionally abstracted from, to the singular part of teacher and the 
plural part of silent audience of this one-dimensional theatre, 
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which here, as at CIPH, and in all other state institutions, 
governs the public dynamic of parts in abstraction from the more 
radical question of the relation of the various players to their 
parts. 
In an iteration of the 'sixties move from the abstract 
matrix of traditional 'theoretical' questions into a linguistic or 
textual matrix in which that dynamic is inscribed as one 'side' 
doubled by its 'other' analogical side, and its dynamic (in lacan- 
ian terms, the side and dynamic of the Other), the 'institutional' 
dynamic of the academic 'space' and time of reading theory (a space 
of which the 'sixties matrix and dynamic of 'textuality' appears 
as a sort of extreme or limiting version) can no more be articulated 
'in' such a space of the seminar, abstracted from the poetic or 
practical dynamics of movement of teacher and students 'into' and 
'out of' the ritual of the classic seminar, than, say, the converse 
'analogical' side of its linguistic framing or constitution can be 
adequately mapped into the side of a 'theory' abstracted from its 
own such constitution in language. - This no more than the aristo- 
telian topology of logical 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' could ade- 
quately frame the inclusion of that millenial 'logical space' it- 
self in the cosmic context constituted by other coordinate dimensions 
with their own topologies and associated dynamics - their own,. dif- 
ferent modes of a radically equivocal or analogical 'being-in'. The 
aristotelian logic of inscription of its logical or theoretical 
dimension or topology 'in' the wider coordination of different modes 
of 'being-in' it formally mapped in language, closed not with a 
logical or theoretical framing of the inscription of that its framing 
in a cosmic coordination of theoretical text and its coordinate con- 
texts, but rather in the radically analogical matrix of a 'wisdom' 
or 60AL" logically 'beyond' or 'outside' logic, in the practical 
axis of '16ve', 
ýLX(K. The limiting attempt to reiterate the move 
from theory to text or language, through the linguistic embedding 
of the textual order of theory in a practical, 'institutional' 
coupling of text and social context in a socio-logical dynamic of 
roles or parts in social interaction of 'groups' (defined by a 
range or group of individuals' symmetric participation in or playing 
of a common part), practically confronts a radical impasse which 
is the analogue in the practical order of coupling of text (or 
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'script') and action or interaction, of the earlier attempt 
(criticised by Derrida in Husserl's version) to map the analogical 
'side' of its linguistic constitution into the abstract 'theoretic- 
all space constituted in 'impure' ordinary language. 
Bourdieu, at the Ecole Pratique, over the 'sixties and 
'seventies, was inquiring into the group dynamics exemplified in 
the french educational institutions in which this very research 
was itself instituted. In 1984 he published, on the one hand a 
series of responses (in interviews, colloquia, and so on) to quest- 
ions which arose in relation to this questioning or inquiry in the 
extra-textual dynamics of the specific contexts of such relatively 
'informal' exchange (with reporters, students and so on): 
964 BOURDIEU, Pierre Questions de Sociologie (1972-80) 1984 
965 
1968, but opening with a direct confrontation with the radically 
'dramatic' configuration of his attempt to systematically question 
the institutional frame and dynamics of that questioning: 
analysis of that 'crisis' in the french academic world which was 
... and on the other hand a systematic summary of his investigations 
from the late sixties onwards, into the french academic world in 
which those investigations had themselves been pursued, closing 
with a detailed application of his 'results' to the sociological 
Homo Acadetnicus 1984 
En prenant pour objet un monde social dann lequel on est prix, 
on s'oblige ä rencontrer, sous une forme que l'on pent dire 
dramatisde, un certain nombre de problbmes epistemologiques 
fondamentaux, tous lies ä la question de la diffdrence entre 
la connaissance pratique et la connaissance savante, et notam- 
ment ä la difficulte particuliere et de la rupture avec l'ex- 
p4rience indigene et de la restitution de la connaissance 
obtenue au prix de cette rupture. 
The opening sentence of the presentation of the results of 
this inquiry into the institutional frame of this inquiry, thus 
locates the radically dramatic axis of the whole enterprise as 
residing in the interface of 'everyday' unscientific experience 
'outside' the institutional part of the theorist (in the Lebenswelt, 
so to speak), and the instituted theoretical space (in which the 
'part' of sociologist constitutes around it a 'scientific' matrix 
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of questions and answers) into which the theorist passes from 
Ila connaissance pratique' - and this practically, or as one move 
'in' his Lebenswelt - and from which he must return with his theory 
of the interaction of theory and practice, in setting his theoretical 
elaboration as text in the dynamic of which it is an analysis. 
Bourdieu the individual sociologist thus tries to map out the 
practical interactions of $theorists' as a group of individuals 
symmetric insofar as they are 'theorists', with various other groups 
in the historical dynamic of the social configuration in which they 
play this part, in which they produce 'theory': and this without 
reducing the variety of the individual players of this part in 
french society around 1970 to some uniform theoretically defined 
'part' or stereotype, but taking as axial in the analysis just 
that interface of this part of 'abstraction' from individual char- 
acteristics to something like a theoretical 'I' as instance of sci- 
entific question and assertion, with the various other parts and 
interactions and associated institutions whose multifarious correl- 
ations with the part of 'theorists must be empirically discovered 
in the whole range of individual french academics, or at lenst in 
(theoretically) significant samples. 
Thus, even 'theoretically', the logical extension from 
the embedding of logic in textuality or language, to the embedding 
of the linguistic order of theoretical seminar, debate, text, and 
so on in the practical order of interaction of this part of 'theorist' 
with other parts in various other institutions interacting with the 
institution of Theory in the cultural context of the french Nation 
(as more or less maximal institution, coordinate with the french 
language of the theory, the economy of teaching-posts, the more or 
less unitary hierarchical coordination'of french institutions of 
theory under the Ministry of Education, and so on)... even 'logically' 
this implies the passage (in and) out of the abstract linguistic 
space and time of exposition or analysis of the configuration of 
such analysis, into a practical or dramatic order formally corresp- 
onding to the 'analogical' side of language (by which the language 
of theory is so to speak practically embedded in the concrete situ- 
ations of production of theory). The configuration of each move 
into the theoretical or textual space of inquiry into the coupling 
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of this space and its dynamic with the institutional dynamics of 
its various contexts, can no longer itself be considered as 
'theoretically' neutral, any more than the various traditional 
analogies in whose terms classical theory abstracted itself from 
the figural order of analogy, can be so considered after the der- 
ridean 'deconstruction' of this millenial dynamic of Abstraction. 
Bourdieu's own part in french academic life was so to 
speak canonised in 1982 by his move from the Ecole Pratique to a 
chair at the College de France. I did not list either of the books 
just cited along with those by various colleagues at either of these 
two institutions of inquiry, as I never msde the transition from 
the parisian Lebenswelt into the theoretical, institutional and 
physical space of Bourdieu's seminar or cours - working as I was 
from a more abstract theoretical side of inquiry into the coupling 
of Theory and the contexts of which it framed theories. Let me then 
complete the lists of the books that mark so many textual and con- 
textual coordinates of my encounter with the parisian theory of 
around 1970 and since, by adding those which I confronted in abstract- 
ion from practical experience of the institutional spaces of their 
elaboration, but grouping them, nevertheless, within the same pattern 
of institution of theory which served to range those listed already: 
Ecole Pratique (EHESS) 
BRAUDEL, LE ROY LADURIE - already noted 
966 GENETTE, Gerard Figures I 19 
II 19 
I HES 
967 S4minaire de G4ometrie Algcbrique, 1964: Theorie des Topos et Co- 
homologie dtale des Sch4mas-: (GROTHENDIECK9 
ARTIN, VERDIER)' Berlin 1972 
Paris XII 
968 BAUDRILLARD, Jean Le Systeme des Objets (1968)1972 
969 L'Effet Beaubourg 1977 
970 L'Am6rique 1986 
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Bourdieu, as it were the exemplary representative of french 
sociology, at the Collbge de France, articulates in that insti- 
tutional space the 'exposition' of its own embedding in the pract- 
ical order of interaction of parts in France - the interaction in 
which that very space of its own analysis is both theoretically 
and practically 'constituted', defined: this theoretical space of 
embedding of french theoretical space in the practical interaction 
of parts which is 'France' itself explicitly 'entered into' at the 
'outset' of the exposition as merely one 'side' so to speak of an 
essentially-'dramatic' interface of theoretical and practical 'space' 
and time. Derrida meanwhile (1985)' constructs in the instituted 
theoretical space of reading which is his EHESS seminar held at 
ENS, a reading of Tocqueville's french reading of 'american thought', 
'Philosophy in America' in the context (the opening of the second 
half) of 'Democracy in America', the context of that american demo- 
cratic symmetry of parts - or 'freedom' of any individual to accede, 
in principle, to any part - together with its 'analogical' dynamic 
of universal suffrage (for white males, at any rate) under an egali- 
tarian 'constitution', which organises the activity of the Nation 
as a whole in this symmetry. Tocqueville seeks in 'cartesian' french 
manner to frame an abstract 'sociology' of America; and in defining 
its moving principle systematically in terms of a symmetry of 'I's 
or individuals ('equality', 'freedom', 'democracy') otherwise uncon- 
strained in virgin Nature separated by thousands of miles of sea 
from any civilised neighbours, he at once determines the context of 
american thought 'within' the cartesian principle of systematic 
framing of its global context within the textual articulation of 
a 'logical' space of questions and theories around the abstracted 
function of cartesian doubt and responding assertion.... and at the 
same time presents what he-thus defines, as itself bringing radically 
into question the abstract space of systematic thought in which it 
has been defined, just as it brings intö question the whole european 
social order of well-defined parts abstracted from the fundamental 
democratic symmetry or identity of free individuals, in which this 
traditional part of sophisticated european Philosophy is itself one 
component. Brings the coordinated abstractions from radical demo- 
cratic symmetry of parts into question, by presenting America as a 
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sort of 'laboratory of the future', in which those forces which 
towards the middle of the nineteenth century are appearing in 
the fragmentary characters they assume in reaction to the old 
fixed order of abstraction of hierarchical parts from symmetric 
democratic freedoms in Europe, may be scientifically, philosophically 
analysed with a view to organising the inevitable transition from 
the old order into Liberty and Equality in the Old World, with the 
minimal amount of that terrible dislocation and destruction which 
was first seen, in France, in the bloody transition from eighteenth 
to nineteenth century. 
Bourdieu presents his theory of the embedding of theory 
in the social matrix of activity as explicitly 'one side' of the 
interface of 'theory' and 'practice' which I have suggested corresp- 
onds to the theoretical and practical, or logical and analogical 
'sides' of language - this rather as Derrida presents the theoretical 
'space' of E ep rons as embedded by the open-ness of the linguistic 
matrix around it, like the space of possible constructions around 
'J'ai oublie mon parapluie', in the metaphorical dynamic of desire 
which cannot, in principle, itself be definitively embedded 'in' 
theory. I suggested that the 'analogical' side of language itself 
reflects the practical character of linguistic terms in the particu- 
lar limited configurations of verbal and non-verbal 'variables' in 
particular 'situations' into which language enters as one dimension 
(which cannot then be definitively abstracted from its coupling with 
the other dimensions of such situations, to frame some unitary log- 
ical or linguistic 'space' in which the situation might itself be 
logically inscribed). Thus one might re-read E ep rons in this light 
in terms of the theatrical dynamics of the C4risy scenario of its 
initial delivery: the abstract textual formulation of the irreduc- 
ible embedding of that abstract formulation in an analogical dynamic 
of what one might mark (but not hope to theoretically 'define') as 
'desire', might then appear as a somewhat questionable narcissistic 
flirtation of the theoretical dandy with his mixed audience. One 
might perhaps, recast the script as... 'Derrida's Prick', and quest- 
ion just what or who it was poking at: the Envois of the Carte Postale 
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are repeatedly explicit on this score: the audience thought he 
was talking to them about metaphor or whatever, but 'they', the 
anonymous plural third person, was blind to the real destination 
of his talk, which is always the same as the destination of his 
postcards - not some abstract 'femmeI formally marking what the 
pen... would pin down, and whose constant elusion draws the pen 
constantly forward over the paper, making that string of marks 
we call writing - but rather a particular woman en chair et en os 
absent from the lecture-hall... and that non-verbal matrix traced 
by Loubrieu's pen between Derrida's pages of words. 
Bourdieu theoretically framing the embedding of his 
theory, its institutional space or matrix, in the practical order 
of interactions which is french 'society', and underlining the 
practical side of his own theoretical enterprise, theoretically. 
Derrida questioning the paradoxical character of Tocqueville's 
fraiing of symmetric society and institutions in the asymmetric 
abstraction of the cartesian theoretical space as instituted in 
France, which is itself supposedly brought into question by the 
social dynamic it frames - brought into question as one component 
in the various linked coordinates of the old european order which 
must pass away in a future whose image is America. And Derrida, in 
this, echoing that same paradox in the french theoretical 'sp'ace' of 
reading abstracted from the dramatic order signalled by Bourdieu, 
as I, at least, in his audience felt that the primary scene of the 
questions he was addressing before those Japanese and american and 
french students was the very ENS Theatre in which he pursued his 
le ctio behind a table on the stage. And Baudrillard, meanwhile, 
in America, rewriting De Tocqueville in his travelling diary, doubling 
Bourdieu's explicit abstraction from the complementarity of theo- 
retical and 'practical' dynamics of writing $sociology', by a theor- 
etically motivated embedding of his 'observations' in the actual 
'moving' or travelling practical space and time of the various 
american situations in which these observations on 'the american 
scene' were made. Again and again there recurs the observation 
that 'no sociology can properly compete with the experience of 
... '. Once again, as in Tocqueville, America is the image of 
Europe's, and now of the Globe's future... even if the americans 
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themselves are blind to this image, even if the whole drama is 
Baudrillard's fantasy of America: for it is just this very space 
of fantasy coordinate with the european's theoretical identificat- 
ion in America of the symmetry of parts which finally dissolves 
the millenial abstraction of the theoretical 'It itself in the 
perfect mirror of the american TV screen organising the whole 
simulacrum of The World around it.... it is just this order of 
appearance or experience in which there are no longer separate 
subjects and objects and subjectivities and objectivities, which 
is the Future that Baudrillard maps out for Europe and for the 
New World in which the separate identity of Europe is dissolving. 
If the 'space' of traditional systematic questioning or 
'philosophy', instituted in book or seminar (or various correlative 
scenarios of dialogue abstracted from the question of their own 
theatricality), itself comes 'into question', in an 'eighties iter- 
ation of the 'structuralist' moves of the 'sixties from abstrict 
matrix of 'thought' to the embedding and dynamic of this in the 
very language in which that abstraction is constituted or instituted 
... then any attempt to frame, and respond to, this question, and 
to articulate around such question and response a new 'space' of 
Philosophy (in which the textual space of the 'sixties and 'seven- 
ties appears as merely one component dimension), cannot be simply 
framed 'in' the old institutions of text and seminar abstracted 
from the question textually marked by Bourdieu as the 'rupture' or 
break into and out of such 'spaces' of questions. What appears 
'formally' in such spaces as an order of questioning posed by their 
embedding or inscription in the 'pragmatics' of philosophical texts 
(written or spoken) themselves, can no more be 'resolved' within 
such a space abstracted from the dynamics of its coupling to its 
various contextual dimensions, than could the husserlian question 
of the linguistic constitution of transcendental subjectivity be 
resolved 'in' the space and time of that abstracted subjectivity. 
Thus Bourdieu's Homo Academicus as 'theoretical' model of the inter- 
play of theory and its dramatics or pragmatics, Baudrillard's 
dramatisation of a theoretically motivated inscription of the 
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sociologist 'in' the american symmetry of parts which dissolves 
the millenial abstraction or transcendence of autonomous theoretical 
'I', Lyotard's discourse on the embedding of any discourse in its 
'pragmatics', and Derrida's questioning of a french philosophical 
space which frames its own scarcely tenable abstraction from Tocque- 
ville's and Baudrillard's american drama, by framing that drama 
within its abstract cartesian coordinates... all these may be read, 
or seen, as so many textual coordinates of a transition from the 
abstract verbal space of structural and 'post-structural' analysis, 
into what is only formally determined 'in' that space of questions 
and corresponding theories, as a dramatic context in which no con- 
figuration of transition from such interaction (of which the verbal 
is only one dimension coordinate with others) into some verbal framing 
of that transition, can any more be considered 'neutral' (any more 
than the various analogies which frame the abstraction of an older 
'theoretical' space from the figural order of analogy). 
One cannot iterate the 'structuralist' move from theory 
to text, from an earlier 'logic' into the complementarity of logical 
and figural or analogical 'sides' of language, within a textual 
order abstracted from the configuration of its own embedding in 
a practical or dramatic order of 'entry' into the text, which a 
'post-structuralist' text defines theoretically simply as the 'other' 
(or Other's) side of the theoretical dynamic of this logical op- 
position of logical and analogical. Textuality is embedded as one 
variable or dimension 'in' a poetic order whose autonomy cannot be 
adequately modelled or recuperated by that textual order - any more 
than Derrida's femme or 'J'ai oublid mon parapluiel can be definitively 
pinned or penned down 'in' phallogocentric theoretical space. 
And Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Derrida in the 
mid-eighties each in their different way frame textual responses 
to this continuation of the millenial dynamic of 'philosophical' 
questioning of the 'premisses' of previous questioning, in their 
various residual abstractions from a radical 'dramatisation' of 
their textual framings of embedding or inscription of that textual 
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framing in the configuration of coupling of text and context it 
nominally frames. For a new 'axis' of philosophical inquiry which 
responds or corresponds to an iteration in relation to the embedding 
of language in human interaction, to the (structuralist' inscription 
of earlier theory in the complementarity and dynamic interaction of 
logical and figural 'sides' of language (from which the earlier 
theory had been 'figuratively' abstracted), can be 'formally' marked 
in the textual order of 'post-structuralism', but the question of 
this marking of the new axis as itself subject to the radical quest- 
ion of the linguistic order of marking as itself one variable in 
the question it purports to mark, cannot in principle find any satis- 
factory response outside the 'practice' of coupling marking and 
question, text and context, in the writing of the question of that 
writing of the question itself. 
That is: the axis of questioning here in question must 
(we can go this far. 'formallyt, just as, twenty years ago, one 
could 'logically' show that the analogical 'side' of language 
could not be definitively mapped into that logic - and so that the 
demonstration itself must actually exemplify somehow an analogical 
dynamic it could not in principle 'define') pass through, and art- 
iculate itself around (with our irreducible 'participation') what 
I tried, experimentally, to mark at the outset of this inquiry by 
opening simply with a 'question-mark', with the question of the 
marking of that question itself. I have attempted to 'experimentally' 
map this new axis of 'philosophy' by allowing it to direct this 
inquiry 'into itself', this questioning framed in the symmetry of 
its text and context, and the dynamic of transcription of that 
'symmetry' into its textual order of questions. Each 'move' in 
the text is itself 'brought into question', transcribed into the 
textual order of questions, by the next move, and this simple 
question of the textual eleboration of the inquiry as itself a 
variable component in the unfolding configuration of text and 
context, 'constitutes' the philosophical axis of the inquiry as 
a whole, as a text, as a book, as an activity recorded, transcribed, 
over the course of writing the inquiry. 
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That is: any attempted response to the question textually 
posed by the formal symmetry of various dimensions of 'theoretical' 
text and context (a 'theoretical' text being considered as organised 
around an axis of questions) which abstracts in its institution or 
constitution from the question of its constitution as theory, as 
questioning - which abstracts from the character of textual response 
to a situation in which there are, among other things, paper, type- 
writer or pen, and so on, and in which the elaboration of a sequence 
of questions in the form of a theoretical text is only one activity 
open among others - which abstracts from the question of the 'quest- 
ion' as the marking of this open-ness as one thing open among others 
'in' it - any such response abstracts in some degree from the open 
coupling of textual and contextual dimensions of the situation of its 
writing, to an unquetioned textual framing of what then appears not 
as 'this' text, but as generic 'text' in generic 'context', in the 
abstract verbal dynamic organised around the cartesian residue of 
a merely nominal 'I' as instance of question and assertion in the 
text, with which the writer identifies in the construction of the 
text, inviting the reader either to identify with him (or it), or 
to frame in his turn a more radical textual space of questions, in 
which the initial text may be brought 'into question' and inscribed. 
I suggested at the close of Part III that various european 
and american 'schools' of theory around 1970 could be coordinated 
in the 'space' of questions unfolded from the opening question here 
of this inquiry itself, by correlating their various 'internal' text- 
ual orders with various contextual dimensions of a common geographical 
context, in relation to a common figure of abstraction of all these 
theories from the more radical question of the 'dramatic' coupling 
of text and context, and of text to text through a common context. 
I have suggested that various theoretical 'positions' elaborated 
in France since around 1970 as the abstract linguistic frame of 
'structuralism' comes into question, may be considered as 'transit- 
ional', marking so many dimensions or coordinates of the passage 
from the textual axis of french theory around 1970, into a dramatic 
posing of the dramatic 'frame' of any questioning as a more radical 
axis of 'philosophy', and of more 'local' theories also, as coherent 
'response' to various residually formal attempts to textually frame 
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the articulation of 'text' or 'discourse' as sequential configur- 
ation of verbal components or variables in the situation of com- 
position, in which the construction of a text is only one activity 
'open' among others - rather as the selection of one word or phrase 
rather than another at some point in the constitution of the said 
text is itself a variable, one space or dimension of possible sub- 
stitution, in the text itself, allowing the linguistic mapping of 
the wider order of substitution of writing for other possible activ- 
ities, into the narrower linguistic order of substitutions (through, 
for example, the word 'writing'). 
I have verbally inscribed various 'transitional' french 
texts of the nineteen-eighties in the 'space' of substitutions co- 
ordinate with the matrix of possible substitutions which is this text 
itself: this by bringing them into its space of questions, which is 
the textual marking of the coordination of this textual dimension 
of this situation of our writing or reading, with correlative con- 
textual dimensions. Just as Derrida brought various apparently dis- 
parate 'texts' into a common space of language or textuality, and a 
common question of their abstraction as 'theories' from the figural 
dynamic of 'abstraction' from the figural 'side' of languege - this 
in an iteration of the traditional reconstruction in each succeeding 
generation of a 'wider' critical space in which previous philosoph- 
ical texts and their 'spaces' and times could be inscribed; and this 
also in a more or less constant french 'institution' of 'philosophy' 
leading down from Revolution, Empire, Restoration and Cousin, to 
Derrida himself - so now various different institutions of question- 
ing may be coordinated through the different figures of their com- 
mon abstraction from the 'dramatic' order of their composition. 
Thus Lyotard, Habermas, and Rorty, for example, may be read or seen 
to be vainly competing to conclusively inscribe the others' theor- 
etical or discursive 'spaces' and times within their own, the trans- 
atlantic dynamic of the 'debate' about that embedding of theory in 
the contextual symmetry of parts in human interaction for which 
Tocqueville and Baudrillard take Rorty's America as model, itself 
driven by different national institutions of such theory (of which 
the discourses of Habermas, Lyotard and Rorty are 'representative' 
exemplars) and different identifications with the textual instance 
of question and assertion (' I' , '. Jeff f Ich') which the disputants, 
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in their common abstraction from their different 'dramatic' inst- 
ances of self-assertion in language (or rather, in their different 
languages) implicitly assume to be just an abstract function of 
question and assertion as such, in principle equivalent, subject to 
mere 'translation' or transposition from one language and national 
culture to the others. In their common abstraction from the actual 
drama of the debate in its transatlantic context, to argument over 
abstract models of inscription of text in dynamics of context (rather 
than discussing the actual drama of interaction of their different 
texts, scripts, parts, in the actual context of confrontation), they 
suppose that they are meeting in a common space of argument, a com- 
mon textuality whose embedding in context is under debate - whereas 
what they actually share is a common abstraction to identification 
of a theoretical instance of question and assertion in their respect- 
ive languages, which is differently instituted in the different nat- 
ional contexts of their respective texts, and which cannot be resolved 
into a single unitary definitive (victor's) space abstracted from 
its actual embedding in different contexts, but only resolved when 
the different 'versions' of the same abstraction from actual texts 
to textual models of 'text in context', all come into the same quest- 
ion of their abstraction. 
In a specific situation of human interaction one might 
speak of questions 'arising' when an unquestioned 'working' of the 
situation so to speak breaks down - say, for example, one of the 
components of the situation deviates or differentiates itself from 
some 'analogy' that was working up to that point, and in which the 
part of one of the participants was engaged as itself one component 
of the situation. In some situations the breakdown of 'appearances' 
may constitute an impasse for a participant, who marks as a question 
the embedding of some configuration of the situation in a new con- 
figuration in which he or she can reassert themself: the breakdown 
of the previous configuration 'at some point' opens up a range of 
formally possible embeddings of the configuration 'up to that point' 
in the matrix of various possible 'extensions' so to speak of the 
configuration, and this range may be marked as a question addressed 
either to the participant himself (in 'thought') or to another 
participant who appears to be in a position, to encompass the part, 
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of resolving the impasse. Philosophy might be taken as an extreme 
case of such 'questioning' of one's situation, which proceeds by 
questioning each successive instance of its questioning, until it 
can frame the widest possible 'context' of the situation of quest- 
ioning in relation to the mere function of 'question' itself, 'ab- 
stracting' from any specific 'part' of the philosopher in any spe- 
cific situation to the mere instance of question and assertion, 'I', 
and the mere instance of its 'object' as what differentiates itself 
from its 'appearance' or 'appearances', as these are coordinated 
within the overall linguistic matrix abstracted from the practical 
business of marking various possible variations or substitutions in 
concrete situations in questions and answers to practical questions 
arising in specific situations. 
Just as the passive 'spectator' of a 'play', 'theatre', 
can 'abstract' from his own fixed part among the other analogous 
fixed parts in the dark and silent auditorium, in the analogical 
dynamic of 'emotional' or 'sympathetic' identification with the 
'actors' interacting in the poetic symmetry of their various 'parts' 
in the common action, so can the passive audience at a philosophy 
lecture identify with the teacher's own identification with the 
abstract textual 'I' that in reading or questioning his text stands 
back from its own instance of abstracted 'I' or thought, and inscribes 
it in a wider space or matrix of theoretical questions. And of 
course a member of the audience may in turn 'stand back' from the 
teacher's 'playing' of the part of reflection, and articulate his 
own reflection in a still 'wider' space - or perhaps in a personal 
space of reflection that is wider than some particular configuration 
of the teacher's space (and that of the teacher's own 'text') abstract- 
ed from the wider matrix in which that particular configuration is 
itself embodied in the teacher's thought.. The part of thought is, 
so to speak, to stand back, abstract, or differentiate itself from 
any particular part - to question. 
One miGht follow Freud or Piaget or various others in 
trying to trace the dynamic evolution of personality or that part- 
icular dimension around the part of conscious 'I' we call thought, 
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from its inception in the newborn baby through various more and 
more complex configurations over the course of a life constituted 
by a multitude of successive situations of interaction with others. 
We may abstract from this multitude as a whole to consider various 
'structural' features of the sequence as a whole. Thus, for example, 
I might try and elaborate the sketch I have already given of the 
development of my own reflection, its 'space', from infancy through 
adolescence, Oxford, Paris, and the british countryside, through the 
successive configurations of books, institutions, sexual relations 
and so on: discovering 'philosophy' books at 13 or 14, leaving 
Oxford for Paris, and meeting both Debbie and Julia at 20 and 21, 
discovering myself in a new axis of response to questioning itself 
'in question' at 27, finishing this marking of that new position 
finally at 34 - throughout it all a personality dominated by quest- 
ioning and abstraction, and theoretically and practically finding 
that process finally coming full-circle when coming into its own 
instance of questioning in a 'space' of coordination of inquiry and 
context, whose so to speak homeostatic symmetry organising the 
male temporal axis of the quest, was ultimately found to be articu- 
lated about a particular woman (even -if, as in so many other ana- 
logous cases - Dante, Hölderlin, Valdry and so on - the particular 
woman did not altogether recognise herself in the verbal narration 
of the drama). 
I might then, retrospectively, see various components 
or dimensions of my questions and their context (as indeed I did, 
approaching 27) as 'unconsciously' converging, as through successive 
questions I tried to find a coherent 'position', framing my situa- 
tion, and my part of framing in it, through questioning earlier 
philosophical texts, and the positions of various anglophone and 
french theorists whose reflections I witnessed in Oxford and Paris, 
while this 'abstract' line of inquiry was practically or dramatic- 
ally coupled, all the while, with all the interactions which con- 
stituted its 'place' in european culture in the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
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Such a convergence of textual and contextual components 
of my life towards a coupling in a 'dramatic' response to the con- 
figuration of my textual attempt to articulate all theoretical 
questions in the symmetry of the internal 'space' of theories 
of the various internal and external dimensions of theory -a con- 
vergence towards the question posed by the symmetry in a particular 
situation of writing of such symmetry, between textual and context- 
ual dimensions, the textual 'representation' of which was itself 
but one so to speak 'asymmetric' version of, and component in, the 
situation - this embodies, indeed partakes in, a wider convergence 
of various nationally instituted 'spaces' of reflection (theory, 
systematic questioning). A convergence of various verbal spaces 
of theory instituted in various languages - french, english, german 
(and american? ) - towards a coupling one with another, through the 
coupling of each with various components of coupled contexts: for 
the 'dramatic' configuration of response to a french 'textual' 
space of theory of around 1970, 'coming into the question' posed 
by the radical asymmetry of a merely textual presentation of em- 
bedding of textuality in context, is the same space and time of 
dramatic coupling of text and context, as one enters by, say, ex- 
tending the anglo-american inquiry into the relations of a unitary 
formal 'logical' space in which 'ordinary' informal language is 
to be embedded, and the informality of the language in which that 
quinean or davidsonian project is itself constituted, to the quest- 
ion of the status of the very texts of the debate over (their) lan- 
guage, and the 'pragmatics# of the debate itself. One arrives, so 
to speak at the same 'point' (I arrive here, for example, in the 
dramatic axis of an inquiry into this inquiry itself) 'in' the coup- 
ling of theoretical text and context, whether one has extended the 
french question of inscription of theory in its textuality to that 
of embedding of textuality in context (which cannot be a merely 
'textual' operation), or the anglo-american questions relating to 
the interplay of syntax, semantics and pragmatics of formal and 
informal languages, to the coordination of these in the texts of 
the various component controversies themselves. 
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If the textual spaces of Lyotard, Rorty and Habermas 
remain so to speak incommensurable, in the interplay of respective 
mappings of the 'debate' on embedding of text in context into each 
of the contending spaces, this is itself a reflection of the resid- 
ual abstraction of each of the writers' representative 'national' 
positions from the radical symmetry of the textual and contextual 
components of the debate itself, from which the apparently conflict- 
ing textual presentations of relations of 'text' and 'context' or 
'pragmatics' differently abstract, this difference so to speak 
marking the different constitutions of 'theoretical space' in the 
writers' different languages, and marking also the common implicit 
assumption of the neutrality of the different authors' accessions 
to an apparently common 'space' of debate as untenable. 
I have marked my position 'in' the coupling of the paris- 
ian theory of around 1970 to its parisian context in terms of an 
iteration of the 'sixties french move from 'abstract' phenomenological 
space and time to the space and time of language or textuality, 
which eventually leads to the impasse of any merely textual attempt 
to frame the 'dramatic' axis of coupling of text and contexts, which 
I have tried to mark by raising the question of the marking of what 
is open in the symmetry of textual and contextual dimensions of the 
situation of marking as itself only one 'line' open in the situation. 
The mapping of the situation of a mapping of what is open into the 
linguistic space of questions and of theoretical texts in particular 
is itself only one thing open in that situation, and no more 'neutral!. 
in relation to what it marks or maps as the 'question' of questioning, 
than some figure, of 'abstraction' of the logical from the figural 
'side' of language in the constitution of an older 'theoretical 
space' is neutral in relation to the theoretical 'time' and 'space' 
so constituted. A certain order of text, even though it may bring 
into question the dynamics of the latter abstraction, may itself 
be brought into an analogous question (which may be marked, but not 
resolved, simply in the textual order of marking questions) as it- 
self abstracted. from the dynamics of its practical or dramatic 
institution and constitution as a questioning of 'the institution of 
philosophy'. The question of Iles institutions uhilosophiques' 
which may be marked and further elaborated 'in' a textual order 
of reflection on the embedding of text in pragmatics or context, 
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cannot find any satisfactory response in an institution of 
'dramatisation' of theory (traditional parisian 'academic' space) 
which is itself constituted, along with its dynamic of inquiry, 
in a configuration of abstraction from the individual p-, rt in the 
drama to instituted parts of teacher and students or audience - 
constituted in abstraction from the biographical dynamics of 
accession to this '. space' which no more permits the opening-up 
of the seminar in this dynamic, than an earlier theoretical text 
permitted a 'deconstruction' of its 'theoretical sp<tce' in the 
more radical dynamics of interplay of logical and analogical 'sides' 
of the language of the text. Language is only one 'side' of the 
philosophical dynamic of questioning, and the philosophical text 
of book or seminar cannot be brought into question and resolved 
in that textual dimension alone, any more than the relations of 
logical and figural sides of the text can be definitively inscribed 
in the logical matrix"of a theoretical text figuratively Abstracted 
from the metaphorical dynamic of that inscription. The persistence 
of a transatlantic 'postmodern debate' is itself a mark of the 
persistence in the institutions of that debate of a traditional 
theatricality or scenario of 'philosophy' which appears equally 
in the mute 'following' by his audience of the teacher's pr-rt of 
critically reading his chosen text before them, 'acting' the 'I' 
of reflection, thought, and in the merely textual space of different 
and contending identifications of Lyotard, Habermas and Rorty (for 
example) with the function of question and assertion trying to 
organise the question of the relations of text and context 'around' 
it 'in' a text. In the textual order of questions developed from 
around 1970 in France, Germany and America there is no underlying 
function of question and assertion, off 'I' which any of these 
contending national parts of theorist'could definitively assume, 
but the debate is rather directed by the analogical interplay of 
the three 'I's in the 'pragmatics' of the international debate itself, 
framed by their common abstraction from the parts of Jean-Franjois 
Lyotard, Jurgen Habermas or Richard Rorty to different textual 
functions of questioning and assertion differently instituted 
in analogous abstractions of french, german and american 'institutions' 
of philosorhy from a common dramatic axis of response to the 
various different posings in these different spaces of the question 
of their common abstraction. 
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Analogous, but different, orders of questions 'in' 
the various institutions or instituted spaces and times of 
'philosophy' in different countries and languages from around 
1970, then, all lead so to speak, through the recognition that 
the posing of the questions is itself a part of the question, to 
the same axis of response from which the different axes of posing 
questions in different schools, and of posing the question of this 
difference, have been differently abstracted. 
. Thus the oxonian frame of posing and resolving all quest- 
ions in terms of the pragmatics of natural language, abstracted 
from the question of the pragmatics of such 'philosophy' itself 
(abstracted from the order of text and its cultural and historical 
context to the order of elementary components of text or language 
and culture or human interaction) allowed me - to organise 
a critical position in relation to various parisian theories of 
around 1970 through a more or less mathematical framing of their 
various 'logics' of analogy (or of the relation of logical and 
analogical) as themselves formally analogous and differentiated 
and coordinated in the 'informal' frame of, say, a poem (rather 
than the 'poetics' of language framed in terms of 'language-games' 
or 'speech-acts'). At the same time the parisian primacy of the 
text as frame of philosophical inquiry allowed me to 'stand outside' 
or take a systematic critical position in relation to the texts of 
the anglo-american debates on language abstracted from the textual 
dynamic of, the debate. And the inscription of both french and 
anglo-american axes of 'philosophy' around 1970 as complementary 
abstractions from the questioning of inquiry itself as dramatically 
articulated in the coupling of texts and contexts, allowed a fairly 
schematic working back from the analogy of these two inatituti;., ns 
of abstraction, to an analogous Berman axis plotted on the basis 
of critical reading of far fewer texts - and no direct 'experience' 
of german teaching of philosophy apart from odd encounters at 
Oxford and Paris with visiting or displaced german philosophers. 
The 'internal' development of questions within these 
various axes, institutions, national schools, languages, cultures, 
itself leads - that is - to the recognition in different posings 
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of the question of the embedding of theory in context, of the 
'same' question: the question of different posings of the quest- 
ion of this difference; different textual orders of framing the 
question of inscription of texts in the dynamics of their coupling 
with their contexts - the question of this difference not being 
adequately posable 'in' any abstract textual order, let alone 
resoluble in the terms of such a space. 
Just as the 'nouveaux philosophes' could group all the 
abstract 'structuralisms' together as so many variants or dimens- 
ions of that common ideological position or place of 'standing- 
back' from the moral order of parts (Cicero's 'offices') in the 
human drama, nominally bringing the whole existing social order 
'into questions, into the textual space of their systematic quest- 
ioning - while Foucault could identify such a place of analogical 
substitution of different theories one for another as a 'lacune de 
vocabulaire' - and borrow from Lacan himself as 'representative' 
structuralist the characterisation of his instance of assertion of 
a 'structuralist' theory as primary 'marker' of such a place of 
questioning or theory, its 'father-figure' organising in the text- 
ual space of such theories the abstract textual dynamic of various 
substitutions or attempted substitutions of other figures or instances 
of assertion of theory in that place (Derrida's organisation around 
this place of questions complementing Lacan's theoretical assertion, 
for example, or Kristeva's 'feminine' or 'feminist' version which 
may in turn be marked in the derridean version as the analogical 
coordination of different theories around the place of femme, 
theoretically 'outside' theory) - so one may class the 'nouveaux 
philosophes' themselves as so many complementary variations on a 
common ideological position (unlike the 'structuralists' they posi- 
tively assumed the common 'moralf direction or orientation coord- 
inate with such an analogy - and this is itself perhaps the funda- 
mental analogy between their 'positions' or parts); and one may 
further class 'structuralists' and 'nouveaux philosophes' together 
as complementary 'positions' or groups of positions within a com- 
mon french space of theoretical criticism of ideology and ideolog- 
ical criticism of abstract theory, between about 1970 and about 
1985, the 'interaction' or interplay of the parts of theory and 
ideology turning about the sudden eruption of the question pre- 
sented by this confrontation in the parisian press and french 
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'media' (directed from Paris) in 1977. More generally still, 
one may correlate such a 'french' axis of embedding of theory 
in the ideological interface of abstract 'academic' space (of 
'structuralism(s)') and 'practical' space of human interaction 
in Paris (ideologically framed in the 'media' by the 'new philo- 
sophers' as the 'moral' - and sometimes theological - space of 
a normative harmony of individual parts, hierarchically organised 
in a unitary symmetry of ideal democratic consensus over demo- 
cratic consensus) with analogous axes of the 'institution' of 
theory in Germany, America and Britain, the relatively autonomous 
'political' spaces of activity in those geographical and linguistic 
domains reflecting a continuing relative autonomy of those various 
orders of systematic questioning or theory instituted as one 'side' 
of each of those national orders of activity as so many national 
'schools' - with the 'national' character of the various schools 
best typified by that most radical frame of questioning and theory, 
'philosophy', rather than the various more 'local' domains of 
science or theory, in which different national components can be 
coordinated in a more international 'practical' orientation of 
questioning, relatively autonomous in each country from its various 
notional inscriptions. in the theoretically 'wider' space of the 
specialists' 'philosophies'. This question, confronted by Derrida 
in 1985, of 'Philosophy and Nationality', and posed in analogous 
ways within the french institution of theory by Derrida, Bourdieu 
and Baudrillard, finds so to speak its canonical formulation in the 
opening section of the second half of Tocqueville's Democratie en 
Amdrique: for what appears formally in relation to what I have 
characterised (along with Tocqueville, Derrida and other frenchmen) 
as the 'cartesian' tradition of organising philosophy around the 
'subjective' coordinate of questioning, appears 'practically' in 
question in the american attitude towards questions as simply co- 
ordinates in the practical order of activity whose 'cartesian' (so 
to speak) or 'archimedean' point of unquestioned root, axis, orien- 
tation of questioning, is akin to the nouveaux philosophes' con- 
sensus over consensus (among the 'moral majority' at least). A 
merely 'theoretical' posing of the question of the 'french' insti- 
tution of systematic questioning begs the question, - even if Derrida 
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remains caught in a characteristically french theoretical elab- 
oration of this impasse of theory, this paradox of the very posing 
of the paradox. Nor can specifically american theory theoretically 
confront the 'consequences of pragmatism', frame the theoretical 
consequences for theory of that analogical approach to different 
european theories which simply combines figures from different 
theories, in abstraction from their european embedding in various 
theoretical differences, and theoretically marks the practical 
axis of this interplay as a 'pragmatism' whose systematic ambiguity 
(as Lovejoy pointed out) cannot be theoretically, but only (perhaps) 
practically, defined. The self-confirming autonomy of these 'trad- 
tions' of systematic questioning or systems of questioning, is seen 
directly in the contending circular responses to the 'postmodern' 
questioning over the last third of the century of that 'modern' em- 
beuding of theory in context elaborated into various modern theories 
and modernisms in theory, over the first third, and characterised 
most simply in relation to the emergence over the turn of the century 
of that specifically 'american' school of theoretical and practical 
inscription of theory in the pragmatics of context systematised by 
Dewey between the turn of the century and around 1930 as 'Pragmatism'. 
You don't have a theory of Pragmatism - one might, and many did, 
object to William James - Quite so, he could reply, I have only tried 
to mark the radically practical axis of any theory (and this, like 
Dewey, and, most characteristically, Mead, in the practical situation 
of lecturing before a class, and teaching, inducting or educating the 
student into his part in the pragmatic order of american society). 
The Ipostmodernl question of the pragmatics of theory 
thus evinces, in the 'postmodern debate, that is the interaction 
of various abstract versions of this international interaction 
of different schools or 'cultures, of theory, the common abstract- 
ion of the different schools from what one might call the question 
of questioning, the question attaching to what is open in a situa- 
tion of marking what is open textually as a question: a common ab- 
straction from the dramatic interplay of text and context to a 
textual framing of text-in-context (or earlier, theory-in-world) 
that historically institutes in different 'nations' or national 
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coordinations of more or less unitary national activity (whose 
'textual dimension' is just the particular national language) 
more or less unitary textual orders of systematic questioning or 
theory, 'in' none of which the question of their incommensurabilir: y 
as different theoretical orientations (in what translators tend to 
assume is some unitary space of questions) can be resolved - the 
presentation of this question of their difference (or some more 
abstract version of the 'pragmatics of theory' h is Lyotard, Rorty, 
Habermas) 'in' any of the contending textual framings of embedding 
of texts in the practical dynamics of context always 'begs the quest- 
ion' - for the space of any such textual frame is constituted, and 
academically instituted in each language and culture and national 
economy of activity, precisely by or through the practical dynamics 
of abstraction of theoretical space from the dramatic configuration 
of any individual's passage into and out of his or her 'part' of 
questioner, debater, critic, theorist, philosopher, in such a 'space'. 
I have tried to textually institute here, in english, 
a dramatic space articulated around the axis opening out of the 
'dramatic' configuration of a questioning that first questions 
the passage into this very textual space (rather than from the 
outset framing such a question 'in' a text whose 'institution' 
is at some point of 'rupture' with its context unquestioned). This 
is not simply an 'americans inscription of theory in some textually 
presented 'story' or fiction about that theory (or rather, : lw,, ys, 
about 'theory' in general), any more than it is an attempt at some 
european theory of the embedding of 'theory' (in general) in some 
textually marked and articulated 'context (in general). The gen- 
erality of these complementary 'markings' of inscription of text 
in context is itself in every case an: index of the decoupling of 
the dramatic interplay of text and context in the specific situat- 
ion of opening, 'institution' of the text. One can only inscribe 
any 'theory' or systematic questioning in such a 'dramatic' s-once 
whose primary locus (pace Derrida) is always necessarily a 'present' 
situation in which writer and reader are dramatically engaged with 
the physical economy of production and consumption of 'text' as 
one component in a wider matrix of their interaction through the 
written or spoken words, through a radically 'indexical' charact- 
erisation 'in' the text of those various instances of 'I', 'here', 
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'now', 'this book', 'this matrix of interaction in which the verbal 
order of this book is physically embodied as one dimension coordin- 
ate with these other dimensions - cultural, physical and so on - of 
its, this, context' and so on. This allows me, for example, to 
'presume' certain characters of any possible reader' - you - as 
it were physically trapped in the space of reading this book, in 
the various coordinates it marks, which probably clash rather with 
the traditional assumption by you as reader of some absolute critical 
detachment 'outside' the text, in a purely abstract textual frame 
of questions which no given text can, in principle frame - and in 
which any attempt of a theoretical writer to presume any 'position' 
of his reader in the wider matrix of possible questions from which 
his or her text abstracts, betr'ys simply a rhetorical arrogance 
utterly repugnant and inadmissible 'in theory'. 
I attempted to establish in relation to this concrete, 
'dramatic' axis of this inquiry into this inquiry, a range of con- 
textual coordinates, marked as such in the text through the working 
of the coupling of textual and contextual 'coordinates' discovered 
in the 'opening' or introductory section of the inquiry. Thus I 
characterised what might be called 'cartesian', 'leibnizian' and 
'lockean' schools of Philosophy in France (or rather, french) Germany, 
and England (Leibniz, though wrote in french or latin: schools of 
theory are no more reducible to their dominant language than the 
use of that language is restricted to the dominant area of its use 
on the Earth's surface; Descartes wrote in french and latin in 
Holland... and so on) from the seventeenth century onward, and the 
arising self-consciousness of a specifically american 'pragmatist' 
school over the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century. 
And I chzracterised the 'french' school (represented in general 
by Descartes defining his 'position' as locus of the questioning 
of the presuppositions of any questioning; towards 1650, rather 
as various subsequent phases of the school may be 'represented' 
by Voltaire, Cousin, Bergson, Sartre, Lacan, and so on) as articul- 
ating the matrix of its various theories in the 'cartesian' space 
of framing theory within the figure of the individual subject's 
or theorist's assertion of his own instance of assertion as primary 
response to the general space or matrix of substitution in language 
which frames 'questions' in general. The 'german' school, I suggested, 
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conversely articulates its textual space of theory within the 
primary axis or direction of 'objective' determination of system- 
atic theoretical response to systematic questioning, while the 
'british' school frames theory in the practical coordination of 
these complementary continental poles of subjectivity and object- 
ivity, and the american school arrives on the scene when, in Europe, 
the abstraction of any theoretical logic that might hope in the 
traditional manner to frame its own embedding in its World by framing 
that World in its own abstract 'logical space', comes within the 
orbit of its own questioning, comes into question, in various 
analogical 'crises of foundations' that issue in so many 'modernisms' 
systematised towards 1930, around the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
I have suggested that this inquiry itself marks a 'con- 
vergence' of these various different 'lines' of questioning, towards 
a common dynamic of theory articulated in a radical questioning of 
questioning sketched in this book, as each comes, between 1970 and 
2000, into the common question of their difference, which cannot 
be resolved 'in' any of the abstract traditional spaces of question- 
ing (become after 1970 so many spaces of 'textuality'framing their 
own embedding in 'pragmatic' context), but only in the 'practical' 
question of their interplay, dramatically articulated in the devel- 
oping inquiry into the passage to and fro between the text of this 
inquiry and its context. The 'theory' of this dramatic 'space' and 
time of writing theory is itself elaborated through the 'historian's' 
hermeneutic working-back from various different 'theories' of the 
whole ('philosophy') or some part (specific 'sciences') of the con- 
text of their theoretical texts, to the frame of an 'action' which 
is 'The History of Philosophy' in which conflicting framings of 
the universal context in different texts, may be systematically 
coordinated with the positions or parts of the various different 
writers in the spatiotemporal and cultural frame of that 'action', 
'drama' or history, story. Most of the work is, so to speak, done 
already, by the various different writers of theory (and of hist- 
ories of theory) over the last two and a half millenia; my task, 
like Cicero's 'translating' greek philosophy into his pragmatic 
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roman frame, is simply a kind of editing or rearrangement, a 
transposing into a new script or score. As I have often remarked, 
the general figure of such transposition is simply the marking in 
this text of a figure taken from an earlier text which sets both 
this and the earlier marking of that figure in what that figure 
itself marks or frames in a common context, Thus the 'history' 
evolved in parts I-III opens. with a 'pythagorean' figure of Kosmos 
which coordinates various dimensions of the mark or marking, in 
coordinating the physical, logical, poetic, mystical, psychological, 
ontological and other characters of the marking here of that coor- 
dination, with its original marking at a 'point' framed here as 
'Croton around 500BC1. The next 'figure' or configuration of 
what after those pythagoreans we call 'theory' or 'philosophy' in 
its context, appears as at once a figure of Parmenides' response 
to the figural abstraction of the 'fiction' of pythagorean theory, 
as it comes practically into question in a context whose coordinates 
it has itself framed (Parmenides' 'step back' from identification 
with a silent part in the pythagorean mystery, after the violent 
overthrow of its political framing of activity in Magna Graecia), 
and also as a response 'transposed' from Parmenides' version, to 
the question confronted here as the marking of the initial con- 
text as 'Kosmos' comes into the dynamic of this inquiry articulated 
in the axis unfolded in the opening Introduction. The question 
posed at each point by the previous transposition of an old figure 
of embedding of theory inzcontext - by the previous marking of 
the 'space' of this inquiry, what is 'open' in its situation, in 
the textual order of this book, through a figure 'borrowed' from 
earlier theory which itself situates that earlier theory in the 
unfolding 'action' or drama of theory in a spatiotemporal Kosmos - 
this itself allows the identification of a further figure of em- 
bedding of this inquiry in its 'space' or context, borrowed from 
some historical response to the theory from which the previous 
figure was itself taken... and so on and on from 500BC down to 
1970 and the 1980s. 
ccccccxvi 
Questions: the marking of a space or place in language 
which invites in response the selection of one of a range of 
otherwise equivalent or 'symmetric' possible substitutions of 
term or phrase (or discourse or book) 'in' that space. And 
'question-mark': a linguistic marking of a particular 'space' in 
language as a question. So that if one is to question all previous 
'theory' or systematic questioning in the pythagorean tradition, 
by marking the very marking of 'question' as a question, one can- 
not in principle derive any adequate response to such a question, 
and this book it frames simply 'in' the textual order of the 
inquiry, for this would be to abstract at the outset from the 
question of what is open in the situation of marking what is open 
(in the situation of marking) as a question - in this case by 
marking the whole inquiry here as the marking of a question(ing), 
marking the question of this marking. 
One can mark what is open in the situation of marking 
what is open as a question: one can mark the locus of substitution 
of a, that, mark, for the space which it marks, and 'in' which the 
marking of the space is only one possible substitution. And, indeed, 
if the linguistic order of substitutions or 'space' were not thus 
embedded in this radical play of substitutions in a specific situ- 
ation of marking the questioning of questions, there could not 
even be any question of there being 'questions': a question is 
marked in a situation as the (inscription' of the configuration 
it marks in a wider matrix of what is open in the situation as 
possible embeddings of that configuration in some wider configurat- 
ion. A question and its linguistic character of (partly 'open') 
mark or sign substitutes in a present situation for something open 
'outside' or beyond or behind or absent from the situation. A 
complete 'abstraction' from embedding in a situation to some 'text' 
in which 'the question' might be supposed brought into question in 
a merely linguistic order of substitutions, independently of any 
particular situation of posing the question, constructing the text 
in a wider order of substitutions (in which then a text may be 'sub- 
situted' for some partly non-textual configuration) would not even 
amount to an 'empty' space of all possible linguistic substitutions, 
Language-in-itself or whatever. There would be no mark of any dif- 
ference 'in' the abstract linguistic or textual space, not even of 
different 'points' in the space: there would be nothing open, not 
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even a 'space' at all. There has to be an 'external' side, so to 
speak, to any 'mark' or sign, which reflects its embedding in an 
order of substitution in which the linguistic dimension of the 
'sign' is itself one among other possible substitutions: and this 
'external' side of language (discussed at length by Derrida in De 
la Grammatologie, for example) cannot simply be 'represented' or 
marked in a discussion of questions as 'external', and used to 
frame a questioning of the textual order of questioning 'in' a 
text abstracted from its 'dramatic' constitution, simply through 
the 'internal' linguistic syntax (logical and analogical so to speak) 
of this word 'external', 'in' an inquiry into inquiry. Any radical 
questioning of 'the question' as embedded in a matrix of substitut- 
ions in which the linguistic order of substitution of one term for 
another in a text is itself a substitution for what the text frames, 
must, 'logically' even, be articulated in what the text of the in- 
quiry directly marks as the 'space' of substitutions in which that 
very text itself is articulated, as a 'stepping back' which frames 
the particular situation of writing, and the text itself, in a non- 
textual 'context' which it marks itself merely as marking, rather 
than definitively inscribing or circumscribing in the text. We 
cannot for example just recognise that some nominal limit of ab- 
straction of sign and question from context is radically 'empty', 
is indeed, simply 'nothing', and then proceed to reconstruct some- 
thing like Hegel's Logic by positing something outside this Nothing, 
and following through the whole dialectical reconstruction of the 
resulting 'syntax' to the point where it frames the posing of the 
initial absolute abstraction in what it determines as Universal 
History, and comes 'full-circle'. Nor can we just turn such an 
'idealist' dialectic on its head by textually framing its ideological 
embedding in the material economy of the physical producticn of 
the "irst text: for the frame of such a converse m! teri^1 'side' 
of the idealist text is itself 'abstract' insofar as it is linguist- 
ically elaborated in a 'standing-back' from the question or situat- 
ion of its own 'dramatic' constitution, which embeds that situation 
of writing in the 'wider' economy whose positing is a direct cor- 
relate of the 'ideal' abstraction of its textual order from the 
drama of producing the text. And nor de we resolve the situation 
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much or any better by framing in abstract terms some textual 
formulation of the dramatic centrality in 'the concrete situation' 
of the existential individual, as long as the 'concrete situation' 
is not actually the choice of those very words by their writer 
within a space or scene of their writing of which the words mark 
themselves as the 'script'. 
And yet all these figures of inscription of reflection 
and its writing in a context whose textual framing is itself ab- 
stracted from the dramatic coupling of script and action in the 
composition of the text can themselves be 'historically' embedded 
in the dramatic axis and dynamic or 'dialectic' here marked by the 
question of marking what is open in the situation of marking in 
the textual order of a question. And all these figures of inscrip- 
tion of their textual framing in context then appear precisely as 
so may complementary figures of the inscription of this text in its 
context, so many components of a textual matrix which marks, and 
in this marking partly organises, a wider matrix of what is open 
to writer or reader as he or she physically confronts this book. 
A question marks something open in the situation of 
its m, arkingi-this 'situation' of the question itself being defined 
in terms of the question as a matrix of possible substitutions of 
which the question presents the textual coordinates, the textual 
'space' of possible embeddings of the situation marked by the 
question in a wider situation or frame. The question mrrks in 
a 'present' situation various possible embeddings of the textual 
and coordinate terms of the situation in a configuration of 'absent' 
determinations of those present terms, which configuration the 
question so to speak invokes, invoking in particular, as response 
from the receiver of the question (the questioner him- or herself, 
or one or more others) a textual framing of that wider frame. A 
question may arise when the figure brought 'into question' beaks 
down - as, say, in Propp's analysis a folk-tale (or in various other 
analyses the 'western' film... and so on) always begins with the 
disruption of an an initially stable state of affairs - or as, 
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in the 'practical' order of the situation a figure of various 
elements in the situation and their relations or interaction, 
is seen as only an 'analogy' for the 'real' rel'tions 'behind' 
the working of the analogy, behind the 'appearances' up to the 
point where the analogy breaks down. I suggested that affective 
orientation was articulated in the analogic. jl 'side' of l'nguýge; 
thought or reflection might be seen as the opening up of a 'move' 
out of one identification or part of the 'subject', some 'I', in 
a situation, to reassertion in some new figure or framing of a 
wider or redefined situation, 'I' redefining itself as the new 
instance of framing its situation, and as also the constant funct- 
ion of reflection and consequent reassertion 'behind' the changing 
figure of assertion in successive situations, just as it asserts 
other components of the situation to be constant objects, identi- 
ties behind their various 'appearances', which appearances are then 
the correlates of the marks or signs 'substituted' for the internal 
'thoughts' referred to an 'I' which refers them to these 'objects' 
'behind' these appearances, like the 'I' behind its signs, using 
them to frame a whole configuration 'behind' the various signs and 
appearances in which it verbally sets the situation of its marking. 
To the verbal order of substitutions in 'linguistic 
space' around a particular question or response (a space unfolding 
so to speak from the frame of substitutions which is the question, 
rather than somehow fully articulate in unitary manner 'in itself' 
before any question is posed by being marked by some physical com- 
ponent or 'mark' in the situation) corresponds that other 'physical' 
space in which various marks and appearance may or may not be ex- 
changed for others in the spatiotemporal 'economy' of material 
Nature. And complementing the 'internal' logical constraints on 
possible extensions of the text of a given situation to its embed- 
ding in a 'wider' text framing the 'context' (or a context) of that 
particular situation, are the 'material' constraints on possible 
substitutions of other things and other appearances for the present 
apl. e; arance of the situation. Or rather, to the 'logical' side of 
textual analysis of the situation of this textual analysis or 
questioning, corresponds the 'physical' dynamic of mere spatio- 
temporal substitution of one 'thing' for another in the situation 
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(the basic 'mechanics' of the situation), while for the linguistic 
'side' of the situation as a whole (with its two complementary 
sides of logical and analogical embedding of the situation in 
the 'subjective' space of a frame posited 'behind' the appearances) 
one must set as 'objective' correlate its embedding in a material 
economy, of which the mere natural 'mechanics' is only one abstracted 
side, complemented by that affective disposition or orientation of 
the various 'subjects' involved in the situation, on which the 
analogical articulation of desire in the linguistic space of thought 
and imagination in which those various agents orient their self- 
assertion, individually and collectively, is itself one constraint, 
coupled in the actual dynamics of the affections (pace Lacan) with 
an... analogous.. orientation of the embodied agent among the various 
appearances or images of his or her material place among other 
bodies, animate and inanimate (this then the 'other' material side 
of the economy of our bodily 'embedding' in situations, from the 
mere 'mechanism' logically determined as the outward spatiotemporal 
order mathematically mirrored in 'internal' logical space). The 
'material economy' of the situation in general, then, is just the 
interface of such Nature and desire in the 'material' space of 
our bodily spatiotempöral intervention in various 'natural mechanisms' 
in the pursuit of our wants (rather than our questions), structured 
like a sort of material analogue of language where physical exchange 
of various goods or products of intervention, 'to the common good', 
replaces verbal exchange coordinating interaction towards that same 
end as perceived. The material 'matrix' of intersections of var- 
ious processes of intervention in 'Nature' at 'points' of substi- 
tution of ranges of intermediate or 'finished' products of such 
interventions is as it were a reflection in 'outward' space and time 
of the interaction of complementary linguistic activities of 
framing a common situation in a wider textual space of various 
terms absent from or beyond a present situation of interaction. 
In particular, different framings of the common good in some com- 
munities' collective intervention in Nature may be discursively or 
otherwise coordinated in the 'political' axis of articulation of 
group activity; 'money' may serve to mark out a general space of 
substitution of goods, products of intervention in Nature; and so 
on. 
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In 'external', 'physical' space the economy of our 
activity appears 'in principle' simply a matter of substitutions 
of one thing 'in place of' another: substitution, for example, 
of one place we are at for another in 'space' open to us (using 
for example our feet in this 'locomotion'), and in the place at 
which we find or have brought ourselves, displacement of something, 
replacement of one thing by another - say with our hands, say put- 
ting something (thereby, hopefully, 'food') in that place we call 
our mouth, thus intervening in the mechanical maintenance of that 
physical system which is the digestive tube to which our physical 
bodies may be schematically reduced, when we are considering the 
basic 'mechanism' of our life. The elementary collective economy 
of life in a 'primitive' agricultural group appears simply, in 
these terms, as intervention in the reproductive mechanism of 
organic life by displacing all such life within the mark or pale 
of a certain place (a 'field') and replacing it with 'seeds' col- 
lected from 'Nature' (for example, from that field the previous 
'year', or from some other) physically set in the earth of the 
field at a more or less specific point of the natural mechanism 
or cycle of the reproductive year. Such activity presents the 
figure of an elementary 'economy' of collective activity: the in- 
vestment' in a present activity of clearing and sowing the field, 
rather than simply gathering seed or other edible matter for pre- 
sent consumption, is framed by 'standing back' in thought or imag- 
ination from the 'animal' part of immediate consumption, and fram- 
ing the present activity of putting seeds in the earth rather than 
in one's mouth, within a wider activity of intervention in what is 
in some sense a wider order of things 'beyond' or behind the immed- 
iate present, corresponding to collective assertion in the figure 
of a thinking 'I' standing back, itself, from the animal dynamics 
of identification with the body and its needs in a present situation, 
as it frames the situation of sowing in'a wider mechanism of aspects 
of present things (like the seeds) absent from that immediate 'ap- 
pearance' - as it frames the situation of sowing seed within a 
configuration of selves 'behind' the immediate natural or animal 
dynamics of their bodies, and of 'natures' of seed and year and 
so on behind the presently visible natures, in the wider activity 
or situation of 'agriculture'. 
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'Standing back' from a situation in thought or quest- 
ioning was, I suggested, always a marking in some element of the 
'situation', of a configuration - of 'I' thinking behind or in 
the surface of its body and various 'things' thought 'behind' their 
present configuration or appearance - in which the 'present' con- 
figuration is thought or imagined to be physically and dramatically 
embedded, in a sort of 'economy' of interaction of 'I's with one 
another and with other things. The 'mark' is itself mirked by 
being physically put in a 'place' in a present or current action 
in which it is not appropriate simply as a present physical element 
of the interaction current 'at that point'. The inappropriateness 
of the mark simply as a 'thing' in a merely material economy itself 
marks the breaking open of a current configuration in a question, 
or in a response to the question it implicitly marks in making a 
response. Thus the interposition between another's gaze and its 
current objects of a configuration that has been produced apparently 
with a view precisely to such interposition, for it does not have 
any 'place' in the current 'scene', may as visual mark or 'picture', 
'image', invoke in the viewer's imagination a configuration of his 
'I' and some object or objects or activity 'absenct' : rom the scene 
into which it is interposed. Or a modulation in that locus we call 
in our various languages or tongues the 'tongue' (or langue or what- 
ever else) may serve an analogous function of marking the embedding 
or inscription of 'the present' in an 'absent' configuration, these 
visual and verbal orders of mark each having their specific and 
variant economies - the sonorous modulation of physical space, fil- 
ling it with a sound that serves no immediate purpose and so marks 
itself as marking something, may carry beyond the visible present; 
while a visible mark that is not simply gestural (like 'pointing', 
marking with a bodily movement that serves no immediate function) 
carries beyond the brief presence of a modulation that dies after 
a moment in the air. 
In its minimal configuration such 'marking' marks simply 
the assertion of an instance of assertion, an 'I', and as such 
constitutes a 'place' of substitution (say the tongue) in which 
various modes of assertion of Is and other things and their 
relations may be articulated, framing a whole order of action in 
'marks', or 'language'. I noted in passing towards the close of 
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Part I that the elementary configuration of indo-european 'roots', 
MST 
PR 
K(W) 
which mark a systematic syntax and semantics of 'primitive indo- 
european' from which various members of the family diverge from 
around 2000BC in successive waves of geographical migration from 
the eastern european plains, present in the analogies of the various 
more complex and later roots derived from them in various languages, 
an elementary 'topology' of action and its marking, an elementary 
phonetic model for the elementary configuration of action as 'break- 
ing' open of a situation (K(W)), the locus of the action of break- 
ing silence to mark this situation or action (M), as model 'agent', 
an 'object' (T), a movement 'out' (P) or back (R), and something 
like a 'verb' (S). Thus in Sanskrit,, for example, the three modu- 
lotions or persons of the 'empty' verb 'to be' are asmi, asi, asti 
(SM, S(S), ST) (in latin, sum, es, est); in English the various 
modes of question are marked by modifications of wh (in french . 
2u) 
and various responding designations by th (thus, what/that, when/then; 
where/there; how, why, who &c). 
Now it might be supposed that this elementary form of 
'intervention' in physical space, announcing oneself simply as 
'actor' or agent, could, like the actions it frames in 'language' 
which are in their turn substitutions in what is 'open' to us in 
'space' and its mechanisms or 'spaces' of intervention in various 
sorts of 'action', be itself 'inscribed' or embedded in that order 
it intervenes in space and its mechanisms to mark as 'space' and 
'its mechanisms'. But the intervention in 'space' as what is 
physically 'open' to us (or rather, the widest frame of what is 
so open) can in principle ('logically') be no more definitively 
inscribed as its marking in what it marks, than can an abstract 
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'logical spaces logically determine the 'logic' of marking the 
differences it logically articulates (then in classical philosoph- 
ical manner to generate or reconstruct a logical 'Universe' by 
dialectically framing the physical order of what is logically 
'outside' the logical space in which it is articulated, as the 
'other', 'outer' side of the marks 'in' which logical space is 
supposed 'arbitrarily' embodied, m-aterialised). What is open to 
us 'physically' is radically open: the conservation or invariance 
of physical symmetries is so to speak one 'dimension' of constraint 
upon our actions, complementary to the dimensions of symmetries 
I have called 'logical' and 'poetic'; non of these three dimensions 
of the general 'space' of our action completely constrains it, or 
frames or determines the remaining two - any more than to specify 
the movement of a body in one of the three dimensions of that 
physical space constrains what it may do in the remainsing two. 
Thus current physical theory (since the turn of the century) can 
only be framed in terms of a relativistic 'observer' and quantum- 
mechanical 'measurer' who so to speak 'intervene' in the physical 
order in a way that cannot, in principle, be determined 'in' the 
physical systems 'framed' through that intervention; there cannot 
be a physical theory of quantum-mechanical 'measurement' for example, 
because that 'selection' from the probabilistic configuration-space 
of a physical system to one of the configurations possible, subject 
to quantum-mechanical symmetries (conservation of 'quantum numbers') 
as well as relativistic ones (spatiotemporal; the quantum numbers 
correspond to the symmetries of the 'internal space' of the system, 
itself mathematically 'symmetric with the 'external', 'physical' 
space proper in which the system is set with other systems), which 
is called 'measurement' or-'reduction of the wave-packet' (and on 
the basis of a group of which 'measurements' alone one can actually 
single out any definite 'system' as a space of what is mechanically 
possible, along with the various probabilities of various results 
of further measurement on that 'system'), cannot be itself framed 
as a probabilistic mechanism that could itself be 'measured'. Nor 
would there be any relativistic 'space-time' if there were not some 
asymmetric 'point' actually marked in it. As in the converse 
'logical space', there could not even be an 'empty space' except 
as an abstraction from some particular 'dramatic' situation - the 
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'widest' such situation being the 'space' and time of this quest- 
ioning simply as the mprking of the question of this marking of 
this question - which must be always a 'this situation', ultimately 
sharing some 'space' and time of activity with this 'this situation'. 
The whole 'physical universe' is so to speak coordinate as one dim- 
ension of the matrix of what is open, with some marking of it which 
marks itself as 'this'; (in some 'tongue') - and with the 'area' of 
that matrix in which this set of words, this book, has been 'sub- 
stituted' for what might otherwise have happened (given enough 
correlative substitutions in its various non-verbal contexts). 
Physical theorists noticed around 1970 that a whole range of theor- 
etically undetermined 'constants' of the current physical theory 
just 'happened' to have values within the exceedingly narrow ranges 
that would actually allow for the development of a planetary system 
around a star and a 'life-form' on it that could evolve a 'physical 
theory'; and some suggested inverting Copernicus' revolution and 
introducing the 'anthropic principle' that any adequate physical 
theory must take as part of the physical data upon which the theory 
is constructed that there be a physical theory of the 'physical Uni- 
verse' (or multiverse) in that frame. But such 'bootstrap' cosmo- 
logy was itself at odds with the 'metaphysics' (so to speak) of ab- 
straction of the texts of physical theory from the dramatic 'present' 
of their elaboration, of which logical, textual and physical orders 
were just so many coordinate dimensions among others (poetic, mater- 
ial 'economy'). 
Where do we start, then, to textually frame this whole 
configuration or 'matrix' of 'the text'? Well, we must start, as 
we did, in any particular text in which we propose such a system- 
atic philosophical 'framing' of the widest frame 'behind' or 'be- 
yond' the text, in that (there 'this') text, and the question of 
marking what is 'open' in the widest context of the text in an 
order of questions and our responses in the text. We must start 
from the actual situation of a 'stepping back' in the text, in 
its order of marks, from the various practical situations and 
more limited 'workings' of those various marks, as they are all 
brought, so to speak, into the question or questioning of the 
marking of that questioning itself. 
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We must start, as we did start, 'here' and 'now', with 
a questioning of that questioning, of marking what is open in the 
configuration or situation of that marking in language, in this 
book - this, rather than with an unquestioned 'rupture' between the 
practical order of material construction of the book, and a text- 
ual space of questioning in which even the indexical 'this' must 
be determined in an abstracted syntax of questions: a questioning 
abstracted from the question of that questioning, as marking what 
is open in the situation of that marking - what is open always em- 
bracing that marking of what is open as one activity that may be 
considered as taking the place of some other action or assertion 
open, another physical set of movements rather than writing, for 
example, which do not constitute marking, language. 
Nor is this 'marking' of what is open 'in theory' in the 
situation of that marking merely a generic 'marking' of the general 
type which as it were simply responds to what it implicitly marks 
as a question arising in its 'situation', in that configuration of 
activity in which it intervenes as 'mark' rather than part of the 
configuration it thereby disrupts, marking a question posed by the 
passage from that configuration into another, and at the same time 
responding to that question by marking or determining from what is 
open in that disruption, something 'absent' from the situation its 
marking disrupts, and in a manner 'presented' in its marking to con- 
stitute (if itself unquestioned) a component of a new situation. 
For 'theory' like 'art' constitutes 80 to speak a second 
order or level of 'marking', 'outside' the general configuration of 
a 'practical' marking of transition from one configuration to 
another. Just as the 'mark' intervenes in a situation by marking 
by its immediate inappropriateness to the activity 'in hand' some- 
thing 'outside' that unquestioned present, so 'Art' may be charact- 
erised as an order of 'marking' which in its turn is 'innappropriate' 
to the general 'practical' figure of marking as transition from a 
present situation to some new and analogous situation. 'Art' stands 
in relation to 'practical' marking rather as the latter stands to 
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the 'present' situations which, as mark, it disrupts to frame 
a new present into which the previous present so to speak opens. 
'Art' is 'poetic' rather than 'practical' in that it presents 
'in the place of' mark or image a mark or image that does not 
so to speak fit in the generalised present of constant transit- 
ion from one configuration to the next, and stands as a sort of 
intransitive object or product, marking so to speak, questioning, 
the general 'situation' of transition from one configuration to 
another, as 'practical' language marks that transition, indeed a 
system of 'transitions' or 'actions' which language models, as 
opening out of one situation and closing in another, through the 
opening and closing of sentences, paragraphs, chapters, books: the 
opening into a space of coupled substitutions of one mark for 
another, a matrix, which is 'language'. Language with its open- 
ings and closings of marking question and response, transition from 
one 'configuration' to another, where each 'configuration' is it- 
self a complex configuration of 'action' or transition, opening and 
closing, which, until questions arise, is the configuration of 'the 
present' with all its workings and temporal structures. Each tran- 
sition, marked by language as complex of coupled responses to the 
various questions which open out of an 'initial' situation, is thus 
a transition into a structure of action and interaction in which the 
very 'working' of that transition is itself, until it comes 'into 
question' itself coupled as one component to the wider complex of 
workings discovered in previous transitions or 'experience'. And 
the 'original' configuration of 'the mark' entering into an 'unquest- 
ioned' 'radical' immediacy, in which in 'originary' manner it marks 
itself for the 'first time' as marking a 'transcendent' order 'behind' 
appearances and previously 'absent' altogether from 'experience', 
is just the inception of 'experience' : itself in something like a 
'primal scream' in which the newborn child's central nervous system 
begins to articulate an individual identity and consciousness, mov- 
ing towards that accession to language in which the infant mrrks 
his or her newly discovered position or place or function of marking 
itself as the self-assertive locus of marking, 'behind' its mark 
as 'objects' marked by other marks substituted 'in place of' the 
marking of self are behind their 'marks' or appearances. 
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'Art', then: a 'poetic' order in which a mark brings 
into question the whole 'previous' dynamic of experience, by mark- 
ing something 'outside' anything that might be determined in resp- 
onse to some opening up of some particular configuration of exper- 
ience, some 'practical' use of language marking an action of tran- 
sition to a 'new' situation out of the 'present' one -a poetic 
order which marks not only something 'outside' the present situa- 
tion, but also outside any practical transition from the present 
situation to another: which marks, then, a 'fiction'. A 'fiction', 
though, in its turn redefining 'experience' or 'the practical' by 
practically effecting transitions to new situations through so to 
speak 'invoking' an order of 'transcendental' response attributable 
to analogues of present, visible, human embodied agents, 'invisible' 
and indeed in some sense 'fictional' beings who in their turn 'in- 
tervene' in experience from 'outside' its familiar practical human 
order, rather as humans physically intervene in Nature. A 'mythical' 
or mystical 'side' of the 'poetic' order, which is yet already im- 
plicit in the 'initial' order of the mark, simply as the constant 
possibility of simply marking the function of mark itself in a kind 
of recursion of the mark upon itself open from the very first. 
Theatre: 'mimesis of one action by another action': and 
in a sense the radical frame of all 'art' insofar as even the action 
of setting something (sound or image or gesture) 'in place of' some- 
thing else, by interposition in a situation of something that is 
not 'part' of, has no immediate practical part in, a present situ- 
ation, is in a way always essentially an action of 'significant' 
intervention in such a present, to bring it 'into question' and 
mark some new configuration, closing what is opened up through this 
activity of marking in 'response'. Thus around 1950, for example, 
the painted image itself becomes radically 'theatrical' in 'action 
painting', and by around 1970 the 'art object' can even more or 
less drop out of art, replaced merely by some otherwise empty mark- 
ing. of some action or intervention in a situation as 'art': in the 
formal limit, for example, an attempt at 'pure' conceptual art in 
Keith Arnatt's attempt to do nothing as his contribution to the 
London exhibition 'Idea Structures' in the summer of 1970. All 
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art as 'performance' insofar it marks itself as 'art' through an 
action of intervention in, the intervention of an action in, a 
situation in which that action does not 'mimic' a transition into 
'the next' configuration of ongoing activity, still less remain 
unquestioningly fixed or framed in some present activity. 
The 'poetics action, then, 'mimics' a configuration of 
transition abstracted from the 'practical' embedding of that action 
in a present situation, or in articulating transition from that 
situation to another situation like it, so to speak practically 
contiguous with or connected with it. If it be a 'poem' in the 
restricted sense it frames, then, some configuration of 'actuality' 
or actualities 'behind' the embodiment of this configuration in 
any particular action or transition, 'abstracts' a configuration 
of figures in which the figuration of the locus of enunciation or 
'marking' of the poem must itself, at least implicitly, be a com- 
ponent. I have already noticed Mallarmd's Prose as a sort of lim- 
iting version of 'pure' poetry, which seeks to frame the radical 
configuration of 'essences' or actualities 'behind' the particular 
situation of their marking or evocation in a 'poem' - the radical 
actuality of marking, naming, itself, in a specific situation in 
which the poet tries to mark it. 'Theory', then, as itself 'vision' 
of the invisible actuality of Kosmos, 'hearing' the silent harmony 
or music of the spheres, presents simply a direct correlate,. in its 
inception in pythagorean marking of the primary 'abstract' config- 
uration of elementary 'empty' or simple mark or 'point', of the pre- 
cisely contemporaneous inception of 'theatre' at Athens around 500BC. 
The original 'ritual' of invocation of Dionysus becomes systematic- 
ally articulated in a marking of the general invisible frame of 
all human activity and transitions between birth and death, in terms 
of 'dramatic' bringing-into-question of the protagonist's identi- 
fication with the part of framing his activity in self-assertion 
within the merely visible order of practical daily life - this 
through the abstract working in the invisible frame of the radical 
breakdown of hubristic frame of identification with an apparently 
autonomous instance of self-assertion: the working precisely in 
the unworkability at the point of breakdown or catastrophe of the 
protagonist's framing of his action within the merely 'practical' 
order and working of some particular 'part' with which he or she 
(later on) identifies, a particular configuration of the basic 
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identifies, a particular 'personal' configuration of apparently 
autonomous 'I' embodied in the visible order of appearances. The 
'poetic' frame presents in an 'intransitive' configuration of mark 
or image an 'opening-up' of the general configuration of 'experience' 
up to that point where it 'intervenes' in the transitive, practical 
order of marking, bringing the general figure of that practical order 
of transition 'into question', and transposing, so to say, a figure 
of opening and closing, question and response, action, from 'within' 
the circuit of ordinary experience, to the embedding of this pract- 
ical circuit of opening and closing of transition or action 'as a 
whole' within a wider transition from it, where it breaks down in 
'art', to a 'mystical' order of response to this breakdown, which 
response, and the breakdown attributed to 'it', as practical tran- 
sitions are attributed to 'natural' agents, thus appears as a dis- 
covery to and by man, a revelation or 'opening' to man, of the wider 
invisible frame of divine activity and actuality, in which the various 
apparently invariant functions in the practical configuration of 
marking and action, are inscribed, embedded. In particular, that 
everyday identification of self in its 'world', in the general con- 
figuration of action or transitions and their working, experience 
up to that point, breaks down at that point 'in' a classical tragedy 
where the protagonist's self-assertion from transition to transition, 
step by step, towards the end he has framed coordinate with this 
image of himself, breaks down, and with it the 'actor's' part of 
identification with this part and, through this, with that of 'actor', 
and, in its turn, the 'spectator's' identification with the p. nrt of 
mere spectator, identifying with the 'actor's' identification with 
the protagonists identification of his part in the action. Thus 
in the 'catastrophe', this configuration of identification in the 
actor's 'empathy' with the part, and the immobile spectator's em- 
pathy with the actor and part, is broken open in that intervention 
of the 'invisible' divine order whose response is specified in the 
closing 'act', which reiterates in relation to the everyday pract- 
ical order of action or transition in which we 'naturally' identi- 
fy our parts, and assert ourselves in 'transitive' marking of re- 
sponse to natural situations as they naturally open into others, 
just that figure by which we ourselves visibly intervene in situa- 
tions. 
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This model only applies, of course, to one particular 
figure of the 'poetic' in one particular configuration of practical 
activity, one 'world': to the classic greek tragedy in its transition, 
around 500BC from choragic ritual to the essentially secular morality 
of Euripides - the world, precisely of 'presocratic philosophy'. 
Even in this period the tragic trilogy is always followed by a 
comedy, re-establishing the practical frame within the wider invis- 
ible frame revealed in the tragic cycle, in the spectator's comic 
detachment throughout from a more or less recognisable contemporary 
type, who is caricatured to maintain a 'natural' gap between his 
part of obvious folly, predictably unworkable even in the ordinary 
practical order, and the spectator's self-image. The spectator 
bears to the comic actor's part in-that practical demonstration of 
caricatured self-image at odds with the world around it, a relation 
analogous to that between the gods of tragedy and himself, just as 
the poetic 'abstraction' of the tragic action or drama from any direct 
practical contiguity with the spectator's present, which allows the 
embedding of that present with all its figuration in the normative 
moral and affective axis of a self-enclosed transition or action, 
whose elements are symmetrically articulated each simply in relation 
to the others (in an otherwise unspecified context), reflects the 
closed world of the comedy set '. within! the specatator's world, and 
perhaps borrowing its structure of abstraction in some measure from 
the tragedies that precede it. The tragic configuration is itself 
abstracted as a sort of symmetric episode or unit from earlier epic 
narration of the 'historical' or mythical embedding of the present 
world in universal time and space; the lyric explores general fig- 
ures of that identification in which singer and listener are engaged 
through the subjective focus of the scene presented... and so on. 
And in each genre or mode the poetic 'recurrence' of the natural 
transitive order of the mark 'upon itself' so to speak, effects an 
analogous 'abstraction' of the scene from the 'present', which ab- 
straction from the practical dynamics of the particular present con- 
text is coordinate with a more or less 'symmetric' structure of 
opening and closing of the poem whose elements are coordinated 
one with another simply in terms of their abstract interplay in 
the affective figural axis of the abstracted 'transition' from 
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'opening' of the whole 'practical' structure of its present ex- 
periential context, into the wider order of such symmetry, to the 
'close' of the smaller yet wider 'world' of the poem, and the re- 
turn to the practical, 'transitional' dynamics of that context, 
from which all the language, imagery, action of Art is borrowed, 
and in which it is set, thereby presenting a figure of the setting 
of this context in its context. 
This schematic picture of the 'institution' of greek 
tragedy around 500BC might itself serve as a primary index in 
a Story of Western At which would parallel the 'History of Theory' 
elaborated in Parts I to III. If Aristotle opened his inquiry into 
the 'poetic' order of Art by considering the dramatic order of 
an action substituted for another action, rather than some more 
limited or specific dimension of 'representation', such as linear 
music or recitation in time, or static two- and three-dimensional 
spatial representation in painting or sculpture, or the 'external' 
spatial frame of action presented by architecture, this may be 
taken to reflect the coordination of these more specific dimensions 
of the 'poetic' in the Gesamtkunstwerk of a music-drama which em- 
ploys them all within its poetic unity of 'action', 'drama'. And 
the theoretical primacy of tragedy over other forms of stage-drama 
may be considered in relation to the essential unity of the wider 
divine frame in which it inscribes the everyday context of the 
apparently narrower space and time of the stage, as against the 
essential plurality or diversity of comic scenarios. And if one 
chooses the critical transition into 'classical' tragedy around 
500BC as primary index of the overall historical configuration of 
a poetic order in a developing cultural context in a 'Kosmos' which 
is there discovered precisely as the widest unitary frame of all 
'transition' or action, and so itself constant in all transition, 
this corresponds to the exemplary unity of the three frames, drama, 
context, Kosmos, in this point of opening of the complex cultural 
drama of their interplay over the following two-and-a-half millenia, 
when, for example the poetic order in various successive forms be- 
comes in its turn subordinate to a 'merely' practical function of 
decoration and entertainment, rather as, in Heidegger's figure, 
the 'thought' instituted at the same historical conjuncture becomes 
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subordinated to a merely 'technical' unction directed by unquest- 
ioned 'practical' ends. 
And if the period around 500BC in the greek world pre- 
sents the complementary figures of an Art and a Theory abstricting 
from previous 'practical' figures of coupling of 'poetic' forms 
within that transitive context and 'mythical' frames without, to 
a limiting extension of the 'mythical' frame of that world to co- 
ordinates correlative in pythagorean 'theory' with the elementary 
'point' or 'mark' itself, defining a universal 'scientific' frame 
of questions by a recurrence of the figure of 'marking' upon itself 
analogous with the recurrence of the mark and image upon itself that 
has just been taken as an index of 'tragedy' and the 'poetic', then 
it also presents us with the institution of the coupling of these 
two 'sides', logical and analogical, of language and mark, in the 
'historical' frame of narrating the 'practical' dynamics of this 
decoupling of Science and Art from Myth, and the coupling of the 
resulting theory and poetic in 'history'. 
Pythagorean 'theory' as recurrence of the 'mark' upon 
itself, a marking of the configuration of marking and language 
in opening in a question, and closing in an answer, a transition 
from one 'practical' configuration to the or a next configuration: 
an abstraction of questions from their 'transitive' part in the 
practical dynamics of experience, to the universal frame of 'all 
possible questions', so to speak, in the questioning of this 
'transitive' configuration of mark and question and answer and 
actions itself - which directly reflects the contemporaneous 
'poetic' of 'intransitive' substitution-of a 'dramatic' action 
for another action, marking the embedding of the cultural context 
in which that drama is embedded, in the widest, invisible, 'cosmic' 
context of universal Law. An 'abstraction' of structures of open- 
ing and closing of question and answer from their 'practical' em- 
bedding in that structure of transitions which is developing 'ex- 
perience', which in its turn provides 'technical' figures subord- 
inate to that unquestioned 'practical' order, just as drama becomes 
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a mere practical filling-in of time, 'entertainment', and the 
other arts become decorative and ornamental. 
Theory: around 500BC a marking and bringing-into-quest- 
ion of the configuration of practical 'transition', of everyday 
activity, marked by and coordinate with 'the mark' itself - the 
latter 'abstraction' from any more specific mark itself coordinate 
with this very 'opening-up' of the practical order, which must, 
like the parallel breaking-open of the practical order in contemp- 
orary tragedy, be experienced as a 'supernatural' revelation or 
intervention, disclosure, in the natural order. The revelation 
to Pythagoras, and through him to his disciples, of the universal 
frame or coordinates of the 'mark', in which the practical order 
of our questioning in day-to-day activity itself comes 'into quest- 
ion' as a whole, or in the figure of a question attaching to the 
general coordinates of question and mark, in a recurrence of mark 
and question upon itself which frames an order of 'abstraction' 
analogous to that of the poetic 'fiction', but corresponding to 
a universal frame of questions in which the actions verbally or 
visually presented by poetic 'fiction' or historical 'fact' are 
as structurally indistinguishable as their parallel etymologies 
themselves: fact, fiction; action, drama... 
A universal frame of questions in which the practical 
progress of our questioning towards this 'breaking-open' of the 
previous practical frame of our questioning, as we stepped back 
further and further from our particular situation, questioning 
each instance of questioning the frame of the previous question, 
is itself at last 'revealed' by the irruption of the invisible 
order of cosmic divinity into our limited earthly frame, in its 
widest dramatic significance in the univ. ersal theatre which is 
Kosmos. Actors, until this irruption or disruption or revelation 
lost in an identification with our visible embodiment and its 
practical transitive working on the earthly stage, we suddenly, 
as in a theatrical catastrophe, discover the wider invisible 
frame of this earthly part we have taken on for the space of 
that 'natural' transition or activity we call our 'life'. And 
our essentially tragic identification with an earthly part, 
turning in the habitual circuit of its systematic reassertion from 
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transition to transition, suddenly appears transcendentally 
funny, comical: human tragedy is divine comedy. 
Hoho. 
Now the 'logical' axis of a theory, the opening and 
closing of whose questions present an axis of linguistic substi- 
tutions 'abstracted' from the particular reference the terms of 
the theory might have 'practically' in the situation of elaborat- 
ion of the theory (the theory being 'intransitive' precisely through 
its questioning not marking a practical move from one configuration 
of present experience to another, and so bringing this structure 
of action or transition into question 'as a whole') must also em- 
body a poetic or analogical inscription of the 'theory' in the 
'transitive' practical situation of its enunciation which the 
theory 'breaks open' in its radical questioning, to embed that 
situation of questioning in a wider 'cosmic' configuration, con- 
stant 'beyond', yet necessarily revealing itself as so constant 
within, the practical order of transitions in which it is marked 
but cannot in principle be 'comprehended'. The complementarity 
of logical and poetic figures in the embedding of the 'texts' which 
mark the inception of theory in their greek 'situation' around 
500BC - in a 'presocratic' transition from Thales around 570BC 
down to Socrates around 430, say - is quite direct; indeed I 
suggested that the opening phase mapped in Part I above, from 
the pythagorean group framing access to the 'text' of the theory 
through 'initiation' into the group who framed their activity within 
the cosmic drama their 'vision' revealed and from their Ionian con- 
temporary Heraclitus' construction of a text or N o. structured 
by its own inscription in the universal dynamic or drama it framed, 
down through Parmenides' poetic 'fiction' of the breaking open of 
the fictional order of theory and poem in the revelation of constant 
Being, through Empedocles' cosmic self-dramatisation, sophistic 
'logic of occasion' and its eleatic corollary at mid-fifth century, 
Socrates' philosophic revolution, and on to the transition from 
platonic dialectic to aristotelian logic and logical poetics of 
abstract logic around the middle of the fourth - that this whole 
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phase or cycle of 'theory' might be framed precisely as the 
dynamic of abstraction from 500BC to 350, of abstract 'logic' 
from its 'poetics' of practical embedding in the particular situ- 
ation of its enunciation. 
This opening 'cycle', itself comprising a 'cycle' of 
theory or questioning from Pythagoras down to Socrates and from 
Socrates down to the death of Plato, with each of these subordin- 
ate cycles being a configuration of parallel and sequential 'steps' 
from one theorist or text to another in greek cultural 'space' and 
historical time, was in its turn characterised as merely an initial 
phase of theory within a still broader cycle from pythagorean insti- 
tuted 'mystery' around 500BC to an analogous christian institution 
of mystery and its 'theory' around 1250. And that wider cycle or 
phase was itself framed as an 'opening' cycle of theory, coordinate 
with a transitional cycle turning about the seventeenth-century 
'Scientific Revolution' which leads around 1800 into a closing 
cycle, whose final configuration, towards 2000AD presents a high 
degree of symmetry or 'analogy' (in Novalis' characterisation of 
1799) with the opening configuration of 500BC: the relation of 
these opening and closing 'ähnliche Zeitpunkten' being on the 
model of opening and closing scenes of a 'drama', or, on a smaller 
scale, opening and closing of sentence or chapter or book. 
The opening and closing configurations of the 'history' 
of theory traced out in this book over Parts I to III from the 
beginning of the fifth century 'BC' until the close of the twentieth 
century 'AD' frame in their 'poetic' symmetry the 'historical$ in- 
scription of the question traced through this book - the question 
of its question, reflecting pythagorean marking of the mark or 
point 'as such' - 'in' a 'cosmic' context coordinate with the sym- 
metry of opening mark and closing question, and organising a wide 
range of historically 'intermediate' figures of embedding of theory 
and theoretical text in the wider frame of which it always is 'the 
theory', which, as in the limiting case of the figure of Kosmos 
itself, allows both the inscription of those intervening texts in 
the drama of western theory as narrated here, and, correlatively, 
the inscription of this text itself in the dynamics of the same 
dramatic context, presented over the course of the drama or story 
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in so many different figures coordinate with the place and time 
of framing the drama 'in terms off these figures. 
I have already suggested that the generic 'poetic' 
frame, of 'drama' presents as it were the 'schemata' of historio- 
graphy - just as the abstract and symmetric structures of opening 
and closing of an 'action' in the poetic abstraction of its affect- 
ive axis from embedding in some 'practical' or historical transition 
from one present situation to the next provide so to speak the 
'schemata' of 'appearance' or 'experience' in general', that 
particular limiting configuration of minimal transition, the 
'moment' or 'specious present' being precisely a limit case, cor- 
responding to a simple mark or thought or feeling or 'sensation' 
whose very characterisation as, say, primary or 'originary' con- 
figuration of marking or image in the separation of primal 'immed- 
iacy' into sujective and objective sides, itself implicitly involves 
a complex 'schematisation' involving all the other 'scales' of 
'presence' up to the complementary limit of 'life' or 'experience' 
itself, just as the minimal 'quantum' of physical action involves 
to be just that a physical 'syntax'-. so to speak, or economy or 
context, extending to the complementary limit of 'space-time' as 
a whole. 
If 'poetic' abstraction provides the models or structures 
of that story or inquiry we call 'history', then the coordination 
of the practical dynamic of our own and others' experience, ^nd 
its documents or script, in a particular 'history' also requires 
an embedding of that story in the wider context of all other pos- 
sible true stories unfolding, in principle, so to speak, from every 
configuration of its elements, concretely setting that particular 
story in all its 'historical context': involves, that is, a 'theor- 
etical' inscription of the story as 'true' (rather than poetic 
fiction) within the wider frame of experience or history 'as a 
whole', within the cumulated web of actions or transitions in 
which both the story and its telling are both embedded - without 
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which common embedding there could be no 'practical' zbstraction 
to the limited frame of some finite historical text, some opening 
and closing of an inquiry in which the analogical or affective 
axis of the questioning mirrors the present in a past, and so to 
speak frames an affective (political, and so on) orientation in the 
present by thus inscribing its terms in the wider web of human act- 
ivity as a whole. The 'poetics' of history emphasised by Dilthey 
and the 'scientific' or theoretical embedding of a past action in 
a 'universal' web of History, are simply two sides of the same 
activity of historiography. 
Now if the 'history' of Parts I to III is to allow the 
theoretical and dramatic embedding of this text, this book, in 
a 'present' configuration of activity (including its writing and 
reading), as marking what is open in this context or configuration, 
within the primary matrix of a questioning of the mapping of what 
it marks as open into the logical axis of text and inquiry - in- 
quiry into the inquiry itself as a text - then I must now 'close' 
both this 'inquiry' and the 'history' of inquiry it textually and 
contextually frames and marks, by setting the whole book itself 
in a whole historical web or matrix of 'substitutions', in which 
the internal verbal matrix of this text marks, and in so mPrking 
practically coordinates (by marking its own marking in*its context), 
a 'cosmic' frame of what is open to me as writer and you as reader: 
Kosmos, indeed, as precisely 'what is open' in the various couplings 
of the various dimensions of this book, verbal and non-verbal, in 
which we as writer and reader 'find ourselves'. Kosmos as what 
reveals itself 'at this point' in Kosmos, as the 'space' and 'time' 
of substitutions marked by the question-mark which opens and closes 
this book... just as it reveals itself here as revealing itself 
2500 years ago in the greek world as the same space and time of 
an inquiry there marked by a pythagorean marking of 'the mark', 
coordinating the inquiry opening out of this marking at a partic- 
ular 'point' in what it first framed as Kosmos, with other coor- 
dinates of the 'mathematical' frame articulated in relation to the 
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elementary symmetries of those 'numbers' which were configurations 
of marks, points, 'units', chief amongst them the Tetractys 
. S 
S S S 
S S S S 
Let us consider the elementary dramatic 'scheme' of 
an 'action' or interaction: a group of 'actors' or agents, each 
of them framing their interaction in thinking and imagination 
'behind' their particular actions, each framing the parts of the 
others as analogously framed in an 'internal' embedding of the 
common situation of interaction in a wider framing of 'self', 
'others', 'things' and so on 'behind' their present appearances. 
An action or interaction 'opens' as the working of the 
interplay of these different framings of the difference of these 
framings themselves, breaks down or open. Various different ini- 
tial responses of the different actors to what thus 'opens up' in 
their common situation in their turn present each participant with 
so many 'appearances' from which he or she must (or at least, can) 
frame a new version of the transition or action or dynamic opening 
out of the initial situation as what was 'behind' its appearances 
expresses itself, together with a more definite conception or as- 
sertion of their own 'part', which must itself in some sense be a 
'question' or something radically 'open!, not only to the others, 
but also to each actor him- or herself. 
Thus from an initial web of possible embeddings of the 
opening situation in a system of 'responses' of the various dif- 
ferent components, 'subjective' and 'objective', to the opening-up 
of the situation 'before' the action, before the opening of the 
transition from that situation to a final closing set of responses 
whose new 'working' in some sense restores the initial breach in 
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a new configuration of subjects and objects as it were 'consonant' 
in their appearances or presences one to another - from the ini- 
tial 'question' so to speak, there opens up an 'economy' of inter- 
action as the various participants make successive responses to 
the question of their 'part' in the developing situation, by 
making succesive steps, successive moves or actions, in response 
to the previous set of responses to the previous set of responses 
... to what was opened up at the outset. 
The action opens as it were in a system of questions, or 
rather in a system of what is open in the web of possible substi- 
tutions in the spaces 'behind' the various components of the pre- 
vious situation in the various dimensions of interaction, which one 
may frame textually as a-system of questions. Thus this (true or 
false) expression of what is open, and of their response to it, by 
the various participants in the interaction, in language, is itself 
merely one dimension in the overall 'economy' of responses - the 
dimension in which, in principle, different actors may coordinate 
their responses towards a shared goal (but in which the appearance 
of subordinating one's own assertion to the symmetry of common act- 
ion directed towards a closing resolution of what has been opened 
up at the outset, may itself be framed from a different self-per- 
ception and perception of one's end at odds with that appearance 
or deception, and directed towards the subordination of the other's 
action towards one's own hidden end). 
A conflict of 'positions' taken in response to what 
'opens up' at the outset may be resolved 'in' various dimensions 
of the interaction - in dialogue, where one actor 'questions' the 
other's apparent position, and the two positions are redefined 
within a common framing of a common end; through 'competition' 
of different frames or conflicting positions, within a mutually 
agreed 'constitution' of the group in which this takes place - 
according to various explicit or implicit 'rules' or fixed 'in- 
stitutional' frames or models of interaction; or 'violently', 
outside that rule or law, as one 'competitor' acts to constrain 
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first becomes a particular individual's self-consciousness in 
the mirror of confrontation with an other. If Hegel first sys- 
tematically framed the universal dynamic of individual interact- 
ion in this abstract symmetry and its inaugural, mythical dis- 
ruption, and Marx first transformed this ideal dialectic by identi- 
fying the locus of its abstract framing as itself engaged on one 
side of the asymmetry it thought to symmetrically frame 'in theory', 
then Lacan, the Hegel of structuralism, theoretically framing 
human interaction in terms of an inaugural oedipal disruption of 
the symmetry of child and Mother in the mirror-phase - in that 
radical quaternary structure of 'double mirroring' in which the 
symmetry of two bodies is traversed by the question. of my self- 
assertion in differing from the other - the question of the Other 
as locus of substitution for 'I' in language, to which my self- 
assertion is always a secondary response - Lacan's framing of the 
individual's part, and its 'marxist corollary in AlthuS8er's 
framing of the social dynamic which is the sum of these parts, 
presents the primary part of subordination of the moral dynRmic 
of human interaction to formal theoretical framing, in the Paris 
of the 'seventies. He is the representative 'father-figure', the 
focal theoretical authority, with whom the generation of May 1968 
must come to terms, if they are to come to terms with their new 
'parts!:, and frame in their moral response to the part of subord- 
inating human interaction to theory, a 'new philosophy', articu- 
lated in a new axis of questions, where the theoretical axis 
which articulates social questions in the mirroring of abstract 
theory and context is itself judged in the moral dynamic whose 
texts are constructed in the ideological order of 'representative' 
figures, substitutable one for another in a narrative order ex- 
plicitly articulated through its inscription in the practical 
drama of moral, practical assertion. 
Now, structurally, this 'new philosophy' whose own 
'maitre-penseurs' suddenly eclipsed the representative Istruct- 
uralists' in 'the media' in 1976-8, partakes of a familiar figure 
of conservative reaction that responds to the question of the 
abstraction of an earlier order of theory, and of the coupling 
of that abstractinnn to a breakdown of an old order of harmonious 
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parts in human interaction, by presenting the complementarity of 
an existing practical order of choice, and the old theory that 
systemitically questioned the asymmetry or inequality of 'parts' 
in the old order, as a practical alternative which, thus presented, 
invites the practical resolution of the question in the choice of 
the practical order of moral alternatives, rather than the formal 
inscription of the coupling of theory and practice in the axis of 
a theoretical questioning which does not question its own disrupt- 
ive force in the prevailing social harmony. In practice the heirs 
of 1968 aligned tiemselves with Giscard, as earlier Chateaubriand 
had aligned himself with the conservative reaction to 1789, while 
Derrida and his associates in GREPH attempted to make Giscard's 
suppression of 'abstract' theory in his 'pragmatic' conservative 
reform of french education into a political question: a practical 
assertion of 'disinterested' questioning directly coupled by the 
old progressives with the questioning of the 'ideological' assertion 
of morality as alternative to 'abstract' theory, as attaching to a 
specific and unquestioned political part or alignment of the 'new 
philosophy' with neoconservatism - the locus of this questioning 
being seen in those politically dominated 'media' where the rising 
interest in journalistic presentation of 'ideas' was linked by the 
majority of the participants in GREPH's Etats Gdneraux de Philosophie 
with political suppression of 'serious', abstract, academic debate. 
After the return of a socialist government in 1979 the political 
dynamic of a questioning of the coupling of questioning or theory 
with other orders of its institutional context, as one component 
in 'progressive' opening-up of social possibilities, was in its 
turn eventually instituted in Chevenement and Derrida's College In- 
ternational de Philosophie, before Chev&nement, now Minister of 
Education, had in his turn to pragmatically back away from a wider 
educational reform in the face of a massive conservative reaction 
which threatened to jeopardise the government as a whole. In a sense 
this socialist impasse repeats in reverse the educational revolt 
which brought down De Gaulle in 1968 - but the shift from the dog- 
matism-of 1968 to the pragmatism of 1984 is reflected in the sub- 
stitution in a socialist CIPH of the 'marginal' dynamic of embed- 
ding the opening up of social possibility as one component of 
change instituted in an existing social order, for the earlier 
theoretical fantasy of reconstructing the whole social dynamic 
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what is open to another, to constrain his 'options', and this 
as part of his self-assertion within a wider natural frame of 
bodily activity beyond the constraint of a shared 'culture' that 
seems, perhaps, 'unworkable', and which is hereby brought in some 
measure 'into question'. 
Now the various configurations of actors, interactions, 
things, institutions, indeed of 'Nature' itself, are not ranged 
as such 'options' for each actor within some comprehensive 'internal' 
space where an 'I' corresponding to abstract self-assertion freely 
chooses from what is thus utterly 'open' to it as its imaginary 
universal context of 'free' action. Rather are the various figures 
or 'parts' of the actor or 'subject' themselves coordinate with 
other figures - of others, things, institutions and so on - in the 
individual actor's 'experience', evolved, precisely, from the moment 
of birth in a particular cultural configuration (which might be 
variously framed or, defined from various different points of view 
of those already engaged in. that 'situation'), through successive 
questionings of successive 'parts' or figures of self-assertion as 
successive situations of activity 'open up' from birth onward. The 
'actor' in any situation is rather himself or herself a space or 
place of substitution of various different figures, coordinate in 
imagination and thought with various correlative figures of others, 
things, and so on. And the self-image of the 'theorist' in a certain 
kind of 'abstract' theoretical space as free instance of self-assert- 
ion, corresponding to the questioning and affirmative instance of 
'I' in his or her 'linguistic space', is itself only one figure of 
the 'actor', one (often unworkable) 'part' open, in the specific 
situations in which it arises as one option among others. More 
generally, 'given' a certain situation - identified or marked, say, 
by some question or response, as the essentially open matrix of 
substitutions coordinate with the 'place' of that question (as 
both locus of various possible verbal substitutions, and also as 
itself 'chosen' in enunciation as alternative to various other 
possible actions) - the !. places' and options of the various actors 
engaged in the situation amount to the configuration of a com- 
mon 'present', to a 'present situation' indeed, which can only 
be adequately characterised or marked by a play of questions, in 
which verbal marking by presenting the structure of what is there 
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open as a range of questions must itself be taken in some sense 
as the primary 'question', coordinating both the 'internal' or- 
ganisation in language of various subordinate questions, and co- 
ordinating this verbal dimension or mapping with non-verbal com- 
ponents of the 'situation' there mapped. Thus I began this in- 
quiry into this inquiry simply by marking its locus, situation, 
as that of a question: this question, this questioning, this 
inquiry - hoping thereby to coordinate 'internal' verbal elements 
of the inquiry with correlative components of 'context' in a 
radical 'space' and time of my writing (whatever that turned out 
to be) and your reading (whatever you and reading turned out to 
be) in which a whole range of theories - indeed 'theory', 'inquiry' 
itself - might be brought 'into question' and set, as so many texts 
or rather books, in a more radical space in which, standing back, 
say, from identification with the various textual configurations 
of the instance of questioning in France, Germany, England, and 
America around 1970, I might mark my position as thus 'standing 
back' from a range of texts, in a 'spaces and time of substitut- 
ions marked by my initial question-mark, in which those various 
books of around 1970 could be set and coordinated in a correlation 
of institutianal and other 'contexts' - in a correlation of their 
cultural 'configurations' in this more 'radical' space of questions. 
I suggested that this 'question-mark' marks, or mNy be 
taken to mark, a configuration of transition from various 'theories' 
or texts around 1970, to a configuration here projected to the 
close of this transition or 'present' drama of reflection, Around 
2000: a 'transition' or action in some' sense 'turning about' this 
attempt to mark a space in which, say, Derrida's texts of around 
1970 might be set (by being inscribed in this textual order which 
in turn sets itself in a largely non-textual (pace Derrida) con- 
text), rather as Derrida there sets (among other 'theories') mid- 
century phenomenology in the textual space articulated in and 
around those texts. 
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Now the simple 'dramatic' model of transition from 
'opening' to 'close' of an action or interaction - in many ways 
analogous to the primitive 'scenarios' of mid-century french phe- 
nomenology, so that one might speak of a wider transition from 
around 1950 to around 2000 'turning about' the questions of 'text- 
uality', 'discourse' and so on, around 1970-.. with the 'dramatic' 
figures drawn from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty contributing to a 
sort of 'deconstruction of deconstruction' - this must be extended 
from the 'theatrical' abstraction of a group of 'actors' on a 
'stage', an abstract 'scene', to the wider interaction in which 
such a singular 'intransitive' action is itself instituted within 
the wider interaction we call Culture, set in a global Nature, a 
sort of Globe Theatre. 
I have already proposed that the complementary 'intransi- 
tive' marking of 'the question', the 'action' of theory set in this 
book in its otherwise undetermined 'context' or situation, may be 
taken to mark, and in part thereby frame or organise in the coord- 
ination of 'internal' and 'external' variables of the 'theory', a 
more general order of 'action' in which it is itself substituted 
(by me writing, and perhaps by you reading) for various other act- 
ions open in its situation. This coordination is rooted in the 
circumstance that the words used 'intransitively' in 'theory' must 
of course themselves all be 'borrowed' from contemporary 'transitive' 
or 'practical' usage - just like the script of a play, which is 
'abstracted' from context not through any difference of language 
(well, not necessarily, at any rate) but simply through what I 
called the 'inapplicability' of a particular formally acceptable 
speech or situation to 'transitive' practical interaction between 
actor on the stage and audience (of course once the affective dyn- 
amic of 'drama' itself becomes a practical matter of entertainment 
with its various roles of 'actor', 'audience' and so on, the 'in- 
transitivity of (specifically 'modern') art may be reintroduced 
precisely by the now 'inappropriatelbrechtian address to the aud- 
ience, from the actor as 'actor' rather than as the 'part' he or 
she plays - taken to its limit in Handke's play of 1966 in which the 
'action' is structured around just such an address). 
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If, now, one considers an 'action' or transition from 
one 'situation' to another, not symmetrically structured in ab- 
straction from other transitions 'into' and 'out of' the action, 
but rather as, so to speak, merely one 'scheme' or pattern of 
appearance or experience, itself tinteracting', 'in' its various 
elements or components as 'real' entities or identities 'behind' 
their limited part in some particular working, interaction, con- 
figuration, then one finds oneself back, so to speak, in the 'hist- 
orical' order of 'practical' transition, of which the general 
'space' of theory and the complementary opening and closing of 
the limited abstract frame of a 'drama' set 'intransitively' in 
'history', in cultural space and time, are two 'sides' - indeed 
one might speak of the 'logical' or theoretical, the 'analogical' 
or figural or poetic, and the narrative or 'historical' in which 
these complementary 'abstractions' mirror one another as three 
'symmetric' dimensions of the 'linguistic space' of a particular 
culture, of its language. The general space of human interaction 
articulated in the wider frame of 'theory' theoretically (as limit- 
ing version of the questioning 'step back' from a particular config- 
uration in which one is embedded or embodied, corresponding to the 
'bringing into question' of the general configuration of 'question' 
and response itself) is directly analogous to the linguistic space 
in which it may be mapped, with the linguistic matrix theoretically 
articulated in structures of opening and closing of questions and 
inquiries, reflected in what one might call a 'dramatic matrix' art- 
iculated in structures of opening and closing of actions - the 'poe- 
tic' or affective or analogical or figural axis of language itself 
articulated in this dramatic order. To the abstraction of a part- 
icular interplay of individually embodied parts in the theatrical 
institution of the stage-play, there corresponds more generally 
cultural structures of integration of 'parts' which we call 'insti- 
tutions', the theatre being just one among many others; and we may 
call the 'individual' actor or agent in a culture, and the widest 
group of all individuals belonging to or sharing a common identifi- 
cation with a part in that culture (its language, political insti- 
tutions and so on) the two 'poles' of a structure whose dynamic may 
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framed 'sociologically' in terms of interactions of different 
'groups' each corresponding to a particular 'part' in an insti- 
tution of social interaction, 'abstracted' from the coincidence 
of a whole range of such 'parts' in any particular individual 
social 'actor', but coordinated one with another through the gen- 
eral dynamics of human interaction whose primary 'term' is the 
generic individual as locus of substitution of various parts open 
to him or her in a particular 'situation'. This sociological matrix 
of substitution and its systematic articulation in terms of various 
'symmetries' of parts in the overall sum of individual interactions 
in Nature - this institutional dynamics of human interaction - 
is directly analogous with the linguistic structures in which it 
is verbally modelled; but just as that linguistic 'space' of sub- 
stitutions has its two 'sides' or poles in theory and poetry, so 
this sociological or cultural, ethnological, matrix of social in- 
teraction, is articulated in the symmetry of a linguistic 'economy' 
of verbal 'exchange' in which one term marking one element of the 
situation of dialogue is 'exchanged' between two individu9ls' 'ver- 
sions' of the relations of that term with others in some wider frame 
than present appearances, and a material economy of physical exchange 
of an element in the material economy of the situation from its 
place in one frame of material activity to a place in another. 
This 'replacement' of one 'product' for another (or for some more 
or less universal marker of its 'place', 'money'. - so many 'marks', 
for example, in the 'market'), structured as 'material economy', in 
its turn has the two 'sides' of the affective axis of desire which 
it shares with 'figural' language on the one hand, and the 'natural' 
or physical mechanics of substitution of one material thing 'in 
place of' another, in time, on the other. 
I will not elaborate any further on this general play 
of different orders or dimensions of 'substitution', coordinate 
with the question of the question, marking the linguistic space 
of substitution, as itself a substitution for other possible actions 
in the 'situation' or general 'place, of present possible substi- 
tutions marked by the question. For the more detailed configurations 
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of this generalised symmetry or substitution in the particular 
'situation' marked by the opening '? ' of this book, this activity 
of inquiry of which the book is the 'transcripts, have already in 
effect been abstracted from the thousand or so books already noticed, 
and those about to follow below, in the course of the inquiry, and 
may be considered to articulate a vast detail of this 'space' of 
the present inquiry, simply through their coordinated inscription 
as books in 'the question of this questioning', as each in its turn 
comes 'into question' in subsequent books, until finally the 'text- 
ual' space of 'Paris 19701 comes into this closing questioning of 
questioning - this precisely in the 'symmetry' of various limiting 
abstractions of the 'theoretical text', in various 'national schools, 
of instituted 'philosophy', and various more 'international' frames 
of more specific domains of theory (relating to various primary dim- 
ensions of the text and context of 'philosophy'), from the question 
of their 'dramatic' coupling with and embedding in the 'situation' 
of their practical production around 1970. 
I have suggested that this question 'opening up' after 
around 1970 is at once the matter of the 'postmodern debate' between 
Habermas, Rorty, Lyotard and others in the mid-eighties, and also 
the frame of its 'transitional' dynamic of argument, as a common 
residual abstraction of the various texts theoretically inscribing 
'text' in its cultural 'pragmatics' generates symmetric orders of 
theory of the embedding of theory in culture in Germany, America 
and France, whose difference of 'perspective' is irresoluble within 
an instituted frame which does not question, practically, the in- 
stitution of its questioning, the supposition of a common language 
in which theorising and argument over the embedding of language in 
culture can be symmetrically carried on. The 'question' at issue 
cannot be resolved 'in' any of the national institutions of 'phi- 
losophy', 'in' any of the disputants' different languages and cul- 
tures, but only in a wider western cultural 'space' in which the 
difference of language, and the different but symmetric institutions 
of 'philosophy in Germany, America, and France themselves become 
the central 'parts', axis, of the question. This book is intended 
to 'mark' the common situation and dynamic of argument and theory 
from which these various versions of inscription of theory and 
argument in 'situation' are differently but analogously abstracted 
ccccccxlvii 
in different national institutions of 'philosophy'. Thus it 
marks the 'difference' - in Lyotard's language the 'differend' - 
'between' the different versions of their difference, 'in terms of' 
different national axes of 'bringing previous questioning into 
question': french 'subjectivism', german 'objectivism' and american 
'pragmatism'; Habernas'abstract 'transcendental' coordinates of 
questioning as such, the widest theoretical 'context', Lyotard's 
complementcry 'poetics' of abstraction from any universal 'theor- 
etical' frame, Rorty's intermediate pragmatics of conflicting nar- 
rations. 
In the institutional frame of an 'international' philo- 
sophical dialogue on the pragmatics of dialogue, each of these 
'philosophers' is instituted as such in their 'home' culture and 
native language, through their 'job' of professional philosopher 
in a french, Berman or american university - in each case playing 
the part of educating or inducting adolescents into a part in the 
cultural matrix of autonomous individuality through inducing them 
to take a more or less coherent 'position' critically 'standing 
back' in reflection from a range of texts on the philosophy syl- 
labus in their respective institutions. I have already suggested 
how a textual tradition of a given 'school' is reproduced as a 
student learns to 'stand back' or reflect upon his or her te"9cher's 
'standing back' from some text, iterating the teacher's own critical 
distance and its figuration, as that model stance is itself an iter- 
ation of figures in the primary 'texts' of the syllabus... and so 
on. But this model of instituted dynamics of induction into a 
textual space (even where, in the american model, the 'textual 
space' is itself an abstract verbal framing of an essentially 
'dramatic' space of the 'working' of certain figures, including 
that of the student's own questioning and self-assertion) itself 
comes 'into question', indeed formally into its own 'space' of 
questions, in texts of'Bourdieu and Derrida already noted, after 
around 1970; and the 'international' postmodern debate might be' 
seen as a last vain attempt to question the 'textual' institution 
of philosophy while remaining 'in' that institution, by institu- 
tional 'exchanges' which confront different configurations of 
such institution one with another, rather than directly confronting 
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each of these contending 'textual spaces' of theory with the 
contextual structures of its institution 'at home' which are 
reflected abroad in structures of differently instituted textual 
spaces. While the international debate remains structured in 
a common figure of instituted abstraction, the competition between 
different figures in the different national instances of such in- 
stitution, of embedding of theory in the 'pragmatics' of institut- 
ions, social interaction, cannot be either theoretically or pract- 
ically 'resolved'. 
Said criticises the abstraction of Eagleton'scriticism 
of the abstraction of Jameson's criticism of the abstraction of 
current 'literary criticism': in each case, at each step of the 
reiterated criticism of abstraction, the embedding of a text in 
its 'social context', is itself framed as another text within the 
dynamic of questions and questioning directed by a common 'academic' 
abstraction; another text in which an abstract textually framed set 
of terms mapping 'social context' and its dynamic, in which new 
textual space and dynamic the questions of literary criticism and 
the criticism of previous criticism are to be deconstructed or re- 
constructed. But Said's own assertion of the 'concrete' context 
of american literary criticism, and the critical debate, as not 
Jameson's abstract 'political space' or 'political unconscious' 
and its social dynamic, but rather 'Reagan's America' in which he 
and Jameson actually, practically construct their texts as one in- 
stited activity among many others on that scene, in that theatre, 
is itself merely a formal, abstract, move within the shared academic 
space of 'critical inquiry', a reiteration of the same critical 
dialectic it purports to bring into question, where an abstract 
questioning of abstraction requires a nominally concrete space in 
which to bring the earlier abstract criticisms of abstraction 
'into question', but where this nominal critique shares in exactly 
the same abstract textual dynamic of question divorced from any 
practical coupling with their 'social context'. This impasse of 
a questioning which confronts the question of its own 'pragmatics' 
or politics or theatricality, but still remains, in posing the 
question, in marking it, in the very space it would 'bring into 
question', still remains so to speak constative rather than per- 
formative, is dramatically underlined by the fact that Said's 
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'performance' is so divorced in its textual structure from any 
'dramatic' embedding in the coupling of text and context it nom- 
inally proposes, can appear (as 'Opponents, Audiences, Constitu- 
encies and Community') either as an article in-Critical Inquiry 
in September 1982, as a 'contribution' to an opportunistic and very 
badly edited packaging of disparate 'critical' perspectives as 
The Anti-Aesthetic in 1983, or as Said's 'contribution' (again) to 
a Johns Hopkins colloquium in November 1984 ('A French-American 
Colloquium: The Case of the Humanities. Questionable References') 
with merely a changed title, 'translated' into the french language 
and the number of the french literary institution Critique contain- 
ing the contributions to the symposium in french (May 1985: 'La 
Traversee de 1'Atlantique', Said's text is now 'La Critique Litter- 
aire Avancee et le Monde Exterieure'). One might suggest that the 
primary relevant 'context' for this constatation that criticism, 
questioning, should be performative rather than constative, this 
saying to colleagues that they should be doing something for a dif- 
ferent audience in 'le monde exterieur', rather than just saying 
that they should to one another (as Said 'here' - wherever that may 
be - does, or rather says... or rather said) is not so much that nom- 
inal-_y concrete abstraction, 'Reagan's America', but the marketing 
operation in late capitalist societies (criticised, among others, 
by Eagleton, whose own critiques sell pretty well as 'contributions' 
to the 'debate') which gives its sole editorial coherence to The 
Anti-Aesthetic, and which determines the repackaging of an otherwise 
unaltered collection as 'Postmodern Culture', in which guise it 
became the best-selling 'theory' (or 'anti-theory'? ) of 1985 in 
Britain ('In all the arts a war is being waged between modernists 
and postmodernists... only a smug and xenophobic state could dismiss 
the importance of translation and the importation of non-British, 
not to say non-European, political and cultural theory... Another 
Pluto anthology hits the chart: "in many ways... the book represents 
[sic] a clear Lsic1 attack on the 'metaphysics of presence' ". So 
that's why you're all buying it. ' - cover notes and reviews on 
the second british edition of 1985): 
971 Postmodern Culture ed & intr Foster (as The Anti-Aesthetic: Port 
Townsend Wa. 1983) London 1985 
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'Postmodernism' and 'the postmodern debate': a dist- 
inctly unitary 'ideological' grouping of a range of purportedly 
pluralistic pluralisms, taking on the configuration of a systematic 
and 'synchronic' reaction 'in all the arts' to the high modernism 
of the 'sixties, coming 'into question' from around 1970 on. A 
term introduced by an architectural critic in 1967, and brought 
to prominence as a new wölfflinesque art-historical 'style' (the 
style precisely of interplay of previous styles, rather than the 
supposedly unitary functional space of 'modernism', recognised now 
as itself just one style among others rather than a universal sym- 
metric syntax, so to speak, arising around 1930 as systematic 
space of symmetric human interaction, 'synchronic' with parallel 
'modernisms' in painting, sculpture, music and so on, developed 
from the breakdown or opening-up of their various analogues of 
central perspective at the turn of the century) by Charles Jencks 
in 1977. If 'postmodern architecture' be understood in terms of 
a-generalisation of the albertine correlation of (central) perspect- 
ive organising in frescoes an imaginary doubling of the 'real# 
space of the building whose walls they, in imagination, replace 
by an imaginary space of action in which the actors in those rooms 
to some extent frame their interaction -a generalisation from this 
subordinate function of perhaps diverse frescoes in different or 
even identical rooms of a given (neoclassical) house to an interplay 
of the architectural elements of the house or building itself, 
which might in principle, in the conflict of different figural 
spaces and dynamics of action, induce or focus in the visitor or 
passer-by the opening-up or bringing-into question of his own role 
or identity as 'actor', as a 'place' where the different implicit 
personae reflected in the different figural 'languages' of the 
different styles may be substituted (rather than a more unitary 
'classical' erp sona coordinate with the focus of albertine perspective) 
- then one might talk of the postmodern architect as the purveyor, 
not so much of an albertine 'ideal city', but rather (to borrow the 
title of Julia's mattrise at the Theatre Department at Vincennes) 
an 'urban scenography'. Of a 'theatralisation' of the primary 
'space' or stage of human interaction, by setting all the different 
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styles and 'languages' of earlier periods, as they jostle in the 
streets, each dominating in more or less unitary manner their own 
particular architectural 'units or building, in a theatrical dyn- 
amic in which each actor in the overall human interaction which 
animates the surrounding town, can to some extent become the quest- 
ion or the place of all the various possible substitutions, personae, 
masks, roles he or she may play, corresponding to his or her more 
or less 'existentially' free part in the interaction of the various 
institutions in which those variant 'parts' take their previously 
unquestioned places. That is: the jostling on the walls of that 
quintessentially 'postmodern' architectural form, the Art Gallery, 
of a range of different styles with their often 'incommensurable, 
imaginary spaces and affective dynamics, reflects the possibility 
of the visitor's 'standing-back' from the play of different parts 
competing for his or her assumption outside. And reflects also the 
equally ýpostmodernl part (par excellence) of a glib cynical relat- 
ivism 'maximising performance' in the newly acceptable ideological 
stance that takes any 'wider' frame than the practical play of dif- 
ferent forms of action, transition, 'performance', as the only il- 
lusion that one need discard - as presenting itself as a truth 'be- 
hind' appearance or illusion, as truth - and which relegates to the 
same limbo the moral dynamic associated with the actor as not so 
much his interchangeable parts, but the question which is the place 
of their exchange in a wider economy, along with any intransitive 
dynamic of 'Art' bringing the figures of parts and activity into 
its 'transcendental' questioning as a whole: Art becomes essentially 
transitive, entertaining; mere kitsch whose practical function is 
to deride any instance of questioning outside the practical order 
of being entertained, having a good time (for the moment, but there 
is always only the moment), acquiring and consuming 'goods#. 
Like the Romanticism of two centuries (fairly precisely) 
before, this new anti-classicism (which is yet so often a mere neo- 
classicism supplanting the more recent classical order of modernism) 
has, in its analogous questioning of Reason in the name of Reason, 
questioning the myth of abstraction from myth, logic from figure, 
the twin faces of progress ('post' modernism, indeed) and reaction. 
'Bracketing' so to speak the difference of orientation of those 
two symmetric faces, looking forward and back at the close of the 
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second millenium, one might take the 'theatrical' order of 
'postmodernity', in its extension from architecture, first to 
the other 'arts', and then to the best-selling philosophical 
debate of the 'eighties, as an index of a transition 'opening 
up' around 1970, turning about the various figures of textu"il 
and institutional impasse already noted, over the mid-eighties, 
and moving towards a resolution in an essentially dramatic rather 
than merely textual space of theory and theorising, towards the 
end of the millenium. Moving towards a practical coordination 
of the theoretical questions that cannot, even theoretically, 
be resolved 'within' the textual space of theory, and the essent- 
ially theatrical dynamic of an affective (rather than logical) 
axis of that 'intransitive' bringing-into-question of 'activity 
as a whole' which we call 'Art', in a 'dramatisation of theory' 
that symmetrically closes. a textual tradition of theory which 
opened 2500 years before with the pythagorean conjunction of 
'theatre' and 'theory' in the mystery of the mark which 'intrans- 
itively' marks itself to dramatically 'point' beyond the pract- 
ical earthly order of pointing and marking, to invoke the working 
of a wider 'cosmic' dynamic of our earthly part, in which alone 
the question of our questioning itself can find its response. 
Opening, closing: this questioning of its own 'mark- 
ing' or writing marks a 'space' and time of substitution, a 
sort of general cultural economy, in which writers and re'ders 
can begin to frame a 'dramatic' axis of 'theory' in response to 
this or some other marking of what is 'opening upl around the 
year 2000. If the 'present situation' of this writing is 
primarily what the writing identifies. as the transition from 
around 1970 ('opening as the unitary space of 'language' comes 
into question along with that of, say, modern architecture), 
through 1977 (nouveaux philosophes, Jencks' Language of Post- 
Modern Architecture, and so on), the mid-eighties, early nineties, 
to around 2000 ('closing' that transition with something like the 
'institution' of a new axis of theory as a kind of Globe Theatre), 
then this primary 'context', historically 'symmetrical' as 
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closing phase or cycle of theory to a complementary abstraction 
of 'logic' from 'theatre' between about 500BC and 350BC (more or 
less the first third of the first half of Part I, and the last 
Lhird of the second half of Part III, or Part III 'completed' by 
this Close) has its 'nested' historical contexts as a subordinate 
'cycle' of opening and closing of a particular figure of question- 
ing - notably that context evinced by the very name 'postmodernism' 
itself: a twentieth-century context in which it echoes in a sort 
of inverted form that systematisation of the various 'crises of 
foundations' of around 1900, by around 1930, that became 'modernism'. 
Lyotard sees the 'modernity' to which postmodernity is the limiting 
response as opening (usually, as one might say of a story that exists 
in a variety of versions) with the French Revolution; but then he 
also relates it to the far wider cycle (corresponding roughly to 
the range of this story as a whole) leading from the socratic, 
platonic and aristotelian criticism and logic of 'sophistic' argu- 
mentation, down to his restoration of the 'logic of occasion' and 
identification of 'logic' itself as a rhetorical form; or from 
the initial greek abstraction of theory from mythical narrative 
(before this pythagorean break into abstraction the mythical story 
was always, necessarily, tied to the specific theatre of particular 
occasions of narration and application, specified in the mythic in- 
terplay of stories) to his narration of abstraction as itself a 
myth. 
Opening, closing: I briefly characterised Hamlet in 
terms of a linguistic structure of various nested levels of action 
or transition between single sentence and play as a whole; and 
more recently I characterised the 'economy' of a dramatic transition 
from the 'opening up' of an 'initial' situation in the breakdown 
of some configuration of interaction, to a closing restoration of 
a configuration of responses to the 'questions' arising at the 
outset, in terms of the interplay of synchronic lines of individual 
and group response to previous such responses. One may call such 
a structure in the dramatic 'space' opened up by the breakdown of 
the 'initial' configuration an 'economy', insofar as the various 
lines of response to successive responses to what is opened up at 
the outset, all as it were share that same 'space' of possible 
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embeddings of the initial situation in the actual interplay of 
the various components of the action slowly emerging and defining 
themselves from, so to speak, 'behind' the appearances (or indeed 
absences) of the opening situation. At each step in the action 
the same figure of action or transition presides: each step is 
a response to what is opened up by the sum of previous steps, or 
rather the way that the sum of previous steps still leave the ini- 
tial question or situation open or unresolved; each step resolves 
some component of what is 'open# in the dramatic 'space' as a whole. 
Dramatic space 'as a whole': a 'mathematics' of the 'ele- 
mentary' mark, point, Isign' (d )&ZWJ) symmetrically organises, from 
the pythagoreans down to the close of the twentieth century, a 
'universal' space and time of marking 'as such' whose general 
economy is constrained only, and thus defined, by the radical 
'symmetry' of logical, poetic and physical dimensions or spaces 
of 'the mark', the point. Each of these three dimensions or spaces 
of what is 'open' in the situation of marking the function of mirk, 
marking as it were the 'initial' radical separation or differenti- 
ation of the three dimensions whose interplay itself constitutes 
the mark a 'mark', is precisely, and indeed only, the 'internal' 
reflection (as 'logical!, 'poetic', 'physical' 'space') of the 'ex- 
ternal' relations of those 'spaces' as three coordinate 'dimensions' 
of the wider space of 'Kosmos'. Each of the three dimensions of 
what is 'open' in the situation of marking the function of marking 
is just the reflection or image of the 'cosmic' symmetry or coupling 
of those three dimensions themselves. Yet such absolute symmetry 
of the mark, such an absolute dynamic - of which the physical 
dynamic of physical or 'external' 'space' and time is a sort of 
partial, if canonical 'image' 4 is itself merely a formal constraint 
on the variations over time of different substitutions for the 
coupled elements or components of the situation in which any 'mathe- 
matics' must be practically framed. Kosmos is always the theor- 
etical contextual configuration of some - and every and any - spe- 
cific 'present' situation, some action, rather than some abstract 
self-subsisting 'absolute' space and time of its coordinates in 
which situations, and the situation of marking this 'Kosmos' in 
particular, might be 'theoretically' supposed to be mathemrtically 
inscribed and so as it were constituted, brought into being and 
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consciousness and actuality - brought into Kosmos so to speak, 
from 'outside'. There is no such 'outside'; the 'dimensions' of 
Kosmos, theoretically articulated in the symmetry of their terms 
supposed in principle 'abstracted' from their figural embedding 
in the practical matter of specifying such abstraction in a part- 
icular largely 'informal' situation, are theoretical abstractions 
from the situations of their specification, their elaboration as 
so many analogous symmetric 'theories'; and to as it were suppose 
these complementary abstractions recombined in an empty universal 
space in which the situation of their abstraction might be supposed 
reconstituted (like a 'transcendental' constitution of the informal 
language used to specify that 'transcendental' space and time of 
constitution in the first place) is to invert the 'actual' relation 
of Kosmos and situation. Kosmos 'exists' only as a set of coordin- 
ate abstract constraints, as the abstract constraint upon possible 
embeddings in a wider 'context' of a particular present configurat- 
ion in which it may be marked. Kosmos is so to speak the presence 
in any situation of what is absent, the frame of possible 'extensions' 
into past, future, elsewhere, and so on. Kosmos is the 'same' in 
any situation, like the subordinate physical 'space' or sp"'ce-time 
which frames in any 'physical' situation the correlation or coord- 
ination of that situation with any other, what is physically 'open' 
and what not in any given situation. It is the essentially open 
matrix or web of possibility in which we always are, always have 
been, and always will be: it is nothing outside the situation of 
my writing here or your reading, and anything 'in' it is necessarily 
connected in the frame of mathematical symmetry with my writing and 
your reading. The fact that every situation 'in' Kosmos is equally 
open or incomplete is as it were a mark of the fact that Kosmos is 
embodied in every situation, rather than any rigid 'spatial' total- 
ity of situations in which every situation must be considered, in 
principle, definitively embedded or inscribed. 
In some practical situation of 'markings this systematic 
frame or symmetry of Kosmos, we must 'already' be engaged, not in 
some abstract mathematical symmetry, merely, but in a specific 
situation in which various variations or substitutions are open 
in a huge configuration of components, all of which could be 
'otherwise', each embodying their substitution for a renge of 
what might have been in that situation - each being so to speak 
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marked by other situations (or marking other situations in that 
situation), where each of these 'other situations' is so to speak 
altogether symmetric with the given situation in its radical open- 
ness or incompleteness, and its radical specificity or concreteness, 
embedded in an open play of connected situations, in which many of 
the formally possible substitutions are already 'decided', 'contin- 
gently', rather than theoretically derivable from the more abstract 
constraints of the general symmetries of the various orders of subst- 
itution they embody or exemplify. 
In Parts I to III I set this inquiry itself, as something 
'open' to construction in the situation in which I found myself at 
its outset, in a wide spatiotemporal economy of ItheoryI, systematic 
questioning, organised, as far as possible, simply in the 'symmetry' 
of the 'space' marked by the marking of this questioning, the textual 
elaboration of this inquiry, as one thing 'open' in the situation of 
this elaboration. A 'question' is always the marking of something 
'symmetric' in the situation in which the questioner finds himself, 
and I organised the dynamic of the inquiry in the symmetry m-rked 
in its situation by bringing its own questioning 'into question'. 
At the close of Part III I suggested that the configuration of sys- 
tematic questioning (various schools of questioning-in-general or 
philosophy, together with various more limited domains of theory 
articulating an inquiry into one of the primary dimensions of quest- 
ioning in supposed abstraction from the others) in its global con- 
text around 1970 might be coordinated as a whole in the figure of 
a common abstraction of each of the parallel 'lines' of questioning 
from the question of that questioning itself - from the question of 
the 'dramatic' articulation of that questioning in the symmetry of 
the various orders of symmetry in various theories and in the various 
contextual 'dimensions' of theory of which they framed competing 
'theories'. From the symmetry of the configuration opening up after 
1970 with other configurations of earlier theories already 'brought 
into the questioning' of this inquiry, I suggested that. one might 
frame a transition from around 1970 to around 2000, turning about 
(among other things) this marking of questioning as question over 
the mid-eighties, which is symmetric, for example, with the opening 
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'transition' of the twentieth century from around 1900 to around 
1930 which defines various dimensions of 'modernism'. And if it 
is temporally symmetric, in the general 'cosmic' dynamic defined 
by the abstract symmetry of the various symmetric 'dimensions' of 
marking and questioning, with the 'modernism' elaborated between 
1900 and 1930 - with that 'opening' phase of a wider transition 
spanning the century as a whole, and turning about the configuration 
of theories and contexts over mid-century - then it is, further, 
symmetric with that opening 'hegelian' phase of a wider transition 
from around 1800 to around 2000 which 'turns about' the various 
crises and the inception of american pragmatism and russian activism 
over the turn of the century, which I traced from about 1800 to 
about 1830. On a still wider scale, just as the Romanticism mark- 
ing the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth centuries is, in 
Novalis' expression 'analogous' to the thirteenth-century christian 
'system' (of theory, practice, society and so on) - the two as opening 
and closing 'points' of a transition. turning about the Scientific 
Revolution of the seventeenth century - so this 'closing' situation 
of transition-from 1970 to 2000, which is the immediate 'context' 
of this inquiry, is historically symmetric as closing, with the 
opening phase of 'abstraction' of theory from the 'drama' or theatre 
of questioning between about 500BC and about 350BC, the whole 'his- 
tory' of abstraction over 2500 years turning about- the seventeenth- 
century revolution marked by, among other coordinate developments, 
Descartes' scientific reconstruction of Kosmos in the mathematical 
symmetry unfolded from the empty function of theoretical assertion 
as apodictic response to the context-free logical space of questions 
in language, organised around the abst""act question of question, 
doubt, 'standing back from a situation', itself. 
1970-2000, then: a closing configuration of 'interaction' 
of the textual space of theory with various dimensions of its con- 
text; and the question of the marking of such a question coordinating 
variables of the 'internal' textual space of that marking with 
variables of the context there marked, in a sort of map of what 
is open to us, as we find ourselves 'in the context' of this mapping, 
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in a situation, an action or interaction with others and things, 
marked by this text among others. A textual order of mapping or 
framing the situation, which maps itself as one variable dimension 
of the situation in a wider dynamic where textual framing or mapping 
is only one option, whose substitution for other lines of action 
cannot in principle be itself decided, chosen, in a textual 'stand- 
ing back' from other orders or dimensions of our embodiment with 
others, writing materials and so on, since such an 'abstract' framing 
of the move of abstraction as it were 'begs the question': it would 
itself have been chosen, determined, in a wider 'cosmic' dynamic of 
substitutions or assertion, in which it is symmetrically mapped and 
determined in the affective and material spaces or dimensions of 
situation and choice. 
Thus I might take as an illustration of the 'economy' of 
this choice of 'standing-back' from the particular spaces of action 
in which various 'national' figures, politicians, actors, found them- 
selves after 1970, to frame a 'global' space of common activity, a 
global economy of interaction of nations, the report of the Brandt 
Commission set up under the auspices of the UN in 1977: 
972 North-South: A Programme for Survival intr Brandt London 1980 
The international group of senior statesmen (and one woman) frame 
the global system of relations of a wide range of economic variables: 
they map the various contradictions implicit in short-term pursuit 
by each nation of local political interests, and the long-term 
common good of coordinated global planning toward the common good 
in the Global Village; yet the failure to map the strictly 'poli- 
tical' economy which determines such Habermas-style ideal dialogue 
and community as itself only one variable whose interaction with 
other 'non-rational' dimensions and variables of the contradictory 
global 'system', and to attempt the construction of a concrete 
international political programme in the frame of that practical 
question of the dynamics of 'standing back' from national and sect- 
ional parts or interests, to raise the transition from the seventies 
to the close of the century as a question marked in the international 
community of action and interaction, is echoed in the running global 
Debt Crisis of the nineteen-eighties, whose major outbreak in 1982 
may be taken to embody, 53 years later, and on a global rather than 
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fragmented national scale, the same breakdown of market structures 
seen in previous systemic crises, in 1929,1874 and so on, marking 
an underlying long or 'Kondratieff' wave which can be traced back 
through Thorold Rogers' data to the beginning of systematic market 
records in England in the thirteenth century. 
The Brandt Report presents the 'North-South' axis of 
a global political and economic system of interdependent variables, 
and the contradictions resulting in this system from the process of 
decolonization between around 1950 and around 1970, as - to borrow 
Mao's terms - the primary global contradiction to which the East- 
West axis of ideological division is supposed subordinate. Yet the 
fact that this very supposition is precisely the north-western, not 
to say american, ideological position - that open dialogue or'verbal 
'exchange+", between different framings of their common situation, 
directed toward the material framing of an equally open structure 
of material exchange, is the natural axis of political advance - 
is reflected in the absence (lamented by the Commission) of any de- 
legates from the (north-: or south-) East. In the East the North- 
South contradictions of decolonization are evidently regarded as 
subordinate to an ideological difference over the optimization of 
production; in particular that vast section of the south-east, China, 
as representative of that pole of the global order as America is of 
the diametrically opposed north-west, was still framing the locus 
of political assertion in terms of Mao's scheme of the practice of 
identifying the primary contradiction of forces rather than abstract 
political goals in any specific situation, and framing one's specific 
local and transitional part in the revolutionary transformation of 
each situation. Framing, then, a practical, local resistance to 
the 'northern' model of optimization of the North-South market, 
without which chinese decolonization would not even have been ef- 
fected in a specifically south-eastern form in the first place. 
Framimg a model from-which the Brandt Commission might themselves 
have learnt a more 'practical' mode of intervention in the contra- 
dictions of western decolonization: 
973 MAO TSE»TUNG Four Essars ( 
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Global system, and local configuration of intervention. 
Mao, Marcuse McLuhan; back to 1968... 
974 MdLUHAN, Marshall The Gutenberg 
975 Understanding 
976 The Medium is 
Effects NY 1, 
977 War and Peace 
978 Counterblast 
Galaxy Toronto 1962 
Media NY 1964 
the Massage: An Inventory of 
967 
in the Global Village NY 1968 
NY 1969 
... and on to Baudrillard's generalized 'communication' whose primary 
or representative 'channel' is the american TV screen. System, 
communication, information, 'dematerialisation' öf objects, dissol- 
ution of the individual subject, as we pass from the millenial 
european order of coupled abstractions into what opens up when 
that system of separate identities, subjects, objects, mind, matter, 
material economy of exchange, linguistic economy of exchange, itself 
comes systematically into its own systematic questioning. A univer- 
sal, but yet fragmentary, contradictory, 'economy', into which one 
enters from all sorts of apparently different points in the old 
abstract structures, as these various points, theoretical, textual, 
aesthetic, material and so on dissolve into a mere configuration 
of originary appearance, simulacrum, with nothing 'behind' it as 
transcendent reference, but only other appearances. 
I have already marked a distance from such heraclitean 
flux, and set what I take to be the essentially dramatic 'schemata' 
of experience (rather than pure simulacra or appearance) within 
a 'transcendental' space, not of fixed identities 'behind' their 
theatrical schematism, but rather as what may be mapped in language 
as a system of open-ness, questions, coordinate with the radical 
'theoretical' question of the question itself as only one symmetric 
dimension of what it thus maps, open among other coordinates of 
" what is open. A transcendental 'space) and time of Kosmos not 
so much 'behind' appearance, as always invariantly 'in' any situat- 
ion, framing what is open in that situation as theoretical range 
of embeddings of that situation in the unlimited matrix of systems 
of substitutions for its terms, which can be partially mapped, but 
not determined, in language. 
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Given a situation 'opening up' in a breakdown of some 
prior configuration of parts (individual or collective), things, 
'institutions' and so on, we may as 'historian' map the (or an) 
economy of response to the initial 'question' posed by that break- 
down, as a sort of matrix or lattice of determinations of what is 
apparently 'open' at each point - each of these 'points' or subord- 
inate 'questions' being dependent on a range of previous points or 
determinations, and itself partly determining a range of subsequent 
questions or 'points'. The 'question' as a whole, the mapping of 
the action defined at the outset in relation to an initial configur- 
ation (say one of those many late-nineteenth-century 'questions': 
The Eastern (juestion, The Social Question, The Straits question, and 
so on) is closed or resolved when the whole combinatorial system 
of interdependent determinations or substitutions, the whole 'syntax' 
so to speak of the action or situation or transition, has been 'work- 
ed' right through by the various instances of determination at var- 
ious points (people, groups, things and no on), until nothing of the 
original 'question' is left open, and a new configuration of rede- 
fined components (including perhaps some new ones, and excluding 
perhaps some of the original or initial ones) is 'in place'. 
The 'sociologist' has as task the elaboration of such 
a 'syntax' of activity; and the practising historian must in general 
abstract from a supposed complete scientific matrix of variables 
(the space and time of Ranke's 'Universal History') in that organis- 
ation of the 'question' he treats or maps which is a direct com- 
plement of the practical situation and dynamics of his own asking 
of that question (the diltheian side of the question, so to speak). 
The story, history, 'inquiry' mapped in Parts I to III above pre- 
sents an extreme form of this activity of historiography, insofar 
as the 'question' which it addresses is the historical economy or 
dynamic of systematic questioning itself. The opening 'configurat- 
ion' is determined simply as the initial 'point' in an economy of 
interplay of question and context in which this inquiry or history 
may itself be set, itself closing as it marks the close of the 
order of 'inquiry' and history into which it inquires, as what 
is open in the context which it marks by marking itself simply 
as question, as question-mark. 
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Thus this 'history', which is just the setting of this 
book, this marking of systematic questioning, 'in' a questioning 
of questioning, presents an extreme case of 'historiography' insofar 
as it frames the 'diltheian' poetics of its abstraction from all 
the further questions which might be asked of its various terms 
'scientifically' in the economy of the frame it investigates: in 
the general 'cosmic' economy of substitutions structured by its 
questioning of its questioning, its marking the 'place' in an inter- 
play of substitutions marked by questions, of that substitution 
which presents its own questioning as its directing question. This 
circular configuration determines the 'history' as precisely the 
investigation of the 'economy' of systematic questioning or theory 
or philosophy as a peculiarly symmetric matrix of 'questions' at- 
taching to questioning, 'opening' with the 'breakdown' of a Pyth- 
agorean institution of theory in what that theory framed as the 
perfect harmony or symmetry of a Kosmos whose terms were all 'mathe- 
matically' coordinated with the simple mark or point as a sort of 
primary unitary response to the question of the question, that it 
implicitly posed, and from which the whole matrix of universal 
symmetry was unfolded as figurate Number. 
The positive, figural, poetic abstraction of the pythagor- 
ean 'history' or story of Kosmos, coordinate with the point of 
opening of that story in the spatiotemporal coordinates it framed - 
the closed circuit of a theory opening with just such a 'point' 
itself and closing when the questions and responses opening from that 
initial mark finally frame the universal contextual configuration 
of the 'text' of theory itself - and so the systematic frrme of an 
action into which one passes through the 'closing' of the text (an 
action or universal poetic in which the dynamic of questioning as 
the opening up or breaking out of the earthly circuit of identifi- 
cation with a particular embodiment or incarnation is itself first 
understood: a questioning of questioning which can in principle have 
no resolution in any specific transition in the 'practical' order 
of earthly transition, but only in an 'intransitive' move out of 
that circuit into the wider 'invisible' frame of Kosmos) - this 
is itself 'brought into question' by Parmenides. And the 'action' 
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thus opening out of the 'initial configuration' of the pythagorean 
'mystery' of theory (or 'philosophy': movement towards - in the 
affective axis of ýºi'- - that ctAýA which is the 'comprehension' 
of the movement of questioning itself in a dynamic which questioning 
cannot itself 'comprehend') has a presiding 'symmetry', articulated 
in the symmetry of the question of question, unlike that of any 
other 'history' opening out of a 'question' other than that of 
question itself (when there must necessarily be a 'rupture', in 
Bourdieu's expression, between a 'scientific' economy of the com- 
ponents in interaction, and the poetics of historical r4cit struct- 
ured in the writer's 'identification' with the participants in the 
action). 
The 'documents', the 'script' of this singular drama, are 
'. hen the thousand or so books cited above and below; and the action 
is just the dynamic of successive framings of the 'universal' context 
of these various texts from those different 'points' in what each 
differently identifies as their common 'universal' frame, those dif- 
ferent points which are the different books themselves. In retro- 
spect each book is 'nested' within the question posed by this book 
itself, through a sequence of 'bringings-into-question' of the 
starting-point of that book, in subsequent books, down to those 
books of around 1970 which are 'brought into question' here as a 
system of abstractions from the question of their questioning itself. 
At the same time this textual embedding of earlier 'philosophy' and 
more specific theories (of various primary dimensions of its context) 
in this text is coordinate with the successive or nested embedding 
of this text in the various configurations of context identified 
as contextual figurations of the series-of abstraction from those 
configurations which frame successive 'logical' versions of such 
context. 
. ý» 
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Thus these thousand or so books present so many 'coor- 
dinates' from which the 'space' of what is open as 'context' of 
this book may be 'abstracted' by setting those texts at so many 
points in an 'historical' dynamic of questioning organised in the 
symmetry of the 'question' of this book of questioning. Working 
from a range of texts set in libraries and bookshops in the situat- 
ion of this writing, and trying to 'coordinate' them in a spatiotemp- 
oral matrix of questions and contexts which explains, for example, 
why 'copies' now stand in those libraries and bookshops, one eventu- 
ally finds this text itself set not merely in the textual dimension 
of words, but also in a wider dynamic in which various elements of 
its context other than books are correlated with it in the 'histor- 
ical' matrix in which their transmission along with books down to 
the present situation of writing may be textually mapped, through 
the 'historical' economy of questions, or rather of what has been 
open, at various points at which books of theory were written. An 
economy in which the words of this book Cnly mark, without 'compre- 
hending', their own interplay with the various non-verbal components 
of their context to which they give names and descriptions. The 
book closes, so to speak, with the passage 'out of' the textual 
order of questions, into the dynamics of what they mark as open. 
This 'open' context' is only a frame Sf activity coordinate with 
this book, in which my; 'detour, so to speak, through a limited number 
of questions, itself makes some kind of sense in the order of open- 
ing and closing of the activity of writing the book. The pas",, age 
'out' of the text into other orders of activity among which the 
text has been 'chosen', makes sense in the space marked by the text, 
and this transition out of the textual mapping of what is open, into 
another order of activity in the 'space' thus mapped, constitutes 
the 'close' of the action of writing, the transition from the situ- 
ation in which the textual order of questioning opened up, to that 
in which it has been 'practically' resolved... for a while at least. 
The text of inquiry is so to speak the transition from one 'space) 
of action into another, a sort of induction or introduction into a 
new space or situation in which that passage makes sense, leading 
out of an earlier situation which didn't make sense and naturally 
enough induced an activity of questioning. 
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Such a 'closure' of a text of theory sets the text in 
an essentially 'abstract' space of activity in which the closure 
makes sense; and I have suggested that the 'Kosmos' into which 
as coordinates of what is open, marked by this book, this text is 
framed as an 'induction' is only an abstract space of symmetries 
of 'the question', organised 'around' a philosophical book as 
passage into that 'space' and its time of activity. Whence the 
symmetry of the various embeddings of the 'documents' supporting 
this inquiry in such a 'cosmic' frame of which they are interpreted 
as so many 'versions' or framings from so many different points in 
what they differently frame (the difference of the versions being 
correlative with their differences of position in what they variously 
frame as their common context), which is not intended as any exhaus- 
tive 'determination' of any of the documents or texts, but only as 
an abstract correlation of various terms in the texts and components 
of 'context' they mark, coordinate with the dynamic of opening and 
closure of this text itself, in its own specific (or partly specified, 
marked) context or situation. 
In this inquiry the 'immediate' situation of its quest- 
ioning is thus 'abstractly' identified as a 'question' opening up 
around 1970 (the time of my own introduction to 'philosophy'), spe- 
cified here as the question implicitly posed for theory by the 
'system' of coordinate abstractions of different national schools 
of philosophy and different theories of the primary dimensions of 
the 'context' of philosophy, the symmetry of which 'system' in a 
general economy of substitutions constitutes for philosophy after 
1970 the question of how to pose that symmetry as a question: 'In- 
quiry in Question' indeed. The question of the system of abstr".: ct- 
ion of inquiry from the question of that system. I have already 
noted an impasse over the 'eighties in various 'internal' textual 
and institutional attempts to frame the embedding of text and in- 
stitution of 'theory' in a 'postmodern' pragmatics of an essentially 
theatrical context - 'theatrical' in the sense that this contextual 
dimension (prefigured by the 'figural' dynamics of textuality around 
1970) is framed in terms of a dynamic associated with the poetic sym- 
metry of the various component dimensions of an 'action', abstr-cted 
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from the question of the textuäl mapping of this poetic axis 
of action in which 'texts' are supposed articulated: this abstract- 
ion in, its turn 'symmetric' with the initial elaboration between 
about 1900 and 1930 of Dewey's 'pragmatist' embedding of theory in 
a systematic textual mapping of human interaction with others and 
with Nature or things, abstracted from the question of its own 
practical embedding in the configuration it mapped -a figure which 
Tocqueville characterised as that of a 'practical' abstraction from 
the traditional abstract universal frame of western philosophy. 
The french versions of this impasse may themselves be coordinated 
in the wider economy marked in the 'eighties by this questioning of 
systematic questioning: first of all in relation to that 'ideological' 
axis of 'analogy' of theories which organises the profile of 'theory' 
in 'the media' in terms of various groups or groupings corresponding 
to those 'lacunes de vocabulaire', 'structuralism' (disavowed by its 
theorists), 'nouvelle philosophies (specifically chosen as journalist- 
ic frame of ideological questioning of 'structuralism', by the 'nouv- 
eaux philosophes' in their self-assertion as a group opposed to the 
earlier grouping), 'postmodernism'... 
979 Tel Quel ed Kristevä & Sollers (f 196 ) 
980 SOLLE±S, Philippe Logiques 1968 (articles from Tel Quel) 
981 PLEYNET, Marcelin Systeme de la Peinture 1977 (rev coil of 
articles first publd as L'Enaeignement de la 
Peinture 1971) 
982 Poetique ed Todorov (f 1970) 
983 Scilicet (tu peux savoir ce que pense 1'Ecole Freudienne de Paris) 
(f 1968) 
984 Ornicar? ed Miller (f 1973) 
985 L'Ane (f 1981) 
986 LARDREAU, Guy & L'Ange 1976 
JAMBET, Christian 
987 HEN RI-LEVY, Bernard La Barbarie A Visage Humain 1977 
986 GLUCKSMANN, Andre Les Maitres Penseurs 1977 
Bernard Henri-Levy and Andre Glucksmann still appear frequently on 
french radio and television; everyone from time to time appears on 
bernard Pivot's Friday evening book-review television programme, 
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Apostrophes; and in a 1982 'special' number of: 
987 Art-Press 
devoted to the newly fashionable subject of L'Audiovisuel ýBHL' 
characterises television, which cannot sustain the autonomous text- 
u3l syntax of 'serious' argument, as 'L'Epreuve de la Vdrite', a 
sort of lie-detector which allows the audience to judge thinkers 
and actions in the moral axis of theatre, rather than in the logical 
or ideological axis of text. The article is headed by a picture of 
BHL on Apostrophes: Apostrophe: a 'turning out of' the textual order 
of the books reviewed by Pivot and his guests into the audiovisual 
order of human interaction in which we ultimately organise the prict- 
ical order of judgement. If the text presents a 'standing back' from 
its situation, to frame it in an order of marks of what is presented 
as 'behind' the situation, so to speak, then the audiovisual inter- 
action of writers and critics in the affective axis of present ap- 
pearances allows one to judge the 'position' in the moral dynamic 
of our interaction and our. society from which the writer frames 
the embedding of that position, and his or her and our situation 
(watching television, for example, or appearing on it) in some pro- 
posed wider frame. The theatrical order of apostrophe, direct ad- 
dress to the audience, momentarily breaking (typically in comedy) 
the circuit of abstraction from context marks an embedding of the 
text in the moral and affective dynamic of its immediate context. 
More particularly, I was myself struck by the shift in the 'sympa- 
thetic register' of my relation to the texts of those I saw in Paris 
after reading their books (Althusser, Barthes, Sartre, for example), 
for which their was no parallel in my perspective on the writing of 
those I read in conjunction with attendance at their cours or semi- 
naire (Derrida, Lacan, Foucault and so on). 
To this 'audiovisual' scenario of french theory as I 
confronted it in Paris - theatrically structuring my 'line of de- 
velopment' toward the question of questioning -I should add the 
complementary axis of french film over the sixties and seventies, 
coupled, perhaps, to the 'theoretical' side of contemporary text- 
uality by figures like Robbe-Grillet (who I also 'saw' in person) 
continuing in their way the sartrian tradition of complementary 
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theory and theatre (or cinema) - but I won't here depart from 
my general rule of indicating 'poetic' components of the context 
of theory, say nouveau roman or nouvelle vague, as such, rather 
than specifying individual texts, films, pictures and so on (an 
equally important dimension of the 'theatrical' scenario of french 
theory in my 'experience of it in the seventies was that typically 
parisian 'event', the major exhibition of 'modern art' that focussed 
the visual perceptions of Paris for a couple of months at a time). 
Back then to the 'ideological' profile of theoryl to 
Art-Press let me add: 
988 La Quinzaine Littdraire ed Nadeau 
989 La Magazine Littdraire 
.. and to Tel Quel the legacy of the previous phase of literature 
and theory.. 
990 Les Temps Modernes f Sartre 1945 
991 Critique f Bataille 1946 
.. together with a few other 'journals' of various character: 
992 L'Arc 
993 Communications 
994 Cahiers pour 1'Analyse 
... and, lastly, let me add the two newspapers whose positions more 
or less on the 'left', criticising established parts and institut- 
ions in France and abroad, are coupled with regular 'coverage' of 
the developing 'theoretical' positions in which various aspects of 
the situations the newspapers report 'in the world' are framed in 
a wider 'space'; 
995 Liberation Y Sartre 19 
996 
997 
998 
Le Monde 
Entretiene avec le Monde ed Delacampagne & alia 1984-5 
Douze Lecons de Philosophie ed & intr Delacampagne 1985 
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The opening 'legon' (of a series of 12, published over the summer 
of 1982, and proceeding through the standard 1ycde themes, from 
Subject to World) by Derrida, 'Le Langage', is presented as a tele- 
phone conversation with Christian Delacampagne, in which Derrida 
questions the 'possibility' (in various senses) of writing an art- 
icle on Language for the readers of Le Monde. It opens with the 
ambiguity between constative and performative senses of 'can you 
give us an article on language', and effectively illustrates this 
opening question with a performance (telephone conversation) which 
is closed by Delacampagne's 'constatation', 'C16et pratiquement fait, 
voyez, mais si, mais si... ' 
Language as 'performative', as a component of an action, 
language-game, speech-act or whatever: and as there cannot in prin- 
ciple be any adequate 'constation' of the performative dimension 
or 'side' of language, a questioning of language must itself be 
structured, implictly or explicitly, as itself a 'performance' - 
a questioning which stands back to question a particular situation 
(in this case the possibility of writing an article on Language for 
Le Monde), opening up what Derrida still calls the wider 'text' of 
the situation, and closing when that wider text has been embedded 
in a new configuration of questions, of what is open in the situ- 
ation of questioning. Philosophy, then, as opening up a situation 
by finding in it a configuration of questions, of what is open in 
the situation of marking that open-ness as a system or economy of 
questions. Derrida, then, attempting a partial (deconstruction' 
of Le Monde: of the wider global text or system of terms of which 
'The World' (compare other newspaper titles: 'Globe', 'Times', 
'Herald', 'Mercury' and so on) is an instituted 'picture' or text- 
ual mapping (still no photographs in Le Monde). Opening up a 
system of questions attaching to his questioning of Language in 
Le Monde, this parallelling in 1982 his'wider project of decon- 
structing the institution of-theory in the Coll4ge International 
de Philosophie. Philosophy as the practical order of opening up 
in language the situation of that questioning, its practical 'text' 
or rather its context mapped into language as a play of questions 
marking what is open in the practical order of that very mirking. 
'Deconstruction' now framed perhaps in the wider 'text' of action, 
rather than in the more abstract interplay of the logical and fig- 
ural, or constative and performative 'sides' or dimensions of the 
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narrower verbal order of 'text'. - Or should one rather take 
the 'constative' as the interface of logical and figural, the 
frame of journalism and less 'contemporary' varieties of histor- 
iography? 
I have already noted the various impasses confronted 
by Derrida in his attempt to 'practically' deconstruct the insti- 
tution of 'theoretical' (rather than 'journalistic') philosophy: 
the impossibility of bringing into question the agrdgation in a 
job practically directed towards getting students through that 
examination and into similar jobs (similar 'exchanges' of a certain 
amount and form of questioning for the products of other less cere- 
bral activities - or rather for a certain amount of 'money', 'in 
place of' those 'products' which bodily maintain the 'philosopher' 
in a condition in which he can pursue that questioning); the devel- 
opment of CIPH into yet another set of 'academic' seminars; the 
instituted 'parts' of students and teacher in the EHESS 'lecture', 
and so on. Perhaps he should concentrate on journalism, bringing 
full-circle the development of french philosophy from the sartrian 
mid-century towards a resolution of 'the postmodern predicament' 
at its close. 
'Deconstruction of journalism'; performative embedding 
of the apparently 'constative' nature of 'reporting' in the prag- 
matics of newspapers as themselves activities and 'products' in 
'The World' they frame from day to day. Journalists from Le Monde 
already abstract a range of the global variables, or terms of the 
global 'text' or system, in an annual survey of the World organised 
on the scale of the year rather than the day, an 'annual' rather 
than a 'journal': 
999 L'Etat du Monde (english adaptation, discontinued in 1985, as 
World View London/NY) 
I hope '999' is a mere coincidence. Similar annuals presenting 
the 'global system', updated each year, and organised within the 
frame of a manageable book, which I have referred to are: 
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1000 The Annual Register: A Record of World Events Z Burke 1758 London 
1001 Britannica Book of the Year NY 
At the close of Part III, I framed a symmetric 'system' 
of textual and contextual coordinates of the configuration around 
1970 of abstraction of theory, systematic questioning, from the 
'practical' question of its own questioning: a global 'system' of 
which a language might be taken as - for indeed it is - an image 
or model in one of its dimensions, in which each component is more 
or less coupled, interacts, 'communicates' with every other ... like 
components in that other dimension, symmetric with the linguistic 
'economy' of dialogical exchange, the material economy of bodily 
existence on this Globe; or moreformally like the components of 
that global economy as a 'physical' system whose overall dynamics 
are simply the preservation of linked physical symmetries of the 
'system' over time (or rather, just the preservation of symmetry, 
since time enters into those symmetries as one component of the 
'action' which is their canonical frame). In relation to the 
variables or parameters of text and context of theory there marked, 
this book itself marks a 'point' in the interaction-of'theory and 
context opening up as the abstraction of the texts of theory from 
their 'pragmatics' comes into question 'in theory' after about 1970, 
which may be considered as an index of a turning-point in the eight- 
ies, in the transition from residually abstract attempts to pose this 
'question' of abstraction, towards responses to the question im- 
plicit in any attempt to mark the symmetry of textual questioning 
with non-textual dimensions of context, which are themselves directly 
constructed, like Derrida's newspaper article of 1982 as 'performance'. 
A transition over the 'eighties, then, from theoretical framings of 
the embedding of the abstraction 'theory' in some abstract textual 
mapping of some abstract 'context' into the theoretical text, towards 
'theory' constructed not only in the logical axis of questioning, 
but also ('at the same time', in the same words, the same text, or 
rather, book or speech) directly and avowedly structured, organised, 
in the figural, 'poetic' axis of interaction with others and things. 
cccccclxxii 
I have already set this textual construction, this 
book, in the 'dramatic' axis of my own interaction with parician 
theory, and with Lacan and Derrida in particular, over the nine- 
teen-seventies, and I have insisted that the same 'position' out- 
side the residual abstrMction of those texts of 'sixties 'struct- 
uralism' and 'seventies 'post-structuralism' is coordinate with 
a directly analogous embedding of german, british and american 
developments after 1970 in the same 'space' and time of the action 
opening up as french abstraction comes into question after 1970: 
an analogy directly deducible from the symmetry of different nation- 
al institutions of abstract theory in (or around) 1970. The 'im- 
mediate' configuration of texts and contexts which frame as it were 
the 'situation' of my 'move' in constructing this inquiry as my 
response to my position in the 'World' of 1970-2000 is constituted 
by those texts or books themselves produced as 'moves' in the eco- 
nomy of this interaction of theory and World after around 1970, 
and which may be grouped by the mid-eighties as a sort of sample 
'script' of the 'postmodern debate' - 'postmodernism' appearing to 
have superseded 'poststructuralism' as an 'ideological' analogy 
made between a wide range of different theoretical or anti-theoret- 
ical 'moves' after about 1970 (under which 'poststructuralism' is 
subsumed as a sort of opening phase, down to the late 'seventies, 
before the overall transition towards the pragmatics of the texts 
of theory becomes clear or $takes shape'). These books or texts 
in their turn are framed, as their generic characterisation attests, 
as a transition 'out of' the 'modernism' in various dimensions of 
text and context which was more or less systematically elaborated 
as a system of linked responses to the 'crises' of around 1900, by 
around 1930; and this 'secondary' context of the 'postmodern quest- 
ion , the twentieth century as a whole,: is in turn set in the wider 
historical configuration and dynamic of texts and contexts orening 
up in French, Industrial and Romantic Revolutions around the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century -a wider frame of the present situ- 
ation dominated in philosophy by Hegel in the opening phase, say, 
1800-1830, and 'turning about' the breakdown of the nineteenth-cen- 
tury 'system' of responses to those Revolutions over the transition 
into the twentieth century - say, between 1870 and 1930. The 'sym- 
metry' presiding over that transition into twentieth-century 'moder- 
nism', may be evinced in its representative political axis by the 
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formulation by the Nazi Schttssler of a bismarckian 'system', in- 
stituted in 1870, and edited from the Chancellor's voluminous re- 
mains as a 'political testament' applicable to Germany in the after- 
math of the global economic crisis of 1929-30, and the accession 
to the political direction-of Germany by the National Socialist 
Movement, dedicated to building a new german Reich, in 1933: 
1002 BISMARCK, Otto von Politisches Testament' ed Schilssler 
Berlin 1933 
... and indeed Bismarckts accession to the central posit. on on the 
european stage in 1870 has frequently been taken by historians as 
the opening of the 'contemporary' scene dominated in Europe by 
the ware of 1914-18 and 1939-4.5 - although I have already noted 
that after the mid-century this eurocentric framing of even europ- 
ean history in the twentieth century comes $into question'. 
In a general survey of the textual and contextual frame 
of 'modern thought' Biddis sees in the configuration of 1870 that 
opening of a growing systematic coupling of theory and context 
which frames the specifically modern 'mass culture' typified by 
a generalised participation of the individual in the interplay 
of all the dimensions and components of collective activity mapped 
for him (or latterly her) in the mass-circulation newspaper -a 
coupling reflected in the parallel opening up of modern historio- 
graphy to questions posed by the overall interplay of many dimens- 
ions and components of collective activity ignored in the more 
conservative 'political' history of Ranke and his school... 
1003 BIDDIS, Michael The Age of the Masses: Ideas and Society in 
Europe since 1870 Harmonsdworth 1977 
Thus Keynes objected strongly and publicly to the impossibility of 
achieving a rational consensus in the Versailles discussions over 
the post(Great)war settlement, where he was economic advisor to 
the british government, since the various national representatives 
were hopelessly constrained by the affective dynamic relating 
their positions at home to the reporting in mass-circulation 
newspapers of their moves at the Conference, and easily predicted 
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the long-term consequences of the peace: 
1004 KEYNES, John Maynard The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
London 1919 
1005 Keynes and After Harmondsworth 196 
.. yet this coupling of politics and mass 'representation' in 
various-senses is itself coordinate with the part of (frustrated) 
academics like Keynes, Woodrow Wilson, Ebert in 'politics', caught 
in abstract ideas of the 'practical' implications of their theories, 
but like the Brandt Commission after them, and so many abstract 
framings of the resolution of present difficulties in a wider rat- 
ional consensus over the middle years of the century, these aca- 
demic administrators could never appreciate like, say, Goebbels, 
the affective axis of human interaction in which any rational 
approach, to be effective, must itself be practically embedded. 
In an irrational world it is not rational to try and sway 'the 
masses' by rationally setting a present situation in a wider rat- 
ional economy in which they might all be supposed to agree to some 
common rational long-term end; besides the theorists themselves 
never agree upon which particular rational frame is the correct 
one, and the masses are perhaps right to frame their collective 
activity in the more familiar dynamic of appearances - judging 
'policies', for example, not by critical assessment of argument, 
but rather in Henri-Levy's 'truth-test' applied to the dramatic 
interaction of proponents of contending 'parties' on, say, televis- 
ion, replacing 'royal families' as the theatrical frame of polit- 
ical direction in the late twentieth century, and finding perhaps 
their canonical 'representative' in Said's Reagan. 
Representation: The World as Will and Representation - 
or in Hartmann's reformulation of 1870, as Representation and 
The Unconscious' as axis of universal Will, Life, in Appearance; 
The Nation as political representation and dynamic of Jameson's 
Political Unconscious; the Race as Rosenbergs Collective Will, 
germanic Will to Power. The World as a Representation, as a 
Globe Theatre, the scene of earthly appearance, and the drama 
of the Visible set in the Invisible articulated in the universal 
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dynamic of Junges retirn from Freud to Hartmann: the Collective 
Unsconscious. 
Representation: 'representatives' of regional groups 
and the groupings or parties competing to frame national activity 
within their complementary versions of their common situation: 
actors playing out and organising on the narrower stage of poli- 
tical institutions the wider conflicts of those groups, and this 
political stage set in the verbal and visual theatre constituted 
by 'mass media', as the athenian stage was set among the whole 
assembled community. The national 'drama' as a whole the wider 
theatre in which actor, politician, audience or spectator are 
themselves so many parts, so many interacting institutions, groups. 
And 'theories' so many versions, representations, framings, of 
various dimensions of this theatre, themselves instituted and 
articulated as one particular form or component of the general 
theatrical dynamic of interaction of 'parts', interacting logically 
and textually in the academic debate of competing versions, theories 
of various elements and dimensions of the overall dynamic, inter- 
acting 'practically' through the 'analogical' embedding of the 
texts in the affective (political, unconscious, institutional, 
performative.. ) axis of the wider interaction of theorists with 
fellow theorists and with various-other players in the wider in- 
stitution of nation and community of nations. 
Ideas and Society since 1870: as in a more restricted 
drama the opening configuration presents the participants with 
a configuration of questions, possibilities, worries... and in 
response new couplings, 'communications' between various components 
of drama or situation may arise.... and old relations may break 
down. In particular, various aspects of earlier theoretical 
'positions' come into question, in what amounts to a special 
case of the actor's earlier figure of self-assertion in framing 
his part, as one component in the configuration in which he or 
she frames his or her situation 'coming into question' as an ear- 
lier working of identification of self and others and things 
breaks down. I framed the 'action, of theoretical developement 
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as a dynamic of unfolding of questions, as previous positions 
came into question (as practical or figural short-circuits of 
a more radical question, through the poetics of identification 
of the part or figure of assertion and questioning as one com- 
ponent in the correlation of theorist, others, and things which 
it framed) within a wider action developing as various other 
non-textual moves became open, and are marked as new questions. 
The dynamic of the whole 'activity' or theatre of theory, opening 
as a whole with the pythagorean marking of the coordination of 
various dimensions of the mark or marking 'as such', was articulated 
within the 'symmetry' presented by the 'question of question', the 
question of the question (as marking something 'open', as such sym- 
metric between various responses) as itself the substitution of 
one order of substitution (language) for others 'symmetric' with 
it, in the wider 'space' of action, or interaction of those primary 
dimensions - language, institutions (or culture), and material 
economy - each themselves the mapping of the symmetry of the three 
dimensions into one of those dimensions themselves. 
Here is not the place to recapitulate the complex inter- 
play of various components of those three dimensions, and of their 
interaction or coupling over 2500 years, articulated in the radical 
symmetry and dynamic of 'question' through Parts I to III. It 
remains, rather to mark. the groups of theoretical 'steps' in the 
twentieth-century 'phase' of theory initiated by the question of 
'modern' theory in various domains, and the questions of emodernismt, 
which marked after about 1900 what 'opened up' through the various 
analogous crises in various dimensions of theory and context around 
that date, which, as so many books of which copies have persisted 
down to the 'seventies and 'eighties, constitute, along with dif- 
ferently transmitted components of their original contexts, have 
entered into the 'theatrical' dynamic of my own marking of my 
position here. Entered by being set in the temporal context of 
this book, and its cultural space, as so many 'points' which allow 
the symmetric matrix of questions and contexts on which they are 
so many perspectives, to be abstracted or deduced from the quest- 
ion of their differences of perspective being symmetric or coordin- 
ate with their differences of position in that on which they are 
perspectives. 
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The texts or books fall into so many 'groups', corresp- 
onding to so many generic figures of questioning, correlative 
with a particular period (as all responses to the same configurat- 
ion of questions opening up around 1900 and typified by Russell's 
Paradox in logic, say; or those opening up after 1930 and typified 
by, say, Gödel's Theorem - the latter perhaps taken as a subordin- 
ate group within a wider order of twentieth-century responses to 
the theoretical configuration of around 1900, or perhaps taken 
as responses to what opens up with the breakdown of the initial 
responses to the 'crises' of 1900, as first given systematic form 
in various fields towards 1930); or with a particular 'position' 
in one national school as tradition or line of questioning, rather 
than another; or with a particular dimension of the text and context 
of questioning rather than the 'philosophical' whole (physics, 
logic and so on). Thus one of the few secondary texts I have used 
for this 'period' or context of my own inquiry, treats of '45 years 
of french philosophy': 
1006 DESCOMBES, Vincent Le Mme et 1'Autre: (Quwrante-Ging Ans de 
Philosophie Fran9aise (1933-78) Paris 1979 
... beginning with the questions opened up by Kojdve's cours on 
Hegel, and closing with the 'Perspectivisme des annees 70' as 
response to 'les Structures de 60', themselves responses to the 
Phenomenology of mid-century. Kojeve provides the opening quest- 
ion of the relation of Self and Other (as question of the embedding 
of traditional cartesian Subject as locus of theory in the symmetry 
of equal and disymmetry of unequal selves, and in its dramrtic dy- 
namic) and Descombes traces the legacy of the famous cours through 
Sartre and Merleau Ponty's response to 'this question over the mid- 
century, to the 'structuralists' bringing-into-question of the 
pressupositions attendant on the linguistic locus of assertion of 
the phenomenological subject as primary locus of questioning and 
theory, of the circularity of the mid-century frame. The seventies 
evince a bringing-into-question, in turn, of the global 'structural' 
system of language in which as a sort of new version of subjectivity 
the old mid-century subject, and dynamic of Self and Other fr'med 
in relation to it, had been 'deconstructed' or dissolved or wh^tever. 
cccccclxxviii 
Now there are only incommensurable rEcits: yet another version of 
the constant figure, over the whole development of an old french 
subjectivism which goes back to Descartes and beyond. What, asks 
Descombes at the close, if one tried to bring into question, not 
successive versions of french subjectivism; but rather the primacy 
accorded to this subjective pole of the subject-object relation it- 
self. What if one began from the 'relativistic' (my term) invariants 
of the 'space' of different perspectives, on which the different per- 
spectives are different views, different versions of their difference? 
Yet in this recasting of (effectively) eidetic variation 
in the language of 'postmodernism' rather than husserlian phenomen- 
ology, there is no question of setting the theatrical dynamic of 
interplay of subjective 'versions' of the differences of those vers- 
ions of their interplay, in anything other than yet another reform- 
ulation of an abstract 'space' of theory, 'philosophy', texts and 
questioning of texts in other texts. No suggestion that the relat- 
ivistic questioning of the traditional 'subjective' space of reflect- 
ion, theory, 'versions' of theory and World, should itself be set 
in, say, a contextual dynamic of interaction of theoretical subject 
and Other or others in France over forty-five years; no suggestion 
that the abstract model of a city which is simply the constant or 
invariant in different perspectives on different perspectives 'of' 
that city of differences, is in fact Paris. 
That, then, is my question, which sets Vincent Descombes' 
h-. istory-of-philosophy abstracted from philosophy-of-history (except 
insofar as that appears as an 'internal' theme of philosophy over 
this period) in the 'analogical' cultural dynamic of that group 
of analogous logics of the doubling of the logical axis of questions 
in a figural dynamic of action (desire, will, or whatever), which 
I attempted to deconstruct as it were, in a structural analysis of 
'structuralism' as so many anlogous abstractions from their own 
embedding in the theatrical axis of french culture in the sixties 
and seventies... 
. ,w 
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1007 Structuralism ed Ehrmann (repr of Yale French Studies 36/7,1966) 
NY 1971 
1008 Structuralism: A Reader ed Lane London 1970 
1009 The Structuralist Controversy (Johns Hopkins Symposium 1966) 
ed Macksey & Donato Baltimore (1970)1972 
1010 Structuralism: An Introduction (Wolfson College Lectures 1972) 
ed Roby Oxford 1973 
1011 Quest-ce que le Structuralisme? ed Wahl Paris 1968 
1012 PIAGET, Jean' 
1013 CULLER, Jonathan-, 
Le Structuralisme (Paris 1968) tr 
London 19 
Structuralist Poetics Ithaca 1975 
Structure of structuralism... with its 'mythical' embedding in 
the canonical textual ancestry of Levi-Strauss' correlation of 
complementary linguistic and material 'exchange' in the common 
cultural matrix prefigured in Mauss' famous essay... 
1014 SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de Cours de Linguistigue Generale (ed from lects 
(d 1913) Geneva 1915) ed de Mauro Paris 1972 
1015 STAROBINSKI, Jean Les Mots sous les Mots: Les Anagrammes de 
Ferdinand de Saussure Paris 1971 
1016 HJELMSLEV, Louis Trolle (Prolegomena to a Theory of Langugge Copenhagen 
1943) fr tr 
1017 JAK0BS0N, Roman & Fundamentals of Language The Hague 1956 
HALLE, Morris 
1018 CHOMSKY, Noam Syntactic Structures 's-dravenhage 1957 
1019 Cartesian Linguistics NY 1966 
1020 Language and Mind NY'(1968) enlgd 1972 
1021 PROPP, Vladimir (Morphology of the Folk-Tale Moscow 19 ) 
fr tr 
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1022 MAUSS, Marcel Essai sur le Don Paris (1925) 19 
1023 MALINOWSKI, Bronislaw Myth in Primitive Psychology London 1926 
1024 The Father in Primitive Psychology London 1926 
1025 EVANS PRITCHARD, The Nuer Oxford 1940 
Edward 
1026 WHORFF, Benjamin Lee Language, Thought and Reality (19 -) sel 
& ed Carroll NY 1956 
The theorist should, I have suggested, elaborate a 'philosophy' 
articulated in a general analogy of the narrower worlds or cul- 
tures of the ethnologist, more on the lines of Malinowski's 'part- 
icipant observation', than on those of the abstract l4vi-straussian 
frame, embedding a World in a textual frame 'outside' the embedding 
of that textual frame in its World. My ethnology of structuralism 
involved several years fieldwork or 'participant observation', co- 
ordinating my position with those of others whose texts I have 
already listed - and theirs with those in interaction with whom- 
the 'positions' of sixties and 'seventies structuralism had been 
adopted.. and so on, back to the opening of the 'modern' phase of 
'french philosophy': 
1027 BERGSON, Henri Essai sur les Donn4es Immddiates de la 
Conscience 1889 
1028 L'Evolution Crdatrice 1907 
1029 POINCARE, Jules Henri La Science et 1'Hypothhse 1903 
1030 MARITAIN, Jacques Art et Scolastique 1927 
1031 GILSON, Etienne God and Philosophy (Yale lects 1940) 
New Haven 1941 
1031 SARTRE, Jean-Paul La Transcendance de 1'Ego (1936)1965 (75) 
1032 La Nausee 1938 
1033 Le Mur 1939 
1034 L'Etre et le Ndant 1943 tr Barnes NY 1957 (74) 
1035 Hula Clos 1944 
1036 Situations I-III (reptd from Temps Modernes) 
1947-9 
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1037 L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme 1946 
tr Manet London 1948 
1038 Les Mains Sales 1948 
1039 Critique de la Raison Dialectique 1960 
1040 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice Phdnomdnologie de la Perception 1945 
tr Smith London 1962 (73-4) 
1041 Signee (194 -) 1960 tr McLeary Evanston 19 
1042 Sena et Non-Sens 1948 tr Dreyfus Evanston 19 
1043 Eloge de la Philosophie (lecon inaugurale 1953) 
tr with other lects at Coll de Fr, with intr, 
Edie & Wild Evanston 1963 
1044 Le Prose du Monde (1969)tr O'Neill L 1974 
1045 CAMUS, Albert L'Etranger 1942 
1046 L' Homme Revolte 1951 
1047 BATAILLE, Georges Histoire de 1'Oeil (1927) with Madame Edwarda 
(1941-56) & La Mort (1967) 1973 (75-7) 
1048 L'Anus Solaire (19 ) in Oeuvres I 1970 
1049 La Part Maudite (19 ) with La Notion de D4pense 
(19 ) 1967 
1050 L'Exp4rience. sntdrieure (1943) rev 1954 
1051 Le Bleu du Ciel 
1052 Ma Mere 1966 (? 7) 
1053 Minotaure ed Bataille 193 - 
1054 BACHELARD, Gaston Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique 1934 (78) 
1055 La Psychanalyse du Feu 1937 
1056 La Poetique de 1'Espace 1957 (76) 
... In particular, I found my position in the 'theatrical' inter- 
action of the 'script' of dialogue about the overall action in 
which that 'philosophical' debate was one dimension, with other 
dimensions of the action, partly by reading the 'theory' of the 
'poetics' or figural side of the french language, and the parallel 
line of textual development in french poetry itself, as two sides 
of the same mallarmean coin, whose intersection, given currency 
cccccclxxxii 
by Val4ry and Bachelard in particular, I will here chart only 
on the 'theoretical' side: 
1057 RAYMOND, Marcel De Baudelaire au Surrealisme (1933) 1947 
tr London (1957)1970 (70) 
1058 BAUDELAIRE, Charles Oeuvres Completes ed Asselineau, intr Gautier 
1868-7o (78-9) 
1059 RIMBAUD, Arthur Oeuvres ed 1946 
1060 BLANCHOT, Maurice Lautr4amont et Sade 1949 
1061 MALLARME, Stdphane Poesies (1893; enlgd 1899) Comm Mauron tr Fry 
(d 1934) London 1936 (69-71) 
1061 Divagations (1897) ed & intr (75) 
1062 Oeuvres ed Mondor & Aubry 1945 
1063 MAURON, Charles Mal 1964 (75) 
1064 VALERY, Paul Oeuvres ed Heytier 1957-60 (78-9) 
1065 Char es (1917-22) comm Alain 1952 (78) 
1066 Paul Valery - Cahiezs du Sud Marseilles 1946 
1067 POULET, Georges Etudes sur le Temps Humain (I) Edinburgh 1949 
(79) 
1068 RICHARD, Jean-Pierre Po4sie et Profondeur (essays 19 -5 ) 1955 
1069 Les Chemins actuels de la Critique (C4risy colloque 1966) 
ed Poulet 1968 
If I now attempt to go against this current, and move back from 
Kojeve's co across the Rhine, setting these french positions 
in a wider matrix in which one may chart the transposition of 
nineteenth and twentieth-century german 'positions' into the text- 
ual and contextual dynamic of 'french philosophy' (Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, Brentano's pupils Husserl and Freud, Heidegger: the 
primary references of 'french' thought after Husserl's visit to 
Paris in 1930, Sartre's return from Berlin and Freiburg in 1932, 
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Kojeve's arrival in 1933... not to mention Breton's various im- 
portations of Dada, Freud and Marx), then the simple french line 
of development which couples 'theoretical' and practical (or poetic, 
or literary, or political) 'sides' of philosophical language, in 
the substitution of one parisian intellectual grouping and its 
ideological or 'media' profile for another, is discovered to trace 
its trajectory over the course of the century in a wider and more 
complex 'matrix' of interplay of different 'lines' of theory in 
various different dimensions of context... rather as the 'straight- 
forward' art-historical canon presented by the Ecole de Paris, in 
relation to which as central axis the history of 'modern art' is 
traditionally (already) traced, is in parallel manner seen to be 
a questionable abstraction from a more complex international web, 
whose other as it were missing pole must be located in german frag- 
mentation, or perhaps in the question of modern german art. 
Thus german-language 'philosophy' over the first thirty 
years of the century appears as merely one dimension in which var- 
ious theretical 'steps' may be assigned more complex coordinates, 
as with the turn-of-the-century breakdown of the earlier model of 
an abstr, -. ct logical embedding of the logical order of theory in the 
'contextual' dynamics of its World (seen in America in the emergence 
of Pragmatism, and in France, perhaps, in a shifting of the axis of 
theory towards the literary and ideological interface of 'logical' 
and 'poetic' or performative sides of language), the subordination 
of various more 'specific' domains of theory to the universal theory 
of philosophy comes into question, and philosophy emerges as 'science' 
or 'logic' or (phenomenological or meinongian) 'ontology' or various 
forms of 'psychology', or as a mere ancilla to theology or art or 
politics... or whatever. And the coherence of a german 'school', 
which is even before 1930 or 1933 'problematic' (that is to say, 
it constitutes, and is itself constituted by a question... just as 
had been Luther or Fichte's 'German Nation' for centuries before), 
becomes after the visits, say, of Ayer and Quine to Vienna, and 
the emigration of Wittgenstein in 1930 followed by the great in- 
tellectual diaspora of 1933, the dispersal of this german questioh, 
its infection of other questions, so to speak, parallel with the 
infection of the political questions facing other nations by a 
'german question'. 
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Thus I will group a fairly wide range of 'german' steps in 
various 'dimensions' of theory and context, before and after 
around 1930, simply according to an often fairly random break- 
down of the complex interplay of various textual and contextu-l 
coordinates of these various 'steps' marked by so many books, 
into a few 'groups' of moves, with varying degrees of coherence. 
Some 'german philosophy' will appear with an 'interriationnl' group 
of books of 'logic' or 'physics' of 'psychology' or whatever else, 
some 'german' writers will be grouped in a german 'school' or in 
german schools (Vienna Circle, Frankfurt School and so on) before 
around 1930, and in american or british 'schools' afterwards; and 
some residents of America over the mid-century will be taken to 
belong to that old german tradition of taking part in germnn deb-tes 
and their dynamic from 'outside' the physical space of 'Germany'. 
1070 HUSSERL, Edmund Logische Untersuchungen (Halle 1900-1,1913-21)tr 
Findlay London 1970; Zr tr 
1071 
_12, 
ie Idee der Phänomenologie (lect 1907) 
tr 
1072 Vorlesungen Uber das inneren Zeitbewusstsein 
(1905710) ed Heidegger ( 1928) tr 
fr tr Dussort Paris 19 
1073 Ideen zu einer reine Phänomenologie und phäno- 
menologische Philosophie ( 1913) 
tr Gibson London/NY (1931. )1952 
1074 Formale und Transzendentale Logik 1929) 
tr 
1075 Cartesianische. Meditationen (1930 Paris lects) 
tr Levinas Paris 1931 
1076 Der Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale PhHnomenologie (1935 
Prague lecta, 'lji'" 1970 
1077 PIVCEVIL, E Husserl and Phenomenology London 1970 
cccccclxxxv 
1078 CASSIRER, Ernst Mythos und Sprache (Berlin 1925) tr & intr 
Langer NY 1946 
1079 SCHLICK, Moritz Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre Berlin 1918 
1080 Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (Vienna 1929) 
tr 
1081 LUKACS, Georg Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (Berlin 1923) 
tr London (1967)1971 
1082 MANNHEIM, Karl, Ideologie und Utopie (bonn 1929) tr Wirth & 
Shils London 1936 
108 BÜBNER, Rudiger Modern German Philosophy London 197 
1084 HEIDEGGER, Martin Sein und Zeit. Erste Helfte (Halle 1927,195 ) 
tr Macquarrie & Robinson London 1962 
1085 Was ist Metaphysik? Tubingen (1929)1949 
1086 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (lects 1930-2) 
(Tubingen 1943) 
1087 Der Selbstbehauptung der deutschen UniversitHt 
(Freiburg 1934) fr tr 
1088 Einführung in der Metaphysik (lects 1935) 
(Tubingen 1953) tr Manheim New Haven 1959 
1089 Zur Seinsfrage 
1090 Brief aber den Humanismus (1946) Tübingen 1949 
1091 Existence and Being tr of (I)& Hdlder- 
lin und das Wesen der Dichtung (1936) with intr. 
Brock London 1949 
1092 Identität und Differenz Tubingen 1957; tr 
Stambaugh 
1093 Gelassenheit 
cccccclxxxvi 
1094 Nietzsche (Pfilllingen 1961) fr tr Klossowski 
Paris 19 
1095 The End of Philosophy: tr of pärt of Nietzsche, 
prefatory interview with Heidegger, & notes 
from 1936-46, Stambaugh NY 1973 
1096 Questions III ( Paris 1966 
1097 Zur Sache des Denkens"(19 -) Tubingen 1969 
1098 Questions IV'(196 -7 )ed &. tr Beaufret & alia 
Paris 1976 
1099 -& FINK, Eugen Heraklit .r 
1100 - 
1101 - 
1102 GADAMER, Hans-Georg Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen 1960,1961) tr 
' Bardon & Cumming NY 1975 
1103 SCHUTZ, Alfred Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Vienna 
1932) tr Walsh & Lehnert London 1967 
1104 LUCKMANN, Thomas & The Social Construction of Reality NY 1966 
BERBER, Peter 
1105 BENJAMIN, Walter Illuminations (1923-40) tr Zohn, intr Arendt 
(NY 1968) London 1973 
1106 MARCUSE, Herbert Reason and Revolution NY(1941)1954 
1107 One-Dimensional Man Boston 1964 
1108 HABERMAS, Jurgen Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt 1968) 
tr Shapiro Boston 1971 
1109 
11'10 Habermas and Modernity ed & intr Bernstein Cambridge 1985 
1111 HOLUB, Robert C Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction 
London/NY 1984 
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Reception Theory: an inscription and comprehension of the relat- 
ions of text and context in a dynamics of context and a context- 
ual rather than textual axis of a textual 'tradition'- this rather 
than the french figure of a textual framing of the figural em- 
bedding of text in a context which is itself understood as 'more 
general' textuality. And the basic context for understanding 
'german thought' in the twentieth century might be taken as its 
own 'reception' in Europe and in american and slav interfaces of 
Europe and World to the West and the East. Holub considers not 
only the dynamics of reception of 'Rezeptionsasthetik' in Germany 
itself, but also that of its assimilation to 'pragmatist' dynamics 
of 'reader-response' by Stanley Fish and others in America. 
Twenty years earlier Herbert Spiegelberg had sought to 
frame the reception of 'Phenomenology' - or rather of the 'Phenom- 
enological Movement' organised largely as european responses to 
or reception of Husserl - in the pragmatic dynamic of american 
theory... framing thereby his own american position as that adapt- 
ation of the range of european 'phenomenologiesI to the analogical 
and 'practical' or pragmatic dynamic of the history of theory, which 
is both his own 'phenomenology', and also the frame of his history 
of phenomenology as 'phenomenology of phenomenology'. This would 
allow a general programme of introduction of (continental) european 
philosophy into the frame and dynamic of american philosophy, since 
as the head of the Division for Cultural Cooperation of the newly 
formed UN's 'cultural' section (UNESCO) reported from postwar 
France in 1950: 
Any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and ex- 
press itself in, phenomenological method... The average am- 
erican student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent vol- 
ume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must 
first learn the 'tricks' of the phenomenological trade and 
then translate as best he can the real import of what is said 
into the kind of analysis with which he is familiar.. (1) 
1: (1112) p xxi 
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Spiegelberg opens his historical phenomenology of 
phenomenology by framing its own position in the history it re- 
constructs as response to the situation marked by this report. 
His book.. 
1112 SPIEGELBERG, Herbert The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical 
Introduction The Hague (1959) rev with sup- 
plement 1964 
.. opens: 
The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical 
reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history 
itself has a history which is pertinent to its objective.. 
... and turning to the body of the book one can place Spiegel- 
berg's response to the UNESCO report in the more detailed dynamic 
of his own trajectory in the 'Movement': born in 1904, studying 
under Husserl in 1924-5, a_. member of the Munich circle around 
PfUnder, until leaving for America in 1937, as he also moved further 
than Pffnder from 'pure' phenomenology towards a philosophical 
inscription of philosophy in the ethical axis of 'practical reason' 
and human interaction (1). A 'practical' phenomenology may itself 
be abstracted from coordinating historical 'appearances' of phenom- 
enology itself, rather as 'pure' early phenomenology discovered the 
objective noematic correlate of a perception in an invariance in or 
'behind' its various appearances, and 'essences' in the analogous 
Gedankenexperimenten of eidetic variation... 
Phenomenology itself is given through various appearances. 
In fact there is room for something like a phenomenology of 
phenomenology. (2) 
Thus the close of the original edition finds the 'essence' 
of phenomenology - or rather 'The Essentials of the Method' - in 
a sort of circular exemplification of this frame of which the dif- 
ferent appearances of phenomenology are-. so many analogues, in its 
self-abstraction from different versions of it by organising those 
as so many views on the frame of phenomenological activity, from 
1: pp 194-5 2: p xxvii 
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particular points in that common space, or rather in the space 
and time of that action or activity, the 'phenomenological move- 
ment' in which they all share. 
Now this passage from consciousness or perception to 
action as primary frame of questioning is characteristic of the 
mid-century as a whole, and one might see the sartrian dramatis- 
ation of consciousness in the primary affective axis of relations 
with others or the Other, say, and a contemporary british reduct- 
ion of 'the subject' to a mere element in the script of interaction 
which makes perfect dramatic or practical sense without the sup- 
position of any 'ghost', 'behind' this machinery, any more than of 
an identical consciousness behind the words of Hamlet as we read 
them on the printed page, as two poles of a common mid-century 
figure, whose relation may be guaged by Passmore's... phenomenology.. 
of the affective dynamic in which the distance between british 
common sense interaction, and the affective hyperbole across the 
water it so abhors (to the point of non-communication, or - profess- 
ional - non-interaction) is articulated: 
Professional philosophers, for the most part dismiss "Exist- 
entialism with a contemptuous shrug... it stands, to British 
philosophers, for Continental excess and rankness... But to 
give a sketch may at least bring into focus that fundamental 
opposition between British and Latin-Teutonic philosophy on 
which I have several times insisted, but in somewhat general 
terms... 
... If most British philosophers are convinced that Continental 
metaphysics is arbitrary, pretentious, and mind-destroying, 
Continental philosophers are no less confident that empiricism 
is philistine, pedestrian, and soul-destroying. (1) 
This sketch is added as an 'appendix to the second (1966) edit- 
ion of the survey first published in 1957: 
1113 PASSMORE, John A Hundred Years of Philosophy London (1957' 
1966 
1: pp 476-7 
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This mid-century non-communication may be seen, on the british 
side as the culmination of that interwar reaction against the 
turn of the century thegelian' reaction against nineteenth-century 
empiricism and natural science, which defines 'current' british 
philosophy (as opposed to the 'history' of the earlier 'empiricism' 
of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Mill) as the arena of debate opened up 
by Russell and Moore at the beginning of the century. The transition 
from old empiricism to new, through turn-of-the-century 'neo-idealism' 
frames Metz' history: 
1114 METZ, Rudolf Die philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart 
in Grossbritannien (Leipzig 1935) tr (as A 
Hundred Years of British Philosophy) 
London 1935 
.. structured rather according to the systematic 'continental' 
principles of Ueberweg, than the more 'empirical' approach of 
Passmore. The interwar transition may be seen taking shape in 
the regrouping and transformation of the dynamics of the debate 
marked by: 
1115 Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements ed Muirhead 
London 1924-5 
.. whose second volume is dedicated to Bradley, who had refused 
the honour the previous year, but died in the meantime; perhaps 
he realised that by putting him thus at the head of the collection, 
his successors were putting him, so to speak, behind them. 
This interwar withdrawal from the international philo- 
sophical scene may be coupled not only with an affective axis of 
distancing from 'the Continent', but with growing political and 
economic isolation on the world stage, after a dominant role in 
the aftermath of French and Industrial Revolutions in the nineteenth 
century: 
1116 ROBBINS, Keith The Eclipse of a Great Power: Modern Britain 
1870-1975 London 1983 
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I have deliberately chosen to be insular... my criterion was: 
to what extent have the ideas of this writer entered into the 
public domain of philosophical discussion in England? Would 
the reader of Mind or the Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society be likely to encounter his name? (1) 
... And even for Passmore to attempt to frame the framework of 
debate in Mind and PAS as a 'history' of discussions about the 
standard timeless, ahistorical, apolitical, scenario of an individ- 
ual's confrontation with a few other individuals and a few things 
or stage-properties in an otherwise unspecified situation of 'per- 
ception', 'knowledge', 'other minds', 'causation' (and*a few other 
variants in the standard repertory of 'The N dramatic situations' 
of british philosophy) is perhaps rather eccentric in 1957 (but then 
he is an australian). For the complementarity of the 'current' 
debate waged by the professional successors of Russell and Moore 
in 'the public domain of philosophical discussion in England', and 
the 'arbitrary, pretentious and mind-destrying' books of continental 
system (in which the elementary or amateur dramatics of everday 
language is abstracted from to frame almost unheard of situations 
in the global frame of a text in which the writer's own position 
in history is itself a primary coordinate) involves the abstraction 
of the frame of 'current' or timeless british debate, together with 
that of its primal scene (Is this table really there, and is that 
other person really a person like me, and am I not only dreaming 
all this anyway) precisely from the complementary french and ger- 
man manners of posing the question of the closure of a system of 
systematic questioning or philosophy as the radical question of 
the configuration of its framing in the World the philosopher 
frames - whether this be posed by Sartre as the question of the 
Subject as primary locus of assertion or response to the question 
of such radical circularity, or by Heidegger as the Seinefrage to 
which Dasein can autheitically respond only (in Stoic or nietzschean 
manner) by asserting his own assertion to partake of the radical 
self-assertion of 'objective' Being. The moral of the british 
debate is to abstract from such an abstract systematic or global 
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frame of questions to the interplay of elementary 'parts' and 
analogous or correlative sorts of thing (impersonal variables) 
in the abstracted little scenario of 'speech-act' or 'language- 
game' -a little 'play' so to speak with its finite range of 
terms and corresponding finitary combinatorics of possible vari- 
ations, sets of 'substitutions' within finite specifiable syntax 
or 'rules'. The part of 'philosophers, elucidating questions in 
term of the elementary dramatics of the specific situations in 
which they arise (reflected in the particular terms whose extra- 
polation'from such practical dynamics generates the 'problems of 
philosophy'), is then implicitly or explicitly identified in a 
similar elementary scenario -a game, so to speak, whose rules 
may be discovered in the dynamics of questioning or debate, the 
interplay or competition of different framings of various such 
elementary scenarios, in the instituted textual space of Mind, 
PAS and the other journals... 
1117 Mind 
1118 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (& suppis) 
1119 Philosophical Quarterly 
1120 Journal of Philosophy 
1121 Philosophical Review 
1122 Philosophy 
1123 Analysis 
1124 British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 
1125 American Philosophical Quarterly 
1126 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
.... and so on. The abstraction of this 'scholastic' frame of 
debate or interaction, together with the elementary actions or 
interactions which provide its subject-matter, from the practical 
interface of the 'elementary' activity of debate on the one hand, 
and its practical institution in a historical and social context 
which is as it were the sum of interactions of the 'elementary' 
scenarios themselves is so to speak the british institution of 
'philosophy' in a social order 'conservatively' framed as a wider 
interplay of coordinate 'parts', into which the study of philosophy 
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enters as one component in the traditional access to the theatre 
of government. It thus complements Dewey's american institution, 
framed as access to that democracy descibed by Tocqueville in which 
each participant is, ideally, the locus of free substitution of any 
one part in the symmetric interplay for any other. Thus american 
philosophy is instituted, like its british counterpart, in a dyn- 
amic of debate in the periodical 'literature', but modelled on a 
'scientific' programme in which each paper addresses some particular 
question within the overall project of framing in ordinary language 
the gradual articulation of that language within a universal formal 
system of questions. And it is in the complementary british and 
american abstractions from the 'continental' dynamic of books, texts, 
framing an individual philosopher's 'position' as that point in 
what it frames where the whole is framed - either a british abstract- 
ion to an elementary scenario (of which the scenario of 'philosophy' 
is one particular case), or an american abstraction to a universal 
'scientific' frame as directing ideal for coordinating the reduced 
components or 'elements' of particular situations * that the gradual 
emergence of an interplay of british and american 'papers' in the 
english-language philosophical journals after the war may be articu- 
lated, as I suggested in Part III. Thus Passmorets second edition 
of his history has two appendices: that devoted to 'Existentialism' 
already noted, and another surveying the emerging anglo-american 
debate. Furthermore, I suggested that that 'debate' or rather, 
as pursued by Strawson and Quine, then Dummett and Davidson, that 
dialogue des sourds between two philosophical institutions 'separ- 
ated by a common language', could only be resolved by being addressed 
to the textual order of the debate itself, rather than to comple- 
mentary approaches to the 'elementary' situations of language-use 
abstracted from the more complex pragmatics of a whole theory, a 
'text' - and in particular to the theories, and their textual pre- 
sentation, of what must ultimately be construed as their own 'ele- 
mentary' textual and contextual components. I further suggested 
that with the transition towards discussion of more complex lingu- 
istis structures, and their 'pragmatics' after around 1970, one 
could trace also a move towards a coupling of the anglo-american 
debate with the complementary franco-german questions of 'textual 
pragmatics' -a coupling typified most obviously by Rorty's papers 
and book of the 'seventies - and that one could further construe 
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the interplay thus opening up in the nineteen-seventies as the 
initial phase of a transition into the dramatic 'space' of quest- 
ioning marked by this inquiry. 
The dynamic of coupling of british and american 'debates' 
after mid-century may be traced within the 'scholastic' or 'scient- 
fic' interplay of 'papers' through those various groupings of 'land- 
mark' papers under the heads of various questions that constitute 
so many axes or dimensions of the overall exchange, which became 
after midcentury-"the primary 'texts' for the study of philosophy 
as instituted in Britain - and one might head the list with Ryle's 
own grouping of papers which together mark the midcentury transition 
itself: 
1127 The Revolution in Philosophy ed Ryle 1956 
1128 Logic and Language ed Flew 1951-66 
1129 Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing ed Swartz London 1965 
1130 Minnesota Readings in the Philosophy of Science ed Tarski & Suppes (I) 
II: ed Feigl, Scriven, Maxwell Minneapolis 
19 ; 1972 
1131 Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ed Lakatos & Musgrave 
London 1970 
1132 The Mind-Brain Identity Theory ed Borst London 19 
1133 The Private Language Argument 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy: 
ed Jones London 1971 
(publ London) 
1134 Philosophy of Perception ed Warnock 1967 
1135 Knowledge and Belief ed Griffiths 1967 
1136 Ethics ed Foot 1967 
1137 Philosophy of Logic ed Strawson 1967 
ccccccxcv 
1138 Philosophy of Science ed Nidditch 1968 
1139 Philosophy of Language ed Searle 1971 
1140 Reference and Modality ed Linsky 1971 
1141 Philosoph y of Mathematics ed 1972 
1142 Semantics of Natural Language ed Davidson & Harman Dordrecht 1972 
1143 Truth and Meaning ed Evans and MacDowell Oxford 1976 
The last two, the 'landmark' collections of what I have described 
as"the opening of a new phase of 'the anglo-american debate' after 
around 1970, together with the Lakatos and Musgrave collection, 
also mark a change so to speak in the 'institution' of the debate 
insofar as the papers were assembled as invited contributions to 
the 'question' announced by the titles - addressed, then, to the 
whole structure of the debate, as characterised by those titles, 
rather than assembled a posteriori from some unforced natural evo- 
lution of questioning in 'the literature' over the years. 
Let me set these more or less 'canonical' coordinates 
of the transition around 1970 from the mid-century 'revolution' 
towards my projected coordination of the two sides of the anglo- 
american debate with the two sides of a franco-german axis of phi- 
losophy, in the wider context of the angloamerican dynamic of 
questioning , taking up the- British.. 'sequence of texts where. I 
left it around 1900, and the americancwhere I left it with Dewey's 
systematisation of 'Experience and Nature' toward 1930, preparing 
the reception in America for the logical and physical 'systems' of 
Carnap and others, as Wittgenstein and Popper - for reasons not 
uncorrelated with their theoretical differences with Carnap and 
the other refugees to America - chose England: 
1144 RUSSELL, Bertrand An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 
Cambridge 1897 
1145 Logic and Knowledge (papers &c 1901-50) 
ed Marsh London 1956 (75-6) 
ccccccxcvi 
1146 The Principles of Mathematics Cambridge (1903) 
1950 
1147 Mysticism and Logic (papers 19 - )London 1918 
1148 The Problems of Philosophy London 1912 
1149 Roads to Freedom London 1918 
1150 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy 
London 1919 
1151 The Analysis of Mind London 1921 
1152 Power London 1938 
1153 Autobiography London 1967-9 
1154 The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell ed Schilpp Evanston (1944)1963 
1155 MOORE, George Edward Philosophical Studies (papers -) 
London 1922 
1156 Principia Ethica Cambridge 0903)1954 
1157 Philosophical Papers (192 -) London 1959 
1158 WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig Notebooks 1914-16 ed with tr Anscombe & 
von Wright Oxford 1961 
1159 Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (1918, ptd 
Berlin 1921) ed with tr Ogden, intr Russell 
London (1922)1955; tr Pears & McGuinness 1961 
Zr tr Klossowski Paris 19 
1160 Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis'(notes of 
discussions, recorded by Waismann, 192 -) 
ed Schulte & McGuinness Oxford 1967 tr 1979 
1161 Zettel ed with. tr Anscombe & von Wright 
Oxford 1967 
1162 The Blue and Brown Books (dictated to students 
1933-5) 
ccccccxcvii 
1163 Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psy- 
chology and Religious Belief ed Barrett 
Oxford 1966 
1164 Philosophische Untersuchungen (I: 1936-45 
II: 1947-9) ed with tr Anscombe, Rhees, von 
Wright Oxford (1953)1967 
1165 Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations (papers) ed Pitcher 
London/NY 1966 
1166 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik 
(1937-44) ed with tr Anscombe, Rhees, von 
Wright Oxford 1956 
1167 Über Gewissheit (1950-1) ed with tr Anscombe 
& von Wright Oxford 1969 
1168 MALCOLM, Norman Wittg enstein: a Memoir (with von Wright's bio- 
graphical sketch) London (1958) 1966 
1169 PEARS, David Wittg enstein London 19 
1170 KENNY, Anthony Wittg enstein London 1973 
1171 BOUVERESSE, Jacques Witt genstein: La Rime et la Raison Paris 1973 
1172 Le M ythe de l'Intiriorit6 Paris 1976 
1173 COLLINGWOOD, Robin Speculum Mentis Oxford 1924 
George 
1174 An Autobiography London 1939 
1175 The Idea of Nature ed Knox Oxford 1945 
1176 PRICE, Harry Perception London (1932) 1954 
11? 7 AYER, Alfred Jules Language, Truth and Logic (London 1936) 
rev Harmondsworth 1946 
1178 Philosophical Essays 
1179 The Problem of Knowledge London 1956 
1180 The Concept of a Person and Other Essays 
(195 -) London 1963 
ccccccxcviii 
1181 WISDOM, John 
1182 RYLE, Gilbert 
1183 
1184 
Other Minds 
Collected Papers London 1971 
The Concept of Mind London 1949 
Dilemmas Cambridge 1954 
1185 AUSTIN, John Langshaw Philosophical Papers Oxford 1961 
1186 Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford lects in 1950s) 
ed Warnock Oxford 1962 
1187 How to do Things with Words (Harvard lects 
1955) ed Urmson Oxford 1962 
1188 STRAWSON, Peter F Logico-Linguistic Papers (1950- ) London 1971 
1189 Introduction to Logical Theory London 1952 
1190 Individuals London 1959 
1191 Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar 
London 197 
1192 HAMPSHIRE, Stuart Thought and Action London 1959 
1193 HARE, Richard The Language of Morals Oxford 1952 
1194 GEACH, Peter Mental Acts London 1957 
0 
1195 DUMMETT, Michael Truth and Other Enigmas (papers 1955-7') 
London 1978 
1196 Frege: Philosophy of Language London 1974 
1197 QUINTON, Anthony The Nature of Things Lohdon 1973 
1198 MACKIE, JL 
These last three books might be taken as indicative of the trans- 
ition around 1970, or the close of a previous phase, in their 
common character as attempts to give a more or less systematic 
conspectus of the anglo-american debate around 1970. 
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1199 CARNAP, Rudolf Der Logische Syntax der Sprache (Vienna 1934) 
tr Smeaton London 1937 
1200 Meaning and Necessity Chicago (1947)1956 
1221 MORRIS, Charles W Foundations of the Theory of Signs Chicago 1938 
1222 QUINE, Willard van --iFrom a Logical Point of View+(papers 19 -) 
Cambridge Mass 1953 
1223 Methods of Logic NY (1950) rev 1972 
1224 Word and Objects Cambridge Mass 1960 
1225 Ontological Relativity and Other Essays 
(papers 19 -) NY 1969 
1226 Set Theory and its Logic Cambridge Mass(1 
1227 -& ULLIAN, Joseph The Web of Belief NY 19 
1228 GOODMAN, Nelson The Structure of Appearance 
Cambridge Mass 1951 
1229 Fact, Fiction and Forecast London 1954 
1230 NAGEL, Ernst The Structure of Science NY 1961 
1231 HEMPEL, Carl Aspects of Scientific Explanation 
NY 1965 
1232 SEARLE, John R 
1233 RAWLS, John 
1234 BERNSTEIN, Richard 
1235 FEYERA13E D, Paul 
1236 PUTNAM, Hilary 
Speech Acts Cambridge 1969 
A Theory of Justice Cambridge Mass 1971 
Praxis and Action 1971 
Against Method' London 1975 
Reason, Truth and History Cambridge 1981 
1237 RORTY, Richard Consequences of Pragmatism (papers 19 
Minneapolis 1982 
1238 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
Princeton 1979 
cc ccccc 
This leaves, I find, a small residue of texts which 
for one reason or another did not seem to fit very well in the 
main sequences. I have already noted the form taken by that 
british 'history of philosophy' typified by Bennett's LockeBerke- 
leyandHume which amounts to the mere mapping of the old empiricism 
into the current linguistic variety, echoing as it were the abstract- 
ion of the latter from systematic and historical context, in a sort 
of sytematic historical abstraction of the british tradition from 
the questions of system and history that, over the turn of the 
century, marked the historical transition, via Hegel, from the 
'historian's' to the current 'philosopher's' empiricism.. Over 
the mid-century a naturalised Popper defended his adopted 'context' 
against any embedding in a systematic textual system, any 'science' 
of history and society (in which the texts of philosophy, for example, 
might be themselves embedded as components in typically 'continental' 
manner), by writing a rather unscientific history of the practical 
consequences of trying to organise activity within such a closed 
procrustean frame, on the continent of Europe from which he had 
had to escape in order to carry on his own questioning of the con- 
verse process of opening things up, which was questioning itself, 
systematised as 'science'. I have noted in the main text the 
ironically rather closed character of the group of 'popperian's' 
around him at the LSE, and their BJPS (yet another instance of 
'dogmatic scepticism'). One might take the two 'points' marked 
over the midcentury by: 
1239 POPPER, Karl The Open Society and its Enemies 
London (1945) 1966 
1240 WINCH, Peter The Idea of a Social Science London 1958 
... as 
defining the axis of a debate which may be retrospectively 
linked to the dominant sequence listed above, as leading eventually 
into the space opened up by Putnam, Rorty and others in the 'seven- 
ties', whose links with the continental axis rejected by Popper - 
and with the german debate over Popper's position itself in the 
'sixties - may perhpas best be mzrked in the England of the 'eighties 
by Anthony Giddens at Cambridge. 
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... Then Putnam appears again, now as editor of the 
standard collection of 'landm^rk' papers on the borderline be- 
tween 'international' mathematical logic from the turn of the 
century, and the vrrious national schools of philosophy which 
may be associated with the various different orientations m? rked 
by: 
1241 Philosophy of Mathematics ed Benacceraf & Putnam Englewood Cliffs 
.. to which may be added as an appendix the only one of the 
four 
papers representing the 'principal approaches' to the 'foundations 
of mathematics' solicited by the editors of Erkenntnis in 1930 not 
here reprinted: 
1242 MANNOURY, G (The Signific Foundations of Mathematics) 
fr tr 
(the others being logicist (Carnap), formalist (Von Neumann) and 
Intuitionist (Heyting)). These papers might be supplemented fur- 
ther by: 
1243 Readings in Philosophical Analysis ed Feigl & Sellars NY 1949 
1244 BETH, Ewart W The Foundations of Mathematics Amsterdam 1951 
1245 BLACK, Max The Nature of Mathematics London 1953 
1246 LAKATOS, Imre Proofs and Refutations (1963-4) ed Worrall & 
Zahar Cambridge 1976 
... so that we end up once more at the LSE with the BJPS... but 
this time with as it were the complementary mathematical formul- 
ation of the essential open-ness of the scientific project of 
specifying in informal language the meaning of the mathematical 
symbolism in whose frame that same informal language is to be 
analysed, rather than with the popperian history of the analogous 
project of reconstructing 'informal' open society within some 
global 'scientific' frame which is itself more or less informally 
specified within the truer and wider open dynamic it would con- 
strain. And here we are back not only with Putnam at-the opening', 
of this short section, and at the close of the american sequence, 
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but also, so to speak, with Carnap and Neurath's project of 
Unified Science at the opening of the american sequence, with 
Neurath's figure, quoted by Quine as device of Word and Object, 
of that project as like that of a sailor who must take apart and 
reconstruct his boat at sea, and with Dummett nt the close of the 
british sequence, with the essentially open character of mathe- 
matical construction, systematically formulated by Brouwer (for 
example in (1241)) and his successors, presented as frame of an 
equally open world - in which 'Truth' marks only an orientation 
or indeed many orientations of resolving, responding to, what 
opens up and is marked as a question, rather than some closed and 
complete topology of what is 'contained' in The Truth, and what 
excluded... just as those things 'behind' our limited information 
to which we refer truth and falsity are themselves in many ways 
essentially open or indeterminate, waiting to be further determined, 
rather than fully definite and defined 'in themselves'. And now 
we are back, even, with various 'continental' figures of the essen- 
tial 'open-ness associated with the configuration of a 'theory' 
which in framing a 'world' necessarily frames itself as part of 
that world: the figure of the self, as locus of that framing, as 
sartrian trou, as primary question supplanting cartesian doubt in 
its place of evoking the primary figure of response, assertion it- 
self, in which the very account of this configuration must itself 
be framed; or the complementary primacy of the Question of Being, 
Being as the radical Question, frame of the 'world', and our resp- 
onse to our situation 'here' in it; or with Derrida's question of 
the language in which the unitary (transcendental' space, and its 
temporal orientation towards Truth, in which that language itself is 
to be analysed and reconstructed, is itself framed; or Lyotard's 
multiplicity of incommensurable orientations in language and its 
pragmatic embedding as one component in the configuration of 
action it frames; or Habermas' project of coordination of such 
orientations in terms of the primary coordinates of 'action' as 
such... 
... All of which may serve to coordinate, or rather pose 
the question of the coordination of all of these 'philosophy' books 
with the historical configuration of various 'points' in 'cultural 
space' in the twentieth century, where a mathematical 'language' 
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evolved from pythagorean 'number' and its 
figuration of 'points', 'markst, 'signs', 
and set like that ' figurate numl 
ordinates of text and context, frames the 
space of substitution, and the 'external' 
that textual and contextual configuration 
is supposed in principle embedded: 
manipulation as con- 
' units' , 
Der' in 'informal' co- 
'internal' logical 
physical space in which 
of the mathematical frrime 
1247 From Frege to Gddel. A Source-Book in Mathematical Logic 1879-1931 
ed Van Heijenoort Cambridge 1967 
'1246 The Undecidable ed Davis Hewlett NY 1965 
1249 NAGEL, Ernst & 
NEWMAN, JR 
1250 HILBERT, David 
1251 
125.2 -& ACKERMANN, W 
1253 -& BERNAYS, Paul 
Gddel's Proof NY 1958 
Die Grundlagen der Geometrie (Leipzig 1899) 
tr Chicago 1902 
Mathematische Probleme (presidential address to 
Intnl Congress of Mathematicians, Paris 1900) 
Berlin 1900 
Grundzüge der Theoretische Logik Berlin(1928) 
1949; tr NY 1950 
Grundlagen der Mathematik Berlin 1934-9 
1251+ RUSSELL, Bertrand & Principia Mathematics Cambridge 1910-13, rev 
WHITEHEAD, Alfred N 1925-7; to *56 London 1962 
1255 TARSKI, Alfred Logic, Semantics, hetamathematics (papers 
1923-38) tr Woodger Oxford 1956 
1256 Introduction to Logic NY (1941)1965 
1257 LEWIS, Clarence Irving Symbolic Logic NY 1932 
& LANGrORD CH 
1258 KLEENE, SC Introduction to Metamathematicd Princeton 1952 
1259 ACKERMANN, W Solvable Cases of the Decision Problem 
Amsterdam 1954 
'1260 HEYTING, Arendt Intuitionism Amsterdam 1956 
dcciv 
1261 CURRY, Haskell BB Amsterdam 
1262 ROBINSON, Abraham Non-Standard Analysis Amsterdam 1966 
1263 HUGHES, GF& An Introduction to Modal Logic London 1968 
CRESSWELL, MJ 
1264 BELL, SC& Models and Ultraproducts London 1969 
SLOMSON AB 
1265 SCHOENFIELD' Joseph R Mathematical Logic Reading Mass 1967 
1266 ARBIB, James A Arrows, Structures end Functions NY 197 
1267 LAWVERE, F'William An Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets 
Chicago 196 
1268 Toposes, Algebraic Geometry and Logic (conference Halifax NS 1971) 
ed Lawvere Berlin/NY 1972 
1269 Das Relitivitdtsprinzip. Ein Sammlung von Abhandlungen (Einstein, 
Minkowski, Lorentz) ed & ann Sommerfeld, intr 
Blumenthal (Leipzig 1913; enlgd 19 ) Einstein 
& Minkowski papers tr Saha & Bose Calcutta 
1920; all papers tr Jeffery & Perrett (London 
1922) NY 19 
1270 EINSTEIN, Albert Die Relativitätstheorie 03erlin 1917) 
enlgd, tr Lawson London 1920 
1271 Xther und Relativitatstheorie Berlin 1920 
1272 The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton lects 1921) 
tr Adams London 1922; finnl enlgd ed 1953 
1273 Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist ed Schilpp Evanston 1951 
1274 DE SITTER, Willem 
1275 EDDINGTON, Arthur 
Stanley 
1276 WEYL, Hermann 
On Einstein's Theory of Gravitation and its 
Astronomical Consequences London 1916-17 
Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation 
London 1918, enlgd 1920 
Raum-Zeit-Materie (Berlin 1918) tr Brose 
(London 192 ) NY 19 
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1277 PLANCK, Max Zur Theorie des Gesetzes der Energieverteilung 
in Normalspektrum Leipzig 1900 
1278 Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie Leipzig 1948 
1279 THOMSON, Joseph John The Conduction of Electricity through Gases 
Cambridge 1903 
1280 SOMMERFELD, Arnold Atombau und Spektrallinien (Braunschweig 1919) 
tr Brose London 1923 
1281 DIRiC, Paul The Principles of Quantum Mechanics 
Cambridge (1930)1956 
1282 FEYNMAN, Richard P, The Feynman Lectures on Physics 
LEIGHTON, R B, & 
SANDS, M Reading Mass 
1963-5 
1283 WHEELER, John Archibald Geometrodynamics NY 1962 
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Around the turn of the century the 'aristotelian' topology of 
an abstract physical 'space' of points in which the 'observer' 
could be subsequently set 'at' some point, and the complementary 
aristotelian logic of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' in a universal 
abstract 'logical space' modelled on this, as 'intensional' in- 
clusion of one concept or predicate in or under another (rather 
than 'extensional' inclusion of a point in a set of points) come 
'into question'. By around 1970 the logical and physical sym- 
metries 'classically' expressed in abstraction from the practical 
dynamic of positing the mark or point textually and contextually 
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'in place of' what I have called a 'transitive' locus of sub- 
sitution of word or thing in text or context - allowing the elab- 
oration of a mathematical 'theory' of logic or physics as comple- 
mentary systems of universal constraints on or symmetries of 'any' 
textual or contextual substitution - in terms of universal 'internal' 
and 'external' textual and contextual 'spaces' in which all texts 
and contexts might be 'in principle' embedded and formally recon- 
structed', have been expressed 'in terms of' Grothendieck's theory 
of 'topoi', as rather systems of symmetries or constraints govern- 
ing the essentially 'local' dynamic of embedding some specific and 
only partially defined configuration of terms in some wider but 
still specific and not fully determinate extension. Logical and 
physical symmetries of or constraints on the 'space' of symbolic 
(linguistic) and physical 'substitution' ara articulated rather in 
the constraints on the dynamics of a questioning which arises from 
or opens out of a specific situation or configuration of components: 
constraints on the range of possible embeddings of the terms and 
relations that model (or are substituted for) a configuration of 
action or interaction of the components they model, in some wider 
configuration, as constraints on the structure of logical and phys- 
ical axes of 'transition' from one situation to another. Yet around 
1970 thin embedding of the old 'classical' spaces and times of logic 
and physics abstracted from - so to speak 'reified' behind - the 
informal or practical dynamics of substitutions and questions, in 
the not fully specified situations in which questions arise, is 
still expressed as a mathematical formalism in which the older 
'spaces' can be embedded as special 'limit' cases. That is to 
say the 'practical' embedding of mathematical systems of substitu- 
tion or syntax in the informal matrix of a particular situation of 
questioning and determination is itself still presented in abstract- 
ion from the question of its own dynamics of presentation in, say, 
the particular texts listed above, and their contexts of writing 
and reading, production and, consumption. - This rather as the 
'deconstruction' of an analogous 'space' and time of transcendental 
subjectivi'6y, in the presentation of the figural dynamic of its 
framing in language, is still presented in a textual order of 
exposition abstracted from the practical or dramatic dynamics 
of articulation of that textual 'deconstruction' in a poetic axis 
of which the figural dynamics of language or text is itself an 
a, st. r. ct model. 
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Now the informal figural complement of 'abstract' 
mathematical models of logical and physical orders of substitut- 
ion and their complementary dynamics (that is, their abstr^ct 
framings of the constraints upon substitution and exchange of 
components in 'any situation' whose generality or abstraction 
is coordinate with the 'mathematical' substitution of an other- 
wise meaningless sign or mark in the informal space of the 'peripher- 
al' language and context of the particular situation in which the 
mathematical text is produced) may be analysed in a parallel trad- 
ition in which mathematical physicists attempt to embed the con- 
figurations and consequences of their abstract systems of symbolic 
substitution 'back' in the informal language and context of their 
practical elaboration: 
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'Physics and Philosophy': the question of the embedding of 
the 'space' of physical questions, and its systematic mathematical 
articulation as 'external' correlate of an analogous (and latterly, 
indeed, mathematically 'symmetric') logical 'space' of substitutions 
and associated questions, in a universal space of questioning-as- 
such. Eddington laboured to show how all the symmetries which 
constrained what is physically 'open' ('external' physical s, nce, 
and the complementary 'internal' spaces or coordinates the preser- 
vation of certain configurations or relations 'in' which - the pre- 
servation of certain 'quantum numbers' - defines all physically 
possible transitions, or interactions) could be deduced simply from 
the elementary figure of 'the physical' itself, informally coord- 
inated as 'objective' side of questions with the radical fact of 
there being 'objects' and 'questions' at all -a 'physical' deter- 
mination of an object (in the limit, just the 'object' as 'external' 
object itself) being characterised 'relativistically' ä la Einstein, 
or indeed ä la Husserl, as what was invariant 'behind' its different 
appearances to"different observers (or the same observer at different 
times). The symmetries and so the laws of 'the physical object' were 
determined in principle by the embedding of this 'physical' dimension 
of our situation in the more or less kantian configuration of 'any 
possible apr)earance' itself - the internal organisation of the 
'physical' dimension of our experience and world precisely a reflect- 
ion of, and indeed an abstraction from, the symmetric embedding of 
this 'external' dimension in a 'transcendental' coordination of its 
relations with other dimensions - most notably the psychical, of 
which Eddington often tended, in idealist manner, to regard the 
external, the physical,, as a mere reflection, as in a perfect cos- 
mic mirror, with his quaker God as, the radical unity of what one 
might call 'inner' psychical space. 
Weinberg closes his book, on the other hand, in a despond- 
ent abstraction of the physical from any embedding in any larger 
space oJ: questions, following rather the physical image of the 
universal 'space' and time whose overall symmetries he had done 
much around 1970, to. _frame, as 
'including' all other orders of 
question 'within' it, and so excluding, in particular, any 'psych- 
ical' order of intervention, any God or soul, outside the mechanical 
preservation of phýsic<al symmetry.... While the lnst title noted 
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above assembles informal framings by a range of eminent physicists 
of what is still formally open, still a question, and still essent- 
ially an 'informal' question within their particular provinces 
in'the larger domain of 'physical science' as a whole - for if 
the question could be properly posed formally, it could ipso facto 
be formally resolved within the formal system or as an elementary 
new extension of it. 
Now one-might extend Eddington's 'transcendental deduct- 
ion'of the organising symmetries of the physical dimension of ex- 
perience as simply the reflection of the abstraction of that dimens- 
ion from the informal configuration of perception and lnngupfe - 
from the 'primal scene' so to speak of a contemporary british phi- 
losöphy - to a more 'radical' configuration of the textual and 
contextual questions and 'symmetries' coordinate with producing 
a textual formulation of 'physical theory' in the late twentieth 
century. The mathematical language of the text must necessarily 
be embedded in an 'informal' space of substitutions in which the 
mathematical order of substitution and question and symmetry which 
constitutes the 'formal' structure of the theory is itself construed 
as a 'substitution' of an order of text developed from the pythag- 
orean manipulation of otherwise indeterminate 'marks', for various 
other orders of text or marking open in the situation in which it 
is produced - in the-context of an informal language which has de- 
veloped to the point where its grammar and the institutions of 
questioning coordinate with it, allow the move 'into theory'. 
More generally, any 'physical theory' must at least allow for 
a coordination with a complex enough configuration of substitut- 
ions to allow the marking of possible substitution 'in the place of' 
components of the situation, as a 'question' - without which 
there would not even be a 'physical' order of substitutions at _ 
all. And once one 'has' this configuration of marking and quest- 
ion, there is no 'physical' - but only so to speak a 'culturalI - 
difference between the configuration of substitutions in which a 
question may itself be chosen or substituted for another possible 
action, to 'mark' something open, and a configuration in which 
such questioning has been systematically elaborated into a 'physical 
theory', mathemztically articulated in that pythagorean marking of 
the place of substitution or questioning or marking itself, which 
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becomes formally possible as soon as there is the initial 
function of 'marking' - as soo. indeed, as there is a 'cul- 
ture' articulated in the analogical coordination of various orders 
of 'mark': language, pale, material economy of exchange, and so 
on. 
In particular, the system of evolution of interaction 
of those mark-producing physical bodies which are our own, from 
initial individual access to gesture, language, thought, questions, 
after birth, to the point where they can and do articulate a 
system of questions, and answers to them, as a mathematical physics, 
has from the turn of the century been dynamically organised through 
the coupling of a classical 'inner' space of thought and inquiry, 
to a practical, dramatic, or poetic order of 'analogical' inter- 
action with more or less symmetrically situated others, just as the 
formal logical 'space' in which abstract Thought was earlier supposed 
embedded (and by which it was alone supposed to be driven or con- 
strained) was around the same time brought into question, indeed 
brought into its own questioning, as engaged in the analogical 
pragmatics of questioning and theory... 
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... Stanislavsky at the 
turn of the century marking a crisis in 
'theatre' parallelling all these crises in theory: the action on 
stage is both an actor 'acting' on a stage and a 'part' in the 
'action represented by' that first action; the actor naturally 
'acts' within the dynamic of the first scene, acts himself or her- 
self, so to speak, and acts a 'part' according to the dynamics of 
'playing a part' within that first order of action ('real' action) 
until by a laborious practical process 
of abstraction from the 
first order of action towards the intrinsic dynamics of the part 
as if it were embedded within the range of possible extensions of 
the 'imaginary' action (rather than extensions of the real action 
to its real context - trying to impress the audience, and so on) 
he or she, with the rest of the group, actually embody in their 
interaction on stage the figural dynamics of a closed abstracted 
action, another world, itself. This embedding of the dynamics of 
abstraction from the practical order of activity in the practical 
matter of 'creating a role', rather than simply assuming in an 
imagination whose dynamics are organised in this world (as it were) 
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a part in 'another' world, parallels a complementary turn-of-the- 
century embedding of theoretical rather than theatrical abstract- 
ion from the 'practical' order in the practical dynamics of that 
abstraction. Brecht and Artaud in their turn reconstruct the 
'theatre' of around 1930 within complementary systems, so to speak, 
of poetic opening-up of the 'practical' order in which the stage 
is set: Brecht framing the dynamics of the spectator's accoss to 
a part in the revolutionary transition from the social order of 
capitalist alienation, to the 'natural' space of collective activity 
framed by Marx, through the breakdown of the system of identifications 
which reveals the actors behind their illusory roles, and the space 
of activity open to the spectator as his or her identification with 
an analogous role in the capitalist abstraction from such an open 
space breaks down with them; Artaud on the contrary subordinating 
the 'role' of spectator as one component of the figural dynamics of 
the 'action' as ritual induction into an affective configuration 
where the didactic rationality-of the brechtian text (inducing the 
'masses' to 'think') presents - despite its claims to 'non-aristo- 
telian' poetics - another reiteration of the millenial framing of 
the poetic or affective axis of life within an abstract theoretical 
space (and time) whose own affective dynamic as abstraction from 
the affective order of its own constitution in a particular inter- 
personal situation is, in circular manner, elided. Brecht articulat- 
ing the stage within the theoretical articulation of a wider space 
of social activity in material Nature, in that 'objectivist' figure 
already traced through other dimensions of german theory - but here 
the textual order itself constitutes a primary dimension of the 'con- 
text' in which the stage is set - and Artaud losing his reason in 
the ritual dynamics of subordination of relations of theatrical 
'text' and 'wider' context to the closed figural unity of the per- 
formance... except that such subordination inverts the 'aristotelian' 
conception of the relations of theatrical 'text' or script, and 
gestural dynamics of spectacle ... so that we should rather, perhaps, 
understand Artaud by seeing in Le Thdatre et son Double the mere 
pretexts of a radically 'theatrical' self-dramatisation, 'perform- 
ative' utterances subordinated as scripts to the drama of his life, 
rather than successive 'constative' frames in which his dramas may 
be rationally inscribed, reconstructed, comprehended. 
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Grotowski's 'Laboratory Theatre' of the 1960s incorpor- 
ates both of these complementary developments from Stanislavsky's 
'Great Reform': the 'empty space' (in Brook's image) of substitut- 
ion of 'one action for another' and the associated 'poetic' dynamic 
of opening up or bringing-into-question of the everyday practical 
system of identifications and 'experience' in which the theatrical 
'action' is 'intransitively' set - of, in Grotowski's. figure, strip- 
ping off the everyday masks of the spectators - is the locus of a 
sort of (Grotowski again) 'research institute' which opens up the 
interpersonal space or configuration of social activity in a manner 
analogous to theoretical science's opening-up of an ever-wider space 
of questions and possibilities in which human interaction may be 
organised. The Theatre at Wroclaw was a 'laboratory' in that its 
work was directed to the constant opening-up or bringing-into-quest- 
ion of the very structures of 'theatre' that allowed such opening- 
up. First of all, the relation of the initial 'theory' of the late 
'fifties to the theatrical dynamics it notionally framed came into 
question, along with the analogous relation of text or script to 
action or play: theorisation was itself dramatically engaged in con- 
figurations)of interaction which were being opened up in the experi- 
mental exploration of the 'space' of action and context, just as 
a parallel theoretical exploration in Paris, say, was bringing into 
question the-narrative constitution of an abstract 'space' of quest- 
ions in which that constitutson was originally to be reconstituted. 
'Philosophy' was bringing into question the space of an earlier theory 
or questioning, while theatre was bringing into question, or opening 
up, rather, an earlier theatrical 'space' - and, in particular, the 
theoretical supposition of inscription of this parallel dynamic of 
'opening-up' of interaction within a theoretical transcription of 
this poetic space into a logical space of questions and theory: this 
process of transcription of something open into a question itself 
being recognised as merely one component in a more general dynamic 
of opening-up of interaction, of its poetic space. 
'These Slavs are the great livers-out of their theories' 
wrote William Jameq... 
He runs a laboratory. He needs an audience occasionally, in 
small numbers. His tradition is Catholic - or anti-Catholic; 
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in this case the two extremes meet. He is creating a form 
of service. We work in another country, another language, 
another tradition. Our aim is not a new Mass... 
... Thus Peter Brook in his introduction; and having worked 
through various principal nodes in the western tragic canon, various 
figures of that breakdown of a*protagonist's identification with a 
particular 'part' which are so many figures of breaking open the 
spectator's own part of identification, inducing as radical response 
a new figure of identity as response to a configuration of 'questions' 
in which this 'self' is itself one component 'question' - or rather 
a response of which the marking of what is opened up as 'question', 
and marking of response as deriving from an 'I' which so marks itself 
as marking its response, is just one, verbal, dimension, discovered 
as theatrically or dramatically coordinate with non-verbal registers 
of response or action - Grotowski in 1968 moves to a 'dramatisation' 
of a text or script derived from that most radical node of the west- 
ern theatrical tradition, the Christ acting out the breakdown of 
our identification with our earthly bodies and roles on the wider 
stage of this Globe Theatre itself, and in 1970 he transfers the 
main axis of his 'research' from the state Institute associated 
with the University of Wroclaw, to temporary groups assembled in 
the nearby countryside, in which the formal division of roles into 
those of 'actors' and 'audience' or spectators, progressively weak- 
ened over the 1960s, itself 'comes into question'. 
Now Stanislavsky, whose 'revolution' over the turn of 
the century Grotowski saw himself in the 'sixties as simply reduc- 
ing to its core principles - rather like, say, Lacan's transposition 
of the principles of the freudian revolution, the psychoanalytic 
drama, from various expressions in older terms that it itself brought 
into question, into an expression coordinate or coherent with the 
dramatic structure or dynamic it expressed - might be seen as intro- 
ducing into the theatre something like an analogue of Alberti's 
scientific' construction of the picture-plane as symmetrical in- 
terface between two different spaces and times of action, just as 
the contemporary inaugurators of 'modern' painting were completing 
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the transformation begun by Alberti's successors of the High 
Renaissance towards the construction of the two-dimensional 
surface of the uq adro as dramatic interface of four-dimensional 
spaces and times of action, rather than static mirror-like moment- 
ary visual interface of two three-dimensional spaces of 'percept- 
ion'. Thus analytical cubism after 1907 assembles in the picture- 
plane a sort of 'schematism' of various #appearances' of (typically) 
a. . supposedly 
inert object ('still' life) which together, in inter- 
action, constitute as it were the 'intentional' syntax of a certain 
'objective' identity 'behind' these aspects from different 'positions' 
in imagination which can only be 'really' combined for one observer 
in a succession of 'points in time' - just as Husserl's logical 'ana- 
lysis' of the intentionality of perception and the empirical 'consti- 
tution' of the objectivity of an object or property sought over the 
same period to find the actuality of subSective and objective poles 
of experience 'behind' a supposedly momentary present appearance, in 
systems of possible variations in successive appearances which left 
some particular identity 'invariant- ndjustaa Einstein's contemp- 
orary redefinition of the 'physical' was framed in terms of an-in- 
variant 'objective' identity organising its different 'appearances' 
or observations. Furthermore, the configurations of possible varia- 
tion or substitution were, like the quantum symmetries constraining 
not-fully-determinate or determinable parameters of elementary phys- 
ical interaction, 'abstract', allowing in each element of the compos- 
ition various possible embeddings or instantiations of a particular 
'aspect' of the object or scene in the more determinate perceptions 
of 'real' physical objects - even if impressionist divisionism had 
already prefigured Planck's revolution in microphysics by determining 
the radically 'elementary' data of an es 
entially dynamic process of 
'perception' as different from a notional indivisible point-colour- 
moment, so to speak, in notional spatial, temporal, and chromatic 
continua... and even if fin-de-siýcle 'symbolism' had already organ- 
ised the logic or syntax of pictorial composition in an 'abstractly' 
autonomous coordination of 'archetypal' components or dimensions of 
the analogical, figural, affective axis of the 'poetic' domain of 
the image. The closed autonomous poetic of coordination of various 
'abstract' components of an interaction - in the simplest case, of 
mere perceptual interaction of a more or less indeterminate percip- 
Tent and an inanimate or 'still, object in Braque's 'conceptual' 
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or specifically 'french' cubism after 1907 - at once 'abstracts' 
from the classical 'window' between two fully determinate 'spaces' 
of things, 'physical realities', and so to speak 'concretises' the 
temporal phenomenology of the various identities of those classical 
'objects' of painting, from which the older model of a universal 
'space' of determinations or identities had itself 'abstracted' to 
a notional 'photographic' moment of perception, of interaction with 
things and others. And indeed the italian 'futurists' were to com- 
plain of the essentially 'static' character of the neocartesian per- 
cipient of the typically 'analytic' early cubism: the percipient 
must himself or herself enter dynamically into the construction, 
which then becomes essentially 'expressionistic', responding to the 
general question of figure of subjective artist or viewer as one 
variable in the dynamic scheme with a figure of commitment, self- 
assertion as assertive moment that, as in Papini's 'theory' or criti- 
cism, closes the circle of 'abstraction' to autonomous poetic con- 
figuration or mechanism, responding to the new question it implicitly 
marks for the viewer (and which Pirandello, for example, systematic- 
ally structures as the radical open-ness of the 'part'). In italian 
and german 'modernisms', then, as perhaps most typically in the 
german 'expressionist' theatre which determined the response of 
Piscator and Brecht to the 'revolution' of Stanislavsky and Meyer- 
hold in revolutionary Russia, the 'logical' order of questions 
classically determined as an abstracted 'standing-back' from any 
particular part, in a pure cartesian space of possible assertion and 
schemes of universal syntax and its determinations, becomes itself 
'poetically' embedded-in a concrete cultural dynamic: the opening-up 
of the part of artist or viewer in the new figure of 'Art' as 
schematism of action, and the incorporation of the dynamic of 
artisth or spectator's part, verbally marked as question and assertion, 
as itself merely one dimension of a wider cultural drama opened up 
by the new Art. Picasso in 1912, in a correlative move, begins to 
'stick' physical material that 'stands for' itself on the picture 
plane, where the difference between such a 'real' object and the 
other components of the composition 'standing fort aspects which 
such a 'real' identity may be taken to be 'behind', thus enters 
into the poetic 'syntax' of coordination of terms or elements of 
the 'picture'., Typically it is part of a newspaper, or a playing- 
card - already themselves coordinate with a 'real' contextual syn- 
tax of signs - that is'thus introduced by 'collage'... or a 'r'al' 
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piece of music added to the 'harmonic' analysis of 'man with a 
guitar' typical of the 'analytic' phase it succeeds... or indeed 
a painted playing-card cut out from the paper on which it has 
been 'represented', or painted words, that are in turn 'stuck' 
in the composition, further complicating the poetic syntax of 
'appearance' and 'reality'. And finally Duchamp over the period 
of the Great War focusses the questions posed by such 'modernism' 
in Art by exhibiting an otherwise unaltered signed 'object', and 
so directly-posing 'art' itself as merely one question or variable 
coordinate with those of artist/viewer, 'reality'/object, and so 
on, in the poetic exploration of the constitution of these various 
identities, and the dynamic interplay of the open-ness attaching to 
each element thus called into play - open-nesses which may be marked 
as so many questions... except that the transposition of the play 
into some supposedly rational space of questions and answers is it- 
self called 'into question' along with other verbal and non-verbal 
coordinates of the situation in which 'the artist' intransitively, 
'arbitrarily' intervenes. Intervenes in a manner which cannot, then, 
in principle be rationally or otherwise 'recuperated' in terms of 
the subordination of this intervention to some definite practical 
configuration of 'Art' among other activities in an unquestioned 
'Culture' at large, but an intervention which calls that practical 
or transitive order of its cultural context as a whole 'into question', 
into a configuration of questions which breach the apparently closed 
circuit of such an unquestioned 'world' at various correlative key 
coordinates - Art, Subject, Object, Culture, Reason, Practicality, 
and so on... like a tragic breaking-open of the various correlative 
identities whose interaction led to the impasse of Total War, and 
the breakdown of the european cultural system in which those various 
nineteenth-century identities had supported one another in a kind 
of mutual unquestionability. 
Questions... but not even questions, since any attempt 
at a sytematic transcription of this opening-up of Culture into 
a verbally expressed theoretical system of questions and answers 
is itself 'in question'; an interplay of questions that cannot be 
converted, say, into Kandinsky's wider (spiritual' frame of Art 
and Culture whose verbal expression may frame itself as one com- 
ponent among others, the transcription of what has been opened 
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up into that dimension we transcribe as 'language', non-verbally 
coordinated with what we transcribe as 'objects' and 'Nature' in 
that activity we transcribe as 'art'. And yet, in parallel with 
the systematic responses to various 'crises of foundations' in 
various other dimensions of theory towards 1930, 'Art' as question, 
or indeed not even as question since this transcription into a 
verbal order is itself brought into question, has been systematised 
by 1930 in Kandinsky's Bauhaus in Germany and as Breton's Surrealism 
in France: Breton seeing in the systematisation of those irrational 
figural 'interferences' of, say, Lautreamont's 'sewing machine and 
umbrella meeting on a dissecting table' evoked by the three-dimension- 
al collage or construction of Duchamp's readymades the experimental 
exploration of the freudian Unconscious, and Kandinsky elaborating 
the essentially 'mathematical' or musical system of abstract logic 
of point, line, surface, volume, colour, sound as the sensorial and 
affective dimensionality and logic of the universal 'design' of a 
coherent space of human activity: Art in 1930, then, among other 
of its aspects, these complementary programmes for the transformation 
of the pre-modern space and time of human activity, each coordinated 
so to speak in Duchamp's 'question' of 'Art'. In each case the 
classical albertine 'window' as illusory figural interface between 
real and imaginary space and time in the two-dimensional surface of 
the uadro has been extended to a 'super-real' mathematical or fig- 
ural schematism in which 'the real', the old material order in which 
'Art' was supposed constructed as illusion, has come to be recognised 
as merely one side or component itself classically 'abstracted' from 
a deeper poetics, in which it is always partial, incomplete, in 
a process of constitution by agents whose true 'space' and time is 
the deeper poetic order, and always radically 'in question'. And 
the classical privilege of figural illusion restricted to the con- 
ventional limits of the uadro, representational sculpture, and so 
on, has been overthrown in the recognition of a more abstract or 
more concrete dynamic of 'figure' coordinating the variables of 
spatiotemporal form and sensory content in all components of our 
activity, not merely in the traditional 'art-work'. The artist 
intervenes 'intransitively' in the practical or conventional order 
of unquestipned activity to explore new 'spaces' of activity, new 
configurations of identity of subjects and objects, opened up by 
a new kind of 'work' of what may be verbally transcribed as the 
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discovery of system of coordinate questions attaching to the 
'conventional' configuration of subjects, objects, and transitive 
activity and experience as a whole. Thus after 1930 the Bauhaus 
as project of opening up a new space of social activity symbolised 
or modelled by the collective research of staff and students in 
Gropius' archetypically 'modern' building at Dessau comes into con- 
flict or competition with the space of the New Myth proposed by the 
local Nazi party, transferring to Berlin in 1932, and (in part) to 
Chicago after Hitler's accession to power in 1933; Breton, meanwhile, 
frames the whole Surrealist project or Movement or Revolution as it- 
self one component in the transition from the closed circuits of 
alienated identities and activities under capitalism, into the radic- 
ally open space of a Nature theoretically framed as the mzrxist sys- 
tematisation of questions attaching to that bourgeois frame of iden- 
tity and interaction. 
Now if 'modern art' is proposed in various manners over 
the first three decades of the twentieth century as a more or less 
coordinated project of 'opening up' a new space of identity of sub- 
jects and objects, and a new space and time of their interaction, 
through the intransitive configurations of questions posed in and 
for its specific context by a specific 'work' framed in the various 
traditional 'dimensions' of plastic expression, or in various new 
combinations of those previous conventional orders of 'artistic' 
activity, then it becomes in many ways complementary to the millen- 
ial project of 'theory' as equally 'intransitive' opening up of a 
more general systematic space of questions in the experiential con- 
text of the theoretical posing of new qu4stions. Indeed 'theory' 
itself comes into the questioning of the new 'art' insofar as the 
latter, in many ways more radically than theoretical 'pragmatism', 
brings thinking and theory (as systematic thinking, rationality) 
into a figural dynamic of its coordination with non-theoretical, and 
indeed non-verbal, correlates of the theoretical text in the situat- 
ion of its production and consumption. In particular the various 
attempts at verbal Jormulat ion of what is opened up by 'modern' 
art (futurism, expressionism, surrealism, constructivism and no 
on) as a system of questions and assertions organised in a specific 
context as 'manifesto' of one 'movement' towards opening-up of a 
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new space and time of activity, are radically ambiguous or ambi- 
valent between a 'theory' of the new space, and a complementary 
poetic bringing-into-question of any such 'theory', through the 
figural coordination of what is open in the verbal order of reflect- 
ion with other components of its essentially dramatic or 'theatrical' 
setting in the social order of interaction (including the traditional 
interactions which constitute 'theoretical' activity of 'abstract' 
theory) which is being brought into question or opened up as a whole, 
in the transition into a new, more radical, space and time... 
1328 Futurist Manifestos (1909-15)-ed, tr, intr Apollonio London 1973 
1329 LEWIS, 'Wyndham 
1330 
1331 BELL, Clive 
1332 
1334 TZARA, Tristan' 
1335 RICHTER, Hans 
Blast London 1914-15 
Time and Western Man London 1927 
Art London 1914 
Civilisation: an Essay London 1928 
Sept Manifestes Dada (Zürich 1916- ) 
Paris(1924)1963 
Dada: Art and Anti-Art London/NY 1966 
1336 BRETON, Andre Manifeste du Surrgalisme (Paris 1924,1929)with: 
Second Manifeste du Surrealisme (Paris 1930,1946) 
(& later sequels) Paris 1973 
1337 KANDINSKY, Wassily Über der Geistige in der Kunst (Munich 1912) 
fr tr 
1338 KLEE, Paul Über die Moderne, Kunst (1924 Bern 19 
tr Findlay London 1948 
1339 The Thinking Eye: The Notebooks of Paul Klee 
ed & tr London 1961 
1340 N AYLOR, Gillian Bauhaus London 1968 
The archetypical 'modernism' systematised as 'Bauhaus' within 
Gropius' and Mies , van 
der Rohe's architectonic of architectural 
space-time as rational systematisation of the theatre of human 
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interaction in which all the other arts would (as in the trad- 
itional scheme only disrupted by transferable and collectable 
easel-painting, and the rise of an individualistic conception of 
artist and connoisseur over the period of the Scientific Revolution) 
find their correlative coordinates - just as the Dessau site as 
spatial frame of opening-up of the new architectonic frame itself 
presents so to speak the mathematically articulated space embedding 
the logical space of 'science' in scientific Nature as unitary rat- 
ional Culture: a project at once reminiscent of Alberti's, and echo- 
ing as universal rational poetic the viennese project of Carnap's 
and Neurath's unitary logical space of Science (the author of their 
model, the Tractatus having himself by the late 'twenties become, 
according to the viennese City Directory, 'Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Architect'). Transplanted like the viennese project to America in 
the 'thirties, and there coordinated with Le Corbusier's cartesian 
or perhaps calvinist project of a new architectural 'language' with 
its corresponding modular architectural elements, in the native trad- 
itionrof, Sullivan_and Wright, this develops. into the universal space 
of what is there called 'The International Style'... 
1541 JEANNERET, Charles- Vers une Architecture 'Paris (1923)19 
Edouard Me Corbusier') 
1342 Le Modulor Boulogne-sur-Seine (1949)1953 
1343 WRIGHT, Frank Lloyd-. An Autobiography NY 1932 
1343 A Testament NY 1957 
1344 RICHARDS, J M' An Introduction to Modern Architecture 
Harmondsworth(19k0)1957 
1345 KIDDER-SMITH, GE The New Architecture of Europe 
Harmondsworth 1961 
... Yet a spostmodernI reaction against a 'modernism' idea- 
tified with cheap, 'rational' (as rather a sort of calculated ful- 
filling of the needilto house or organise the space of a given act- 
ivity at minimal cQst), 'functional' postwar building may itself be. 
seen as a mere-correlate--of_that merely practical or technical appro- 
priation of certain results of modern exploration in architecture 
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which, fulfilling a given 'function' with no regard to the speci- 
ficity of site and aesthetic context (and with modular materials 
produced according to the necessity of which Le Corbusier tried to 
make a virtue at a distance from the site and with no regard for 
any specific use), implicitly sets the varied styles around it in 
an urban environment like so many stage-sets in the new technical 
culture of which the new building's internal space is a sort of mir- 
ror, behind its rationalised facade - or rather surrounding buildings 
become merely so many facades within the geometric space marked out 
by the new 'modernist' infill. Become, indeed, the mere facades 
which nineteenth century building indeed developed, as it developed 
the new materials and engineering techniques whose 'functional' sup- 
port was hidden behind theatrical facades until the days of Sullivan 
and Behrens at the turn of the century. 
If one turns from a postmodern image of modernism which 
identifies the latter with the results of economically motivated 
optimisation of an enterprise in which the provision of a space of 
activity is merely one component outlay to be set against profit, 
to the modernist canon itself, one finds even that archetypal 'funct- 
ionalist' Le Corbusier leaving behind his initial 'cubist' premisses 
after 1930 (the analogue in terms of the 'dramatic' surface of ana- 
lytical cubist composition, of the albertine architectural space co- 
ordinate with the wall-surface as frame of composition in central 
perspective) and organising the symbolic space at Ronchamp after 
1950: the initial constructive or analytic 'language' rationally 
organising the elements of a particular architectural composition 
within the constraints imposed by the 'nature' of"a particular site, 
and of the particular activity to be housed, eventually leads him 
to this focus of the essentially 'intransitive' configuration of 
the. transitive logic of man practically organising his activity in 
irreducibly complementary Nature, which has organised, and indeed 
continues after Ronchamp to organise more 'practical' constructions. 
But Ronchamp is the locus of a stasis in which the pilgrim to the 
isolated chapel arrives to confront his general 'existential' situa- 
tion as rationally, engaged in transitions from one more specific 
situation to the next, constantly facing specific constraints im- 
posed by the 'nature' of successive situations. The 'rationale' 
of the space at Ronchamp is not to lead through the constaints of 
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one situation to those of the next, but rather to lead out of 
this space of transition, at the end of the 'pilgrimage', into 
a configuration of man confronting the practical order of Life 
in Nature as a whole - man confronting the constant configuration 
in which Nature, though specific instances may be 'rationalised' 
in successive situations, can never be eliminated from the pract- 
ical dynamics of such rationalisation, any more than can transition, 
dynamic, itself. 
... And when one moves to Wright at that other pole (from 
'functionalism') of modern architecture which he calls 'organic', 
one finds the dramatic figure of the architect's rational intervent- 
ion in a specific natural 'site', organising each project of provis- 
ion of space for some at first only partly specified structure of 
activity rather in the manner of a painter once more approaching a 
new canvas, framed by the architect himself not in the manner of 
those books which Corbusier claimed contained in their abstract 
argument the whole of his architecture, but rather as the drama of 
a life as 'architect, opening up the internal constitution of his 
part of 'architect' along with successive configurations of the 
Nature in which his material constructions were organised, as the 
working through the interplay of these coordinates in one particular 
project or scene led into the next, to a new site, a new cast, new 
questions, new revelations. 
Similarly, the painter Penrose's picture of the central 
'figure' of 'Modern Arts, Picasso, is constructed in the same 'org- 
anic' frame of the interplay of the identities or questions or 
variables opened up in the passage from one scene, and one painting, 
or sculpture, or drawing, or etching, or theatrical design, or 
pot, to the next, within the overall dynamic of the artist's life 
in interaction with others in situations in their turn set in the 
wider historical dynamic of the first half of the century as a whole: 
1346 PENROSE, Roland Picasso London 1958 
... whereas 
Herbert Read sets the successive, and indeed parallel 
questions that are his transcription of this dynamic restricted to 
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the two-dimensional space of 'painting', and its formal coordinates 
of painter, viewer, figuration and abstraction, theme and object, 
within a 'history of modern painting': 
1347 READ, Herbert A Concise History of Modern Painting 
London (1957, rev 1968) enlgd 1974 
.. which is merely the verbal transcription into a more or less 
linear order of argument or development of successive configurat- 
ions of what opens up in the wider dynamic whose theatrical or 
dramatic articulation is marked by the interplay of pictures and 
verbal illustration (so to speak) in Penrose's picture. 
A history of pictorial space opening with the breakdown 
of the traditional abstraction of illusionistic pictorial 'repre- 
sentation' from its implication in a dramatic interplay of its 
'internal' and external or contextual coordinates: and Read closes 
his account pessimistically construing the mid-century legacy of 
the School of Paris dominated by Picasso as an impasse from which 
he can see no escape. Yet as his successors, adding a last chapter 
to the 1974 edition remark, the apparent impasse is perhaps rather 
the impasse of an abstract 'internalist' model of the dynamics of 
pictorial space isolated from its 'external' coordinates in a wider 
dynamic of Art and Culture, than an impasse of 'Art' itself after 
mid-century, with the breakdown of the unitary axis of questions 
pursued in the School of Paris, and organising a formal space of 
'internal' coordinates of 'Art' around 1930: 
1348 READ, Herbert Art Now London 1933 
The impasse of Read's own perspective is underlined by 
his attempt to couple the internal coordinates of 'modern painting' 
with those of 'modern sculpture': 
1349 A Concise History of Modern Sculpture 
London 1964 
... while the lexternalI coordinates of the 'modern' dynamic of 
pictorial space in Culture might perhaps be underlined by consid- 
ering the history of an an analogous (spaces whose (internal' 
dccxxvi 
coordinates might be considered to be a constant, more or less 
'neutral' mechanical embodiment of Alberti's central perspective 
from the latter part of the nineteenth century onward: 
1350 JEFFREY, Ian Photography: A Concise History London 1981 
Indeed the non-neutrality of such abstract 'internal' neutrality 
itself structures the verbal order of Susan Sontag's rather rhetor- 
ical or theatrical reflections: 
1351 SONTAG, Susan On Photography (NY 1973-7) Harmondsworth 1979 
... dramatic images of the cultural dynamics of an apparently neutral 
mechanical eye nominally or apparently abstracting from the essent- 
ially active or dramatic schematism of perception first discovered 
in 'modern art', and in contemporary pragmatism, bergsbnism,. 'moving 
pictures' and so on, a. "mechanical eye perfecting central perspective, 
the image as mirror or window or two-dimensional interface of two 
worlds, just as the 'truth' of this image of the image was coming 
into question. 
Rhetorical imagery of the radical falsity of the supposedly 
'literal' truth of the photograph, parallelling other post-structur- 
alist and postmodern 'deconstructions' of the traditional imagery of 
abstraction from image, rhetoric, from the specific theatrical con- 
figuration of nominal abstraction from that configuration or situat- 
ion. Ideas are always irreducibly images, figures, metaphors.. just 
as (a parallel and contemporary discovery in the 'artistic' order 
of the image, breaking out of the traditional abstraction of 'intern- 
al', 'formal' art-history and theory) images are never simply neutral 
images, but always. also the mark of a range of 'ideas' in the part- 
icular material situation of their production and consumption. 
The 'impasse' at mid-century, after the breakdown of the 
School of Paris which had provided a sort of canonical axis of 
'modern art' from the turn of the century, -or rather from the 
Impressionism of around 1870, onward, is itself canonically marked 
by Read and othersas 'abstract expressionism': index of a general- 
ised 'existential' coupling of what may be verbally posed as the 
'question' of the artist (viewer, subject) with the questions of 
'object' or objects, and the question of 'Art' as a certain or 
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rather uncertain coupling of these questions - with the proviso 
that this verbal posing, and an associated assumption of some 
'rational' discursive articulation of these 'questions' is itself 
'in question' within the space and time of an action of which it 
constitutes only one, essentially 'subjective' dimension... which 
should perhaps rather be transcribed into the articulation of this 
action as 'art', rather than attempt the transcription of such a 
configuration into thought: words as script, one component- of the 
dramatic configuration now 'in question', rather than transparent 
notation of the classical contradiction of an 'objective' rational 
subjectivity associated with-the imaginary cartesinn focus of a 
unitary 'world-picture'. Radicalising the cubist transition from 
unitary perspectival space of subjects and objects in such a cl s- 
sical 'world-picture' to a 'conatitutive' scheme of coordination 
of a certain figure of the subject and a certain figure of 'object' 
in the dynamic of their perceptual and conceptual interaction, 
Pollock articulates pictorial space and time as simply the dramatic 
space and time of encounter of,.. the subject as 'painter' with the 
canvas which is for a brief time the 'stage' of his trance-like 
'automatic' response to his part in the drama. The implicit !: time' 
of a cubist picture underlined by Apollinaire becomes simply the 
time 'of the painting' which 'intransitively' presents nothing but 
itself and so allows the exploration of the limiting figure of the 
artist-subject confronting simply his confrontation with the canvas, 
and so with himself (rather than more specific 'transitive' config- 
urations of action which provide the 'objects' of a cubist still- 
life, and whose illusory distance from the space and time of the 
act of painting them and of viewing the 'picture'. presents artist 
and vieirnr with a particular figure of t)eir 'being in the world' 
with particular objects, rather than the limiting figure of their 
subjectivity confronting itself in a painting which is simply a 
'painting' of a surface, presenting or representing nothing but 
itself). Each drama of 'painting' is the confrontation with one- 
self and with Art and with the World, in which these coupled 
'questions'-which in their coupling provide the limiting frame of 
what is 'open' may be taken one 'stage' further towards a sort of 
pure actuality or äbsolute sartrian freedom and authenticity. 
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In 1937 Nelson Goodman and Robert Motherwell began 
work on dissertations at Harvard: Goodman had practised as an 
art-dealer after graduation in 1929, returning to verbally, logic- 
ally articulate 'The Structure of Appearance' as a whole; Mother- 
well had turned from painting to theory in 1932 at Stanford, and 
would return from philosophy to painting at Columbia in 1941. 
Düchamp had arrived in America in 1915; Motherwell published his 
influential survey and anthology of 'The Dada Painters and Poets' 
in 1949. I have suggested that the complementarity of the 'struct- 
uralist' question of the figural dynamic of abstraction of 'logical 
space' (in some form or other) from that order of 'imagery', posed 
in terms of the complementarity of logical and analogical or figural 
'sides' of language, and the 'modernist' aesthetic as response 
after the mid-century to the 'conceptual' component in 'art', may 
be seen to converge towards a radical interplay towards the close 
of the century, as the 'postmodern' question of embedding of theory 
in the 'pragmatic' configuration of its production and transmission 
confronts the question I have been trying to pose here, 'in' this 
book set in its late twentieth-century 'context', of the verbal 
transcription of what is open in the situation of this verbal trans- 
cription of what is here open, as 'question', as itself only one 
line of action open within the more general constraints presented 
by possible substitutions of this verbal for other orders (dramatic, 
economic, physical for example) of substitution. 
Art as 'intransitive' substitution of a 'poetic' config- 
uration in a situation where such intervention in the practical , 
order of transition from one situation to another. 'poses a question', 
a question attaching to the configuration of questioning as such 
in transition from one 'practical' situation to the next, leading 
'out of' that whole order of transition in a reiteration of the 
figure by which a 'practical' question marks the move out of one 
specific practical situation into the next, without the overall 
structure of such transition itself coming into question: and 
'modern' art characteristically develops in a 'dialectic' in which 
each successive 'recuperation' of the more radical questioning or 
opening-up of 'experience' by identifying successive firures of 
radicalisation of the question as (just) 'art', itself practically 
embedded as one social activity among others in the rractical 
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matters of making a living, being entertained, investing money, 
and so on, in its turn comes into the more radical questioning 
of 'art' through the 'modernist' introduction of 'art' itself as 
one coordinate question in that configuration of questions which 
is the 'work of art'. - This rather as Heidegger, for example, 
charts the parallel 'modern' dialectic of recuperation of the 'in- 
transitive' questioning of the configuration of questioning as a 
whole (which is 'theory' or 'philosophy' in the original pythagorean 
sense) in the 'technical' progress of scientific systematisation of 
all 'practical questions', to the point where the very question of 
this dialectic itself appears to be on the point of absolute 
elision in what Marcuse calls a 'one dimensional' world. 
I have already suggested how the 'dadaist' bringing-into- 
question of 'Art' itself as system of recuperation and elision of 
a more radical questioning, may in a way be considered as a limiting 
form of that introduction of 'real' objects into the 'art-work' which 
historians characterise as the passage from 'analytic' to 'synthetic' 
cubism around 1912. In the simplest form of 'readymade' the 'artist- 
ic' content simply drops out of the configuration of questions posed 
by 'the artist', leaving only a configuration of 'artist', 'art' and 
'object' as questions organising a sort of unlimited 'dissemination' 
of questions - or rather of what may be marked as questions, this 
linguistic response itself also drawn into question as 'rationalis- 
ation', attempt at closed systematic abstraction from the essentially 
theatrical configuration of which language and questions are only 
one dimension, to an 'internal' space of, thought which is as quest- 
ionable as the pre-modern abstract, internal, illusionistic or re- 
presentational 'content' of the 'art-work'. If the 'modernism' of 
around 1930 as new 'system' of Art may be seen as positive reassert- 
ion of the artist in a new configuration of artist, art, objects, 
society and so on, typified by Bauhaus and Surrealist 'movement' 
after Duchamp had relinquished the production of 'art-objects', and 
in response to the 'crisis' at the turn of the century, then Mother- 
well's attempt to respond to that system, having already alternated 
between what it opened up, and the theoretical transcrip6ion of 
this dynamic into a system of questions verbally articulrted, may 
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perhaps be t: ken as complementary to what I have characterised 
as Pqllock's radicalisation of cubist or futurist pictorial 'time' 
by theatrically responsing to the coordinate 'questions' of artist, 
art, and object by organising the 'constitutive' time of the painting 
as the time of 'painting' itself, the artist's existential response 
to his confrontation with canvas, art, world and himself, itself 
(in Pollock's expression) 'in' the concretised act, action, drama, 
of 'the painting'. Motherwell responds to the v-3rious systematic 
responses to the configuration of 'questions' implicitly posed in 
their. extreme form by Duchamp around 1915 (and by Zurich Dada from 
1916) by trying to find as it were a minimal or irreducible form 
of the configuration of 'art' and 'questions' or theory, which can 
now, at mid-century, be systematically approached within the various 
systems of coordinates established in so many lines of response to 
the turn-of-the-century 'crisis' given most radical expression in 
'Dada'. Thus along with many others he explores the various 'inter- 
nal' and external or contextual configurations of what one may call 
an 'ideography' articulated in experimentation with a few black 
brush-strokes on a white surface. In Paris, with the american 
Tobey and the french writer-painter Michaux, the incorporation of 
elements of the chinese and Japanese calligraphic tradition is dir- 
ect and explicit, and the Zen Buddhist context of that tradition 
is in turn echoed by John Cage, collaborating with Rauschenberg, 
the dancer Merce Cunningham, and others at Black Mountain College, 
presdided over from 1933 by Josef Albers who had taught at the 
Bauhaus before its dissolution and fragmentary transplantation to 
America. Silence: once more the absolute reduction or bracketing 
of aesthetic 'content' -, in this case 'musical', but since there 
is no content, music-without-music employs in a sense the same 
'medium'as, say, painting-without-painting - presents the 'audience' 
with an 'intransitive' configuration of 'questions' which are so 
to speak the direct converse of an unquestioning conventional sys- 
tem of practical elision of 'intransitivity' or the 'transcendental' 
as an 'art' (or 'music' or 'painting' or whatever) which what one 
thinks one understands as oneself thinks it understands as one 
particular activity among others, among a world of 'objects' which 
it also thinks it understands 'in principle'. 
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The 'point' of such 'art' of the mid-century is to 
open up the configuration of the paradoxical 'work', among whose 
elements are previously unquestioned 'self' (of artist or audience) 
'art', 'objects' and so on. An essential dimension of this con- 
figuration is the language which itself attempts the 'recuperation' 
of the closed configuration of unquestioned identities it nominally 
brings into a coordination of questions in transcribing 'theoretic- 
ally', just as an essential dimension of the various 'avant-garde' 
movements earlier in the century had been the verbal 'manifestost 
which Motherwell was assembling and publishing as the 'Documents 
of Modern Art', in which series the Dada anthology appeared in 
1949. In 1952 Cage organises at Black Mountain College the coordin- 
ation of various elements or dimensions of 'art' as an intransitive 
'action' no longer subject to the traditional aristotelian constraint 
of mimesis, but like Pollock's painting simply 'action'; at the 
close of the 'fifties the various coordinates of art as intransitive 
action marked by Pollock, Motherwell and Cage among others, converge 
in Cage's 'composition class' in New York: Rauschenberg's three-dim- 
ensional collages or 'combines', Jasper Johns!: systematic recapitu- 
lation of Picasso's sticking of a painted and cut-out playing-card 
in a 'synthetic cubist' picture as one element, as he explores the 
interplay of art, object, and idea in 'paintings' of elements of 
various conventional sign-systems such-as flags, numerals, words.. * 
and Allen Kaprow's 'action-collages', to become notorious in the 
'sixties as The Happening. These last begin, as the early charact- 
erisation suggests, as three-dimensional arrangements of 'real' ob- 
jects analogous with Pollock's two-dimensional encounter with paint- 
pots and canvas*'field'. Pollock had talked of being 'in' his paint- 
ings; Kaprow was quite literally 'in' thrp 'environments constructed 
in a room of his house, or of an art-gallery or museum. The next 
step, around 1960, came with the recognition of the artist construct- 
ing the 'environment', and the audience or visitors to the constructed 
action-collage, as themselves theatrical components of the 'work' 
along with the various objects -a 'work' whose time now became 
a limited dramatic unity in which the time of construction, and 
of 'viewing' were both components in the overall time of participat- 
ion, radicalising one step further Pollock's own radicalisation 
of the implicit theatrical time of expressionist, futurist and 
cubist 'painting' after the turn of the century, and 'at the same 
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time' renewing contact with the theatrical demonstrations charact- 
eristic of futurism, dada and surrealism. By the mid-sixties the 
frame (so to speak) of a Kaprow 'happening' was verbally articulated 
as a 'script' specifying a certain number of variables and constraints, 
and so as it were replacing Pollocktss canvas, paintpots, brushes and 
so on, now seen perhaps as a special case of the more general art- 
action, constrained by a number of unquestioned conventionrl coord- 
inates of 'art' which then defined or constituted the 'painting' that 
Pollock was calling into question (in a sort of gener'lisation of the 
earlier cubist exploration of the dramatic constitution of bottles, 
guitars, and so on). 
When Julian Beck and the Living Theatre arrived in Paris 
early in 1968, having developed in New York under the twin influences 
of the Happening and Grotowski's theatre-as-laboratory for opening 
up the space of human interaction as 'science' opens up the complemen- 
tary formal coordinates of its widest space or context, they found 
themselves quickly caught up in the 'Events' of May, in association 
with associates of the european Situationist International. The 
architect Guy Debord, who had been the 'ar'chitect' of the Internat- 
ional from soon after its formation in 1957, had just published a 
'manifesto' systematising the framework elaborated over the previous 
ten years: 
1352 Internationale Situationniste ed Debord Paris 1958-69 
1353 DEBORD, Guy La Soci4te du Spectacle Paris 1967 
Anglo-american 'pop' art (first identified as such by the 'Independ- 
ents Group' of artists and critics at the ICA founded by Read and 
Penrose in 1947) might be seen as a sort of inversion or conversion 
of the rational space of Bauhaus design in which the short-circuits 
of abstractions of various cultural schemes, identities and dynamics 
from that unitary space were to have been brought into question and 
slowly remodelled, transformed in a new architectonic or poetics of 
the human theatre, of cultural space: Motherwell's elements of ideo- 
graphy and the complementary explorations of the colour-field pain- 
ters replace the mithem? tical space of colour and form of Kandinsky 
and Klee and De Stiii; Johns' ind Rauschenberg's sign-systems of 
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the fifties expand into a generalised multi-media 'sign-system' 
explored by Warhol, by Godard, by Barthes and so many others: 
the project has now become that, not of framing a unitary space 
of 'design' into which the transition will necessarily occur more 
or less of itself, as people begin to work in Gropius factories, 
relax in Breuer chairs, and so on, but rather of presenting config- 
urations of the present cultural 'space' and time 'intransitively' 
and so to progressively open up from within (or with Warhol to stand 
ambiguously between such opening-up and a converse recuperation of 
questions as 'art-business', posing perhaps a still more radical 
question: questioning art as questioning, 'So what? ') the closed 
circuits of unquestioned conventions and identities. 
The Situationist Internaticnal was rormed largely by 
veterans of various short-lived mid-century european groups (COBRA, 
Lettrisme, Movement for a Pictorial Bauhaus) whose projects prefig- 
ure Debord's generalised situationist revolution which would break 
open the whole contemporary popular sign-system of postwar 'culture' 
along with the coupled short-circuits of capitalist production and 
its theoretical apology. The whole is a coherent system, a theatre, 
a Societ6 de Spectacle, whose component images and identities and 
processes are so coordinated in the action or activity of contemp- 
orary western capitalism, that they must either be broken open and 
transformed as a whole, or stay in place, 'recuperating' every local 
attempt to call particular components 'into question', to open up 
locally 'free' spaces of activity. May 1968, Paris, was identified 
as the time and place where the whole system would be broken open. 
The situationist posters of the Ateliers Populair"es and situationist 
slogans filled the streets, the Living Theatre and situationist 
groups planned demonstrations as street theatre; Beck and Lebel 
r 
organised the Theatre de 1'0deon across from the Sorbonne as dramat- 
isation of the Great Debate over the Script for the global Happen- 
ing. And then suddenly the party was over, the Situationist Inter- 
nationiil split then dissolved... 
1354 VAN NEIGHEM, Raoul Situationist Manifesto 
1355 Leaving the Twentieth Century: The Incomplete Work of the Situat- 
ionist International ed Crmy London 1974 
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I have discussed above a parallel transition in french 
theoretical space', turning about the calling-into-question after 
1968 - say in the years around 
1970,1967-73 - of a unitary space 
of questions, 'classic' structuralism, into which the questioning 
of 'the system' of signs articulating late capitalist culture had 
been taken to prefigure the practical transition. And just as a 
centrali.. 3ed 'cartesian' french political and theoretical order, 
moving so to speak en bloc from one more or less unitary formation 
to the next through crisis or 'revolution' (1789,1615,1830,1848 
and ao on through to 1968) that belies in a discontinuous change of 
'focus' an underlying cultural continuity (plus ca change plus c'est 
la meme chose) has been coordinated at various points above with a 
more diffuse multipolar dynamic across the Rhine, so one might cor- 
relate the situationist 'poetic' of revolution and its spectacular 
climax in May 1968, with a more or less parallel internstional 'move- 
ment' or grouping originating in Germany in the early sixties: 
Fluxus. 
Art as 'opening-up' the general framework or coordinates 
of experience or culture otherwise static, constant, in the unquest- 
ioned system of 'practical' transitions from one situation to the 
next; this through an 'intransitive' interruption of that dynamic 
of transition, which poses 'questions' that cannot be resolved like 
'practical' questions through some transition which remains within 
the unquestioned general frame of transition, but find their only 
satisfactory response in a transition out of the whole current order 
of practical transition itself, 'as such' - in a configuration of 
what may be verbally or mentally transcribed as 'questions' attaching 
to primary coordinates of the otherwise constant scheme of transition 
as a whole: subject, object, sign, question, 'art', truth, life, 
desire, and so on. 'Fluxus'; the coordination of these 'intransit- 
ive' questions or interruptions, openings, not within some 'positive' 
unitary space that might be theoretically articul? ted as a new 'sys- 
tem' into which an 'aesthetic' movement organised so many components 
of transition - Debord's reconstruction of socialism, say, beyond 
the paradox that the natural 'open' space of action beyond the 
current unitary system cannot be expressed 'in' that system. - but 
rather in the 'negative dialectic' of a constant questioning or 
opening-up of what remained unquestioned in the previous framings 
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of poetic 'opening-up' of culture, the previous 'moves' within the 
radically open 'movement' itself - these loosely coordinate 'moves' 
typically taking the form of happenings or Aktionen in which no 
conventional abstraction of the 'art-work' from its various sap- 
posedly 'external' or extrinsic dimensions or coordinates was to 
be left unquestioned. No more traditional 'paintings', then (for 
example); no more painting, indeed, unless it be a vehicle for bring- 
ing into question dramatically the various correlative contextual 
components of the conventional system of identities which had 'con- 
stituted' the previous tradition of painting, sculpture, and so on: 
the previous conventional identity of 'Art'. In 1972 David Mayor 
posed the question What is Fluxus? - by publishing a collection of 
about ninety responses from those more or less engaged in the other- 
wise undefined 'movement' to his invitation to respond to this attempt 
to as it were 'mark' the question ' Fluxus' : 
*1356 Fluxshoe ed Mayor Cullompton 1972 
Fluxus as question: participation in Fluxus as affirmation 
of what may be verbally transcribed (however questionably) as quest- 
ioning as a primary orientation of one's 'intransitive' activity as 
'artist' or 'anti-artist' (or whatever one called oneself in response 
to that question of identity or role). 
Read and Penrose had set up the ICA in London in 1947 as 
not so much an art-gallery as 'a place for adults to play'. Play: 
theatre, game; and the british axis, or a british axis, of what one 
might call the 'dramatisation' of Art around 1970, marked by the 
sudden profusion in that period of short-lived 'Arts Labs', might 
be correlated with the dominant frame of british 'philosophical' 
questioning over the same period - the 'language-game' - in terms 
of this figure of 'play', opening up previously unquestioned con- 
figurations of identities as just so many more or less arbitrary 
but coordinate selections of variables from the wider space of other 
selections, substitutions, rules, made manifest in the games played 
out by a profusion of 'performance' groups such as the People Show: 
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1357 NUTTALL, Jeff Performvnce Art: I Memoirs London 1979 
II Scripts (1966-74) ibid 
.. or in a wider transcription and exemplification of new vnriationr 
within a cultural matrix of Britain as a whole around 1970 in the 
'alternative' culture's 'comic', OZ, whose editor framed a more or 
less systematic picture of what had been opened up by 1970.. 
1358 NEVILLE, Richard Plnypower London 1970 
.. and projected 
its consummation in the transition from the closed 
systems of previous identities and rules broken open by the figure 
of 'play' into a free sp^ce of variation. The failure of such a 
project might be taken as a British component of a more general 
tragicomic impasse around 1970, as the various wider 'spaces' of 
action into which various transitions were projected by situationists 
and others in various different traditions themselves come theoretic- 
ally and practically into question as abstractions from the dramatic 
dynamics of the particular situations and configurations of project- 
ion, to supposed inscriptions of such particular situations in a 
general unitary linguistic space of 'questions' (or correlative com- 
prehensive spaces of free action). Transcription of what is opened 
up in a particular 'poetic' interruption of the 'transitive' intra- 
mundane order of the 'practical', into the linguistic matrix of 
questions and theories itself comes 'into question' as one v'. riable 
of the situation. Thus, for example, in his contribution to the 
Montreal colloquium 'Performance et Multidisciplinarite: Postmodern- 
isme' in 1980... 
'1359 Performance: Text(e)s & Documents ed Pontbriand Montreal 1981 
.. Lyotard reflects on 
Daniel Buren's installations since the mid- 
sixties: Buren brackets any questioning of the 'internal' configur- 
ation of the 'art-work' by reproducing precisely the same coloured 
stripes as identical 'content' of all his work; thus what each suc- 
cessive embodiment of those stripes in various different forms and 
contexts opens up is the dramatic interplay of various questions 
relating to various components or coordinates of form and context: 
in particular they open up the question of the theoretical axis of 
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response (exemplified, though not explicitly, by Lyotard's paper 
itself), the transcription of the various coordinate openings into 
the verbal order of systematic questioning, as itself dramatically 
coordinated with those various non-verbal dimensions of 'question' 
as itself only one among those 'contextual' coordinates (yet once 
more, Lyotard here verbally frames the inscription of the verbrl 
order of theory in the dynamics of action, with no attempt to in- 
scribe this 'theoretical' inscription itself in the 'concrete' in- 
terplay of the various verbal and non-verbal components of its own 
dramatic articulation). 
Ironically, just as the 'structuralist' space of questions, 
Language, was coming into question after around 1970, as abstraction 
from the figural dynamic of closure of the 'space' and time of a 
limited recit or discours, a converse development in 'conceptual 
art' was attempting to as it were take Buren's bringing-into-question 
of the abstraction of the traditional 'content' of 'Art' one step 
further, by (as 'they thought) bracketing the 'object' entirely and 
organising their theoretical dynamic of transposition of the quest- 
ions it poses into Language around the question marked by the word 
'Art': 
1360 Art & Language ed Atkinson & alia Coventry 1969- 
1361 Art & Language (selections) ed & intr Harrison Cologne 1972 
1362 Art & Language 1966-75 Oxford 1975 
While the unitary-linguistic 'space' of classic 'structuralism' 
is schematically brought into question by a residually universal 
or comprehensive figure of inscription of all fragmentary linguistic 
'units' in the figural dynamic of their 'pragmatics', the converse 
traditional abstraction of a figural unity, the 'art-object', from 
the same linguistic interface of figural and conceptual or logical, 
is schematically reduced to the logical grammar of the concept 
'Art'. In the first case the inscription of 'theory' (a la Lyotard) 
in its pragmatics remains abstractly theoretical; in the converse 
second case the supposed inscription of the figurrl in the logictfl 
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remains fundamentally figural, down to the very production of 
the 'journal of conceptual art', as an object, in the 'image' of 
the contemporary journals or anglo-american 'linguistic philosophy' 
it apes - as is underlined by Brandon Taylor in an essay ('Textural 
Art') contributed to the catalogue of an exhibition of 'Artist's 
Books' in 1976: 
1363 Artists' Books (1970-6) ed Attwood London 1976 
m 
'Artists' Books': the 'book' having become a primary com- 
ponent in the generalised 'movement' around 1970 away from the trad- 
tional 'art-object' abstracted from the dramatic coordin. tes of its 
constitution, characteristically documented in a book by Lucy Lippard: 
1364 LIPPARD, Lucy Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art- 
Object 1966-72 London 1973 
'Documented' : the otherwise ephemeral 'actions' of the sixties 
documented by words and images assembled in the form of a 'book' 
from which, within the traditional coordination of 'intern, l' and 
Iexternal' coordinates of 'book', the original 'action' may be as 
it were reconstituted within a wider 'history' which comprehends 
both initial action and subsequent activity of documentation and 
then reconstruction by a 'reader'. Lippprd's documentation of 
such documentation over the years she covers thus presents her 
reader with 'the history' of the diffuse movement or development 
she merely documents without attempting to reconstruct as a unitary 
activity, as a question: thus far her book is itself one component 
in the continuation of the 'movement' it frames, and is itself 
'documented' - along with (1363 ) itself - in (1363) above. Yet 
since its structure as book does not directly enter into the art- 
iculation of the question it poses, standing so to speak 'outside' 
the 'art' it documents as a mere 'representation', it cannot itself 
be considered as an instance of the 'book art' that Clive Phillpot, 
in his essay in (1363), identifies as a morel limited form within 
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the wider genus of 'artist's book' or indeed 'art book' as a 
whole, defined (by him) as a book whose own structure (as speci- 
fically 'book', and specifically that particular construction of 
a book within the range of variation of components more or less 
determined as constituting a 'book') enters into the 'artwork' of 
which it is itself a component, rather than a mere conventionpl and 
unquestioned presentation or representation. One might add that 
Phillpot's own essay makes no attempt to exemplify the 'book art' 
it textually defines or constitutes: like Brandon Taylor's compan- 
ion essay it remains within the form or genre of art-theory 'outside' 
its objects - in the latter case somewhat ironically, since the ir- 
reducible 'figuration' that Taylor recognises in the productions of 
the Art & Language group, vociferously repudiated by that group in 
their insistence that their project amounts to the theoretical articu- 
lation of the logic of figure within the conceptual matrix of an 
essentially immaterial space of Language, may itself, of course, 
be identified in the constitution of Taylor's own 'theoretical' 
reflections themselves. 
Further developments in the form of book-art and artist's 
book, and their documentation, may be traced through: 
1365 Das Buch als Kunstobjekt 
1366 Bookworks London 1981 
ed Schaller Cologne 1981 
1367 British Artists' Books 1970-83 London 1984 
. -. or through the shelves of 'artists' books' themselves in several 
'art-galleries' (Whitechapel, Nigel Greenwood, Lisson in London). 
'Documentation' of an overall 'history' of action (rather than the 
'drama' constrained by various conventions such as the distinction 
of 'actor' and 'audience') as 'art' from mid-century until around 
1970, framing Lippard's more detailed documents, I found in: 
1368 HENRI, Adrian Environments and Happenings London 1974 
.. and Cage's own 
documentation of his seminal experiments over the 
fifties and sixties in: 
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1369 CAGE, John Silence Middletown, Conn 1961 
'1370 M NY 1973 
The 'documentation' assembled for a'198 Beaubourg 
exhibition: 
1371 Yves Klein Paris 198 
sets its subject's (or 'object's'? ) 'actions' from mid-century to 
his death in 1962 within the wider matrix, or history, activity, of 
his life as his primary 'artwork', in which particular 'paintings', 
'sculptures', 'music', 'architecture' ('of the immaterial'), writings, 
and other 'actions' or 'events' are articulated within the transcend- 
ental coordinates of Le Vide, the wider space whose constant 'extern- 
al' image is the ultramarine 'IKB' (International Klein Blue) of 
'Space' itself, in which all these 'actions' mark so many intransit- 
ive points of transition out of the everyday practical order of tran- 
sition from one situation to another, into the cosmic configuration 
of such transition, life, as a whole. 
The critic Pierre Restany identified a grouping (in 1960) 
of which Klein was the most prominent member, as 'nouveaux realistes' 
who, like their american 'neodadaist' counterparts had taken the 
principle of collage to its limit in constructing their 'art' from 
the assemblage of 'real' elements, systematically bringing into 
question the conventional coordinates, abstract 'contextual' iden- 
tities, which framed the social constitution of the analogously 
abstract conventional illusionistic 'spaces' of the various tradit- 
ional genres of 'art'. I have already noted the young 'new realist' 
Daniel Buren's continuation of this 'movement' into the eighties, 
substituting his constant stripes, as it were, for Klein's constant 
'monochrome' blue; and the latter limit form of the 'movement' 
allows of a still more simple coordination of the external or con- 
textual space of (Buren's) 'art' around the axis of the artist's 
life, as what may be transcribed as each successive configuration 
of 'questions' posed by each successive 'work' or installation, 
opens in its turn out of the configuration of artist and culture 
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into which the previous 'works' have led. Klein and Buren, 
like, say, Dali and Warhol, present a sort of one-man 'movement' 
in the coherence of the 'external' coordinates of their 'works' 
within the frame of a life... 
1372 DALI, Salvador Oui! (essays and transcripts 1931-69) 
Paris 197 
1373 Journal d'un Genie 
137k WARHOL, Andy From A to B and back again: The Philosophy 
of Andy Warhol NY 1975 
In each of these cases the script or transcript is dramatically 
coordinate as verbal order of 'opening up' the various correlative 
dimensions of-an-activity in which 'life' and 'art' in a sense co- 
incide, with non-verbal dimensions or coordinates. More generally, 
the coordination of a 'group' of artists' activities as a more or 
less definite 'movement' is naturally framed within more or less 
shared coordinates of transition from a present configuration of 
collective experience-into a new wider 'space', presented verbally 
as so many questions (or responses that implicitly mark them) which 
transcribe into the general situation correlative with a printed 
'manifesto', the more or less unitary frame in which a wide variety 
of different 'works' present so many different markings of specific 
figures-or elements of transition within more specific concrete situ- 
ations of execution and reception of specific 'works'. For the 
'situationists' of May 1968 the transition was to be an essentially 
'political' or 'cultural' revolution into a free social space in 
which 'everyone will be an artist'; for Klein, his actions were 
the marking in the France of the fifties of so many points of tran- 
sition into the cosmic space already marked out by the Zen masters 
of Japan from within the different local configurations of their 
culture - so many component transitions or steps which together 
were simply the pattern of a life that was itself an intransitive 
movement out of the practical and technical transitions of the more 
limited 'world', beginning with his birth, and ending with his death, 
neither of which fitted - any more than the intervening 'art' - into 
an otherwise apparently constant pattern of practically motivated 
transition from one specific situation 'in' life to the next. 
dccxlii 
Such an 'art' might perhaps just as well be called a 
'religion', punctuated not so much by 'art-works' as by a develop- 
ing ritual - except that since the decoupling of 'art', 'theory' 
and 'religion' marked by the opening configuration of theory as of 
theatre around 500BC, 'religion' has been articulated as a sort of 
converse of 'art', in the common 'transcendental' coordinates of 
transition into and out of the 'transitive' practical order of a 
whole community and its universal history, with the theatre of ritual 
transition 'in' life Brom the narrower practical order leading from 
one day to the next, into the wider 'cosmic' frame into which death 
is the definitive transition, determined as a reflection of the 
whole community's configuration in that universal 'space' of birth, 
death and mystery, rather than as an 'artwork' marking the individ- 
ual 'artist's' access to that same wider order, as his own identity 
comes as one component into a configutation of questions opened up 
by the 'intransitive' interruption of the everyday order by the act- 
ivity we call 'art'. 
Just as a group of artists 'in' a wider community may 
constitute themselves as 'group' and as 'movement' in a verbal 
framing of the shared coordinates of the wider 'spaces into which 
their separate 'works' mark so many detailed configurations of 
specific points of transition, so the wider 'religious' frame of 
a member of the wider community's transition in, and beyond, life 
into the coordinates of a wider cosmic order 'interrupting' the 
practical order of life with 'intransitive' birth and death, finds 
its primary expression in the western tradition verbally marked 
as the Book which frames the 'everyday' order of confrontation 
with it in the 'wider' space and time of 'the heavens', Klein's 
blue void. As in the other cultures of The Book, Islam and Judaism, 
there is an historic tension between the subordination of the Book 
as marking the inscription of its verbal order within the primary 
axis of a religious tradition, activity, and institutional frame, 
and a converse emphasis upon the constant opening-up of any fixed 
institutional frame of activity through the radical open-ness of 
questioning associated with the circular figure of a text that 
frames its own place as one component in the configuration it 
frames: conservative Tradition and progressive criticism as 
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complementary sides of the same circular frame of 'religious' 
coordination of a community's activity within its widest cosmic 
or 'heavenly' context. 
The chief representative, - and martyr so to speak - of 
the turn-of-the-century 'modernist' movement in catholicism, Tyrrell, 
explicitly framed his criticism of the conservative reassertion of 
unitary tradition at the Vatican Council of 1869-70, in terms of 
the 'pragmatic' elaboration in particular situations of access to 
a transcendent frame 'behind' everyday experience, of particular 
figures or configurations of interaction of visible and invisible. 
While James on the one hand was inscribing the previously abstracted 
'logical' side of language in a practical dynamics of action and 
judgement, 'modernists' were exploring the same radical interplay 
of a previously 'abstract' theological poetic and its unitary insti- 
tutional frame with the logic of various 'scientific' developments 
over the last century. James was bringing out the dimension of 
'faith' previously abstracted from in the nineteenth-century ideal 
of unitary global 'scientific' frame of questions, and Tyrrell and 
his associates were exploring the irreducible 'logical' dimension 
in the empirical elaboration of what a conservative and authoritar- 
ian institution of 'christian' activity was presenting as a static 
unitary frame o'f the universal christian drama. A more general 
'modernism', only focussed and typified by the catholic 'movement' 
until its authoritarian repression by papal decree in 1908, through 
precisely the unitary structure of that institution which 'modernism' 
strictly speaking was calling into question, may. be seen as a.. 
simple radicalisation of Schleiermacher's figure of all 'religion' 
as simply different expressions in different communities or cult- 
ures of the common 'transcendental' frame comprehending all earthly 
activity, predominantly expressed in the western tradition or 
culture after the breakdown of the pagan culture of classical 
Antiquity in an evolving 'christianity'. Thus one principal 
component of Tyrrell' 'modernism' was an emphasis on the 'mystical' 
experience of individual access to the invisible or transcendental 
'divine' frame of-all religions, which James had taken as empirical 
domain for his investigation of 'faith' (its 'phenomenology' in 
a non-technical sense) in the Gifford lectures of 1900-1, and 
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which Tyrrell's closest friend Von Hugel was exploring in the 
more limited 'catholic' manifestation of 'the mystical element 
of religion' in the circle of Catherine of Genoa ( above); 
characteristically the emphasis on the common cosmic frame or 
mystery to which different communities found different figures of 
access was more influential in anglican than in catholic circles 
after the condemnation of Tyrrell in the same year that Von HUgel's 
study appeared: 
1375 DE LA BEDOYERE, Michael The Life of Friedrich von iitfrel London 19 
1376 UNDERHILL, Evelyn Mysticism London (1911)1912 
In Part III I set Barth's unfinished 9000 pages of 
inquiry into 'the Word of God' as expressed in the Book which frames 
the World and its own part in that World, and through this the 
living dynamic of Word, as sole index of specifically 'christian' 
theology over the course of the twentieth century that, in this 
field, it dominates: 
1377 BARTH, Karl Kirkliche Dogmatik (ZHrich 1932-67) tr 
Edinburgh 1936-69 
... and just as 
I have attempted to trace an unfolding of a 'philo- 
sophical' frame of questioning-as-such from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, through turn-of-the-century pragmatism, down 
to a questioning of questioning as marking what is open in the 
situation of that questioning in this book, and to trace a parallel 
opening-up of 'art' from the turn of the century down to the point 
around 1970 where the linguistic reflection on what is 'opened-up' 
in an 'artwork' itself becomes an explicit coordinate of 'art', 
so, I suggest, one may construe an axis of 'christian theology' 
that runs from Schleiermacher down to 'modernism' at the turn of 
this century, and on through Barth's complementary reaction against 
'liberal' or 'rationalist' tendencies to subordinate the practical 
dynamics of the living Word to any unitary 'scientific' frame, doxm 
to this :: attempt to mark what is open in the situation of a book 
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constructed as questioning of its questioning. 
I noted a distinction drawn in 1976 between 'artists' 
books' in general - typically a book 'presenting' an 'action' as 
art but itself outside the configuration of questions or rather 
'openings' which as components of the action together in their 
interplay constitute it as 'art' (an 'intransitive' action 'in 
place of' another transitive action, but not in general a 'theatr- 
ical' representation of another action) - and 'book art' in which 
the book itself enters as one set of components of the 'poetic' 
configuration. And just as I criticised seventies attempts to 
present as 'art' a supposedly purely linguistic configuration of 
questions (as mapping of 'Art' and -, its. dynamic of 'opening-up' into 
a logical order of questions in Language) as remaining essentially 
'figural', I criticised complementary attempts to inscribe the log- 
ical order of questions within the analogical or figural poetics 
or pragmatics of its liguistic marking as still essentially articu- 
lated in an abstract textual logic of such inscription. This book 
of questioning, inquiry, as attempt to mark what is open in the 
situation in which it responds to what is open by electing to 
mark it in questions, and the questioning of those questions, may, 
I hope be considered to be articulated both 'logically' as sequence 
of questions and 'poetically' as presenting in the configuration 
of words and non-verbal dimensions of its marking an open-ness, 
a matrix of possible substitutions, in which the verbal marking of 
that marking of a system of substitutions in and through which it 
is constructed as 'theory' marks itself as only one among other 
lines of response open. At the same time, what is thus logically 
and poetically organised as a linguistic order of marks opening 
and closing with an object, this book, marked '? ', marks a coincid., 
ence not only of 'theory' and 'art', but of both with 'religious' 
mystery, as marking in 
, 
a, general system of substitutions and con- 
straints upon substitution organised about the question of this 
question-mark, the widest 'cosmic' frame of practical earthly 
activity, of 'intransitive' passage onto this earthly stage, into 
this Globe Theatre, and out of it - of birth and death, and 'theory' 
as 'intransitive' access to the wider 'invisible' cosmic frame 
from within the intervening transitions articuli! ted as our lives 
here on Earth. 
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Globe Theatre 
I opened Part I with a fairly abstract consideration 
of a Book in the 'external' context of this book, framing action 
within the universal space and time it also framed, as response 
to this 'circular' figure, and I opened the second 'half' of Part 
I by considering this book as response to the meeting around the 
beginning of 'our Era' of a 'logical' tradition opening out of 
a pythagorean organisation of 'theory' as both logic and poetics 
of inquiry organised around the question of simple 'mark', and a 
poetic or rather religious tradition developing from the systematis- 
ation of jewish culture on return from Babylonia around the time of 
Pythagoras (and systematically formulated in the contemporary Book 
of Isaiah). On roughly the same 'scale' of transition exemplified 
by these last five hundred years before our Era, I traced the unfold- 
ing of 'religious' questions as logically articulated in a 'theology', 
and the complementary institutions in which such 'theology, was 
organised as one activity among others, through the scholastic sys- 
tems of the thirteenth century. (typified by Aquinas), the 'Scient- 
ific Revolution' of the seventeenth (typi'fied by Descartes), the 
Romanticism marking the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth 
centuries (Schleiermacher), down to the 'modernist crisis' around 
the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Descartes and his associates, over the mid-seventeenth 
century, abstracted a 'scientific' frame of transcription of a 
universal frame of what was open into a universal logical frame of 
questions, from the complementary 'poetics' of questioning as 
'dramatically' articulated in specific situations of breakdown of 
configurations of experience and activity. Cornford, in various 
books noted above, from around the turn of this century, articulated 
the pythagorean transition into a western 'theoretical' space of 
questions 'mathematically' organised around an otherwise indeterminate 
'mark', within its dynamic as religious 'mystery', elided since the 
cartesian 'mathematical' revolution of the seventeenth century, but 
rediscovered through examination of the 'presocratict tradition 
or transition from Thales to Socrates (say, 57OBC-43OBC) within the 
framework of the 'comparative religion' or 'comparative mythology' 
associated with the narrower 'modernism' in christian theology 
around the turn of the century. 
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As the elaboration of a 'scientific' world-picture as 
transcription of unitary physical Universe into a timeless logical 
system of questions abstracted from the specific 'poetics' of spe- 
cific contributions to the universal project slowly eroded successive 
theological circles of argument framed as a whole by a Book which 
justified its stories by itself framing the loci of their enunciation 
within the supposed unity or literal coherence of its story or uni- 
versal history as a whole, a converse move, as I have noted, began 
to question the imminent completion of this project of erosion, by 
beginning to regard biblical accounts of 'religious experience' or 
the interplay of 'visible' and 'invisible' as imperfect 'pragmatic' 
expressions of such experience within the limited coordinates of a 
particular historical situation and culture, just as the grand pro- 
ject of 'Science' itself was being recast into a precisely analogous 
'pragmatics' of the specific steps whose 'scientificity' was taken 
to be constituted now rather by a particular 'scientific' orientation 
toward abstraction from specific to more general application, than 
by an End of unitary logical Truth already fully articulate in itself. 
Now when the dynamic of one question leading to another, 
that 'logical' axis of 'science' itself comes 'into question' as 
itself one particular element of the 'Universe' it seeks to frame 
'within' language or thought as system of questions and answers, 
we enter the essentially 'dramatic' figure of what Aristotle still 
calls . c4CK. His 'science' of the Universe itself presents a con- 
figuration in which access to the 'logical' order of questions in 
which the Universe has been systematically framed is coupled as 
one 'variable' with other non-verbal components of the situation 
of reflection. The question, as the marking of something open 
(for example, the marking of this order of 'question' itself), when 
finally it comes itself 'into question', marks the inscription of 
the logical order of thought and questions as merely one dimension 
of a wider dynamic'system, and thus marks also the possibility of 
the thinker's access to the interplay of his thinking with the 
non-verbal coordinates of thinking it has already mapped 'in' thought. 
Access, in particular, to the axis of motive or emotive in 
which the whole 'logical' dynamic 'in' language and thought is it- 
self recognised as ultimately the thinker's movement, in the wider 
coordin ,. es of he whole Universe, 'through' the ultimately limited 
dccx. lviii 
dimension or domain of logic and the organisation of what is 
'open' in that Universe as system of questions, towards and ul- 
timately ' into' e, oAZA . 
Ct-A-ºcroJ 
, 'Philosophy' ; and Aristotle's 
figure of the dramatic articulation of thought with other variables 
of the thinker's or philosopher's universal or cosmic situation re- 
flects, of course the specific and questionable starting-point of 
his own logic, which has ultimately framed the configuration of 
'dramatic' passage from what that logic determines as its own formal 
coordination with other elements of the Universe it h^s articulated, 
into the embodied and situated thinker's thinking of thinking, or 
theatrical experience of theory: a 'vision' which is no longer 
merely the verbal figure of verbal representation or transcription 
of the 'Universe', and of that representation 'in' it as one com- 
ponent, but which is now indeed an articulate spectacle in which he 
finds himself, thinking his thinking, questioning his questioning 
as merely one element dynamically coordinate with others (not just 
in the 'internal' linguistic dynamics of his 'logic', but now also 
in the 'external', non-verbal affective or emotive dynamic of his 
action and interaction with others and material things): as 'the 
wise man' materially set in a Universe in which he at last understands 
his quest for understanding itself as movement towards his access to 
his true identity, persona, part. 
But this 'pragmatic' articulation of aristotelian theory 
as access to one's true part in a'universal drama is as essentially 
'circular' as any 'religious' access to a similar dram-tic frz. me, 
'symbolically' rather than 'logically' organised, directly in the 
'pragmatic' axis of breakdown of identification with a purely 
'mental' part in the dynamics of thought decoupled from its dramatic 
coordinates -a breakdown of which the transition from logic to 
wisdom as 'abstract' thinking itself comes into question r-s only 
one element in the world it organises 'in thought' may be itself 
taken as merely a special case. Indeed these two orders of access 
to one's 'part' in Kosmos coincide in the pythcgorenn frame which 
marks the starting-point for a progressive divergence bctween the 
vision or QL .L of'! science', and of the instituted 'mysteries'. 
And in Aristotle's #r-+I"c one may still see, logically rrticulated, 
the figure of trance or (in the terms of a litter psychology) 
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'dissociation' in which the 'normal' waking dynamic of identi- 
fication with an 'I' or 'I think' which is the 'pragmatic' locus 
of transcription of various coordinates of a situation in which 
one is involved into a configuration of questions, thinking, when 
the figure or appearance in which one was unquestioningly involved 
'breaks down' or 'breaks open', is so to speak 'short-circuited' in 
some particular 'mystical' figure of dramatic coordination of this 
instance of 'I', 'as such', with other as it were 'intransitive' 
coordinates of some particular f Bure of 'transition', practical 
activity, or 'experience' as a whole. As if one were sitting en- 
tranced lost in a theatrical action on a stage, in its dynamic 
(rather than thinking 'here I am sitting watching some people be- 
having as if they were other than themselves), one so to speak 
watches one's thought and activity within a particular figure of 
'universal' coupling of thought and 'external' coordinates of tran- 
sition, generally articulated in the widest figure of transition 
into the previously unquestioned dynamic of an apparently autonomous 
'I think' as unthinkingly elaborated in the pragmatics of being as- 
sociated with a particular physical body. 
Each day we experience complete Idissociationi, in which 
no residue of thinking remains, in 'sleeps, and partial dissociation 
in the 'dreams' which mark transition into and out of that myster- 
ious state. While Freud was investigating the articulation of the 
'visions' of his patients in hypnoid states as expressions of the 
emotive axis of a desire that could not be entertained in conscious 
thought, William James was investigating the structure of those 
'spontaneous' trance-states generally experienced'by his subjects 
in the midst of otherwise normal 'waking' or consciousness as the 
irruption into the normal dynamics of practical transition in waking 
life from one situation to the next, in which the whole 'everyday' 
order of experience, its generally unquestioned constant coordinates 
of thinking 'Il, physical body and so on, came 'into question' or 
'broke down' - and in which various figures of an agency 'behind' 
everyday. visible experience, and its 'invisible' coordinates, to 
which the 'intransitive' irruption must be attributed (since by def- 
inition, so to speak, it was 'outside' the everyday order) were 
given halting imperfect expression in figures. 'borrowed' prom the 
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'natural' order which the 'supernatural' agency interrupted - 
in which it 'super-naturally' intervened. I have already described 
at some length my own experience of such an 'irruption' ;sI was 
writing a letter to Julia - questioning in the letter, precisely, 
why I found myself writing her this questioning. 
Between the time of Mesmer towards the close of the 
eighteenth century, nd the systematic investigations of Charcot, 
Freud and others towards the close of the nineteenth, the very 
fact of 'mesmerism', 'hypnosis', 'trance' states were questioned 
by many scientists. In his general survey Chertok narrates the 
coming of age and scientific respectability of the dissociated 
state precisely over the period in which the 'abstract' ego or 'I' 
as locus of 'Science' or cartesian scientific system 
of questions 
was being brought into question by James, Freud and others; yet as 
he points out that most familiar of 'experiences', the complete 
dissociation we call sleep (which Locke had already two hundred 
years before urged as a confutation of the cartesian version of 
the 'I'), is still late in the twentieth century as much a 'mystery' 
for 'science' as its complement consciousness, the locus so to speak 
of 'scientific' and other questioning itself... 
1378 CHERTOK, L'Hypnose Paris 19 
Janet claimed that he could 'hypnotise' certain of 
his patients even when not physically confronting them. If one 
enters into 'dissociated' trance at the consummation of 'philosophy', 
as into a figure of coupling of thinking 'I' with other non-mental 
coordinates of questioning and thought; and if the figure of an 
autonomous abstract 'I' directing its scientific or other inquiry 
free of any constraints of coordination with other non-mental dim- 
ensions of its embodied lowner's' (or perhaps it is the It which 
owns the body - 'my' body... ) activities (including thinking) is 
no longer 'scientifically' tenable in the twentieth century, then 
why should most 'scientists' be so scandalised by the suggestion 
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that two individual 'figures' of thinking 'I' should be either 
spont, ineously or (as with Charcot it is claimed) by 'choice' coupled 
in an essentially 'poetic' (or indeed 'mystical') configuration of 
'I's and other coordinates of the two individuals' common situation, 
in a 'sympathy' or 'telepathic' communication in an affective axis 
of their situation partly abstracted or 'dissociated' from the 'every- 
day' abstract domains of supposedly autonomous conscious 'I', and 
autonomous 'physical object', and the everyday practical circuit 
of communication of two 'I's through the intermediary of such thorough- 
ly 'external' media? Is it perhaps that the typical 'scientist' is 
still involved in abstract 'scientific' inquiry (even into the un- 
tenability of an abstract autonomous domain of logic, consciousness, 
questioning, as of a complementary abstraction of an independent 
'physical' order from relativistic 'observer' and quantum 'measure- 
ment', neither 'physically' specifiable) through identification with 
just the traditional 'everyday' appearance to itself of 'autonomous' 
waking thought? 
'Modern spiritualism', or the widespread 'movement' in- 
volving literally millions of people across Europe and America in 
'sittings' with an entranced 'medium' may be fairly precisely dated 
from the reporting of purported occurrences at the Fox Household in 
Hydesville in America, beginning in, that eventful year 1848. I 
will not here enter into the 'sociology' of this inception, which 
would link it to political, economic, and scientific (Helmholz' 
mathematical formulation of the Conservation of Energy, and so of 
the underlying unity or system of the 'physical' world) revolutions 
of that year, but simply cite the most famous 'medium's' own account 
of his central part in the 'movement' from mid-century: 
1379 HOME, Daniel Dunglas Incidents in_My Life intr Chambers 
London 1863 
In another eventful year, 1870, the leading british 
scientist Sir William Crookes opened up the 'scientific' investi- 
gation' of 'mediumistic phenomena' by instigating a series of 
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experiments with Home (and latterly with other 'mediums') under 
'laboratory conditions', to try and ascertain what - if any - 
phenomena of the darkened 'seance room' could be demonstrated 
in such a manner as to 'scientifically' rule out mere theatrical 
deception (in which many mediums, but never Home, had been caught 
red-handed in the intervening years): 
1380 CROOKES, William Researches in the Phenomena of Sniritualism 
London 1871-6 
Just as 'mediumship' had attracted great interest as a demonstrPtion 
or supposed demonstration of what could be regarded as the prim? ry 
phenomena of 'religious' experience - communication in a trance 
with 'agencies' outside the everyday 'natural' order of trnnsitions 
within life ('between birth and death) - just as 'science' appeared 
to be finally disrediting the 'literal' biblical tradition, so many 
victorian scientists and philosophers of considerable eminence felt 
both a need and a social duty, to investigate whether the principles 
of a resolution of what Draper called 'The Conflict of Religion with 
Science' might be discovered by such 'scientific' investigation of 
that basic structure of 'religious experience', so that the relig- 
ious structures of the biblical message might be recognised and in- 
vestigated, while the no longer tenable 'literal' truth of the whole 
biblical Story or History was as it were bracketed... 
1381 Journal of the Society for Psychical Research London 1883- 
As masses of material was assembled, some of those involved began 
to try and cast it into systematic form. No-one doubted any longer 
the reality of the trance state. 'Moders mediumship' had begun 
with the figure of a once-living agency associated with the circle 
of living agencies around the table communicating with that circle 
by, so to speak replacing the normal 'I' in the dissociated or en- 
tranced 'medium', or even 'physically' intervening in that config- 
uration in manners other then so to speak direct 'imperson". tions 
as the medium acted' his or, her persona or part. One of the 
early researchers, Podmore, argued that all those phenomena which 
F 
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which were beyond scientific doubt could be accounted for simply 
by trance, telepathic communication to a greater or lesser degree 
among those in the trance-situation, and a sort of combin! -tion of 
these components in dreamlike collective hallucinntion or trance- 
vision more or less 'telepathically' shared by members of a group, 
without the need for invoking any other invisible or 'spirituol' 
agencies other than the interacting 'I's of the living members of 
the entranced group: 
1382 PODMORE, Frank Apparitions and Thought-Transference 
... and in 
his posthumously published wider survey of the whole 
range of phenomena investigated or reported in the first phise of 
'psychical research' down to the turn of the century (say 1870-1930, 
maintaining the by-now familiar parallel with other developments in 
the various 'internal' and 'external' coordinates of 'theory'), 
Myers generalised this approach, borrowing like Freud and Jung 
Hartmann's figure of the 'Unconscious' as interpersonal. systematic 
articulation of the affective axis of the Universe as a whole, into 
which trance was the access: 
1383 MYERS, Frederic WH Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily 
Death London 1903 
With this systematisation the 'research' parted company 
with. 'spiritualism' and -moved- intordetailed investigations of 
spontaneous' paranormal phenomena within the established structure, 
and the question of correlation of this structure 'with the data 
of comparative religion, psychoanalysis. /and even the 'new' physics. 
I have suggested that Aristotle's 'wisdom', taken over from less 
'scientific' pythagoreans, amounts to a passage from what I have 
elsewhere called the 'formal' internal order of scientific questions 
to the 'informal' dramatic or pragmatic coordination of that locus 
of formal questioning with 'external' coordinates of its practical 
elaboration - Hartmann's attempt' to organise 'scientifically' the 
motive axis of thiq, 'pragmatic' configuration as inscription of 
the informal 'question' of the science of 1870 formally within the 
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incomplete formal system of 'logical' questions (his 'scientific' 
Unbewusstsein then, as h-3s often been observed, just an attempt to 
frame the unknown of 'Science' at a specific point in its develop- 
ment, the unbewusst, within the formal structure of the science of 
that time) may be seen as an analogue of Aristotle's move into a 
logical version of the analogical or dramatic dynamic of 
parallelled in England by an anonymous publication by one of the 
leading physicists (whose scientific works are Plready noted above) 
together with the second president of the Society for Psychical Re- 
search: 
TAIT, Peter Guthrie & The Unseen Universe: or Physical Speculations 
STEIGART, Balfour 
on a Future State London 1875 
(the cover bears the image of the 'trinity knot' of my introduction, 
taken by Tait as the most elementary form of 'matter', a self-main- 
taining 'knot' in his friend Maxwell's electromagnetic field, which 
he had been investigating in the formalism of Hamilton's quaternion 
field - the knot actually an image of the common symmetry of the two 
different kinds of 'field') 
... this updated, so 
to speak, by a subsequent president: 
1385 LODGE, Oliver Ether and Reality London 1925 
.. and the increasing structural reflection within the 'new' physics 
he was helping develop of its embedding as one dimension of a 'deep- 
er' question or configuration of its systematic questioning pre- 
sented in an address to his associates in the Society of Friends 
popularly called 'quakers' from outward 'phenomena of the trance 
that early characterised the group, formally perpetuated in the 
sole quaker ritual of group Silence: 
1386 EDDINGTON, Arthur Science ;.! nd the Unseen World London 1929 
Stanley 
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William McDougall participated along with his fellow 
Cambridge experimental psychologist Rivers in the first 'scient- 
ific' expedition to explore what Tylor in 1871 had called 'Prim- 
itive Culture', in Melanesia in 1898. Rivers went on to lay the 
foundations of experimental 'anthropology'; McDougall followed 
Tylor in seeing in the 'Animism' of the groups he encountered the 
common figure out of which 'advanced' Religion, Science and Philo- 
sophy had developed: 
1387 MCDOUGALL, William Body and Mind: A History and Defence of 
Animism London 1911 
Animism: pragmatic systems of interaction in experience with 'in- 
visible' agencies behind the visible coordinates of human interact- 
ion with the 'primitive' environment, with which specific members 
of the group could ritually interact in trance, and with which the 
group as a whole could enter into a sort of wider economy of inter- 
action in which the visible order of everyday life was framed as 
merely one side. 
One may approach such systems in terms of what I have 
called the intransitive iteration of the 'sign' or 'mark' upon it- 
self - figures of inscription of the 'natural' or transitive order 
of figuration of 'natural' interaction in a wider order in which the 
general coordinates (subject, object and so on) of the 'transitive' 
order are themselves figuratively, pragmatically, inscribed. Before 
the decoupling of 'religious', 'artistic', 'philosophical' and 'sci- 
entific' dimensions of such 'intransitivity' through the pythagorean 
coordination of these dimensions simply in relation to the iteration 
of the 'empty' function of the 'mark' ('point') upon itself (in that 
limiting figure of transition from 'scientific' order of questions 
into the trance-state of 8f-kCc. through the marking of the mark, or 
question of the question, or 'scientific' framing of the place of 
that 'scientific' framing itself as one component of the symmetric 
mathematical 'Kosmos' it framed), they are to be found as radically 
coupled and only theoretically separable elements of 'primitive' 
ritual and primitive 'cultures as a whole. Indeed, complementing 
his 'history and defence of animism', McDougall turned from the ex- 
periment--1 psychology of individuals he and Rivers had studied in 
the Cambridge of ,. he 1890s to what he called group or 'social 
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psychology', emphasising, as it were in complementary mnnner to 
his defence of the reality of coupling of individual minds in the 
primitive trance-state (or modern western 'spiritualism'), the com- 
plementarity in the individual of autonomous abstract thinking, and 
the interpersonal figural dynamic of organisation of the individual's 
affective life in the axis of what Levy-Bruhl was calling 'mentalites 
collectives' - this parallelling analogous figures of the complement- 
arir-y of logical and figural sides of the individual psyche then 
under investigation by Freud, Jung Abraham and others - as also by 
James in his assimilation of both dimensions, 'conscious' and 'un- 
conscious' so to speak, to the pragmatic working or breakdown of 
figures of interaction drawn from an essentially indeterminnte pool 
of figures available for the interpretation of some given situation. 
Ironically the social psychology of british psychologists 
was antipathetic to McDougall's questioning of abstract 'scientific' 
consciousness and its complement, a unitary mechanistic physical 
world of. independent bodies in which the processes of individual 
psychology were supposed to be in principle inscribed. He therefore 
moved to Harvard in 1920 to take up James' old chair, and when the 
social psychology of his colleagues there in turn took on a hostile 
aspect with the rise of Watson's behaviourism in the 'twenties, he 
moved to Duke in'1927, jwhere he was soon joined by his graduate 
students from Harvard, JB and Louisa Rhine, who carried through 
McDougall's long-cherished ambition of setting up an academic lab- 
oratory for 'scientific' experimental 'parapsychology', experiment- 
ion beginning in 1929: 
1388 RHINE, JB New Frontiers of. the Mind NY 1937 
1389 The Reach of the Mind NY 1947 
The difficulty with the vast Pmount of miterial assembled 
since Crookes' initial 'experiments' with Home in 1870, was the 
impossibility of systematising the vast array of vnrinbles that 
were so to speak 'in play' in the discussion, many of which had been 
ignored by the earliest researchers. The Rhines, under McDoug: all's 
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supervision organised a research programme specifically addressed 
to this problem, applying standard 'scientific' criteria to the 
experimental isolation of particular groups of variables, in the 
light of all the suggested 'hidden' factors of earlier reports of 
'paranormal' phenomena urged by both hostile and sympathetic 
critics. In particular, the recognition at the turn of the cen- 
tury that the 'classic' phenomena of 'telepathy', 'clairvoyance' 
(information regarding a spatially distant situation not available 
through 'normal' sensory channels), 'precognition' were so to speak 
convertible hypotheses in any situation, and together convertible 
with the spiritualist's disembodied agencies associated with the 
no-longer-visibly-living, led Rhine to develop experiments (typically 
the guessing by a subject of a sequence of symbols on 'Zener cards' 
as determined by another subject's shuffling and selection of that 
sequence from a pack in a room isolated in relation to 'normal' sen- 
sory channels) to investigate a generalised 'Extra-Sensory Perception' 
while bracketing traditional questions as to the figure of 'trans- 
mission'. Such experiments were also distinguished from 'unscient- 
ific' but influential popular anecdotal approaches such as: 
1390 SINCLAIR, Upton Mental Radio NY 1930 
1391 DUNNE, James An Experiment with Time London 193 
by the systematic recording of all results (without any unquantified 
bias in the selection of 'positive' material) and their statistical 
analysis submitted for approval to the american Institute of Mathe- 
matical Statistics. 
In the-forties the Rhines went'on to examine Oparanormal' 
interaction of 'mind and matters, having exhausted to their satis- 
faction what could be experimentally investigated in mind-mind in- 
teractions outside the normal sensory links through 'matters. Here 
the typical experiment was based on subjects attempting to 'para- 
normally' induce statistically significant departures from the ex- 
pected average of dice-throws mechanically effected by two dice 
mechanically shaken in a container and mechanically dropped from 
the container onto an inclined pl-ine, before coming to rest in a 
flat enclosure. In retrospect Rhine himself was most convinced 
by unex-nlainable patterns statistically revenled in the experimental 
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data in a subsequent analysis several years later, which revealed 
that no matter how 'successful' or 'unsuccessful' the various 
subjects' various attempts to influence the avercge throw (upward 
or downward) of a sequence might have been, there was a st. rikingly 
uniform curve of falling-off of statistical significance in any 
series of attempts carried out in one given session: a 'variable' 
which neither experimenters or subjects (consciously) contemplrited 
during the actual course of earlier experimentation, and which might 
therefore be assumed to be independent of the vrrious subtle bins- 
effects urged by critics against the initial results themselves. 
This 'decline effect' may in turn be linked to another 
development: not only was there, before this 'effect' was noticed 
as a mathematically definite pattern in the vast array of data (the 
'decline effect' being of a wholly new order of statistical signi- 
ficance compared with the 'PK' or psychokinetic effects to the in- 
vestigation of which the experiments had been conducted) no account 
of, or pattern in, the variation of 'success' or 'failure' from one 
experiment involving the same, or different, subjects and experiment- 
ers at Duke to another, but other psychology laboratories attempting 
to 'repeat' the experiments produced widely differing sets of re- 
sults, and correspondingly divergent conclusions. The difficulty ti 
of imitating the standard 'scientific' process of verifying claimed 
experimental conclusions by repetition of the experimental procedure 
by other groups in other laboratories might (as 'experimenter effect') 
be considered to be inherent in a 'scientific' experiment in which 
the mental state of the 'scientist' him- or herwelf must in principle 
be considered to be one, possibly decisive, 'variable' - rather as 
in quantum mechanics any 'measurement' carried out on a system is 
not formally independent of the results of other earlier - and 
later - measurements of that or other variables linked by the overall 
invariant spatiotemporal and internal 'symmetry' of the system. 
The 'decline effect' might be taken as a first 'measurement' of 
such a 'subjective' variable, absent in principle from the 'standard' 
experimental arrangement which defines the procedure for more 
'normal' scientific experimentation and verification; and subsequent 
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'parapsychology' has attempted, along with the elaboration of 
new experimental configurations, to introduce the 'subjective' 
state' purportedly 'interacting' with 'objective' physical systems 
as a variable of the experimental configuration - this, for example, 
by inducing in the subjects various degrees of hynotic dissociation 
measurable by the established criteria deteiled by Chertok. A gen- 
eral survey of the field down to 1977 is given in: 
'1392 BOWLES, Norma & Psi Search San Franciso 1978 
HYNDS, Fran 
.. although the survey 
is perhaps characteristically marked both by 
some degree of rhetorical bias in favour of 'positive' results and 
by a tendency toward sometimes rather 'unscientific' generalisations 
and conclusions (coupled with a recurrent insistence on the step for- 
ward narked by the 'scientific' approach of the Rhines and their 
heirs). This might perhaps be attributed to the same rather 'un- 
scientific' attitude of the compilers (journalists rather than pro- 
fessional academics) revealed in the sloppy editing which places the 
Fox family in England rather than America - but it must also be con- 
sidered yet another example of a short-circuiting of the critical 
'scientific' questioning which, as reflection or complement of the 
short-circuit of dissociation and trance so central to the configur- 
ation of the whole field, is as historically inseparable from the 
affective axis of the whole 'debate' as clairvoyance is structurally 
inseparable from telepathy. And critical 'scientists, - like James 
Archibald Wheeler violently contesting, as President, the democratic 
decision to admit the parapsychologist's professional association 
to representation in the Academy of Sciences in 1980 - are never 
short of anecdotal ad hominem argumentation against the project of 
'scientific' parapsychology as a whole. Then one must add that the 
very structure of the : field of research links it inseparably with 
both various states of waking dissociation or short-circuiting of 
'rational consciousness' that are clinically elnssified as 'psychosis', 
and with the psychotically or otherwise motivated organisation of 
'appearances' so as to mislead even relatively suspicious judges, 
which are proudly demonstrated by the professional magicians who, 
as a rule, are stronger even than traditional 'scientists, in their 
scepticism it relption to the 'results' of p-: rapsychology. 
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On the other hand, one may observe a happily uncritical 
exploration of the whole range of 'paranormal' phenomena ch. trted 
by Myers and others in 'advanced', 'primitive' or intermediate non- 
western cultures, within various 'alternative' groups developing 
(like, say, Arts Laboratories in the 'aesthetic' domain) under a 
predominantly 'religious' impetus from the late sixties onward: 
a new wave of the importation into the West of the Yoga first popu- 
larised by Madame Blavatsky as 'theosophy' towards the close of the 
nineteenth century, then in more 'authentic' form by Vivekenanda : -nd 
his successors from the turn of the century; all sorts of variations 
and combinations of the basic religious 'invariants' associated with 
the trance-state, 'scientifically' analysed by McDougall, Cornford, 
von Hugel, Jung and others in many different contexts, and typically 
framing a sort of group-psychology of collective dissociation in 
various centres in California and elsewhere, typified by, say, the 
Findhorn community in Scotland: 
1393 The Magic of Findhorn London 197 
Now if, rather than complementary 'short-circuits' 
or abstractions of a 'scientific' domain of questioning which does 
not confront the 'question' of Science itself, and a 'religious' 
axis of partly 'dissociated' activity which substitutes .a p<nrticul^r 
figure of 'questioning' in the wider figuration of its universal 
dramatic scheme for the open question of that locus ( the question 
typically converted by the 'scientist' in cartesian m^nner to a 
definite locus of critical thinking in an impersonal 'I' or formal 
place of substitution in language, around which all questions can 
be supposed 'in principle' organised - if not yet in practice), one 
renews the aristotelian figure of 'Philosophy' in the iterption of 
the 'question' itself (rather than some definite firure of question- 
ing) as proposed here in a questioning which takes itself as its 
subject or object, then one may in this renew or radicalise James' 
turn-of-the-century figure of faith and reason as complementary 
axes or dimensions of an essenti^lly oven situr'ti^. n, in which 
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various figures which may be 'pragmatically' brought into play 
in response to the breakdown of a previous configura. ion of 
activity are found, and found to work (for a while) or not to 
work in that situation itself, rather than in some abstract 
'religious' or 'scientific' space or system whose own pragmatic 
inscription in the situation it would nominally comprehend has 
not come into question. 
That is, one may propose a renewal of the pythrgorqan 
and aristotelian figure of 'Philosophy' as a questioning which 
finally, in framing itself as a coordinate-in the linguistic apace 
into which it transcribes what is open in the situation of that 
transcription, dramatically frames the passage into the affective 
axis of action through formally articulating that extra-verbal or 
figural coupling of the linguistic and other dimensions of what is 
'open', as 'beyond', comprehending but not comprehended or compre- 
hensible in, the 'logical' order, dimension, axis, "of articulation 
of the situation of that 'scientific' articulation 'in' the linguist- 
ic order of its questioning, 'in' the abstract space of a text. 
A questioning, now, though, and an associated 'philosophy', which 
does not propose any formal, closed, definitive figure of a universal 
drama presented (and entered) through the 'logical' circuit of in- 
scription of that logic in a logical Kosmos it frames 
-a logical 
circuit which is thus 'practically' or pragmatically coordinate 
with a complementary circuit of dissociated 'trance' through the 
'philosopher's identification with a particular figure of the locus 
of 'questioning' in the universal scheme it frames - but which appears 
rather as the marking here, in the specific confij'uration of this 
text, a 'dramatic' interplay of these essentially open logical and 
figural axes of the situation, to which I, as one component of the 
situation, have provisionally responded by here giving my version 
of what is open - or rather, a particular configuration of Kosmos 
as so to speak 'the open' or 'open-ness' (coupled as essentially 
a question in the complementary 'closure' or constraints which more 
or less define what is 'open'). A version which purports only to 
m_ rk as a question, to which others must give other 'versions', what 
is open in the situation or context of that mark, '? ', and of that 
mark as simply the minimal expression of 'Philosophy' in Britain 
'7 
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in the nineteen-eighties. 
This simple iteration of 'question' as 'philosophy', 
marking an open drama in which the coupling of logical and ana- 
logical or figural dimensions of what is thus marked as open is 
expressed in the character of the questioning or inquiry which 
organises this book as local figure of transition into . he open 
drama of this coupling - this m: iy itself be seen as a sort of 
symmetric-il converse, across 2500 years, of the inaugural pythagor. A 
can marking of this 'iteration' of questioning in a 'positive' 
marking of the mark - the whole pythagorean 'system' of the cosmic 
drama or spectacle, then, organised by such a 'position', rather 
than the converse system of questions opening out from '? ' rather 
than '. ' and 
S 
0 
... 
0000 
This historical 'symmetry' frames intervening 'inquiry', 
the dynamic of interplay of philosophical text and context, as an 
opening up of questioning of earlier figures of residually 'posit- 
ive' questioning or 'theory', which I hieve attempted to articulate 
more or-less systematically in the progress-of this questioning, 
inquiry, 'history' itself. The historical 'symmetry' of the end- 
points - around the 'halfway point' of n. 'scientific revolution' 
as cartesiun abstraction from the poetics of questioning to a 
universal space of 'scientific' transcription of what is open into 
a unitary linguistic space of logical substitution articul^ted 
around the 'places of the cartesian subject as 'positively' m, ºrking 
the corresponding place of the questions to which it organises 
systematic answer or response - may be further su; gested by the 
resurgence within that unitary space of 'Science' itself, not 
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only of a 'scientific' determination, formally at least, of 
'philosophy' as concluding in a 'visionary' theoretical trance 
associated with typically 'pythagorean' wonders of clairvoyance, 
telepathy and so on, and the organisation of a 'mystery' and associ- 
ated closed community sharing a similar figure of philosophical 
'dissociation' around these 'paranormal' phenomena, but also by 
a rediscovery, albeit more or less 'informally' expressed, of 
the 'h"-rmonic' structures or symmetries through which (beginning 
with the Tetractys) the logical order of the mark was logically 
coordinated with complementary dimensions (psychological, physical 
and so on) of pythagorean Kosmos (as embedding of the 'earthly' 
circuits of practical or habitual transition within a wider heavenly 
frame acceded to through the 'intransitive' iteration of the Mark) 
within the ever-more-symmetrically expressed symmetries of post- 
cartesian m3them-ýtical 'physics' itself: 
-1394 GAUQUELIN, Michel The Cosmic Clocks: From Astrology to 
Modern Science (NY 1967) London 1969 
1 395 LOVELACE, Gaia London 197 
Heaven and Earth, coordinated in a symmetric and harmonic- 
ally articulated Macrocosm: in particular the linear development 
of system9tic questioning over two and a half thousand years may 
be articulated as so many phases or cycles of questioning of no 
many successive or reiterated figures, opening up through so many 
'steps' on so many wider or narrower scales, of coming-into-quest- 
ion or bringing-into-question of earlier abstractions of the locus 
and figure of questioning, theory, itself from the dramatic unfold- 
ing of experience: abstractions- to a logical 'I' such as Descartes' 
from which a 'pragmn-tic' Locke dissented, finding in the configurat- 
ion of his own differentiation of himself from that part of 'I' a 
more radical locus of questioning and assertion... or abstractions 
to the 'figural' empirical image of the locus of questioning, as 
with Locke, coming under the criticism which, say, Cassirer trnces 
down through the Enlightenment to Kant. 
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The passage 'here', 'in' this book, from Introduction 
to Part I, amounts to the identification of the pythr, gorenn point 
or mark 'outside' the text, in the 'cosmic' space and time of its 
context, which couples or coordinates the identification or framing 
of that 'point' in the text, with an elementary figure of inscript- 
ion of the text itself in that context. The questioning of this 
configuration 'in' the text in turn sets the text in the more 'con- 
crete' coordin^tes of Parmenides' questioning or 'standing outside' 
the configuration of various orders of 'mark' in both pythagorenn 
'theory' as vision of a universal story or History of Kosmos, and 
in the context of that theory or story, articulated by Pt'rmenides 
'in pythagorean terms', but in relation to a different locus of 
framing their coordination - Parmenides' identification of his 
'part', the locus of enunciation of his 'vision' or theory, outside 
the Pythagorean 'circle' coordinate in their 'Kosmos', no a group, 
with the circle whereby pythagorean theory identifies itself as 
one component (the locus of its framing) in the Kosmos it frames. 
As the reflection of the 'internals dynamic of inquiry or question- 
ing in this text in the 'external' coordinates evolved in the hist- 
orical development of 'theory' in its context unfolds, this initial 
configuration allows a very 'symmetrical' articulMtion of the identi- 
fication in the book of successive coordinates of the book in its 
historical context, down to the close of Port III with the question 
of the residual abstraction of the theory of the figural embedding 
of theory in its context around 1970 from the radical questioning 
of questioning as itself, marking in language what is open in the 
configuration of that marking as itself only one thing, one particu- 
lar response, open in that configuration. This book, no questioning 
of its questioning, thus closes the historical circuit opened up at 
the beginning of Part I by 'dramatically' inscribing itself at last 
as simply marking of what is open in the historical configur:: tion 
of that marking towards the close of the twentieth century 'of our 
Era', in its, or rather a, context or conf'igurnticn of terms lext- 
erneil' to the text, and m)rked as such in the text. The locus of 
theory finally, then, becomes just this book, rather than some res- 
idually abstract determination of 'text' or 'book' within the intern- 
al logical matrix of a typical 'structurrlint' or 'post-structuralist' 
'text' which h": s not confronted the dramatic question, in the apeci- 
fic configur_: ticn of whFt is o-)en to the writer writing that book, 
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of the coupling of the move of transcription of the coordination 
of internal and external figures of text and context into' the lin- 
guistic'order of the text, with other variables and dimensions of 
the activity of that 'writing'. 'That' book or 'text' is abstracted 
from to abstract 'text', coordinated in an Iinternal' textuni order 
of questions around a residual identification of the specific writer 
with an abstrnct logical instance of 'I' formally responding or 
corresponding to the formr=l place of question or linguistic substi- 
tution within the abstract matrix of 'text'. It then, over the 
seventies, and then in the course of writing this long inquiry into 
this inquiry itself, have merely tried to continue one step further 
the critical dynamic already traced from around 500BC down to around 
1970, by finding myself 'outside' an identification with that 'inter- 
nal' function of abstract locus of theoretical questioning 'in' the 
abstract m.? trix'of a (typically parisian) text devoted to the inscrip- 
tion of text in the figural or pragmatic dynamics of its context, 
just as Parmenides found himself 'outside' his part in the pythagor- 
ean framing of Kosmos (that is, the part of framing as itself framed 
along with other components of that frame), or Locke 'outside', dis- 
tinguishing himself from, the cartesian 'part' of abstract instance 
of mere formal assertion itself. I find myself 'dramatically' en- 
gaged in the activity of marking what is open in the dramatic con- 
figuration of this 'activity of marking what is open - proposing this 
configuration as the locus of a'theory which once again, but now in 
the historical context of the mid-nineteen-eighties, rather than 
500BC or the fourth-century Athens of Plato and Aristotle 'closes' 
in its own self-inscription in the universal order of questions 
it frames - closes then in a theoretical marking of what is open 
in the interplay of a range of textual and contexturyl 'terms' it 
transcribes into the verbal order of this text, while at the same 
time marking this dynamic of transcription as itself dramatically 
correlative with what it transcribes as 'outside' this order of 
transcription. And an obvious criticism of this critical stance 
in rel^tion to 'Paris 1970' is simply that it does not work very 
well 'dr^m--tically', feebly confronting potential readers rind 
respondents as two, sets of four bulky volumes, atrociously arranged 
for the reader, sitting on the shelves of two of the libraries I 
h. 've used in the practical activity of its construction. But then, 
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like, say, the 'unreadable' Finnegans Wake, or perh, 'ps like the 
incomplete 9000 pages of Barth's Kirkliche Dogmatik, its Frim"iry 
function is perhaps not so much to be read in linear manner from 
covers to covers, but, precisely, to mark what it proposes as a 
transition from around 1970, to a more 'balanced expression of what 
it would mark, around 2000 - this in relation to interaction (from 
which I have not benefited since it does not yet exist) with other 
'theorists' in a group structure in which the elaboration of this 
vision is articulated more and more 'theat ically' . Thus it marks 
for me, in p, {rticulrr, the question of coordination of its order of 
still very abstract 'script' more directly or closely with a more 
'engaging' theatricality of theory, closer in form, say, to a fut- 
urist manifesto or a 'scripture' perhaps, more n^turally falling 
into its place in a historical 'movement' in which successive verbal 
coordinations of 'questions' enter as merely one dimension of an 
activity whose 'direction' they mark, their opening and closing, and 
internal articulation of questions more 'symmetrically' correlated 
with other variables of the developing activity, as merely one com- 
ponent space of substitutions, one dimension of what is open. 
'What is open': I have net this marking of a frame of 
what is open in its context - the marking marking itself merely as 
one rather ungainly response, proposing as question that to which 
it responds or corresponds - within a 'historical' frame of coordin- 
ates, evolved as the text 'internally' maps out the articulation 
of its historical context as an (action' over two' and a half thousand 
years. The 'externals coordinates of the book, then, are 'logically, 
coordinated as related in space and time in the structures or sym-^ 
metries of a complex 'dynamic' which, more or less, frames figures 
of coupling of variations in one 'place' or term with those in 
others - what is (open', then, being structured not simply as a 
'space' of possible vari : tion and covariance of terms, but as an 
interplay of schemata of possible action, in an essen.. inlly spatio- 
temporal matrix of, substitutions and general constraints on poa_ 
sible substitutions for a particular term in a pnrticulrr situation. 
The fundamental 'invariant' in which all possible substitutions 
(or r_ither, any possible substitution) are in principle constrrined 
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is simply the 'transcendental' requirement that any variation from, 
say, the configuration of this text in the context of its writing, 
must 'preserve' (as the physicists say) the form or structure of 
substitution itself: one must be able, that is, to get from here 
to there, 'there' must be in the 'space' and 'time' of varirtion 
or substitution here marked by this particulrr substitution of these 
words, and this activity of writing this book, for what I might other- 
wise (and perhaps more naturally or reasonably) have done in the situ- 
ation they mark. One cannot, for example, simply abstract from the 
configuration of its marking or definition a ph;; sical 'space' of 
substitution, and elaborate physical 'theories' which do not allow 
for their own elaboration or 'marking'. The temporal projection of 
certain structures, for example 'back' to (what Italo Calvino called 
in his cosmic comedy) 'to' or the nominal focussing of all physical 
symmetries in a 'Big Bang', is itself coordinate with an irreducible 
'observer' formally standing 'here', 11010years later', and apparent- 
ly (according to the theory) about halfway between the 'initial' 
point to, and a 'physically' indistinguishable mirror-image at the 
'end' of the 'Universe' in another point (but it is theoretically 
10 identical) to which a converse contraction' has led 10 years later 
still. 
That is to say: the 'external' physical coordinatos of 
theory are themselves 'dramatically' coordinate with the particular 
cultural and historical configuration in which they are theoretic- 
ally framed. And, in particular, the 'transitive' linear order of 
the 'earthly' dynamic of 'philosophical' or religious embeddings of 
this, transitive order in. a wider 'cosmic' frame cannot ultimately 
be embedded, in an 'earthly' image, in a, wider linear, 'trnncitive' 
i 
frame or economy, even though the christian story 'pragmitically' 
articulates its system of iteration of 'earthly' figuration or 
imagery, setting the transitive order in a wider transitive economy. 
We cannot ask, independently of any particular production of Hamlet, 
what time or day it is at Elsinore; and we cannot ask 'outside' the 
time of our parts on this wider earthly 'stage what time it is 'in 
the Universe'. he Universe', relrtivistically considered, is at 
no particular time"- or rather, what we call to is just the circum- 
ference of 'the visible Universe' which, paradoxically, is not some 
vast furthest circuit or sphere above us, but, one must suppose, 
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a single point. The 'logical' axis of development of 'theory' 
meets a 'religious' axis, I suggested, around the beginning of 
our Era, the 'question' in which they meet itself fornr lly deter- 
ming that initial point as exact 'midpoint' of a symmetrically 
structured christian Kosmos, taking over the 'transitive' imige 
of embedding of the transitive earthly order of the visible in 
a wider transitive economy of Heaven, from the trn: dition of 
Isaiah, rather from his contemporary Pythagoras, whose limiting 
heavenly time was cyclical. I have already discussed at some 
length the christian figure of 'prayer' in this economy as primary 
figure of the trance or dissociation by which one enters into the 
christian 'mystery': frame a story or scenario open in the situntion 
in which you find yourself, stick to your part in th_+t scenrrio, 
and things will come out according to that scenario unless, in 
the wider scenario to which this figure is the access, that part 
is questionable - in which case the specific figure of breakdown 
of the prayer will provide the access to a truer part and truer 
end. A father does not give his child what will harm him or her, 
even if the child asks for it, and through this the child event- 
ually learns what is good for it. The trance or mystery of prayer 
frames a distinction between the various parts we naturally assume 
in the practical-or pragmatic order of transition from one situ,,, tion 
to the next, from birth or arrival on this stage to death or re- 
linquishing of that part of transition, and a part of the actor 
as it were behind that part of transition from birth to death, 
which we rediscover at death, if not before, just as an actor 
resumes his own identity on leaving the stage, even if he his been 
quite lost in a persona or mask throughout the action in which thnt 
persona or instance of 'I' is dramatically engaged. The Christ 
marks the irruption of the wider heavenly order onto the earthly 
stage or Globe Theatre in the particular blatant or direct form 
of an actor whose part is to go around saying that he's just an 
-actor like all the rest of us - talking to the audience, meeting 
a couple of them on the corner of the stage, acting within the 
wider order of stage and heavenly auditorium and so throwing into 
confusion the identification with, r: nd working of, specific 
'earthly' parts within practical economies of life between birth 
r: nd death abstracted from any wider order. So those whose r-+rts 
,,... re sustained end reinforced 
by the f. -ý+miliar working of the earthly 
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economy of ends they apparently control eventually get so fed 
up with the disruption that they decide to get rid of the trouble- 
maker altogether. So they terminate his part on the stage forcibly, 
or throw him off the stage, or whatever. But then, changing the 
whole into comedy or pantomime, the actor, having lain around 
pretending to be dead for a couple of days, while everyone else 
has been returning to the old ways, gets up again from where he 
has been lying 'dead!, while everyone's back is turned, and proceeds 
to wander about, on and off the stage for a while, before saying 
goodbye to his friends in the cast and rejoining the audience, from 
where he continues to give directions to a range of the cast for 
the remainder of the play, which begins to turn about just this 
mystery of that odd part, his crazy story, and its effect on the 
rest of the cast, who continue for centuries to assemble garbled 
versions of what happened - 'pragmatic' images of the impossible, 
full of contradictions, even down to this business of being killed 
and then getting up again when nobody was looking - and attempt to 
fit them into some systematic story that accords once more with 
the transitive earthly order the garbled myth practically calls 
into question. 
Now if the 'action' here on Earth is indeed structured 
as 'theatre', in a coupling of script and its logic with the A figural 
axis of the spectacle within the external constraints of the stage 
and its various properties, then the actor who like blind Oedipus 
thinks to freely pursue a rational ordering of the whole within 
an abstract script he himself devises as'a sort of mere spectator, 
is actually thereby bringing on himself and others all sorts of 
unforeseen or unseen consequences, trapped by his self-image as 
autonomously organising the whole within an iibstract space of 
reason in which he moves freely, moved only by the rational pur- 
suit of his inquiry. He thinks that others who constrain their 
parts within an illogical set of rules and restrictions attaching 
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to and organising actions and consequences within some mythical 
scenario, some 'faith' amounting to playing out a -: art in some 
story - acting as if the story is true in order to make it true 
that these fellow actors are trapped in the dogmatic short-circuit 
of dissociation of their 'I's from the abstract instance of critical 
detachment in the free 'rational' , 'scientific' , space organised 
as universal system of questions, answers, determinations around that 
locus of questioning, 'I', with which the rational critic identifies 
(in thought) the inst^nce of his thinking and assertion of identity 
_ an III, and its dynamic of thinking, correlative with the thoucht 
or imige of systematic transcription 'in rrinciple' of his and his 
superstitious fellows' common situation into that universal rational 
'spice' of thought. His fellows, on the other hind, think or im'gine 
that their scenario and the associated 'rules', rather than constrain- 
ing what would otherwise be open to them (in some imaginary 'wider' 
and 'freer' rati; ný-l space of unfettered criticism rind choice) cor- 
resaonds rather to the truer wider frame of coupling of an otherwise 
aost,! ict axis of questioning, (unthinking) thinking, with other xes 
or coordinates of the arecific situat_,; ns of g `.: z. - 
._'. t`.. c, 
: rapped in the ci: "cuit of his identificatio-n with a fict: en:: 1 
impersonal 'It does not see -' dissocisited' in this identificrition 
from his actual part until, nerhars, his very faith in systematic 
questioning as unquestioned axis of choices r. nd ct_cns tr". nscri: od 
into 'thought' ind its re-. son comes, : 's for Oedipus, to the tr"" is 
imnýsae o' _in=l1y questioning itself is a 'blind faith' that : oe3 
not even see its own ch^ra. cter ^s i-ith, as mere 'art', identifica- 
tion, dramatically coordinate with other axes of he , c: tor'n dovel- 
ocing situation in a deeper 't: a: _, ic' space Ind time of -jetion ind 
interaction organised in a fig-ral poetic of coupling of 'inner' 
_nd 'outer' into which the apparent im rise of thou--t is just the 
dramatic access, corresponding to intervention of or interaction 
with 'divine' agencies which reveal his earlier unthinking identi. 
fication as a mere port on an earthly stage set in a wider Kosmos: 
revealing . he radical : axis of the earthly drama as just this dyn- 
amic of access to a wider drama in which earthly identifications 
and imp. s-es are just one 'stage'. 
Now these complementary figures of 'scientific' Re^son 
and 'religious' Faith appear, in relation to this book as question- 
ing of its questioning, as complementary abstrRctions from a 
dcclxxi 
dramatically open interplay of 'logical' and ' fir"ural' axes of 
our concrete confront^tion with this concrete inst. nce of quest- 
ion`ong, aad from our selves as so many loci of 'intersection' or 
coincidence of these axes in our rc=dically open ,. ctivity of writing 
or rer. ýing (rather tann as norrar -rive 'scientific' ' It , or equai)y 
cano.: ical 'part' in some mythical scen-rio). On the one hind a 
'scien ti-fic' space of universal questioning bstr: cted from any 
p!. rticulcr, irlcarnEte, questioner's dramatic engagement in what 
may be m: rked as . he quest. on of such quest or. ing, such syste;. 1-. tic 
mlrking, t -nscrip ion; on the oL:: er hind a converse r. bc. r:. ct_cn 
fror criticism, the free dyn mit of auezti nine, throuc-h 
inscription or embedding of verol 'script' and the m-rking of queot- 
ions in some universal scent-rio to a p-rt in which one accedes pre- 
cisely through a figure of 'dissocict--on' from any innt-nce of quect- 
ic ping that minic: ^1 ' --rt' of 'faith', some rminim-1 nocit. vc fw; th 
or creed Ibstr4cted from the more det;. iled closed circuit, of a 
'scripture' which in fr'ming is universal drem- or scenerio frrres 
and asserts itself as unquesticn.. ble locus of its enunciMLion in 
the scený. rio. 
These conve. "se abstr-ctions from our irreducibly individ- 
ual engagement in the crossing of 'scienti. "ic' and 'dramitic' ¬xcc 
in our confrontation with a m-rking of tfie question of quest-oni:: g 
itself as marking of what is open (confrontation, then, wish the 
question posed by the character of questioning itself as only one 
thing open in the situation in which it is mnrked as cn option, 
rroposed) may be taken to define converse (scientific' r_nd (say) 
'mythical' axes of the interplay of scientific, religious and other 
orders of figur. ^tion of the 'culture' or gener^1 activity in which 
we find ourselves acting, which historically converge towards a 
coincidence in, say, this questioning of this questioning. Thus 
the symmetry of the various symmetries within which the questicne 
'in' logic, 'physics', and other contextual axes of 'theory, may 
be articulated after around 1970, so that the 'internal' structure 
of each 'theory' is precisely a reflection of the 'external' sym- 
metry of itself and the other primary axes of marking questions 
(so that, for example, a symmetrical physics, organized towards 
2000 in the symmetry of 4 dimensions of an objects 'external' 
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rslativistic spacetime mirrored in the comr. lement-, ry 'supercym- 
metry' of its 'internal' coordinrtes - in the super-du'er-symmetry 
so to sek of 'TOE', 'Theory of Everything' - itself ^rovides the 
'external' im-ge of inscrirtion of this rhysical 'axis' as a whole 
in a yet higher hypersymmetry in which it is coordin.: -te -s e whole 
with the logic^1 axis in which its theory is verb-lly r"rticulrted, 
and a 'poetic' axis of symmetry of these logical , no physical 'axes' 
or sraces ana times of elýbo_"ation of (among ocher things) such 
phy ical theory or ? physics) allows a reiter&-tion of, s. -, y, the ^risto- 
te J-... inure of aeý%-PC , orir-in-lly : r-red in an earlier but c-r: etly 
z. ralog: us symmetric ür. ivcrsc; l system, as access throu-h the ouestion 
f ose:: by -. he sy:. lmetry of the 'internal' logical axis of questioning 
with the other non-verb. -. 1 'extern-1' ='xes transcribed into th^t lo-7ic 
as so many 'theories' or 'sciences' of he contexts of science, to 
one's own dra-Y tic p'rt or n. cturli ty in this symmetric frame of 
Kosmos, as locus of nosing, m"rking, questicns, of T ssace 'into' 
theory, symmetricc. lly coordin-te with other coordinates of one's 
activity or actuality which c-n be mprked but not altocether 'corn- 
r.. rehei, ded' 'in theory': for the theoretical dynr-mic of transcript- 
ion of other axes of the cosmic space of what is 'open' in the sci- 
entist's situation, into their 'images' or representations in a 
logical axis logically symmetric with the other axes o" which it 
frames theories or sciences, cannot itself 'actu'lly' contain or 
determine the other dynamic axes (figural or sffective, material) 
of this very activity o° transcription or inquiry itself. It can 
only as it were logically mark a point of 'crossing out' of the 
verbal mrtrix of substitutions and determinations into some other 
'space' of substitution for which the verbal theory has been sub- 
stituted - >. ý say. 
At the same time, this questioning of questioning - of 
itself as questioning - may be taken as a parallel continuation 
of a 'conceptual art' of around 1970, to its limit in the trans- 
cript of an 'action' which marks itself as one of the primnry co- 
ordinates of that action: a 'poetic' configuration of marking 
something open in the situation of the arti'st's and audience's 
confrontation with that marking or 'work' which, in its turn, 
amounts also to the 'religious' or 'mythical' figure of a 'script' 
which frames a universal space and time of action, or cosmic drama, 
in the closed circuit of inscribing itself as one primary com- 
ponent in that scenario - hereby marking this 'Earth' as merely 
one 'stage' - the 'visible' - in a wider action or actuality. 
Furthermore, this reiteration of an earlier figure of 
'Philosophy' as access to one's 'part' in a cosmic or universal 
drama throu. 3h a questioning which finally, itself, comes into the 
sequence of questioning (marking an impasse +in' the lo'ical axis 
or sequence of transcription of what is open in the situation of 
transcription into that order of questions, and thereby mirking a 
-oint of transition from 'within' that order of cub ti: utica into 
t: ie wiaer interplay of it and ocher symmetric orders of substitution 
- for examrle physical substitution of one thing 'in glace of' an- 
other - for which it has been tempor-rily substituted) m%y also be 
seen as a 'n'. tural' further step from the abstr. iction of the ' 1'ngu° gef , 
'discourse', 'text' of . -round 1970 from the dr"'m-tic or nr! +gmatic 
axis of its very framing in the rctu"il 1-ngua,; e, discourse or text 
of some rarticul-r book about ' 1-ngu : g:: ' , 'discourse' or 'text', 
through the question of that abstraction of a certain order of 
questions from a wider 711", y of substitutions for wni. ch such 'theor- 
etical' tr-nscripýion is unquestioningly substituted. 
ä'ow this conver; 4e.: ce of Science, Irt, Religion, Fitiio: tot^iiy, 
to:: arüs a, co _ncicence in a questioning o' qu--atiLn- 
%2 a- . 1-le 
iteration of question on itself, sym etrically or;; =: nising virious 
orders of substitution, and in rnrticulir the sub3tituticn of 
the verb'l order of subst'tutitn of m. -rks one for Lnother, for 
symsetric:: l orders (' : axes' or ' sraces' within a general 'sp", co' 
and time of substitution) thus 'tr, nscribed' into the verb-, I order 
and 't heo_ et ically' orr ; nixed in its 'logic' - this is i -. self his- 
torically symmetrical with a converse 'positive' r)yth^gore-in mark- 
ing of the märk or ooint. But where,? s the system-+tic tositinr, or 
assertion of the v"^. rious terms of py--h gore= 'theory' or vision, 
and their symmetric"; l rel:: tisns org : Wises the symmetries coca". on 
to the m^rkinö of marking, end the questioning of questioning, as 
a symmetrical universal space :: rd time of Kosmos coordinate with 
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a single initi l point from which r; 11 else unfolds, symmetry 
within symmetry, question within question, determination wi. hin 
determin=tion, tetractys within tetr^ctys, until the whole vision 
comes as it were full circle with the inscription of the initiate's 
access to the vision in the vision to which he or she accedes - the 
part of the initi-te in the 'mystery' corresponding for a short 
w:: ale with the political direction of Croton - the converse quest- 
o-irg of question-ng rather begins where the earlier theory closes 
or ends, unfolding from an individual's confrontstion with a qu-ct- 
inn mrk, into the successive coirdin-tion of orders of question or 
su = st : tutu:: m- rking .: hat is open in thý. t si;. u t -on of quest cuing 
questioning. In t!: e two cases the same symn-tries or structures 
of substitution and corresponding questions are unfolded from two 
fcrer. t, altogethcr com: lemcnt. ry, points: in the firs c se from uri1 
a cure form: l assertion, an initicl 'point' coordiniting an alto- 
rether universal 'snnce' 
(and time) of determin^tions; in the aecon". 
(that is, here) the symmetries of 'question' (rather than assertion) 
are unfolded rather as so many constraints upon substitutions 
for 
various components of The situation of formulryting these constraints. 
Thus, for example, the physical symmetries of the late twentieth 
century, in many respects simply mirroring the symmetries of the 
initial pythagorean 'physical theory' organised by the tetractys, 
m? y be seen rather as symmetries, structures of substitution, that 
must be 'preserved' in any transition to or from the nctunl siturt- 
ion of their formulation, defining 'physical space' then as 'where 
one can get to from here' by a series of transitions backwards or 
forwards 'in time' throughout which 'physical' syhametry, the struct- 
ure of that order of a 'place' of substitution 
(of one physical 
thing for anoher, in place of another) is preserved - this pre- 
senting 'physical space' as a certain order of 
'open-ness' to sub- 
stitution in this situation, rather 
than some 'positive' projection 
of the physical symmetries which are only abstract constraints on 
the activity in which we find ourselves engaged, into some complete 
tspace' of possible substitutions 'in itself', 'out there, so to 
speak, before we ask just where and when the situation of its 
tpositing' is 'in' that 'reified' symmetry. 
More generally, we may mark a 'universal' space of 
substitutions opening out of the questioning of this questioning 
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as what is left open by the limiting constraint of constancy 
or 'preservation' of the mere figure here nrrked as 'oubstitution' 
itself: the constant substitutability, in p: rticulr. r, of a spice 
of 'm-: rks' - that order of substitution - for 'physical' snpce, in 
any system or set of substitutions for v9rious com:? onents of this 
writing or reading: that 'or' already m-rking the subntituta. -i1i-. y 
of 'rc der' for 'writer' in the locus of the 'I' which n-rkc the 
roint of access to this book from its v-rious contexts, or, converse- 
ly, the access t any 'context' from this text. 
This book itself, then, m^y be considered as n sort of 
'mop' of its widest, 'universal', context, mrde at a narticuls"r 
point (Martin Joughin, En, l--nd, the 19&Cs... ) in that 'sr-ce' and 
time of substitutions it maps: a 'mzp' el3boratea by coordin-tine 
v2riouz other more, or less, 'symaetrical' or cubstituta'-le books 
of incuiry, with the points 'in' this rap at which they frame or 
map whole or pert of, nominally, the 'same' universal context of 
any 'text'. The general 'space' and time of this map, this coord- 
inztion of its 'internal' order of substitutions of words (and the 
logic of that order of 'questions') and 'externFl' or contextu;. l 
terms of the writing and reading m-'rked by those words, is organised 
in a primary temporal or 'historical' symmetry of the initi^1 cap 
of 'Kosmos' framed in relýtion to pythagorean msrking of marking 
(the initial pythagorean 'point' 2500 'years ago'), and the converse 
question of question towards 'the year 2000' - this symmetry allow- 
ing the articulrtion of this inquiry as a 'history', or an section 
in which the evolution of questions in the 'interni. l' dynamic of 
questioning 'in' this book directly marks out a corresponding dy- 
namic of questioning in the 'historical' context of the book, in 
which the o,; ening question of the book itself finally appears as 
one term in its 'context', thus 'closing' both book and 'history' 
as the inquiry comes full circle, setting its own questioning in 
a contemporary 'space' of substitutions or variables in which it 
has itself been constructed as a substitution of this writing for 
other things I might (perhaps more reasonably: a 'good question') 
have done in the time allotted to, or taken by, it. 
The space and time, thus structured as an 'action' of 
reflection unfolding in its unfolding contexts over two and a half 
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millenir (two and a hslf thousand circuits of Sun around the 
tropics, or of Earth around Sun), is 'mepeed' by the process of 
'coherently' inscribing a thousand or so books of inquiry (in- 
cluding pythigore,: n silence and : his closing book) as substitutions 
o' so many ai_*ferent m=. rs of a common context of 'r: o: rmos' for this, 
or for the pythagorean 'myp', or for one a, nothcr, -at different 
'Points' in that context, corresponding to varisticns in the lex- 
ternal' co; -. tutu; l terms t:, ey differently chnrt. Within the overall 
'sy. -rr: try' of pyth go. 'e .nm rk and this c; uestioning of questioning, 
v" rious ;, rim- ry or noýzl coor ir. ". tcs of the . -ct_on correspond to 
so m'r. y r. rim ry symmetries of the rcti, n as a rwaole, subordir. -te 
only to the overall sy...::, etry of unfolaing from pytht. e. orean m-, rk, 
Fnd converse convergence to this question _ng, s'; 4 whole. Thus 
DescCxrtes' mathem: -tic: -l m! p coordin,: ted with his initirl I point' 
of self-:. 44firm,. tion in res; -. onse to his attempt to doubt his very 
aoubt, marks preeminently (among a variety of other seventeenth 
century books listed above) a sort of midpoint of the ncticn or 
in uiry or his '. ory as a whole, so to speak mirroring the initi-1 
py, hrgorean symmetry of 'mark' with the closing symmetry of questions 
I have a. tempted to m.: rk here, the latter organised around the 
' question-m--rk' th,. t poses my initi'-l question of marking th' t in- 
itial question. Descartes' revolution, abstracting a unitary 'sci- 
entific' space of transcription of its universal context into the 
textual space of questions (and the mrtnematict; l 'lýngu^gel of that 
unitary sp: ýce of marks and the substi:. utions they mark), also marks 
a 'midpoint' of a 'drama' of int-ernlay of reflection and context 
unfolding from, say, Aquin4s' systematic 'analogical' embedding of 
the 'logic' of scriptural language in the universal figurrl axis 
of a cosmic drama turning about the 'beginning of our Era', and 
Kant's analogous 'transcendentºl' embeading of the 'inner' space 
of questions in the categorial space of a universal context whose 
primary axes are m-: rked within the linguistic order of m=rking and 
questions as a whole, by the primary 'kinds' or orders of question. 
Philo, then, around 'the beginning of our Era', prefigures Aquinas' 
systematic synthesis or coordination of logical and figural axes 
of the universal dramatic context of reflection, by syste©aticilly 
organising a universal History around the figure of the Book which 
canonically marks or frames the universal structure of that Story 
at one critical point ('Moses' in short) in the Story it relates; 
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and just :s Philo's embedding of his book of inquiry 'nd its order 
of cucs;. _ en s in the context i frames m^ rks a sort of fmidpoint' 
of a first ph-se o he 'action' of developing Philosophy as n whole, 
syrn etric-lly ' uetwten' the pyth%goreans -nd thirteenth-century 
Schol_, st ic system, an: ' as Descartes m-rks :: n equ&lly 'symmetric' 
midpoint' between the thirteenth century systems : nd Ore im cdi" tc 
heirs of the k: ntian revolution, so l: iýliSm Jsmesv brineinr into 
question of the ür: m tic or p. -gmýtic co, -'-ling of the lo- icýl xis 
of el-: boration or questf! ýrs L. nu 'theory' to fi-ur-l rnd other rice 
o: ' i :. s 't. ctu- 1' contexts, m? y be ken to rreem4nently T. 1' rk A sort 
of 'mid! -oint' of the development of the systematic 'm"pninr. ' of 
historical texts of theory in their common historical 'context', 
betwc en the -Ron ntic Ecvolution herc_lded by l.:. nt and Her der in the 
seventeen-eichties, rnd the 'close' of the whole trr-dition (symmetric 
as ý whole wi t1". its pythýi Core, -. n 'opening') herrl{: ed, however ineptly, 
here in tlic nineteen-eighties. 
Working no to spec k. 'back' from the most general ' for msa' 
or abstrcrct constrüints on the whole system o" substitutions cor- 
relrting the 'intern-l' articul-tions of these r. nd other texts ki! -h 
their collcctivc 'external' rticulrtion within the com on context 
they differently map or frame from different 'points' in thyt uni- 
versal frame, one m? y symmetrically org-nice the -bstr-ct 'coordin- 
ates' in its : bstr: ct 'context' of any 'book of theory' - and a 
'trnditionel' manner of ? proceeding would then raerhrps tnke thin 
abstract configuration of (book of) 'theory', and present the totr+l 
complexity of Kosmos 'in itself' as a sort of eystemitic reflection 
of the unitary constant or identity of 'substitution' itself, or 
absolute symmetry - the symmetry of substitution governing the 
substitution of the various primary axes or orders of suLstitutic, n 
or symmetry one for another (physical, logical, and no on) - in thin 
'transcendentally deduced' configuration of the very exaression, or 
possibility of expression or marking, of such unity. Abstrictly, 
indeed, one may extend, say, Eddington's programme to the over-11 
symmetry of such a universal categorial configuration (of book 
rather than kantian judgement), seeing the 'elementary' differential 
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comnonents of 'rhysical' objects on the microphysiccl qu-. ntum 
level as sirarýly the system-tic mirroring of the glob-1 relativist- 
ic symmetry of integration of all elementary :. nd higher-level 
physical systems, in the intermedi"'te hum", n scale of the book, :. nd 
a 'physical theory' (r-long with 'observat- the activity of :: roäucinF 
: n' Inc 'me suremeni') comprehenäin the overall symmetry 'in' the 
intermediate con? ir-urr -. ion of 'book', of the converse ' elementriry' 
anc 'glob l' sym etries of differentiation -nd integr-. 1t cn o° hys- 
ic, -. l systems on micro- and m-cro- levels respectively. The 'inter- 
mediate' hum--n level of books and theories, and he incr. rn-tion -nd 
life -; n, 4 ce nth on this yc. rth of those who rroduce them, co~. csrnnýs 
sim-. -, ly to teat prim.: ry system or confivur. -tion of the 'mark', and 
the : _ssoci: ted sym: etries, quecti:; ns, substitutions, which c: crniscs 
the verb, l m" rking o; ' physic", 1. rrd other theories within the 'm-rk' 
or pale of human community on Earth; and the initial uythtKorean 
I'-point' serving here as first m". rk or coordin-: te in the l extern-- l' 
con ext of this inquiry (the 'Point' in its context where the words 
'Ko3mos', 'Theory', 'Philosophy', 'JMiathem-tics' r. nd so on, were 
first used to systemAtically merk out, end orb; =, nise throur*h the 
m-rking of th--"t marking, a unitary context of any text or rr rking) 
allowed an. identi_ic, rtion of such a minim::. l confi+rur: _tion of 'm"rk- 
ing' questions -a symmetric coordination of theory, community, 
political integr"iticn of communal activity, its mrteri-l economy, 
all this within earthly Nature, in turn set in the symmetric c;. -ce 
and time of a wider physical order of mctter-in-gener:, l, earthly 
and stellar or heavenly. But I have elrefºdy insisted that in this 
'close' of inquiry, we can no longer start from some 'initi+ll' al- 
together symmetric 'first point' of Kosmos, finally to deduce the 
point of its eventual identification in the universal cosmic History 
theoretically deduced at the latter point from the former. We must 
first, so to speak, get to that point of pure symmetry or substitut- 
ion itself from 'here', from the configuration of 'book', 'between' 
absolute unity or sym:; etry, and the converse complexity of element- 
ary di'ferences, and identify it rather as one constant 'pole' of 
a constant configuration which constantly (so to speak) involves 
the converse complexity formally identified, perhaps, as Eddington's 
1080(or so) elementary independent wave-functions. 
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I, here, 'got' to that 'first point' of absolute sym- 
metry, by working 'out' through the'Ir. troduction or first of the 
five mein sections of this inquiry (Introduction, Parts I-III, 
Close) - first of its five 'acts', so to speak - to the symmetric 
con: i-uration of the pythagorG ,n fr =wing of she universal context 
of its 'theory' as 'vision' of th= 7ý : 'raine, in which a nomin^. 1 ' ini- 
ti'l point' or th-t Kosmos is itself only one term (one term, hen, 
in the more concrete confil; urtion of this pythc:: gore: n 'first :.. oint' 
as a whole). Various l: -ter 'versi"ins' o such a 'firs. point' of 
Kosmos (from t: h: ch a universal history is nomin- liy unfolded as 
su.. or: in tc symmetries are unfolced ' in time' from a con-letely 
symmetric dimensionless starting-point - versions ri-ht down to 
Lemaitre's extrem pol, -tion b-: ckw-: rds of the Hub--le ' exr-: nsion' identi- 
fied in the system o g: l" cti. c red-shifts, and contem orary atte--ptc 
(like l'. einberg's noted above) to cocrdin". te the un: olding or all 
physical symmetries from a postulated '_, ig Bang' - were in ttzeir 
turn identified as so m-ny ^nalogous terms in successive frmings 
of the 'universal context' of various dif: erent. 'point' of elabor- 
ation of theory wi--hin the fir n: --rrot". er 
history tr:. ced here, of 
such theories in the western euro;: jezn context of theory over two 
an a h, lf thousand ye<, rs down from the pythc. gore _ns of Croton. 
The 'narrower' mi! leniý; l european 'space' and time of framing suc- 
cessive versions of an 'initi'l point' of 'the physical universe' 
was framed not simrly in terms of the 'abstract' constraints amount- 
ing to successive versions of the preservation of 'physical' symmetry, 
but r they within the wider-yet-n, ýrrot": er constraints amounting to 
the constancy of the a. moetry of such 'physical' laws, the physical 
frame of elaboration of theories of that physical frame, with other 
orders of symmetry or substitution involved in any possible elabor- 
aton of that order of 'physical' substitution. Successive 'physic- .L 
theories' were considered not so much as 'ins a primary 'spº. ce' 
of -physical symmetry, ten billion 'years' or whatever momentarily 
interrupted by a 'physical' life-form capable of substituting a 
verbal and logical order of its marking for that primary 'space' 
of substitution of one thing 'in place of' another - but rather was 
the 'physical' space of what was open to a theorist in the situation 
of theorising upon 'physical space', seen as merely one constraint 
upon whit was open to the theorist and his fellows - one axis or 
space of marking and other activities marked out within the 'logical 
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s:;.. ce' of the theory. 
Within this cul:. ural 'sr-ce' of theory - coorcin--"te 
s=_r-1y with the in it i- 1-i:, ure o" 'theory' or iter: 1tion of mirk 
_ n: Burst. on u -. on itself - over two -n:: . h""lf thouc-nd ye, -. ra, 
ny incividu" 1 theorist w: -uld be lucky e: 1ourh to actually I -et to' 
two ciff erent ' -ci: ýts i time' ti: _-eesco ýe nd ten ye rs n rt - 
the ccnst: ncy of a theoretical 'I' beine so to sek more 'abstr et' 
over the whole tr" c: ition . nd its discursive continu - -ion th "n some 
p rticul r theorist's 'I' :s emboýied for " while in body which, 
s rhvsic: _1 
locus of his (or verb occ. sich 11, her) ecn rro: -t: n 
v th e, "'l Ie'_^ -, oohs, n, 4 i'ri `. inm ?: i" ter_*ls, C_ ovitee:; 'no : C^. ' "t 
(though differently embodied) constr-int on the el^bo-at, cn 0° 
'theory' over . 
he whole neviod 'in Question'. 
I, W- rtir Jou hin, h-ve here tr-iced a complex of tr-ns- 
it_: )ns of inaivicu--1 writers of theory from births to ce"ths, the 
whole organised as story, trrdition, 'drpma' of theory coordin-te 
with a more abstr.. ct inst: ýnce of 'I' as locus of questioning : -nd 
of elaboration of t:, eory, for which instance I uycel ", or one from 
among a iew hundred other theorists, has been temporarily substi- 
tuted. The preservrtion of the symmetries or fi-ures of substitu- 
tion coordinate wi-: h the : inure of 'theory' itself, structures the 
whole trrdition down from pyth-: gore; rns to the close of the twentieth 
century as an earthly 'dr'ma' on a more or less constnt stnee, 
this ' Ez_rth' . And within the overall cou'ling of lo: icc l : -nd 
other textual Lnd contextual ,. xes or aimensions or symmetries of 
this act-Lon or drama as : whole, the short lives of individu: -1 
theorists present so many figures of an analogous coupling or 
drama or story, but constrained to a shorter span of time or 
action by the constraints, variously framed at different points 
in the tradition as a more or less common human life from indi- 
vidual birth to individu^l death. 
Yet again and again, from the pythagoreans on, "theory' 
has itself been framed as an 'intransitive' passýige 'out' of the 
coupling of 'mind' and 'body' the theorist so to sret-k works 
through in all the detailed transitions between the 'birth' and 
the 'death' which appear on the earthly stage of the tradition 
dcclxxxi 
as initiý"l entry onto, end fin-il departure from, the stage on 
which that vital cor: juction we c: ll Pyth:. gori. s or Pl- to or what- 
ever else, can or a while be a locus of transcription of Kospos 
as a whole into the subordin"'te lo- iccil order of questions as 
erbo: ied in 'r theory' of Kosmos. Traaition°lly such Imysticfl' 
theory fr-,: ies a transition into - or :, t lest Eventually out of - 
that r-. rticul, -r f : miliar earthly couling of mind and 
body which 
it icenti: ie s as mere 'inc:: rn-t_on' of a more r cic: l idcnt-Ay, 
by settinC the cou-ling of psychicrl Inc' m terial aimensicr. s on 
,y str. gQ 
within a wider 'sr-ce' nd time of Kosmos associ- t-le e.. r-: il 
ate,: \.: h the v rioua coordin -te sym! - etries of m-. rkinr . hocc uni- 
versal symmetries while incýrn"te on E-rth, 'cbstr"cted' from %.. h-t 
I h"-ve insister u~ on as a radical or origin-ry 'complexi; v' so to 
s eý. k of the cor_- i: ur t_on of m rking the 'theory' of such unive: Z. 1 
symmetry -a com: '1 exity which c nrnot .. s 
it were be 'derived' from 
any simpler start ing-noint tnd located r:. s one ph: se or strge in a 
wilder frame and History, but a com7lexit;; which is itcclf ' alre- dy' 
irn licit in any identification, ; 'nd indeed any nominal identity, of 
such a 'prior' point. 
... On the other hand, r-ther than t. kir g these ' embe.. dings' 
of the earthly stage &-. rticul;, ted in the coupling of 'minds' and 
'bodies' in a 'genetic' history or dramp of earthly humanity 'liter- 
ally', one m-y perhý-ns regard them no ' pr:: gmr-tic' , cnnlogieal, 
attempts to set the er: rthly ctrige in some 'wider' order, by an 
ultimately contradictory framing of that 'wider' history no a sort 
of physical extens on of earthly 'h stur y' in 'earthly' terms - 
just as our logic naturally leads us into ultimately contradictory 
attempts to frame the embedaing of the logicrl dimension of our 
theory in the wider configuration of its irreducibly independent 
'contextu-: l' dimensions logically rather thuun vnfllogically. For 
the complex symmetries and structures of the earthly transitions 
involved in the 'drama' of theory unfolded through Parts I to III 
above - the 'preservation' throughout of the complexity of book 
or discourse - even though they cannot be preserved in any attempted 
elaboration of a physical extension of the earthly order of 
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transitions into a merely greater order of transition, beginning 
with something like a 'Big Bang' and eventually giving rise to 
an earthly history in which that 'heavenly' frame can itself be 
framed, are conserved in the 'intransitive' transformation of 
the earthly sphere of transitions that make up our earthly lives 
into what one might figuratively call its 'mirror image', of 
which the traditional 'heavenly' spheres of souls above, coupled 
with the 'elementary' cycles of 'matter' which they rule 'below' 
the intermediate human level of structure, is a sort of canonical 
natural 'image' (before the 'scientific revolution' at least): 
two 'worlds', two lives, two sides of a constant Stage, visible 
and invisible, and some figure of 'I' preserved in the intransit- 
ive transformations from one into the other... even if a structure 
of transition which fixes us here for a time in a 'life' of working- 
through an 'incarnation', a coupling of psychological ^nd physical 
unfolding from its seed in another copulation at a particular time 
and place on Earth is not itself preserved in the transformation, 
any more than the associated 'internal' linear time of transitions 
within our play or interplay on this global Stage. 
If the questioning of questioning, and its circuit de- 
fining this earthly 'stage' and its two sides, is o, ' course merely 
another figure of access from 'this' finitary side of a global 
St^ge to the other 'cofinitary' side, corresponding in its different 
context to 'earlier' pyth^gorean and christitn 'i: ures in theirs 't 
different pints in the action, yet one might sr. y that it marks a 
beginning of the end of a certain dr-: ma, the closing of a cent-in 
linear earthly time at a point 'in' thit time, or of trrinsition 
out of it, where L, revipusly stage-bound actors can begin to ^ct 
in, accede to activity or actuality in, a coupling of 'both sides' 
of this Stage, a sort of historically symmetric converse of the 
opening of the particular action here frimed in the mystery of a 
closed pythagorean group standing at the point of transition from 
'Myth' into a decoupling of 'Religion', 'Science', 'History', 
'Drama'. A question-mark, rather than the points or marks of the 
Tetractys, marks an opening from this historical circuit into 
'A New Heaven and a New Earth'... as the cast in the final scene 
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see what the lunatic crucified two th. usand years before was 
getting at: the drama of history closes in a strange actoral 
party in which the separate World of the Play, of their histor- 
ical interplay, and the boundaries of the Stage, begin to dissolve. 
